experience as it is directly undergone, i.e., as emergent and unitary rather than Cartesian. Only if this is done, i.e., only if consciousness is viewed as participatory rather than exclusive and autonomous, can authoritarianism be avoided.

There is much in all this to be admired. Scott writes clearly and persuasively. His interdisciplinary approach is a refreshing one, and his use of American Philosophy—as opposed to current literary critics in vogue—to look at poetry and art, is relatively unique. He sees his emphasis upon experience as aligned with Cornel West's American Evasion of Philosophy, and opposed to Richard Rorty's "linguistic behaviorism" when the latter argues that language does go "all the way down." Remaining for further consideration in a second book by Scott is the whole issue as the just why, or how, direct experience is so directly available to us, given that, as James himself noted, we are so "embedded in language," so to speak. Nonetheless the present study is both informative and "inspiring," i.e., it prompts further investigation of this rich subject area.

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Foster sets two goals for this book: 1) to present research on the relations between men and women in the Shaker, Oneida, and Mormon movements, and 2) to explore the ways in which the experimental communities raised and dealt with questions of women's roles, family organization, and sexuality (Preface, xiv). I think he accomplishes these goals to a degree. Foster presents useful historical context for the founding of these communities and provides helpful descriptions of their inner workings and values. There is a lack of depth to the analysis, however, which may stem from a minimal acquaintance with feminist theory or from his decision not

... to present any highly articulated contemporary feminist critique of these experiments. Instead, I have let these groups speak for themselves about their attitudes toward the role of women in society. (Preface, xv)

What Foster may miss in doing this is that the "themselves" which he lets speak are overwhelmingly male.

The overall theme, found in the analysis of the three communities is that although not "feminist" by current (by which I believe Foster means only liberal feminist) standards, each community effectively challenged traditional roles for women.

Chapters two through four focus on the Shakers (United Society of Believers in Christ's Second Appearing). The Shakers,
known for their furniture and their divinely inspired dancing, believed in the necessity of repentance and specifically the renouncement of carnal sin. Celibacy was a way of life for the believed women could be free to participate in spiritual and social life only if freed from the risk of pregnancy and the individual burden of childcare.

Wanting little physical connection between the sexes, they established separate orders of command with leaders having equal power, there were male and female sides to all buildings, and male and female labor. The economic division was very traditional. Foster argues that it was difficult to find men and women capable of non-traditional labor and they could not be trained in the community because of the proscription against contact between the sexes. They were, however, seen as complementary opposites, each equally important to the functioning of the group.

It is in regard to the traditional division of labor that Foster finds feminist analysis unhelpful. He believes that, not understanding the communitarian nature of the Shakers, feminists misinterpret and/or fail to appreciate the nature of the Shakers' radical challenge to their contemporary society.

Feminists today typically have emphasized individualism, fuller self-expression, and the need for women to get free from traditional expectations. . . . (40)

While this critique or concern might well be applicable to liberal feminists, I am not convinced it equally applies to Marxist feminists, socialist feminists, or radical feminists. These theories are, for the most part based on some notion of community, shared responsibility, and care for others. Further, Foster believes no feminist would consider foregoing sex (and perhaps we could say heterosexual sex) as a live option. Again, while this may be true for many liberal feminists, what of lesbian and radical feminists?

Chapter five through seven focus on the Oneida Perfectionists. Founded by John Humphrey Noyes, this community sought to create a stable social order. This stability would come only when private ownership was overcome. One aspect of such possessiveness to be overcome was the monogamous couple. Noyes believed all should be loved equally; the community should take precedence over the individual. There was, therefore, communal property and free love. Sex was used to create social bonds and learn to exercise self-control. To prevent a skyrocketing birth rate, male continence was demanded and practiced.

While Noyes agreed with many tenants of the feminist movement, he saw it as asking for too much change. He sought a balance of solidarity and liberty. Despite these reservations, Foster points out several things the Oneida community did do to change the status and opportunities of women. Women were 1) freed from unwanted pregnancies, 2) freed from individual childcare, 3) freed by short hair and Bloomer pants, 4) freed to
choose their work, 5) freed to participate in business and religious policy making, and 6) freed from the sexual double standard and given free sexual expression. (91)

In regard to analyzing the Oneida community, Foster acknowledges that there may be more than one feminist perspective, though the choices remain constricted.

Is contemporary "liberation" for women to be achieved by women simply taking on the same roles and activities as men? Or does such liberation primarily involve freeing women to choose whatever they really want to do, including, in some cases, assume domestic roles? (100)

Despite this recognition, Foster claims feminists misunderstand the communitarian ideal by calling for women to be free individuals, choosing for themselves rather than for the community. Again, this is a possible critique of liberal feminist theory, but not necessarily of other feminists theories.

Chapters eight through eleven discuss the Mormons. Foster says he will focus on the effect of polygamy on women according to their own accounts. This is done, but in the shadow of a detailed Mormon history and a fair amount of psychological analyses of the central male figures of Moronism.

Whatever the reasons for, or justification of, polygamy it seems quite clear from women's accounts that there was a great deal of psychological and physical coercion to get them to accept the practice. Foster presents diary entries of women who accepted polygamy, rejected it, and women who remained ambivalent. All of these women report being physically intimidated during the "interview" when the proposal was made, and feeling pressured by the threat of the loss of salvation.

Despite the resistance of many women, and the questionable techniques to get acceptance, Foster insists polygamy was basically a freeing institution for women. While they may have experienced some emotional strain, it allowed them to improve their social status and gave them an increased feeling of pride and significance. Foster argues polygamy freed women from male control. While the men were away on missions, the women worked together and took care of themselves; they had responsibility and independence.

Foster does note the possibility that this could be as much due to frontier conditions requiring everyone to do what they could as to the freedom provided by polygamy, but he does not examine the possibility any further. For example, he extols the fact the Mormons pushed for women to vote without considering the possibility that they did so to gain more control of the state, rather than because they thought women should vote.

Again, however, to be critical of the Mormons from a "feminist" perspective is not to be allowed. Foster writes:
At the outset, it must be emphasized that the more militant types of feminism that stress individualism and full equality for women are fundamentally antithetical to the hierarchical ideology underlying Moronism. Neither now nor in the foreseeable future is militant feminism likely to be a viable option within the Mormon church. (213)

Foster makes no attempt to define these "militant types of feminism," though one can surmise he is again concerned with liberal feminism. Why is this now militant, though? One can easily be in favor of equal individual rights without being militant. Further, what is inherently wrong with being militant? If Foster wants to say that practically such an approach is limited in regard to the Mormon community, that is one thing, but to say that these are somehow wrongheaded because they clash with other Mormon ideals is quite another move.

Overall, the book lacks a clear focus. The analysis of women's roles, relationships, and responsibilities is superficial, shows a lack of understanding regarding feminist theories, and is misleading. While I appreciate the attempt, I am disappointed with the result. This is a useful historical reference, but there is still plenty of room for a thorough analysis of women and utopian communities.

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The essays in this slim volume treat central, "transcendentally important" issues in pragmatic social and political philosophy. As they aim to provide both an understanding of our intellectual past and a contribution to our collective future, they serve both historical and social goals. All eight essays are clearly written, carefully argued, rigorously researched, and constructive and generous in tone. Six of the eight essays have appeared in earlier versions in scholarly journals. In this light, this book might well be viewed as Campbell's "Greatest Hits, Volume I."

The first chapter, a new essay, "Pragmatic Social Thought," serves as a very brief introduction and a chapter summary. Campbell distinguishes non-philosophical forms of pragmatism—shallow opportunism and anti-intellectualism—from the philosophical pragmatism of Peirce and James and its later development in the social thought of Dewey, Mead, and Tufts. The core of this social pragmatism, for Campbell, is a commitment to cooperative reconstruction of social institutions.