move to individualism.

One weakness of Shain's argument develops from his success. The question remains, from where did the individualism arise that has been pinned on the revolutionary period? In his zeal to separate the images of individualism between now and then, Shain might have missed some of the threads of our "negative" notion of liberty that have their source Puritan thinking without having been given open and public expression. Shain doesn't make a guess where the tension comes from that eventuates in individualism. He does dispel the myth that it was prominent in American thinking, but he does not dispel the myth that it is American, just the negative individualism as freedom from government was not part of parcel of the common thinking of the people who instigated and fought the Revolutionary war.

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Founders of Constructive Postmodern Philosophy, ed.

This is the ninth volume in the SUNY Series in Constructive Postmodern Thought, edited by David Ray Griffin. He is a Professor at Claremont Graduate School, and Executive Director of the Center for Process Studies there. (It has been said that Process Philosophy is the Philosophy what Process Cheese is to Cheese.) As Gutenberg was a "modern," one wonders why "postmoderns" publish books. The "Founders of Constructive Postmodern Philosophy" in this volume include: Peirce, James, Bergson, Whitehead, and Hartshorne (4.5 Americans). This volume contains an Introduction by Professor Griffin, followed by five essays: Peter Ochs (of Drew University) on C.S. Peirce, Marcus P. Ford (author of William James' Philosophy) on William James, Pete A.Y. Gunter (of the University of North Texas) on Henri Bergson, J.B. Cobb jr. (Professor Emeritus at Claremont) on A.N. Whitehead and D.R. Griffin on Charles Hartshorne. It may well be that "Constructive Post-Modernism" is to be preferred to "Destructive" or "Deconstructive Postmodern Philosophy"; but those who do not find the term "postmodern" particularly helpful will doubtless tend to view this volume mainly as the product of a "cult," or "sect." The authors mainly "preach to the converted," to those enamored of "postmodernism" already. They do little to try to convince us that the term is of monumental importance. The term "postmodern" (coined by Lyotard et al.) is very fashionable. It may be useful in art criticism, as artistic trends nowadays tend to be mere passing fads. However, one would suppose that philosophers, trained in critical thinking, would find most talk about "post-modernism" to be poppycock. The term "modern" is polymorphous, but not entirely perverse. How, then, can one have a wholesale attitude to the "modern"? Some believe that is "modern" is good, and some that it is "modern" is bad. How can it be judged as a whole? One can deny "modernity" in certain regards or respects. Those who deny "modernity" do not always agree with each other. It once was fashionable to speak of "The Counterculture." But the status quo can be opposed in various ways. There are countless
counter-cultures, not one. Why then should one suppose that "postmodernism will be one, unified ideology? (Will "postmodernism" be followed by postpostmodernism" etc.?) But if "postmodern" is mainly a bit of empty jargon, what is the value of this book? Yet, even though the project itself may seem ill-conceived, these (rather uneven) essays do contain some valuable insights into the thinkers they discuss.

Peter Ochs must play Procrustes a bit to make Peirce into a "postmodernist." He notes that Peirce was opposed to Cartesian "modernism," and that his failures to develop a modern logic lead him towards postmodernism. For Ochs, it is the "Process" that is most instructive. This seemed to me the most interesting of the essays. Ford says of William James: "Instead of a substance philosophy, he offered a process philosophy, instead of either dualism or physicalism he adopted panexperientialism and instead of sensationalism he put forth radical empiricism." This is the basis of James's "postmodernism" which could even lead to peace: "From a postmodern perspective, however, war can be avoided. The energies that have been directed to fighting one another can and should be redirected to combating natural forces that inflict undeserved suffering" (pp. 126-7).

Gunter notes (p. 133) that Bergson's 1913 appearance in America (in New York) caused a "traffic jam" (possibly the first one in the U.S.). Bergson (once "all the rage") even influenced President Theodore Roosevelt! (Was Teddy also a "postmodernist"?) Gunter finds Bergson's "open/closed" dichotomy (later taken up by Popper) especially useful. To others it seems a horribly, over-simplified dichotomy. (It has been said: an open mind signifies merely a hole in the head.) Whitehead came to America in 1924 (at 63) to begin a second career at Harvard (and began writing things Russell could not understand). Cobb notes: "Although Whitehead never used the term "post-modern", the way he spoke of the modern has a definite postmodern tone" (p. 165). ('Tone' is a rather weak term.) Cobb does his best to make Whitehead seem intelligible to us. Griffin's account of Hartshorne begins: "Modern Philosophy is self-destructing" (p. 197). How do we know? Rorty and Derrida have told us so. But in contrast to their relativistic postmodernism, Hartshorne (building on Whitehead) gives us a constructive postmodernism based on "panexperientialism, radical empiricism and naturalistic theism" (p. 198), opposed to the three basic theories of "modernism." He did not persuade me, but his discussion is of some interest. Those interested may wish to visit his "Center for a Postmodern World" in Santa Barbara, California to see more fully what the future holds. Others may protest: California is not America. This book may be a useful "refresher" course, but it is not a good introduction to Process Philosophy. It seems to assume that one is already a believer. It is at least much better than Rorty.

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