case closely bound as it was to the physiology of the nineteenth century. But as has been noted, James was also ineluctably drawn beyond this standpoint. In his own introduction James writes: "Psychology, the science of finite individual minds, assumes as its data (1) thoughts and feelings, and (2) a physical world in time and space with which they coexist and which (3) they know. Of course these data themselves are discussable; but the discussion of them (as of other elements) is called metaphysics and falls outside the province of this book." (Principles I: v). Fortunately for posterity James did not always follow his own intentions. Metaphysics and phenomenology did leak into the pages of the intended and supposed treatise on the science of psychology. And for this reason his work is richer and therefore more worthy of our retrieval than even he might have supposed or anticipated.

It is fitting to conclude I thin, as Mary Henle does, with an excerpt from a review of the Principles by Leon Marillier in the Revue Philosophique: "in spite of the objections which would necessarily be raised to the theories it contains, it is nevertheless a glorious work."

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In his moving conclusion to A COMMON FAITH, Dewey maintains that it is our responsibility to render "the heritage of values we have received . . . more widely accessible and more generously shared than we have received it." Steven Rockefeller has most impressively discharged that responsibility as regards the values bound-up with the life and thought of Dewey. The accessibility of this work to a wide audience does not diminish its importance for those already familiar with the main contours of Dewey's life and work. Their understanding of Dewey will be enhanced by new details and fresh insights. Those less familiar with the extended life and monumental work of Dewey will be engagingly led into the richness, complexity, subtlety, and scope of his views, centering around but in no way restricted to those concerned with "religion."

The purpose of this study, the author tells us, "is to approach Dewey's life and thought from the perspective of its religious meaning and value." (5) However, since "the religious dimension of Dewey's thought cannot be understood apart from his philosophy as a whole," (18) Rockefeller will consider at some length Dewey's views relating to metaphysics, ethics, epistemology, science, education, and politics. Not only does Rockefeller avoid isolating Dewey's religious concerns from his philosophy as
a whole, he also avoids isolating those concerns from Dewey's life. Thus we are presented with an exceptionally artful blending of the biographical and the intellectual -- a blending that is most appropriate for the presentation of a thinker whose central concern was the overcoming of dualisms of all kinds and in every realm. While it is true that Rockefeller's consideration of Dewey's life experiences is principally in the service of understanding his thought, a happy consequence of this approach is that it shows how profoundly Dewey's thought was in the service of his life.

Two intertwined themes running throughout this work are Dewey's changing views concerning the character and role of "religious faith" and/or "God" and the emergence and development of Dewey's "democratic humanism." It is a central claim, persuasively argued, that these are not separate concerns of Dewey and that while there is a definite shift in emphasis and articulation towards democratic humanism, Dewey's concern for "God" or the divine is never totally abandoned. It is in those chapters dealing with Dewey's early religious and philosophical formation that Rockefeller lays the groundwork for his contention that Dewey's democratic humanism incorporates an indispensable "religious quality." He shows that the early formation of Dewey's views on religion resulted not only in a "permanent deposit" left in his thinking by Hegel but also by Coleridge and James Marsh. One of the distinctive features of Rockefeller's study is his demonstration of how Dewey's early views on religion were radically reconstructed but never completely jettisoned. "Dewey's later philosophy of religion," he maintains, "involves working out the full implications of the convictions and ideas formed in his early period and harmonizing them with his maturing philosophical outlook." (212)

Again and again Rockefeller calls attention to Dewey's effort to construct a "middle way" -- between sentimentalism and rationalism, between moral absolutism and subjectivism, between atomistic individualism and collectivism, between pessimism and optimism. Dewey's attempt to construct a "middle way" in any area, of course, is never a construction ab ovo but always a reconstruction of a number of diverse and often conflicting ideas, beliefs, symbols, and institutions. A notable merit of Rockefeller's exposition is that he presents compelling evidence that Dewey's "middle way" was never a wishy-washy compromise or superficial irrecrimic. Rather, it was always an effort to be responsible to the richness and complexity and indeed the obscurity of concrete situations. The timeliness of and necessity for attempting to devise a "middle way" along Deweyan lines in the political-economic realm would seem evident given the collapse of socialism/communism and the concurrent tendency to celebrate an uncritical and unnuanced capitalism. But now, even more than in Dewey's time, it is imperative to avoid romanticizing or minimizing the tasks confronting those desirous of bringing democracy
into existential reality rather than merely abstract idealization. Rockefeller's book might serve as both a primer and advanced text for those seriously reflecting on an attempting to implement the experimental approach which Dewey believed was the only one that had the possibility for continuing the enrichment and growth of the individual-community. It is an approach, however, which promises no utopian paradise nor any once and for all resolution to concrete human problems. Now, as then, of course, this will not satisfy those who desire certainty of the worth of their values and totalist and permanent solutions to vexing and ongoing human problems. The response to those doubtful of such an experimental method might well be that made by Dewey to Reinhold Niebuhr: "What are the alternatives? Dogmatism, reinforced by the weight of unquestioned custom and tradition, the disguised or open play of class interests, dependence upon brute force and violence" (cited, 463).

The harmonizing value of democracy is, for the most part, uncontroversial. It is quite otherwise with the contention that democracy involves religious faith and gives rise to a quality of experience which can properly be designated "religious." Rockefeller maintains that for Dewey, only "when a moral faith has a distinctively religious function" may it "be termed a religious faith." (479) "Moral faith in the democratic ideal" has such a function and may be viewed "as religious insofar as it is whole-hearted and [involves] the unifying of personality and harmonizing of self and world." (558)

Concerning the intimate relation between democracy and the religious, two questions can be raised, albeit from distinct if not opposing perspectives: Is such a relation adequate for experiencing the depth and scope of the "religious"? Is such a relation necessary to inspire and energize humans to create and participate in democracy?

Whatever controversy surrounded and surrounds Dewey's insistence on the religious dimension of democracy is compounded by his reintroduction of "God" in the last stage of his thought. Rockefeller points out that by the time he was 35, Dewey had separated himself not only from institutional religion but from all philosophical expressions of God, whether in the earlier theistic or later absolute idealistic modes. Still, "he never did entirely abandon the idea of God," (231) and his "poetry reveals that during his fifties the symbolic image of God was still active in the inner dialogue that went on in his imagination and that he was reflecting on new ways of thinking about God." (321) When at age 75, in A COMMON FAITH, "Dewey redefines the word 'God' to denote the ongoing active process of 'uniting...the ideal and the actual,'" (519) few pretended to fully understand him. The reviews ranged from critic Reinhold Niebuhr's contention that Dewey's "credo comes closer than Dr. Dewey is willing to admit to the primary tenets of prophetic
religion," to supporter Corliss Lamont's lament expressed in the title of his review: "John Dewey Capitu lates to `God'." (523)

Rockefeller clearly believes that Dewey's attempted reconstruction of the idea of God was worthwhile and merits continu ance. Though stating that "this essay is not the place to explore at length a reconstruction of Dewey's idea of God," (536) he does, directly and indirectly, drop some tantalizing hints as to what such a reconstruction would involve. Quite obviously, any idea of God constructed along Dewey's lines would exclude the views associated with traditional theism and supernaturalism; less obviously, but just as importantly, it would exclude any deification of nature or humanity. In addition, Rockefeller insists that "to identify God with the imaginative vision of the unity of all ideals arousing us to desire and actions" does not mean that God is just a matter of wish-fantasy or that God is an illusion." (517) Rockefeller might here have recalled the belief of the young Dewey that he had earlier described: "If people think that ideals are merely a product of human imagination and wish, they will lose their moral convictions and determination." (112) Of course, articulating a version of God which is generated by imagination but is not imaginary in the deenergizing sense alluded to by the young Dewey is the formidable task confronting anyone attempting a Deweyean reconstruction of the idea of God.

Rockefeller suggests that Dewey's naturalism might not be fully adequate to the reconstruction which is called for:

Does Dewey's naturalistic view of the world make intelligible how ultimate meaning is possible? In other words, does his account of the religious dimension of experience have implications for an understanding of reality that are not fully articulated in his metaphysics and idea of the divine? Does Dewey's own religious experience point to a depth of reality that is not adequately expressed in his philosophical language?" (532)

The clue to any Deweyean reconstruction is, of course, given in this last question for, as Rockefeller throughout his study has shown, philosophical language for Dewey must follow experience and not vice versa. "The fundamental inspiration for Dewey's interpretation of religious experience is his own religious experience and the evolution of his personal religious consciousness." (475) Hence, thanks to Rockefeller, it is now clear that it was the depth and richness of his own experience and its priority over all ideas, including his own, that kept Dewey from relinquishing the "religious" and "God" in favor of a more intellectually consistent secular humanism.

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