Thus, although neither Dewey nor Santayana accept supernaturalism, Santayana sees no need to discard the practices traditionally associated with it. These practices have long fulfilled and can continue to fulfill human needs for disengagement from the everyday reality of practical social institutions.

In my estimation, Levinson accomplishes two important objectives in this text. First, he presents a scholarly and sympathetic interpretation of Santayana which places him squarely within the classical pragmatic tradition. Second, he offers a persuasive argument for the positive value of a religious naturalism inspired by the pragmatic tradition. Thus, the book represents not only a worthy addition to the secondary source material on Santayana, but also a vital contribution to the ongoing philosophical conversation about the role of spirituality in human life. Those of us with scholarly interests in both pragmatism and spirituality who have by and large ignored Santayana would do well to devote careful attention to Levinson's book.

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The central thesis of this book is that the American philosophical tradition provides an alternative to philosophical "modernism" which is not vulnerable to the critiques of "postmodernist" thinkers such as Derrida and Richard Rorty. Neville holds that "modernism harbors two requirements for philosophy: that philosophy be foundationalist and that it be intelligible and valuable in a self-contained manner" (p. 93). But, he argues, American pragmatism and process philosophy have always been strongly anti-foundationalist, and have recognized the essential interconnection between philosophy and other fields such as "science, politics, religion, art, history and practical affairs" (pp. 93-4). American philosophy is thus a product of "modernity" without being "modernist."

Unlike postmodernist thinkers who proclaim "the end of metaphysics," Neville holds that "metaphysics is . . . central to the way around modernism" (p. 111). Thus he feels that Richard Rorty denigrates or ignores an essential aspect of the American tradition: the speculative and systematic thinking of Peirce, James, Dewey, Whitehead, and their followers and philosophical descendants. In this sense he is also somewhat critical of Richard Bernstein for "downplaying the plainly metaphysical contributions to the American tradition," and for "suggesting that Americans can be just as modernist as the analytic philosophers and the Europeans" (p. 90). His sharpest criticism, however, is reserved for Rorty, who has "fudged this distinction:
philosophy about foundations does not have to be foundational in the sense of uncriticizable formal or ordinary language, or an eidetic reduction" (p. 176). Rorty and other postmodern thinkers also err in their attempt to tell a "totalizing story of philosophy" in the modern period (p. 16); Neville considers such postmodern totalizing critiques "absurd and arrogant" (p. 52).

After an introductory chapter, Neville begins his account of the American "highroad around modernism" with a discussion of Peirce, stressing the antifoundationalist character of his thought from his early critique of Cartesianism to his later "hypothetical" metaphysical speculations. Subsequent chapters deal with Whitehead's philosophy both sympathetically and critically, stressing its non-modernist character and its affinity with American pragmatism. There is also a broader discussion of Twentieth Century metaphysics in America, and an attempt to formulate an idea of philosophical system understood as "speculative hypothesis," which will not be vulnerable to postmodernist criticism. Part I of the book ends with some "reflections on American philosophy," arguing that "the American can be a world philosophy" (p. 176), and suggesting goals for American philosophers in the decades just ahead.

The second part of Neville's book is "an attempt to think systematically out of a speculative system about topics in politics and culture" (p. 21). Neville here applies his own philosophical and religious ideas to the consideration of a number of subjects including power, responsibility, leadership, economic analysis, and the proper role of technology in the modern world. In so doing he attempts to exemplify one non-modernist alternative to postmodern philosophy of culture, and to demonstrate specifically the value of systematic thinking for an understanding and evaluation of contemporary society. Neville notes that "there is an inevitable tension between attempting to make a case for a tradition and a contemporary community of discourse, on the one hand, and the author's own version within that community, on the other" (p. 282, n. 9). In Part I of his book the emphasis is on the former enterprise, whereas Part II is a more explicit expression of the latter. However, as Neville himself is aware, his own ideas certainly color his account of the "tradition and contemporary community," while his sense of that tradition and community and its role in establishing a road around modernism remain important in the more specific formulation and application of his own views.

The chapters which comprise this volume had their origins as talks and articles produced over a number of years. Although the material has clearly been reworked for inclusion here, a certain amount of overlap and repetition remains, and the argument of the book does not always flow as smoothly as it might if it had been written as a single work. Particularly in Part II, the discussion adumbrates a number of topics which are considered in greater detail in some of Neville's other works. For example, Neville's own "axiological metaphysics" is fully laid out in Recovery of the Measure (SUNY Press, 1989), and a number of the
social ideas discussed in the present work are dealt with more systematically in *The Puritan Smile* (SUNY Press, 1987) and *The Cosmology of Freedom* (Yale University Press, 1974). However, the idea that the American tradition provides a viable and often-neglected alternative to both modernism and postmodernism, and the attempt to work out some implications of this from a specific standpoint which draws on that tradition, provide this book with a distinctive theme and focus, and make it a valuable addition to the growing corpus of Neville's work.

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Fukuyama's 1989 article "The End of History" reintroduced the latent Hegelian optimism of much of American thought into the contemporary political debate. Fukuyama summarized the utopian liberal state as "... liberal democracy in the political sphere combined with easy access to VCRs and stereos in the economic." In this book, Fukuyama argues that moral freedom is more significant than economic, and stresses the importance of recognition of human dignity as the means by which liberalism ends history. Liberal states must satisfy the thymotic side of human nature. And liberalism succeeds by providing for mutual recognition of human dignity and the maximum opportunity to publicly express individual values.

Fukuyama still believes that a universal philosophical history is possible because history can be understood as a single, coherent, evolutionary process culminating in liberal democracy. He distinguishes political liberalism, the recognition in law of a sphere of individual rights free from government control, from liberal democracy in which all citizens share in political power. The economic manifestation of liberalism is its recognition of free economic exchange based on private property and open markets.

The point of these distinctions is that one can have political liberalism without democracy. And, the most advantageous economic arrangement would be political liberalism and strong government control. This leads Fukuyama to speculate on why political liberalism and economic development lead to liberal democracy.

Fukuyama rejects "Anglo-Saxon liberalism" which defines freedom negatively as the absence of external coercion. The Hegelian freedom of making moral choices is what will be found at the end of history. The ability to make such choices is demonstrated by the willingness to risk one's life for a value. This demonstrates that history is fueled by conflict, and that the good society must be more than a non-aggression pact. It must satisfy all citizens' desires for recognition of their dignity.