In this book, Professor Roth undertakes to illuminate "the pragmatic turn" in which American pragmatism developed out of and diverged from British empiricism. Roth addresses the views of Locke, Hume, Peirce, James, and Dewey on experience, cause and effect, necessary connection, personal identity, and moral, social, and political theory.

Two illustrations should convey the character of Roth's essay. Early on, Roth discusses Dewey's use of a biological model of environment-organism interactions to develop his notion of experience. Later in the book, Roth shows how this model led Dewey away from treating the self as a substantial thing independent of experiences or even as a continuing awareness of mental activity. According to Dewey's version, Roth writes:

Human beings are more than physical objects, and the difference consists in the type of organization which enables the human organism to interact with the world in ways that are vastly different from those of inanimate objects or living organisms other than humans. (p. 87)

Roth also discusses briefly the differences between the approach Dewey takes to the self early in Experience and Nature and that of the later chapters of that work.

Over two chapters, Roth shows how the authors' moral, social, and political views relate to their accounts of experience and the self. This discussion is engaging. Roth replies on behalf of James to Peirce's criticism that James treats the self as isolated and asocial. Roth points to the various theories of the mind that James reviewed and to the assorted "selves" he enumerated in the Principles of Psychology. Going on, he notes that a Jamesian account of interaction between a self and the environment, as employed in James' approach to inquiry and experience, presupposes that personhood not be private. Roth uses disparate textual material to assemble a convincing case. As these reflections may suggest, Roth's book is not so much about relations between pragmatism and British empiricism as it is about the development of pragmatism itself and about disagreements among the three pragmatists. Roth confines generalization about tendencies or typical features of the two movements to a few pages of the final chapter.

That final chapter also speaks to some questions about American pragmatism in its contemporary socio-cultural context. For example, Roth holds that pragmatism can inform contemporary democratic movements by encouraging a renewal of vision and a willingness to share goals and purposes. Its "rich social dimension" can ameliorate elements of culture that create a need for artificial stimulation, without which individuals feel lost.
Roth notes in the preface that recognizing the influence of British empiricism on American pragmatism "does not imply any great insight . . . ." (p. vii) Indeed, H. S. Thayer's, Meaning and Action: A Critical History of Pragmatism (Hackett: 1981), calls Peirce's "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" the "spiritual heir" to Locke's "critical quest" concerning knowledge. (p. 82) The index of names in Flower and Murphey's A History of Philosophy in America (Putnam: 1977) notes more references to Locke and Hume than to Peirce or Dewey. Somewhat surprisingly, neither these nor Bruce Kuklick's works, nor other such histories of ideas are listed among the secondary sources.

Authors are entitled to choose their subjects, and reviewers are free to quarrel with their decisions. In light of Peirce's attack on British empiricism in the 1871 review of Berkeley's works, Berkeley's complete absence stands out considerably. For example, Roth's first pass at indicating how Peirce should be understood to use "idea" in "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" would have benefitted from comparison with Berkeley's theory of meaning. (p. 13) Perhaps a similar case could be made for the inclusion of Thomas Reid. No discussion of the influence of Kant occupies more than a sentence in the book. Though he is no British empiricist, Kant's influence on pragmatism is overwhelming, and his absence leaves gaps in the story of its intellectual development. Despite these criticisms, Roth's book is a useful addition to the growing literature on American philosophy. It is interesting to read and well written. It suffers from few typographical errors. It would be a useful supplementary text in a course on pragmatism or American philosophy, and it would be a good starting place for anyone wanting to know more about the pragmatic turn from British empiricism.

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This useful new paperback edition of James' Pragmatism would serve as a good "teaching text" in American philosophy courses. The introduction by Doris Olin and the selected articles, reprinted after James' primary text, serve to situate the pragmatic theory of truth in relation to the other theories (correspondence, coherence, and semantic.) In addition, several long-standing controversies in pragmatist philosophy and James scholarship are addressed. The relation between truth and verification, pragmatism and fideism, and facticity and semantics are examined in detail. Owing to space constraints, this review will focus on the critical articles.

Bertrand Russell, George Edward Moore, and James Bissett Pratt are offered as historically important critics of William James' pragmatic theory of truth. G.E. Moore ("Professor James' pragmatism" Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 8, 1907-8, 33-77), launches a lengthy attack on James which I believe represents