aesthetic dimension of Dewey's later thought is essential to his overall ethical thought.

I believe this book could have been enhanced by a more thorough evaluation on how Dewey's ethical thought might contribute to contemporary discussions on moral philosophy. A truly "pragmatic" goal of a study of Dewey's ethics would be to demonstrate its value and contribution to moral theorizing in the contemporary philosophical scene. Without this type of evaluation, the value of this book does not extend very far beyond Dewey scholarship. Furthermore, I am surprised that Welchman did not offer a more sustained analysis of Dewey's treatment of Mill and Kant, which permeates much of his writings on ethics.

Overall, this book is a valuable resource for anyone studying Dewey and the historical context from which his works generated. I am impressed with Welchman's erudition on the development of Dewey's ethics, hence I recommend this book to anyone interested in John Dewey's ethical thought, and American philosophy in general.

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I do not know if I am different than most, but when I read a book or article, I want to be taken to the intellectual edge beyond where I have ever been and perhaps beyond where the author has been. Of course, the vessel in which we travel must have some familiarity or the voyage is doomed to failure from the start. The vessel—my experience—is typically shaped to the form appropriate to the voyage by the author's words and diagrams. What is of utmost importance is: first, that the author so shapes my experiences—so forms the vessel—that the voyage can be attempted; and second, that the adventure will add significantly to my experiences, my curiosities, and my questions, not subtracting from any. Dewey calls such interaction between two people, in this case author/reader, "educative," as opposed to miseducative experiences.

These two books move me beyond where I have been before to that creative edge where the reader has a responsibility to take what the author has presented and to move the ideas to new levels. Victorino Tejera calls such educative experiences dialogical. His book, indeed, is one which shapes the vessel and sets sail for regions beyond. Those regions include Plato, Dostoevsky, and much more.

"Why," you ask, "are these new regions, since we have all
studied them to greater or lesser degrees?" The answer: the vessels we have traveled in, Tejera argues, are so ineptly made, that we have missed much of the region, including the vast beauty—yes, the aesthetics of the works. Neoplatonism, positivism, binary semiotics, and more have blinded us. They have painted lands that never were, nor ever intended, Tejera explains carefully. Why these other vessels have failed to provide the reader with an adequate journey, simply put, is they do not account for the aesthetic.

We have failed in our explorations because we did not understand Charles Sanders Peirce's notion that all of science, all of literary criticism, all of any intellectual endeavor is subsumed under the aesthetic. Tejera writes: "And since 'all thought,' for Peirce, '[is] performed by means of signs,' an aesthetically grounded semiotics must be the most inclusive of the disciplines which reflect not only upon art, communication, and literature, but also upon reflection itself." (p. 74) Reflection on Plato, for example, must realize that his works were works of an aesthetic whole and we must read them with what Tejera calls the "poetic response" (p. 10). Such a response is an examination of the semiotic whole.

Both Tejera and Merrill argue against the shortfalls of deconstruction and a Saussarian approach to semiotic, suggesting that these approaches have built flawed vessels. Their failures, for Tejera are that much of the interpretive work of Plato, Dostoevsky, and others has been sterilized—there is no aesthetic valuing, no going beyond in a dialogical fashion, but merely an explication. Tejera writes: "Semiotically speaking, the literary work is an indexical symbolic argument because it affects the reader, it is in a hypoiconic relationship to its subject-matter or object, and it presupposes any number of conventions." (p. 42) "Critical reading . . . always presupposes some experience of life and the personal precipitate of this experience. . . . We do not forget . . . that the concern of many literary artists is to challenge existing judgments of experience, and previous ways of constructing responses to it." (p. 37 emphases are Tejera's) Plato, Aristotle, Dostoevsky, Pascal, Shakespeare, T.S. Eliot, Ray Bradbury, Georges Cuvier (the zoologist), and others are shown to be dialogical, responding poetically, which is aesthetically, to the experiences of their time and moving intellectually to the edge. That means that the most basic literary or scientific work provokes values in the reader based upon the reader's experiences and those values provoked come from the author's aesthetic experiences as the vessel is crafted. There is then, a dynamic building, a growth, and each adds to some civilized whole.

While Merrill does not argue for the aesthetic in so many words he uses valuation in the same Peircean/Tejeran manner. Postmodernism, he feels, is bound in part by a Saussarean binary semiotic, which is also found in the cyberspace of Boolean algebraic technology. He contends that the Saussurean semiotic "flattens" (e.g., p. 259) everything, just as "computer thought"
Merrill and Tejera both present a vision of the Peircean semiotic. Although Tejera's work is not a Peircean primer, he does discuss how he uses Peirce's ten classes of signs and he provides an appendix of the ten classes. Merrill uses the modernism/postmodernism dynamic to show the two sides of Peirce's analysis and his process, which are a united whole in Peirce's semiotic. Both authors have an excellent grasp of Peirce and, I believe, use his understandings to move to that intellectual edge that I suggested earlier. In fact, Merrill understands Peirce so well, that the best explanation of Peirce's ten classes of signs (that I know about) appears in Merrill's Chapter Four, complete with the famous Merrill diagrams.

Going beyond Peirce, in Tejera's dialogic manner, Merrill introduces operators which move between sign classes and which explain the dynamic process of the semiotic. The operators are akin to Hamiltonian operators in quantum mechanics, or even a simpler arithmetic operation, such as addition or multiplication. Merrill does not provide the mathematics beyond a graphics approach, however. He does suggest a valuing within the sign functions and offers that value is introduced semiotically between a certain level of classes (p. 141), although all signs have a value or quality.

While I am excited about the concept of Merrill's operators, I wonder if Peirce's intent was not that the sign was the operator-moving between the object and the interpretant. In any case, the object, the sign, and the interpretant are all dynamic (particularly in Peirce's sixty-six class system). In a manuscript under review, I argue that sign action can be found within the dynamics between matter and energy at all levels from atomic to neurochemical to behavioral. There is an aesthetic whole in Peirce's semiotic which holds both the physical chemical and the social worlds. These worlds are not dissimilar and that is why Merrill mixes the literary world with Archibald Wheeler's study of relativity or Ilya Prigogine's "order out of chaos" (which is a study of physical chemistry).

Merrill's operators are important to study because they call us to the edge of semiotic dynamics. That dynamic is often misconstrued by Peirce scholars. Merrill reminds us that the signs are not just nouns found within language, but they are also verbs that drive language and are parts of the cosmic whole. The reason is that everything is a sign—all individuals, all lan-
guage, all matter, and all energy.

Some final comments about these books are in order. First, both move beyond our current understanding of the semiotic as found in the works of Thomas Sebeok and Umberto Eco. The authors acknowledge our indebtedness to these semiotic giants, but challenge their views in the most fitting dialogical manner. Second, what is written on Tejera's jacket cover is more cryptic and less aesthetic than anything one finds within the book. My recommendation is read the book before you look at the jacket. Third, Merrill's book is truly an aesthetic experience and one's response necessarily must be a poetic whole—which is what both authors call for. Merrill has significant other works, but this is his finest effort and with it one finds a scholarly maturity that should be envied. There are quotable lines on many pages and Merrill uses cliches artfully to show that our experiences are indeed connected. Finally both works are masterpieces by people who are well read and they have indeed taken me to several intellectual edges. I am indebted to Patrick Dooley for the opportunity to review these dialogs.

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Greeley's daily readings, excerpted from Thomas Jefferson's numerous writings, is not a work for scholars, unless the scholar is also an evangelical freethinker who ritualistically performs daily anti-fundamentalist devotions. For this book is an imitation of the devotional literature of evangelical Christianity rather than a philosophical treatise on Thomas Jefferson's contribution to the freethought movement in America.

For example:

April 8

Where there is an absence of matter I call it void or nothing or immaterial space . . . To talk of immaterial existences is to talk of nothings.

Letter to John Adams, 1820

And,

August 8

Calvin consumed the poor Servetus because he could not find in his Euclid the proposition which has demonstrated that three are one and one is three, nor subscribe to that Calvin notion that magistrates have a right to exterminate heretics to Calvinist creed.

Letter to William Short, 1820

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