poems of these states, 1965-1971, a book dedicated to Walt Whitman), McDermott closes: "America--ambiguity / Quo vadis. I have not the slightest / idea. / Why go--then? / Precisely. / As the parade goes by-- / Hey Camerado-- / I love you. / They do not answer-- / Hey there--no matter. / When you come, as you will, / to look for me-- / Find me under your boot soles. / I am--will be / the leaves of grass--" (pp. xix-xx). To this, like so much of this book, one must say: Precisely.

University of Oregon John J. Stuhr


Some issues are so important that we rarely get around to thinking much about them. The relation of war and democracy, including the many puzzles theoretical and practical generated by their relation, is surely such an issue. Peter Manicas has done us all a great service by turning his talents to this theme, and he has done so in a way which will resonate with those of us who tend to think in the grain of American traditions. One of the enduring characteristics of classical American thought has been the idea that the reconstruction in and of philosophic categories and analysis. Manicas endorses this Deweyan historicism, and therefore takes a methodological approach to the relation of war and democracy which is no doubt shocking to many philosophers, and probably to more than a few historians and political scientists. The philosopher must adjust to the notion that the theoretical questions about war and democracy cannot be approached outside a consideration of the historical development of the two, and the ways their mutual relations have influenced each. The social scientist may be equally unsettled by the idea that history raises questions which demand philosophic consideration, so that a history void of philosophy is as flawed as a philosophy that knows no history. If the proof is in the eating, so to speak, then War and Democracy makes a powerful case for the necessary interrelation of history, sociology, political theory and philosophy.

The book is prompted by the necessity of democracy and the ubiquity of war. By the "necessity of democracy" I mean the fact that no serious consideration of political matters over the past few hundred years, and certainly for the present and future, can avoid democracy. Whether regarded as a means or an end, whether feared or admired, whether a threat or an aspiration, democracy touches everything social. The difficulty is that like every great human product, this one raised as many problems as it may solve: is democracy direct or representative; does it require a small scale or may it be large; what is its relation to republics, to justice, to rights; what may we make a bourgeois democracy, liberal democracy, socialist democracy? As if these concerns are not sufficiently intractable, there is the fact that the historical course of the development of democracy has intersected war at nearly every turn: dynastic wars and imperial wars, colonial wars,
revolutionary wars and civil wars, limited war and absolute war, defensive wars and wars of aggression, local wars and world wars, hot wars, cold wars and star wars. The task Manicas poses for himself is to understand something as significant and powerful as democracy in its relation to something as persistent and complex as war.

The primary aim of the book is to attempt to understand the current situation with respect to democracy, democratic aspirations, and wars of all kinds. Manicas announces his conclusion early on, and it is that despite the complexities, and with possible exceptions, war and democracy are incompatible: "It may well be that the problem of 'democracy', construed as an ideal, cannot be solved until there is a solution to the problem of war, and conversely, that the human blight of war will not be eliminable until mankind takes some significant steps in the direction of greater democracy." (P.1) In the process of elucidating and defending the thesis Manicas articulates a number of provocative, if not entirely original, propositions. One of them concerns the drafting of the US Constitution, at the time of which, he argues, conditions prevailed which made possible the development of institutions which would have been far more democratic than the Constitution, which is distinctly anti-democratic in its spirit and many of its provision. Manicas also argues for the deeply democratic character of Marx and of Lenin, despite the anti-democratic nature of the Stalinist directions in which the Soviet Union and Bolshevism went. And in yet another intriguing remark, Manicas suggests that with respect to the development of democracy in the 20th century, there is far too little appreciation of the significance of World War I. This is an especially prescient point, considering the fact that since this book was published in 1989, the European political order has unraveled, and we now see wars in the Balkans, deadly struggles between Christians and Muslims, German unification, the breakup of the Soviet Union, and most recently the split of Czechoslovakia into two nations. We are, I would suggest, still working out the results of World War I, which is to say we have yet to solve the problems generated by the collapse of the Hohenzollern, Hapsburg, Romanov and Ottoman Empires.

Though Manicas is interested primarily in war and democracy today, he takes us to ancient Greece to begin the story of their relation. Athenian democracy, he argues, is tied to hoplite warfare in that the military was in the fullest sense a citizen army, despite the fact that most residents were not citizens. Even in decidedly undemocratic Sparta, the decision to go to war required consent of the fighters. Though there is no direct consideration of the Roman legions in their connection to the Republic or the Empire, there is an indirect account of Rome through its influence on early modern political thinkers. It was Machiavelli who argued that a modern republic must be expansionist, and that this required a large population and an army of the Roman rather than Greek type, which is to say an army which is into coincident with rule of the polity. The "Citizen army," then, changes its meaning from that in the Greek polis, and in its new manifestation raised the problem of how to compel a sufficient number of individuals to serve. For
Machavelli this required men of virtue, and in any case this is still an issue in our time, as is the question of the relation between patriotism, a draft and democracy.

After an account of Montesquieu's treatment of the nature of a republic, Manicas moves to the modern period, in four chapters which deal with the American situation from the Revolution through Jefferson's Presidency. In the American Revolution the citizen-soldier reemerges as the colonists fight to free themselves, a situation which makes of ideology an important factor in war. There is first the question of how, in an atmosphere of democratic principles, it is possible to maintain an effective military force, and on the other side of the coin there is the role of democratic ideology which can play in mobilizing a citizenry. One of the crucial questions Manicas raises, and another which is still with us, concerns the character of the U.S. Constitution. The Articles of Confederation, he argues, had endorsed a kind of localism, and by thus making direct participation in government more possible, it had a democratic character, much of which was undermined by the 1787 Constitution. Manicas' sense of all this is that the Founders were wrong to insist that a stable, large nation is inconsistent with the democratic localism more prominent in the Articles. For Manicas, the Deweyan sense of democracy as the expansion of the Community (not necessarily the national is consistent with, indeed requires, local democratic structures and power. Thus we have the problem of nationalism and democracy, which was encountered early in US history with the Alien and Sedition Acts, and continues to haunt us. Even Jefferson, who Manicas argued never gave up a conception of the nation as a confederation of local entities even during his Presidency, nevertheless accepted the Machiavellian imperative to preserve the nation. For Manicas, "antidemocracy and war have been its consequence."

As significant as the American Revolution was, it was the French Revolution was, it was the French Revolution and the wars which followed and changed everything. With respect to democracy, the radical program of the Revolution established what we might now call Social Democracy as its end. This has been so powerful that it is possible to say, Manicas argues, that ever since and for the foreseeable future, there are only two "parties" in the world -- those who wish to complete or at least advance the radical program of the Revolution (Marxists, socialists, anarchists, etc.), and those who hold that something like an American-style democracy is as far as one can go in this direction. (p. 195) With respect to war, as Clausewitz saw clearly, the wars following the revolution approached absolute war, involving entire populations. Paradoxically this is due both to the fact that the radical ideology of the revolution gave the French populace a more direct stage in the wars, and to the fact that elsewhere in Europe the threat from France was so great that entire populations had to be mobilized to respond. Prior to these wars it has been possible for Kant to pin his hopes for perpetual peace on the supposition that republics would likely be peaceful because peace would be in the interest of the citizenry. The Napoleonic Wars made it more difficult to hold such a view, and the problem may have to do with the relation of
national interests to the interests of the populace. For Manicas, one of the fundamental traits of the modern situation, at the same time one of its flaws, is the assumption by all modern nation-states that the interests of the nation are shared by the populace. In the absence of a much more radical democracy, Manicas argues, there is no good reason to make this assumption.

This is an issue with which Marx, and later Lenin, dealt directly. In the essentially democratic program of the Communist Manifesto Marx pushed beyond the limits of bourgeois democracy, in which, as Manicas paraphrases Marx, "one had the right to choose among one's exploiters, the right to own what one could never afford, the right to say what one pleased unless it threatened the status quo, and the right to vote for candidates who represented the interests of the rich and powerful." (pp. 236-37). The other crucial question concerning Marx has to do with the role of war in the transition to a more socialist democracy. Manicas argues that though Marx thought that revolution is likely to be violent, he also thought that modern war is in general not in the democratic interests of the populace. The experience of 1848 was important here, but even more compelling was the Franco-Prussian War and the fate of the Paris Commune.

In the 20th century the tension between war and mass democracy, and the tension between very different democratic visions, becomes more severe. If for Marx and Engels war was likely to inhibit progress towards democracy, by 1917 Woodrow Wilson was ready to fight a war to make the world safe for democracy. One of the great consequences of World War I was the Russian Revolution, which Manicas regards as democratic, or at least as having democratic possibilities. He argues that Lenin's political concepts as developed in State and Revolution aspired to an "anti-statist -- anarchistic -- decentralized association of soviets," and was to that extent democratic. (p. 273). But following Marx's sense of the danger of war for socialism, Lenin's program had no chance of success, largely because of the continuation of war in Europe, the allied intervention in Russia, and the Civil War.

One of the themes Manicas develops is that not only is war dangerous to democracy, but the absence of democracy is conducive to war. The democratic possibilities in Europe after the war failed, and in so doing set the stage for he Second World War: the Spanish republic eventually collapsed under the weight of fascism, Bolshevik democracy never materialized in Russia an the Soviet Union, having given way to Stalinism, but worse still was the failure of the revolution in Germany in 1918-19. The defeat of the radical democratic program of Rosa Luxemburg, the USPD, and whatever left-wing might still have been left of the SPD, set the stage for the Weimar republic an the rise of Nazism.

There is, finally, the issue of American democracy. The most prominent American theoretician of democracy has been Dewey, with the more radical side of whom Manicas would identify. Dewey of course had supported World War I, having regarded it to be a struggle of democratic peoples fighting for "our democracy and civiliza-
tion." Manicas argues, though, that the experience of the war, and the political processes which followed it in Europe and here, for example repression during and after the war, transformed Dewey's conception of democracy into something much more radical than it had been. Manicas contrasts Dewey's writings on democracy and political theory with Lippmann's who, as he puts it, "was not transformed." Dewey's radicalization would be, in any case, an extension of his earlier conceptions, for example in Democracy and Education, since even there democracy and the "method of intelligence" require each other, and war cannot for very long be conducive to the method of intelligence. Dewey had also argued earlier that nations themselves are barriers to democracy in that they construct limits to the outward push of community; in place of the vital growth of an equitable community they require, a la Machiavelli, the expansionist pursuit of national interests.

Manicas ends his analysis with a short Epilogue which treats the Second World War and the Cold War. It is as if no extended consideration of those two events is necessary, at least not in this context. The point has been driven home: war is a threat to democracy. In the late 1980s Manicas was writing in the context of the Cold War, which no less than all the hot ones impeded democracy at every turn. If we look at the American case alone, the Cold War helped to bring about the National Security State and the Imperial Presidency, neither particularly conducive to democracy. And abroad, the Cold War justified any and every anti-democratic action the CIA, State Department, Pentagon and White House wanted, from Iran and Guatemala in the early 1950s through Southeast Asia, the Dominican Republic and Brazil in the 1960s, to Central America in the 1980s.

In any case, Manicas has written a fine book, one in which there is a good deal to think about and from which there is a good deal to learn. Anyone with a clear sense of the boundaries between history, political science and philosophy may find the book unsatisfying, but then anyone with a clear sense of the boundaries between history, political science and philosophy has an unsatisfying position to begin with.

SUNY College at Cortland

John Ryder

The Topical Notebooks of Ralph Waldo Emerson, Vol. II. Ronald A. Bosco, ed. University of Missouri Press, 1993 420 pp. $44.95

This is the second (of three volumes) of Emmerson's Topical Notebooks. The first volume was edited by Susan Sutton Smith. (Ralth H. Orth is the Chief Editor of the series.) The University of Missouri Press also publishes Emerson's Complete Sermons (A.J. von Frank, Chief Editor). This volume contains five notebooks, designated: Orientalist, RT (Rhetoric), LI (Literature). PY (Poetry) and PH (Philosophy). These notebooks were Emerson's "repositories for anecdotes, quotations, reminiscences, drafts of