poems, outlines for lectures and observations. . . ." We are also
told that they "offer unparalleled insight into Emerson's thinking
and imaginative processes." The volume seems very scholarly.
(Though I did not check out all the references, I assume they are
accurate.) It is beautifully produced. Yet this is not a volume
that one can read through. One even wonders whether it is more
than mere "antiquarian pedantry." Surely, only the most advanced
scholar of Emerson (it would seem) will find this volume helpful.
One must first have read (and studied thoroughly) the published
works of Emerson before turning to this volume. Even then, it will
probably be more useful to biographers and literary scholars than
to philosophers. (Possibly, it may be enjoyed by those philoso-
phers who liked Wittgenstein's *Zettel*). The notebook "PH" (Philos-
ophy) is about as fragmentary as the works of the Presocratics.
One may seem like a Philistine if one wonders (publically) whether
such a volume even needed to be published. Still there may be gold
in all this "slag." Often, the citing of unpublished works to
illuminate published texts is little more than scholarly
"busywork;" but sometimes it is indeed revelatory. For me, a
careful re-reading of the published works seems more profitable
than delving into "notebooks," but (doubtless) there are some
puzzles of interpretation which might be resolved by something in
this volume. At least, one can affirm confidently that this is not
for the general reader, or even for the casual scholar of Emerson.
(Yet I would not quite dare assert that this Emperor has no
clothes!)

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An Introduction to C.S. Peirce: Philosopher, Semiotician and Eco-
static Naturalist by Robert S. Corrington. Lanham, Maryland, Rowman

Robert Corrington introduces Peirce by tracing in successive
chapters four strands of Peirce's philosophy. The first follows
abduction and pragmatism and provides an exposition of the 1877-8
Popular Science Monthly series, the 1905-6 Monist series, one of
the 1903 Harvard lectures, some manuscript material and the 'Ne-
eglected Argument' article. The second considers Peirce's concept
of self as sign-user by examining Peirce's early series in the
Journal of Speculative Philosophy. The third sets out the doctrine
of categories beginning with the 'New List' article, developing
this into an account of Peirce's semiotics. The fourth treats
Peirce's metaphysics on the basis of the 1891-3 Monist series
supplemented by material which Peirce did not publish.

Each of the chapters follows the chronological order of its
material, but gives little sense of the development of Peirce's
thought. Later material is not identified as a response to inade-
quacies in earlier claims or formulations. We are cautioned at one
point to "be wary of reading the later Peirce into the earlier" (p.
89), but not given any illustrations of this danger and very little
information about Peirce's own later views of his earlier efforts.
Close attention to development is probably not necessary in an introduction. But what is needed is a chapter in which it is possible to see how the four strands, so carefully laid out by Corrington, are tightly plaited together in Peirce's thought. The material in each of the chapters is shown to make contact with material in other chapters, but it is not shown how the four strands constitute a single fabric.

Instead we are given a biographical introduction and a speculative conclusion. The former leaves the impression of being hastily written. Infelicities, which occasionally mar the main body of the book ("Chance is a real ontological event," p. 43; "Taking a brief sidetrack for a moment, we can briefly explore . . ." p. 188), are here more frequent and more excruciating. ("Such clubs were quite common in the Boston area in the 1870s and Peirce's club was certainly no exception" p. 8. "His wife, Zina, fed up with his drinking, sensuality, and possible physical abuse, left him . . . ibid.) This chapter is drawn mostly from Joseph Brent's recently published biography, to which are added some reflections on the significance of Peirce's relationship to his mother--or perhaps 'non-relationship' is a better word, for biographers including Brent, have given far more attention to the influence of Peirce's father. Corrington offers a psychoanalysis that reads Peirce's verbal dexterity and fascination with symbolic plenitude as "a mask for deeper semiotic rhythms of the material that were left behind by the identification with the cultural symbolic codes of the father" (p. 23).

Corrington makes clear later (p. 84) that he regards Peirce's implicit denial of a "presemiotic or preintelligible realm" as a serious weakness. The criticism is stated but not pursued. It is possible that it is followed up in the concluding chapter, where Corrington attempts "an emancipatory reenactment in which a vast unthought insight [i.e. one buried in Peirce's thought] is given the space within which to find its true measure" (p. 216). What Corrington claims to find in the "inner momentum of [Peirce's] own categorical structures" is a drive to something he calls "ecstatic naturalism." This is a view of nature as transfiguring itself from a source which somehow lies outside Peirce's categories. It may be doubted that Peirce's thought has any momentum whatsoever in this direction, but it is a virtual certainty that Corrington's brief conclusion is nowhere near enough space within which to find the true measure of this idea.

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William Joseph Gavin is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Southern Maine. More than simply an exposition of James's thought from the standpoint of "vagueness," his book represents an