may learn from Bush's radical politics and provocative argumentativeness.

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As the title suggests, Goodman's American Philosophy and the Romantic Tradition is an attempt to trace the development of "romantic" themes in major American philosophers. The book concentrates on romanticism in the thought of Ralph Waldo Emerson, William James and John Dewey. Goodman's rather strong emphasis on the pragmatists makes his book a significant contribution to the recent shift away from a purely instrumentalist account of pragmatism towards a balanced account that includes aestheticism. For this reason alone, I would recommend this monograph for both the student and scholar studying James or Dewey.

Goodman's thesis is that romanticism is an essential theme in the philosophical ideas set forth by Emerson, James and Dewey. He readily admits that this is not the only way to interpret these philosophers, but that by bringing to light the romantic continuities in the American philosophical tradition he will have "chart[ed] some new routes through the terrain, and open[ed] certain new prospects to general view" (p. x). Goodman does this and more. His interpretative insights on Emerson, James and Dewey extend much deeper than drawing the romantic continuities in their thought. The book's four chapters rest on solid scholarship, as indicated by the numerous, helpful references.

The chapter on Emerson, for example, is an excellent introduction to Emerson's philosophy seen as a development of Kant's philosophy. Here Goodman's scholarship is strongest. Yet this point is mitigated somewhat by what appears to this reader as an overreliance on Stanley Cavell's interpretation of Emerson.

"Romanticism," on Goodman's account, involves a number of overlapping themes: (1) a "marriage of self and world" that undercut philosophical skepticism, (2) a robust conception of experience (inclusive of noncognitive structures like feeling, imagination and will), (3) an emphasis on the expression of the feeling subject through poetry, (4) experimentalism, and (5) a "transformative" humanism that connects the natural and the spiritual. Goodman effectively shows that these romantic themes are present and essential in the thought of all three American philosophers. He argues persuasively that there is no necessary opposition between empiricism and Romanticism, hence no fundamental contradiction between romanticism and pragmatism. Goodman
even goes so far as to include a certain brand of idealism as a "romantic" link between Emerson, James and Dewey. Here Goodman is on thinner ice. I, for one, am not convinced that idealism accurately describes the pragmatism of James and Dewey.

In what I detect as a weakness of the book, Goodman does not develop the numerous themes in pragmatism (e.g., anti-absolutism or the social construction of the self) that appear to run counter to his romantic interpretation. If James and Dewey are not wholly romantic philosophers (a claim Goodman would appear to accept), then he should have spent some effort pointing out the delimitations of a romantic interpretation. It would have provided the sense of balance that is missing, and some fruitful insights, if Goodman had explored the romantic "edges" of pragmatism and shown us (perhaps dialectically) which elements in pragmatism stand outside of (or in opposition to) the romantic themes James and Dewey appropriate.

In making his case for the romanticism of pragmatism, Goodman exhibits a perceivable prejudice in the works cited. Although Goodman is entirely correct in citing Dewey's *Art as Experience* as evidence for Deweyan "romanticism," he neglects textual sources that present a complex (sometimes nonromantic) picture. In *Experience and Nature* and *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*, for example, Dewey's romanticism is tempered (if not contradicted) by his anti-transcendentalist naturalism and cultural emergentism. Furthermore, Goodman displays an uncritical eagerness to accept the personal statements of James and Dewey that square with the romantic interpretation. For instance, he naively accepts Dewey's version of Emerson's philosophy as evidence for real continuities between pragmatism and romanticism. What Dewey says about Emerson should have little weight in itself, since the real test of continuity is whether the genuine Emerson (not Dewey's "reconstructed" Emerson) and the corpus of Dewey's pragmatism (not his Emersonian mood) actually agree on the major issues. On this matter of philosophical agreement, in spite of Goodman's best efforts, the journey is still out.

Despite these few weaknesses—perhaps only spurs to further reflection—the monograph is extremely valuable because it effectively demonstrates the central role of romanticism in the American philosophical tradition. Goodman is at his best in this work when he articulates how Emerson, James and Dewey reject "paltry empiricism" (e.g., Locke's sensationalistic empiricism) and glorify the kind of creature or poetic experience that lifts and revitalizes human life. Here he has put his finger on the qualities that make American philosophy profound and distinctive. Goodman's romantic interpretation shows the richness and cultured sensitivity of Emerson, James and Dewey, thus providing a counterweight to the unbalanced picture of American philosophy as mundane "practicalism." In this way, Goodman's book has done a
laudable service for we Americanists. This solid study of American romanticism belongs not only in the specialist's library, but also in the library of any college that offers courses in American philosophy.

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