like Rorty, are still taking his "one right answer" thesis to be some sort of metaphysical postulate as opposed to the simple assertion that in legal practice, even in hard cases, it turns out that one answer can be said to be more reasonable than another (367).

These debates will no doubt continue and certainly nothing one reads here resolves the issues in question but this collection of essays goes a long way towards mapping the terrain. In an important, albeit limited way, this book not only describes recent developments in the dialogue between pragmatism and law but plays some role in that development itself. The "importance" of this role depends on the future. A turn towards locating discussions of critical inquiry within the felt demands of actual concrete problems is making itself manifest in at least some of these essays. What remains to be seen is how this is taken up -- not whether pragmatic philosophy can be made more practical for law but whether legal practice can be made more philosophical, thereby yielding "better," "more satisfying," outcomes.

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Bad ideas, someone once said, die a slow death in academe. But then, perhaps bad ideas are merely untimely, broken, or less fertile than good ideas, but of some value, nonetheless.

Were the ideas of Charles Morris bad ideas, merely broken or less fertile, or were they "good" ideas? The question plays heavily in reading this recent publication of Morris's dissertation (under the direction of George Herbert Mead). The question is not an easy one, for the editor (Achim Eschbach) of the volume praises Morris's scholarship, suggesting that he is an original thinker whose works must not be ignored (x, xi). Max Fisch reveres the work of Morris, as do many others in the field. After all, it was Morris who divided semiotic (the study of signs) into the syntax, semantics, and pragmatics, used extensively by many in linguistics. (Howard Gardner incorrectly attributes this division to Charles S. Peirce, p. 57 The Unschooled Mind.)

Dewey, on the other hand, argues vehemently against one of Morris's later works, suggesting that he is wrongheaded. Dewey ends the essay with a classic line for any scholar of Peirce: "'Users' of Peirce's writings should either stick to his basic pattern or leave him alone." (Later Works, 15:152).

In the same critical vein, the editor (Eschbach) ends his preface of Morris on a very negative note, advising that Morris's dissertation is of far less value than the first portion of the
preface suggests. Specifically, Morris's behaviorism is disdained. So, the question remains, are Morris's ideas worth studying?

To begin, the criticism of Morris is not completely unfounded and Morris is far less fertile than authors such as Floyd Merrell, who has been compared to Morris. Criticism can be found in three broad areas: his limited view of the semiotic; his understanding of the interpretant; and his behaviorism.

First, concerning his behaviorism, I do not find his dissertation behavioristic. He addresses meaning and processing which is between the stimulus and response—a non-behaviouristic trait—and appears to have a healthy dose of pragmatism—after all, Mead was his major professor. He could, indeed, be called a pragmatist as he addresses consciousness (28-9, even 38); or a functionalist (32,101); an evolutionist (28); a naturalist (28); and only partially a behaviorist (30,43). He does, however, work with the process of learning and of knowing, within a rich environment of experience. On that ground alone, he is not as behavioristic as suggested. In short, epistemologically he may be a pragmatist (104).

Second, his interpretant is problematic. Dewey's concern is that Morris confuses the interpretant with the interpreter. Eschback sees Morris's interpretant as a mere category, bereft of meaning. As Morris unfolds his interpretant, it is obvious that it is more realistic (behavioristic?) than pragmatic. The interpretant is all those things that come to mind after one has left the object (7-8, 105). Thus, for Morris, the individual after some experience is the interpretant, that is, the individual is all actions, emotions, and thoughts defined by the experience coupled with some past. The basic problem with Morris's categorization of interpretant is that it is not driven by the sign (which one finds in Peirce). The relation between the sign and interpretant is crucial for meaning and values, both of which, for Morris, are outside of the relations of the object to sign and the interpretant. Thus, metaphysically and axiologically, Morris is a realist—but that does not make him behaviorist, perhaps he is an early cognitive scientist.

Third, while Morris examines symbol from perspectives as varied as logic, psychology, and civilization, he does not have a comprehensive view of symbol or of semiotic. (This, in part, creates the interpretant problem, above.) His semiotic dwells only upon a level of consciousness and language. He does, however, when discussing the unconscious, begin to suggest that there is perhaps a symbolism which is taking place, hidden from consciousness (44). He, unfortunately, constantly divides the symbol world from the non-symbolic. The symbol is not the thirdness of Peirce's semiotic symbol, nor does Morris address any lower level symbols or semiotic. His work is disappointing from its lack of comprehensiveness.

On the other hand, his work is important for at least three
reasons. First, historically, as the editor states, it is important to understand the historical antecedents to discussions today in sign theory. Morris has propagated a major branch of semiotic study, whose branches intermingle with a Peircean branch and could well provide understanding in some areas (see below), but they are still separate from Peirce's semiotic.

Second, while sometimes problematic, Morris's semiotic bifurcations (e.g., given and givenness) provides particular insight into the context of the field of sign action. He uses given and givenness, for example, to delineate between specific aspects of the environmental context which are of importance to the individual as one finds meaning in the surroundings. The givenness might be equated to the details of Peirce's ground or Mead's aesthetic image (part of the perception stage of the act). Givenness is what is perceived from sense data of the surroundings before the non-essential sense data are discarded in Mead's manipulation stage. Aspects of givenness may be the greatest strength of the book.

Third, it is interesting to juxtapose some of Morris's ideas with current ideas to broaden our comprehension of the human mind. For example, Morris's discussion of unconsciousness, as defined psychoanalytically (43-4) is very similar to a recent publication which uses a Peircean semiotic to discuss psychoanalysis and the diagnosis of pathologies (Semiotic Perspectives on Clinical Theory and Practice, ed. B. Litowitz and P. Epstein, Morton de Gruyter, 1991).

While there are many who may revere Morris, Dewey's words loom large cautioning anyone who reads Morris. Peirce is by far and away the better shadow to follow, but Morris provides a significant historical context. This book needs to be a part of any comprehensive semiotic library, but it should be read in the greater context of comprehensive semiotic meaning.

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This volume adds to a fine series "The American Novel" under the general editorship of Emory Elliott. The series is designed to "provide students of American literature with introductory critical guides to the great works of American literature." Student reading Walden for the first time or professors refreshing themselves before they teach this great work for the umteenth time will find this volume very useful. The book contains five short, accessible essays with attractive range and variety.

Robert Sayre's Introduction begins with an insightful general biographical sketch stressing Thoreau's several decades of wrestling with the problem of vocation--armed with a Harvard college degree he declined several forms of gainful employment, yet