originality, not to say profundity (434)" is provocative and should generate a good deal of critical attention, as should his generally negative assessment of the promise of pragmatism.

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Stimulated by recent "flirtations" in Peirce scholarship with the pluralistic dimensions in Peirce's thought, Rosenthal aspires to tie together several strands (some of which appeared in her previous work) into a "new design" that ultimately forms a pragmatically oriented pluralistic fabric. This new design makes more visible Peirce's convergence toward the final ultimate opinion of the community of inquirers.

This new design demands that we look at the fabric synthetically. This permits not the usual "piecemeal" view but rather a wider, holistic one. The result is that we can see the cloak of pragmatic pluralism in a novel way and is thus more productive in reassessing Peirce's "relevance for some key contemporary issues."

One of the more key contemporary issues is Kuhn's influence on the interpretation of science. From this first strand Rosenthal begins to form the core pattern that weaves together the epistemological and metaphysical foundations essential to Peirce's pluralistic convergence. The second strand concerns meaning and habit, and investigates the relation between ultimate logical interpretants, the dynamical object, and the "given" of sense experience. The third and fourth strands wind themselves around Peirce's proofs of realism and the derivation of his categories. The fifth and final strand finishes the design. Now what we can see more synecologically and thus more clearly is that Peirce's metaphysics forms the basis for a "Kuhnsian-Peircean interpretation of science."

She is right in beginning with a contemporary discussion of Kuhn because so much of what he says touches upon essential aspects of Peirce's own work: epistemology, truth, interpretation, perception, phenomenology, metaphysics, realism, the community of inquirers, and the final, ultimate opinion (convergence). Holding on to these threads can sometimes be demanding, but like Ariadne, Rosenthal doesn't get us lost in the labyrinth.

What "lies at the heart" of the relationship between Peirce and Kuhn is the foundation of a pluralistic community. This community, in a sense, remains absolute as questions around it change, as paradigms shift, as new meanings develop:

It is the foundation for such a pluralistic community, rather than for the drive toward unanimity in final
knowledge, that lies at the heart of Peirce's pragmatic position and provides the metaphysical and epistemic underpinnings for Kuhn's understanding of science (20).

There is no need then for Peirce's and Kuhn's "radical opposition" or our "piecemeal" attempts at reconciliation. The remainder of the book weaves the threads of Peirce's "pervasive strand of pragmatic pluralism" into a new mantle of his and Kuhn's "kinship."

As briefly as possible let us pull on some important threads. A basic one is the "doctrine of meaning as habit" that serves to "illuminate the other intricately interwoven threads" of pragmatic pluralism. She examines this in a rather "un-Peircean" context of the synthetic-analytic distinction. Why? Because this leads to an understanding that the "certitude and specificity of mathematical truths implies the functioning of an analytic-synthetic distinction" that is pervasive in empirical knowledge. Such functioning leads to distinguishing between "habit as the basis of meaning and habit as the basis of belief." Lastly, this points to a "contextualistic and holistic" approach to fallibilism and to the "inherent pluralism in the very structuring of experience at all levels of awareness."

This ties us to the question of Peirce's arguments for realism and their proofs. Here is yet another strand of "inherent pluralism" that is "implicit" in these arguments. One more strand appears in the realization that Peirce's "experimental phenomenology," is especially evident when we notice that this grounds his metaphysics because they are fallibilistic and serves to illuminate the "concrete richness" of experience with all its ramifications.

Rosenthal continues to unravel pragmatic pluralism with this important final metaphysical strand because pragmatism and metaphysics are themselves interwoven. She interprets metaphysics as foundational for Peirce. It is in this last chapter that she ties together many of the previous strands: "the features of experience to the categories of metaphysics"; possibility and potentiality; generality; realism and idealism; the dynamical object; neutralism and materialism. Now, one can see more clearly the design in the rug (with apologies to Henry James) as a "worldly pluralism of a Kuhnsian-Peircean interpretation of science." This is the mantle of a new paradigm; a mantle that can be worn comfortably both by Peirce and Kuhn. This provides a new and enriching context for the "kinship" of both.

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