Stack's knowledge of Nietzsche and Emerson is deep and thorough, and his explanation and interpretation makes Nietzsche especially accessible and, at least for me, more acceptable. Nietzsche turns out to be deeply radical, but no "wild man." Stack's study is a model of philosophical interpretation (which I will use to show students how to draw causal and interpretative connections). There is some (though not much) awkward phrasing, and sometimes it is difficult, without much backtracking, to determine if Nietzsche or Emerson is the antecedent for a pronoun. The book is remarkably free of publisher's and printer's blemishes. Stack has produced an interesting, insightful, and persuasive account of the influence of Ralph Waldo Emerson on Friedrich Nietzsche.

University of Florida

Robert R. Sherman


It is a long awaited pleasure, for which I thank Messrs. Ketner and Putnam, to have this important example of Peirce's transitional philosophizing available on my shelf where I can reach for it and study it at my leisure. Bits of these lectures were placed separately and confusingly in the Collected Papers with no indication of the time at which Peirce wrote them.

The introduction, comments, and notes (comprising 119 of 261 pages of text) are both misleading and instructive. It contains a brief biographical sketch which makes no mention of Peirce's disabling illnesses and the alcohol and drug abuse connected with them, or of his many serious moral failings as causes for his inability to succeed professionally. Instead, continuing an unfortunate pattern of prudishness which undermines any serious attempt to understand this prodigious man, the authors write of "trying to forgive his frailties." In fact, these lectures were given a few months after he had spent two poverty-stricken years with his seriously ill wife in New York City as a fugitive from Pennsylvania law for the crime of assault on his female servant (not the first), reduced to sleeping in the streets and stealing food to keep from starving, while he frantically tried to being one of his many and foolhardy get-rich-quick schemes to succeed. He wrote a friend at the time, "The prospect is that I shall soon be in receipt of large sums from an invention . . . almost an Arabian nights cave of wealth . . . my share in it will be worth several million dollars." Nor do the authors present the intoxicated, obsessive and afflicted philosopher who "voraciously" pursued truth as "an uncontrollable impulse" at the sacrifice of almost everything else. Truly, his was a singular, magnificent, almost Rabelaisian intelligence which continued furiously to track down the Real in every instant he could snatch from his struggle to survive. As Peirce wrote James in one of the illumina-
I have learned a great deal about philosophy in the last few years, because they have been very miserable and unsuccessful years, --terrible beyond anything that the man of ordinary experience can possibly understand or conceive.

The 1898 lectures are the first to reflect, still very incompletely, what Peirce discovered so painfully and admirably during those years. The authors accurately connect these lectures with James' decision to point out, in his California Union Address of the same year, that Peirce originated pragmatism in 1872, and with the beginning of Royce's increasingly intense study of Peirce's doctrine of signs which became the kernel of *The Problem of Christianity* published in 1918.

The lengthy introduction provides an elegantly simple analysis of Peirce's conception of continuity in mathematical terms, placing it within the appropriate mathematical history (without, however, describing its origin in Leibniz's conception). It provides the reader an understanding not only of how Peirce's approach to the idea of a continuum, because of his use of infinitesimals, is at odds with most modern thinking on the subject, but also how it is consistent with modern non-standard analysis and its rehabilitation of infinitesimals, and of how this history helps in understanding Peircean continuity and his doctrine of Synechism. The authors summarize:

The metaphysics of continuity, in Peirce's sense, is not merely or primarily a metaphysics which insists that there are a lot of important continua in nature, or a lot of important continuous functions in physics; it is a metaphysics which identified ideal continuity with the notion of inexhaustible and creative possibility.

They do not, however, extend their analysis to show how prescient Peirce's Synechism was in its mathematical and theoretical anticipation of the work of such modern physicists and cosmologists as Niels Bohr and David Bohm. Generally, the authors focus narrowly on the logic of science.

One of the major benefits of these lectures is that they provide a fine example of the way in which Peirce thought by means of diagrams and it is a delight to follow his track. As the authors point out:

... for Peirce the simplest and most basic laboratory was the kind of experimenting upon the diagrams one finds in mathematics [and that] mathematics was an observational, experimental, hypothesis-confirming inductive science that worked only with pure hypotheses without regard to their application in "real" life.
But these lectures are not, as the authors claim, the single work that is an "introduction to Peirce's overall later philosophy." There is virtually nothing in them of Peirce's Formal Semeiotic, or of his critical-commonsensism, or of his phenomenology, or of his of ideal-realism. The lectures, in fact, deny what was shortly to become for Peirce the source of his system, esthetics, and the dependence of logic on that. For these critical elements of his later philosophy we must wait for the second volume of Houser and Kloesel's The Essential Peirce which will include the 1903 Harvard lectures in which Peirce does present almost all his late ideas.

University of the District of Columbia

Joseph Brent


For many years, general readers and philosophers interested in Charles Peirce had available two one volume selections of his writings. The first, Philosophical Writings of Peirce was published in 1940, selected and edited by Justus Buchler. This appears in a later Dover edition which was published in 1955. The second available text, Charles S. Peirce: Selected Writings, subtitled Values in a Universe of Chance, appeared in 1958 and was later published in a Dover edition in 1966. This volume was edited and introduced by Philip P. Weiner.

Now we have the good fortune of a new and selected series of Peirce's important and philosophically significant papers. The first volume contains twenty-five chronologically arranged texts which cover Peirce's work from the early papers on the Categories and the Cognition Series to the later and more speculative Monist Metaphysical Series. Thus, the reader can rather nicely grasp and sense the development in Peirce's thought in this period of his work. We are promised a second volume which will cover the period from 1894 until Peirce's death in 1914, and will primarily focus on the development of his semiotics and his pragmaticism.

The Essential Peirce begins with a Foreword by the editors, N. Houser and C. Kloesel, which explains the purpose and manner of selecting each essay in the volume. It also informs the reader how daunting a task it is to compile a representative selection of Peirce's writings. Thus, the editors mention that many of Peirce's important logical, scientific, and mathematical, papers are omitted. What is important, as well, is that the textual integrity of each essay is preserved so the reader can rest assured of the accuracy and completeness of each essay.

As many readers who are familiar with Peirce's body of work will know, it is by no means an easy task in one volume or two to present, comprehensively and developmentally, Peirce's method and system. But Houser and Kloesel have done admirably. For those