recent article on Sellars's theory of perception in Transactions of the C. S. Peirce Society, Summer 1994.

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Frank Oppenheim's new book on Josiah Royce's ethical theory is required reading for any Royce scholar and all serious students of American philosophy. It is clearly written, thoroughly researched, and, though wholly sympathetic and appreciative, carefully argued and always fair-minded. This, of course, will come as no surprise to anyone familiar with Oppenheim's previous work—particularly his 1987 study, Royce's Mature Philosophy of Religion and his 1989 essay, "A Roycean Response to the Challenge of Individualism" in Beyond Individualism.

This book deals with Royce's ethical theory during the five final years of his life, 1912-1916. Oppenheim claims that this ethics sets forth highly important new themes in Royce's thought and is especially rich and relevant for us today. However, this relevance has been obscured, Oppenheim asserts, by the inattention and misinterpretation of philosophical analysts, naturalists, instrumentalists, and deconstructionists. Accordingly, drawing on published texts, unpublished manuscripts, and the Royce Family Papers located only in 1988, Oppenheim seeks to recover, illuminate, and apply this mature ethics.

In order to do this, Oppenheim argues that we must understand the context of Royce's mature ethics. To grasp this context, we must understand not simply the development of Royce's mature ethical thought and its connections with his mature theory of knowledge and metaphysics, but also the relation of Royce's thought to his life. In Oppenheim's words, "we need to taste enough of Royce's life to see how his family, his surroundings, and chiefly his own choices nurtured ethical life in him before 1912. I believe with Royce, Fichte, and William James that a person's philosophy arises from one's unique personality...a philosopher's personal life affects both the basic attitude he or she takes toward life and one's self-positioning toward the world. From this basis one looks upon and tests the various ethical theories and upon it one ultimately rests one's case" (p. xiv).

Thus, following a chronicle of response (and non-response) to Royce's work from 1910 to 1990 (chapter 1), Oppenheim turns to Royce's life and personal moral development (chapter 2), his early and middle ethics (chapters 3 and 4), and the vital interconnections between Royce's ethics, epistemology, and metaphysics (chapters 5 and 6).

Having brilliantly set the stage, Oppenheim turns directly
to Royce's mature ethical thought in the four chapters that form the core of the book). Oppenheim begins with an account of Royce's methods in his ethics of 1915-1916—his empirico-historical method, his distinctive ethical method, and his overall method of interpretive musement. Here (chapter 7) Oppenheim makes clear the three convictions basic to Royce's ethical method: that metaphysical categories are teleological such that to recognize Being is to value it; that to be a human self is to have a common, reasonable human nature; and, that to become conscious of Being is to interpret individual and community as two ultimate levels of reality. This makes possible an "art of loyalty" (distinct from the earlier doctrine of loyalty) that requires the discernment of community and the promotion of human unity. Oppenheim carefully details (chapter 8) the demands for exercising this art of loyalty, and then by example illustrates it and Royce's communitarian teaching to discern the fitting response. This discussion goes a long way toward establishing the practical applicability of Royce's thought.

In the next two crucial chapters (chapters 9 and 10), Oppenheim summarizes the "doctrinal content" of Royce's mature ethics—a view that Oppenheim strikingly claims developed as much after The Problem of Christianity as it had before. Focusing on individual and community, Oppenheim shows that in 1914 Royce integrated three theses: that communities may be genuine selves; that individual salvation depends upon free devotion to some community; and, that through this devotion one comes into contact with a live, unified spiritual reality that constitutes loyalty. This integrated vision led Royce to reconsider the nature of self and community, finally viewing reality as an interpretive process between "two mutually ultimate and interacting levels—a unique individual and a community—as these are found in three Orders"—the natural, the human, and the superhuman or infinite (p. 154). This led to the many insights of his mature ethics. Oppenheim calls some of these insights "second magnitude insights:" the role of family as original community; the need for solidarity and wise provincialism; and the indispensability of cooperative mediation and triadic relationships in social life. He calls others "first magnitude insights:" the integration of three leading ethical ideas—freedom, happiness, and duty; the identification of three corresponding kinds of loyalty—sibling loyalty, friendship loyalty, and parent-child loyalty; the development of a communal interpretive process and an "ethics of the fitting;" and, a delineation of the bold hope that both fits and is demanded by genuine loyalty and community.

Oppenheim concludes with an examination of the thinkers (above all Peirce, the Apostle Paul, James, Kant, Spinoza, and Nietzsche) who influenced the development of Royce's thought (chapter 11), a contrast with the ethics of J. S. Mill, Dewey, H. R. Niebuhr, and others (chapter 12), and a very brief analysis of the strengths and weaknesses (not quite three pages worth!) of Royce's mature ethics (chapter 13). These comparisons help situate and clarify Royce's views.
That Oppenheim gets Royce right seems unquestionable. That Royce himself is right, however, remains very much in question. Oppenheim brings much "appreciative empathy" to his study of Royce, but seems to have little empathy (or even argument) left over for those whose lives have led them to other views or other provincialisms—especially those worried by Oppenheim's discussions of the Infinite and superhuman such that they prefer, for example, Dewey's *A Common Faith* and *Theory of Valuation* to Royce's *The Problem of Christianity* and "Extension Course on Ethics, 1915-1916. In this light, it is perhaps surprising that Oppenheim does not say more about his own personality and personal life—given his recognition that this is the basis upon which he, like other philosophers, ultimately rests his case. But, in any case and for readers of all temperaments, this wonderful book is a model of scholarship and no doubt long will remain the definitive work on the topic.

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One Holy and Happy Society, Gerald McDermott. University Park, PA; The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992. 184 pp. $29.95

This book examines Jonathan Edwards's (1703-1758) relationship to civil religion in the United States. Civil religion, in the author's use of the term, refers to the collection of beliefs that the United States is the redeemer nation, the New Israel, and will be the locus for the millennial reign of Christ. This may be an exaggerated form of civil religion, but McDermott is trying to separate Edwards from this strong view—of America as the redeemer nation. Edwards's involvement with the spiritual awakenings of the 1730's and 1740's and his stature as a theologian and philosopher make him prime material for this kind of speculation. Civil religion arose with the spirit of the revolution in the years just after Edwards's death. The author is at great pains to dispel this myth. Edwards was not the source of civil religion. Rather he was a global thinker who did not see the young America in a favored position, but a position of great peril—as either the faithful beginning of a period of revivals and failings or as the unfaithful hindrance to the progress of the Kingdom of Heaven. He was also not the promoter of American economic power as the image of the millennial kingdom, rather he was a caustic social critic who promoted charity to the poor and condemned usurious commercial practices. According to McDermott this latter critique may have cost him his job, since the Northampton people that turned him out of the pulpit were primarily the wealthy.

McDermott argues this thesis in six chapters covering Edwards's view of the national covenant, the millennium, social ethics, the Magistracy (law enforcement), and theology of citizenship, followed by the author's conclusion. The author reverses the traditional image of Jonathan Edwards by thorough