BOOK REVIEWS:


Hausman says that he has two aims in this book. First, he wants to provide an introduction for students of Peirce and, second, he plans to resolve some of the apparent problems in Peirce's thought by showing that his philosophy is constructed within an overarching architectonic (vii). Hausman attempts to illustrate that certain elements of this architectonic, particularly Peirce's pragmatism, semiotic (or semeiotic), and the categories, are all grounded in an "evolutionary realism", which itself has as its basis Peirce's notions of synechism and continuity.

Hausman begins by examining Peirce's version of pragmatism (or pragmaticism). Like most introductions to Peirce's pragmatism, Hausman focuses on the early "How to Make Our Ideas Clear", but unlike most introductions, he highlights Peirce's subsequent editions and comments on this early version of the pragmatic maxim (43,48-9). These later comments, Hausman points out, are Peirce's efforts to make clear that the maxim is not a form of subjectivism but an attempt to eliminate human contingency as much as possible from conceptual analysis. But for Peirce to accomplish this—and this is Hausman's main point of the chapter—Peirce introduces a metaphysical realism. This chapter is well done, and I think Hausman succeeds here in showing "that Peirce's pragmaticism is connected to a realism" (50).

The following chapter is a complex discussion of Peirce's semiotic; the point is to show that for Peirce to have signs relate thought to objects, he must (and does) anchor his semiotic in realism. Semiotic as based in a realism leads to a lucid discussion of the categories in chapter three, where Hausman focuses on the categories as approached phenomenologically (as opposed to logically), and their application as metaphysical categories. Thirdness as necessary for intelligibility raises the issue of Thirdness as the metaphysical category of law-like relations and the need for a notion of continuity, a central topic of chapter four. Like Peirce, Hausman sometimes moves too easily from the categories as descriptive of cognition to their metaphysical application. Hausman suggests that his connection between the categories as phenomenological and metaphysical is one of "speculation" (166), but a tighter argument as to why we should think that the world is subject to categories that describe certain epistemic conditions would be helpful here.

Chapter four is interesting and provocative. In this chapter Hausman defends and develops the claim that Peirce holds a metaphysical realism of a unique kind, which Hausman calls "evolutionary realism". He argues that true beliefs are grounded in a real "dynamical object", or a continually evolving extra-
mental world (156). An advantage of evolutionary realism, as I understand it, is that in the dynamical object, at any given time there is an extra-mental component (a "residue-reality") that constrains and directs inquiry (145), thus accounting for error and avoiding subjectivism or some other form of human-dependent notion of truth. But since the dynamical object is always changing, what is incognizable at some specific time \( t \) is cognizable at \( t_{1+n} \); as a result, evolutionary realism avoids positing any things-in-themselves that are always beyond our epistemic grasp.

Many details of evolutionary realism need to be worked out, of course, not the least of which is that the idea of natural laws as themselves evolving requires a major shift in our current notions of what a law is (a problem that faced several nineteenth-century theories of evolution). But more importantly, how the relation of the dynamical object as the object of final opinion to knowledge escapes the skepticism consequent of things-in-themselves is not clear. As Hausman admits, since the object of final opinion consists of Firsts and Seconds, and hence typism, it will always contain an element of unintelligibility (164,7). It is hard to see, then, how the object can be "rendered intelligible," much less be an "actual inexhaustible actuality" (as long as there are Firsts, there are unactualized possibles) (165,163). Perhaps a solution lies somewhere in seeing the inexhaustibility of the object of final opinion (which is a unique object) as due not to the future directed "would-be's" of Thirdness, but to "would-have-beens" (i.e., true counterfactuals), a neglected but necessary aspect of Thirdness.

In any case, Hausman has written an insightful exposition and interpretation of Peirce. The book would serve as a solid introduction for advanced undergraduates and graduate students. It is also a must read for anyone interested in realist/anti-realist debates; in the final chapter, Hausman suggests ways that evolutionary realism answers the central worries about traditional realism that have spawned current anti-realist positions, particularly those of the "linguistic turn". Hausman has refreshingly reaffirmed the place of a realistic metaphysic--albeit of a "unique" sort--in contemporary pragmatism.

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The publication of papers from the 1989 Peirce Congress, ongoing at various presses, may well initiate a new era in Peirce scholarship and in American philosophy. Peirce is of course known among non-specialists primarily for his philosophy of science. This volume, edited by the late Edward C. Moore, sig-