mental world (156). An advantage of evolutionary realism, as I understand it, is that in the dynamical object, at any given time there is an extra-mental component (a "residue-reality") that constrains and directs inquiry (145), thus accounting for error and avoiding subjectivism or some other form of human-dependent notion of truth. But since the dynamical object is always changing, what is incognizable at some specific time \( t \) is cognizable at \( t_{1+n} \); as a result, evolutionary realism avoids positing any things-in-themselves that are always beyond our epistemic grasp.

Many details of evolutionary realism need to be worked out, of course, not the least of which is that the idea of natural laws as themselves evolving requires a major shift in our current notions of what a law is (a problem that faced several nineteenth-century theories of evolution). But more importantly, how the relation of the dynamical object as the object of final opinion to knowledge escapes the skepticism consequent of things-in-themselves is not clear. As Hausman admits, since the object of final opinion consists of Firsts and Seconds, and hence typism, it will always contain an element of unintelligibility (164,7). It is hard to see, then, how the object can be "rendered intelligible," much less be an "actual inexhaustible actuality" (as long as there are Firsts, there are unactualized possibles)(165,163). Perhaps a solution lies somewhere in seeing the inexactitude of the object of final opinion (which is a unique object) as due not to the future directed "would-be's" of Thirdness, but to "would-have-beens" (i.e., true counterfactuals), a neglected but necessary aspect of Thirdness.

In any case, Hausman has written an insightful exposition and interpretation of Peirce. The book would serve as a solid introduction for advanced undergraduates and graduate students. It is also a must read for anyone interested in realist/anti-realist debates; in the final chapter, Hausman suggests ways that evolutionary realism answers the central worries about traditional realism that have spawned current anti-realist positions, particularly those of the "linguistic turn". Hausman has refreshingly reaffirmed the place of a realistic metaphysic—albeit of a "unique" sort—in contemporary pragmatism.

Robert Reuter


The publication of papers from the 1989 Peirce Congress, ongoing at various presses, may well initiate a new era in Peirce scholarship and in American philosophy. Peirce is of course known among non-specialists primarily for his philosophy of science. This volume, edited by the late Edward C. Moore, sig-
significantly expands previous notions of the depth and applicable scope of Peirce's thought in this area.

The editor states that "a main point of this present volume is to show how worldwide the interest in Peirce is today" (xi-xii). Indeed, the authors of the twenty-eight contributions represent ten countries. Internationality of scholarship means nothing if quality and significance are absent, however. There are a few disappointments in these respects, but the volume clearly rates very high overall. Competent readers will easily identify (and quietly ignore) the few weak essays here. The majority of the papers are solid, thoughtful contributions to Peirce scholarship and/or to current work in the three broad areas that serve to organize the book: "Logic and Mathematics" (heavy on the logic of abduction and on probability theory), "The Physical Sciences" (primarily on Peirce's relevance for discussions of contemporary physics), and "The Life of the Mind" (philosophy of mind, psychology, psychoanalysis, and linguistics). There are simply so many worthwhile contributions on so many diverse topics here that one could never do them justice in a short review. Suffice it to say that nearly all the essays in this volume merit serious attention.

On principles that I will sketch, however, several essays do recommend themselves for special mention. Edward Moore's account of the purpose of this volume was noted above. Several contributors also touch on this theme, usually by way of summarizing their own intentions. A cover-to-cover reading of the volume thus inadvertently raises a general question about the proper aim of Peirce scholarship. Why should we comb through the work of a thinker who has lain dead these eighty years? Peirce might answer that the only legitimate reason would be to generate ideas (interpretants of his work) that may serve to advance ongoing inquiry. The contributors to this volume are engaged, either exclusively or jointly, in two sorts of inquiry. One sort aims to increase our understanding of Peirce's philosophy itself. The other aims to advance current knowledge about our world. The first belongs to the history of philosophy. The second belongs to philosophy proper, or to science -- living enterprises that attempt to reconcile our ideas with current lived reality. These are both legitimate, but are largely distinct kinds of inquiry.

We have here several notable contributions to Peirce scholarship. R. Valentine Dusek (ch.3) argues, against Murphey's widely accepted criticism, that Peirce's topology not only is adequate to support his approach to logic, but that this area of Peirce's work presents an unexplored entry to "the potential field of the topology of logic" (p. 58). Peter Robinson (ch. 14) sets out to save one variety of abduction from a recent criticism. In developing his case, he advances beyond Peirce in attempting to state the conditions which make some abductions more reliable than others. Philip H. Hwang (ch. 18) points out an important difference (unrecognized by Peirce) between Peirce's and Aristotle's conceptions of chance. André De Tienne (ch. 19) provides a thorough study of Peirce's various definitions of the
Phaneron. These are the high points of pure Peirce scholarship in the volume.

Any reader of Peirce comes across ideas that anticipate discoveries for which later researchers are commonly credited. In certain cases, such as his sketching the construction of electrical circuits that would function as a logical "computer" in the modern sense, Peirce achieved major breakthroughs that remained unavailable until later thinkers independently made equivalent discoveries. These are cases where Peirce's thought, had it found wider dissemination in his time, would have contributed directly to contemporary science.

A number of the essays in this volume are devoted to pointing out areas in which Peirce was more or less clearly ahead of his time: his thoughts about x bear a striking resemblance to those of some pioneer who came decades later. What, again, is the proper aim of such scholarship? It sometimes seems that an author wishes only to label Peirce as a prescient genius -- and a tragic one at that, because his work on x went unknown. That Peirce was a genius is pretty well established, and that he was prescient, tragic, or both is in itself irrelevant either for understanding the content of his thought or for advancing our current research into the world around us. This sort of melodrama ought to be avoided in favor of something more helpful.

Where the evidence clearly shows that Peirce did develop an idea ahead of others, intellectual integrity requires that he be given proper credit. To set the historical record straight is a noble thing. Beyond this, though, there is a more compelling reason for contemporary philosophers and scientists to muck around in the Peirce papers. That Peirce was able to anticipate later discoveries, often quite thoroughly, suggests two things. First, he was a creative and learned thinker of the first rank, and there are no doubt many more nuggets of insight to be found in his works. Second, Peirce's discoveries are invariably products of his own unique system of thought. His ideas were generated from within a set of theoretical positions, and according to a methodology, that are both well-developed and (usually) quite different from those of the later discoverers of the same insights. A Peircean "anticipation" of x is superficially similar to a later statement of x, but it is almost always born of philosophical associations that, if taken up in the context of current research, might well solve problems that the better-known "pioneers" could not adequately address.

Several essays bring Peircean ideas to bear on current research problems, with exciting results. Peder V. Christiansen (ch. 15) argues that synechism provides the insight needed to refine Einstein's concept of "local realism," and thus resolve the problem in quantum physics known as Bell's Paradox. Demetra Sfendoni-Mentzou (ch. 17) draws on tychism in elaborating a concept of "matter as potentiality" that supports a realist interpretation of quantum phenomena. Clyde Hendrick (ch. 24) proposes that Peirce's categories be explored as the basis for a
new understanding of psychological phenomena, and even suggests their applicability in occupational counseling! Peter Gärdenfors (ch. 5) develops a theory of natural cognitive classification which draws on the idea of innate "conceptual spaces." This epistemological account complements Peirce's genealogical-metaphysical theory of natural kinds in the "Classification of the Sciences" papers (CP 1.203ff). Together, these approaches could constitute a powerful realist response to the nominalistic genealogy championed by Foucault and others.

In sum, Moore has left us a fine collection of essays that, together with the other volumes of Peirce Congress papers and the chronological Peirce Edition, help establish new standards and directions for Peirce studies in the coming decades.

Grand Valley State University

Kelly A. Parker


This set of essays is a truly superb collection of contemporary work in American philosophy of religion and theology. All of the eighteen articles, chosen from those presented at the Conference on American Religious Thought at the Highlands Institute for American Religious Thought in Highlands, North Carolina in June of 1990, are worth reading by anyone interested in 20th Century American philosophy and theology. I am especially attracted to this volume because three of my former teachers at the University of Denver and the Iliff School of Theology—Sheila Greeve Davaney, Delwin Brown, and James Kirk—contributed essays to it. Also, almost all of the other contributors are leading figures in contemporary American religious philosophy—Gordon Kaufman of Harvard Divinity School, William Dean of Gustavus Adolphus College, Charley Hardwick of the American University in Washington D.C., and Mason Olds of Springfield College. I know of no other recent anthology that synthesizes so much process philosophy, language analysis, neo-Barthian theology and the early Chicago School of Theology. I cannot praise this book enough.

The new Religious Naturalism is a distinctive form of American religious philosophy that analyzes religious concepts in terms of experience, language, and historical traditions. In his essay, Professor Delwin Brown explores the implications of Hans George Gadamer's ideas about our historically-bound linguisticality for help in solving the vexing epistemological problem of knowing anything without the aid of language. Professor Brown adduces passages from Truth and Method that reveal Gadamer's conviction that there are pre-linguistic bodily feelings that inform our historically-bound traditions of discourse. [29] In her essay, Professor Sheila Greeve Davaney, Del Brown's colleague in theology at Iliff, takes issue with the thesis that there is a