knowledge, that lies at the heart of Peirce's pragmatic position and provides the metaphysical and epistemic underpinnings for Kuhn's understanding of science (20).

There is no need then for Peirce's and Kuhn's "radical opposition" or our "piecemeal" attempts at reconciliation. The remainder of the book weaves the threads of Peirce's "pervasive strand of pragmatic pluralism" into a new mantle of his and Kuhn's "kinship."

As briefly as possible let us pull on some important threads. A basic one is the "doctrine of meaning as habit" that serves to "illuminate the other intricately interwoven threads" of pragmatic pluralism. She examines this in a rather "un-Peircean" context of the synthetic-analytic distinction. Why? Because this leads to an understanding that the "certitude and specificity of mathematical truths implies the functioning of an analytic-synthetic distinction" that is pervasive in empirical knowledge. Such functioning leads to distinguishing between "habit as the basis of meaning and habit as the basis of belief." Lastly, this points to a "contextualistic and holistic" approach to fallibilism and to the "inherent pluralism in the very structuring of experience at all levels of awareness."

This ties us to the question of Peirce's arguments for realism and their proofs. Here is yet another strand of "inherent pluralism" that is "implicit" in these arguments. One more strand appears in the realization that Peirce's "experimental phenomenology," is especially evident when we notice that this grounds his metaphysics because they are fallibilistic and serves to illuminate the "concrete richness" of experience with all its ramifications.

Rosenthal continues to unravel pragmatic pluralism with this important final metaphysical strand because pragmatism and metaphysics are themselves interwoven. She interprets metaphysics as foundational for Peirce. It is in this last chapter that she ties together many of the previous strands: "the features of experience to the categories of metaphysics"; possibility and potentiality; generality; realism and idealism; the dynamical object; neutralism and materialism. Now, one can see more clearly the design in the rug (with apologies to Henry James) as a "worldly pluralism of a Kuhnsian-Peircean interpretation of science." This is the mantle of a new paradigm; a mantle that can be worn comfortably both by Peirce and Kuhn. This provides a new and enriching context for the "kinship" of both.

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Whatever one thinks of Rorty's definition of philosophy, this collection cannot but be understood as a unique contribution to the "conversation" that at least partially constitutes American philosophy. For here we have, so to speak, a series of conversations--critical articles and individual responses--between the philosopher and his critics. The contributions of Charles Hartshorne, Thelma Lavine, Richard Bernstein, James Gouinlock, Allen Hance, Susan Haack, and Frank B. Farrell, along with Rorty's respective responses, are situated between two independent essays by Rorty and Herman Saatkamp, Jr.'s concise introduction. Rorty's critics, representing a wide range of philosophical temperaments, broach topics ranging from Rorty's "Protestant impulses" to Hegel's "circular epistemology".

One salient theme that does emerge, however, is a frustration with Rorty's misrepresentation (misuse?) of other philosophers. Lavine and Gouinlock both react to Rorty's (mis)appropriation of Dewey, arguing, in Gouinlock's words, that the supposed "bad" Dewey is but the only Dewey. Gouinlock provides a systematic discussion of method, correspondence, science, language and philosophical tradition in Dewey, making a textual case against the "good" anti-metaphysical, anti-realist philosopher that Rorty would construct from such Deweyan themes. Gouinlock and Lavine's contributions combine to form a sustained defense of a Dewey that was beyond neither method nor metaphysics.

Similar concerns are made on behalf of Hegel and Davidson by Hance and Farrell. Hance rejects Rorty's linguistic naturalization of Hegel and the distinctly epistemological, representationalist interpretation of Hegel upon which such a supposed "detranscendentalization" is predicated. Frank B. Farrell, in like manner, argues that Rorty has falsified Davidson in an attempt to make his radical views about the "vacuity of the world" seem more plausible. Finally, Haack claims that Rorty's signature "either/or" dichotomies trade upon a simplistic characterization of foundationalism which effectively banishes more sophisticated and subtle foundationalist positions from the bargaining table.

Rorty responds to these criticisms in turn, at times admitting misreadings, at times regretting a certain looseness with his name-dropping, at times citing texts and defending his readings. He remains unapologetic about his disposition to redescribe thinkers in hopes of preserving the significance of their philosophical spirit, if not the specifics of their philosophical letter. (Rorty's first essay, "Dewey between Hegel and Darwin," is an instance of a such a redescription, presenting an admittedly "hypothetical Dewey" adapted to the philosophical environment of the late twentieth century.) Rorty likewise defends his habitual employment of others' ideas for tasks not explicitly addressed by the original authors. Throughout the series of Rorty's responses an interesting irony develops as Rorty often finds his own thought as difficult to find in his critics' redescriptions as they find Dewey, Hegel, and Davidson's thought to find in his.

A highlight of the collection as a whole is Bernstein's...
"American Pragmatism: The Conflict of Narratives." Bernstein would temper the rhetorical upshot of his peers' essays through a plea for the abandonment of "nostalgic" metanarratives, metanarratives which paint either Rorty or the analytics as "kidnappers" or "perverters" of pragmatism. Bernstein recalls the various conflicting narratives told throughout the history of pragmatism in hopes of prodding us on toward a self-awareness of the continuities that loosely define American philosophy, reminding us that our various conflicting narratives of pragmatism are signs of a vital, rather than decaying, tradition.

This said, one blind spot which limits the majority of the contributions is the relevance of Rorty's political thought. The decided emphasis on Rorty's views regarding "world," "language," and "truth," serves to direct the majority of the conversations back to Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature and Consequences of Pragmatism. Discussions of Rorty's development on these topics are few. (Rorty himself addresses this briefly.) There is, for example, little attention to the admission, from Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, that the "only argument I could give for the views about language and about selfhood put forward in [earlier chapters] was that these views seemed to cohere better with the institutions of a liberal democracy than the available alternatives do" (197). With the exception of some brief remarks by Hartshorne in his frank and lucid interchange with his former student, it is only in Farrell's final essay that any sustained attention is brought to bear on the political (and, on at least one reading, pragmatic) justification for Rorty's views on language and truth. Farrell's discussion here, along with Rorty's response, however, provides a pleasing segue into Rorty's closing piece, "Philosophy and the Future," which is followed by a comprehensive bibliography.

Herman Saatkamp rightly notes that the contributors to this volume have put themselves in the unusual position of giving Rorty the final word for the moment. This said, it is likewise the case that the clarity and careful prose of each and every essay provides the reader with the tools to anticipate their responses. Ultimately the reader does, in fact, find him or herself carrying on the conversation.

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This big book is an important collection. Drawing on the work of leading American philosophers of the twentieth century, it brings together twenty-eight important essays that address a wide range of issues from naturalistic perspectives. In doing so, it provides us an opportunity for reflection on the meaning, warrant, influence, and contemporary viability of philosophic naturalism.