Roth notes in the preface that recognizing the influence of British empiricism on American pragmatism "does not imply any great insight . . . ." (p. vii) Indeed, H. S. Thayer's, *Meaning and Action: A Critical History of Pragmatism* (Hackett: 1981), calls Peirce's "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" the "spiritual heir" to Locke's "critical quest" concerning knowledge. (p. 82) The index of names in Flower and Murphey's *A History of Philosophy in America* (Putnam: 1977) notes more references to Locke and Hume than to Peirce or Dewey. Somewhat surprisingly, neither these nor Bruce Kuklick's works, nor other such histories of ideas are listed among the secondary sources.

Authors are entitled to choose their subjects, and reviewers are free to quarrel with their decisions. In light of Peirce's attack on British empiricism in the 1871 review of Berkeley's works, Berkeley's complete absence stands out considerably. For example, Roth's first pass at indicating how Peirce should be understood to use "idea" in "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" would have benefitted from comparison with Berkeley's theory of meaning. (p. 13) Perhaps a similar case could be made for the inclusion of Thomas Reid. No discussion of the influence of Kant occupies more than a sentence in the book. Though he is no British empiricist, Kant's influence on pragmatism is overwhelming, and his absence leaves gaps in the story of its intellectual development. Despite these criticisms, Roth's book is a useful addition to the growing literature on American philosophy. It is interesting to read and well written. It suffers from few typographical errors. It would be a useful supplementary text in a course on pragmatism or American philosophy, and it would be a good starting place for anyone wanting to know more about the pragmatic turn from British empiricism.

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This useful new paperback edition of James' *Pragmatism* would serve as a good "teaching text" in American philosophy courses. The introduction by Doris Olin and the selected articles, reprinted after James' primary text, serve to situate the pragmatic theory of truth in relation to the other theories (correspondence, coherence, and semantic.) In addition, several long-standing controversies in pragmatist philosophy and James scholarship are addressed. The relation between truth and verification, pragmatism and fideism, and facticity and semantics are examined in detail. Owing to space constraints, this review will focus on the critical articles.

Bertrand Russell, George Edward Moore, and James Bissett Pratt are offered as historically important critics of William James' pragmatic theory of truth. G.E. Moore ("Professor James' pragmatism" *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 8, 1907-8, 33-77), launches a lengthy attack on James which I believe represents
about the best classical misreading of pragmatic texts. For example, Moore would have James contend that the "usefulness" of the facts regarding Julius Caesar's death has come bearing on the "truth" of the proposition. Indeed, most modern students of James' works would not have much difficulty in differentiating James' pragmatic theory from an "Alice in Wonderland" type of subjectivist factionalism. Bertrand Russell's essay "William James's Conception of Truth" (see Philosophical Essays, 1966) is a more sympathetic reading. Russell accepts James' "tough" proto-positivism while rejecting the "tender" accommodation of religious concepts. Pratt ("Truth and its Verification, "The Journal of Philosophy, 1907, 320-4) accuses the pragmatists of identifying the process of verification with the product (truth itself).

Moving on to more recent times, Moreland Perkins ("Notes on the Pragmatic Theory of Truth," The Journal of Philosophy, 49, 1952, 573-87) argues, in defense of James, that the pragmatic theory does not involve an identification of the true and the confirmed. Verifiability in James is a very "elastic" and flexible doctrine which does not require a true statement to actually become verified. Perkins sees a weakness in James' radical denial of abstraction in favor of concrete relations. Perkins errs when he contends that James would deny all probity to abstraction. This misunderstanding may arise from Perkins's view of James as an "extreme nominalist." Works as early as "Necessary Truths" from Principles show that if James was indeed a nominalist, then he was a very realistic one.

The two highlights in this book are Robert G. Meyers' "Meaning and Metaphysics" in James's Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 31, 1971, 369-80) and D.C. Phillips' "Was William James Telling the Truth After all?" (The Monist 68, 1984, 419-34). Both of these articles are so rich and complex as to deserve full reviews of their own, so I will restrain myself to a few brief comments with recommendations for further study.

Robert G. Meyers offers a convincing defense of James against charges that he pragmatic theory of truth leads to irrec- oncilable aporias and conundrums. According to Love joy and Henle, James' theory entails the view that experiential consequences and positive effects of belief are both criteria for the meaningfulness of a statement. This would lead to such logically and metaphysically impossible conclusions as:

a. Judaism is the true faith for you but not for me, and
b. Santa Claus exists for Timmy but not for Jenny.

Meyers solves this difficulty by distinguishing between fideism and pragmatism. The pragmatic "test" emerges as a tool for clarifying meaningful propositions (God exists) rather than as a logical-positivist weapon for destroying the meaningfulness of the proposition in the first place. The "will-to-believe" is important but not cognitively necessary or normative. D.C. Phillips ends the series of reprinted articles with a thorough
and concise refutation of Moore's previous paper. Moore's continuous attack on James involved the use of reductio ad absurdum counter-examples. Moore's examples of "true ideas" which cannot be empirically verified do not refute James himself but only Moore's caricature of James. D.C. Phillips also shows that Moore's criticisms of "utility" and "mutability" can actually be shown to support, rather than refute, James' arguments in Pragmatism. James instrumentalism is neither a relativism nor an extreme subjectivism.

In conclusion, I would recommend this edition for courses in metaphysics, epistemology, and James studies. The introduction and articles provide a good overview of scholarly discussions about verification, criteria, and belief in regard to the pragmatic theory of truth. A paperback edition of a classic text has its own independent merits as well.

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