ing the Sense of Deity in all humans which would help them work together to create a better republic (p. 85). The Sense of Deity could be sparked only if "three avenues for knowing"--sensation, reason, and testimony--combined (pp. 114, 89). Of these, divine testimony was the most important. Testimony required an individual and corporate will that was capable of assenting to the certainty of true testimony. The holy scriptures and church traditions were the dominant mediums of its communication. Rush therefore supported a diversity of religious traditions--including helping to found a black church--on the basis that each tradition could contribute to to the whole of testimony. Voluntary associations of people assenting to testimony and the other two avenues of knowledge would be grounded in a Sense of Deity that would undercut the destructive force of post-1790s America. The unified spirit of the Revolutionary era would be renewed, and the Republic would be founded upon a right-minded population.

The weakness in Kloos' book is that he does not fully understand the epistemological and psychological traditions that Rush was working with. Kloos mentions two sources for Rush's view of testimony--Middle-Colony revivalism and the Scottish Enlightenment--but spends most of his time unsuccessfully trying to associate Rush's ideas with an eighteenth-century theory of the sublime. He would have done better to stick to the epistemological traditions of the revivalists and Scots. Granted there is very little secondary literature on the role of testimony in epistemology (there is an article on "Reid on Testimony" by C. A. J. Coady in The Philosophy of Thomas Reid (1989), eds. Melvin Dalgarno and Eric Matthews), but the logic textbooks and the major epistemological movements after the Reformation all had to deal with the certainty of faith when based on human and/or divine testimony. The importance of assent to testimony by the human will as transformed by divine grace or corrupted by sin was at least a three hundred year old debate by the time Rush lived.

Kloos' book is an important advance in understanding Rush, but there is much more to be done. Kloos leaves us still unclear about the intellectual creativity of Rush and his place in history. Rush was certainly not, as Kloos says, just a popularizer reflecting main currents of thought. He was closer to a "crackpot" than that. He was a social visionary rooted in deep epistemological and psychological traditions who synthesized the old and the new in novel ways during one of the most intellectually stimulating periods of American history.

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Every discipline probably has its famous dissertations that were never published. Jerald Brauer and Martin Marty have finally found the opportunity to publish the late William Sparkes Morris' 1955 University of Chicago dissertation on the intellectual context of Jonathan Edwards' education. Norman Fiering wrote in *Jonathan Edwards's Moral Thought and its British Context* that Morris' nine-hundred page dissertation "remains the most comprehensive investigation of the intellectual influences upon Edwards in his youth." More than just a study of Edwards, this massive work is an insightful study of the Augustinian-Calvinist transatlantic philosophical culture of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.

In 1955 Morris' dissertation stood in opposition to the now almost completely discredited biography of Edwards by Perry Miller. Today the dissertation stands against a Harvard-Perry Miller school of history that has over-emphasized the influence of Ramus and Locke in early New England. Instead of Ramist logic being all dominant in the seventeenth century as it is in Miller and followers such as Elizabeth Flower and Murray G. Murphey's *The History of American Philosophy*, Morris is much more sensitive to the eclecticism of the era and especially the continuing influence of scholasticism and a post-Cartesian neo-scholasticism. As for Locke's influence, Morris is sensitive to Locke's own ambiguities and the way believers in active divine revelation could emphasize the fourth book of the *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* and easily merge it with strong metaphysical traditions. Morris shows the error of the one-dimensional Lockeanism that is so prevalent in later books such as Henry May's *The Enlightenment in America*. Miller, Morris wrote, fashioned "a twentieth-century Edwards...in terms of nineteenth-century continental sensationalism" (p. 9). Morris' assessment is correct and stands today among the new scholarship which continues to expose the parochial character of Early American intellectual history in the 1960s and 70s.

Morris's book is bottled fresh air from the fifties. More than any other Early American intellectual historian Morris leaps into the intellectual eclecticism of period that for Edwards was a whirlpool drawing ideas into the service of his religion. The book can be criticized as too much of a search for source-texts; as not having made careful distinctions between available sources and actual sources; as over-emphasizing the youthful genius of Edwards; and as offering too much loose discussion of a "Suarezi-an tradition" of metaphysics that is never proved; yet the book consistently presents inciteful and stimulating possibilities. No other book in English has taken Franciscus Bergersdicius and Adrian Heereboord so seriously. Morris shows over and over the importance of Bergersdicius and Heereboord's Dutch Cartesian/neo-Aristotelian/Suarezian logic. Many ideas prevalent in New Eng-
land that are attached to philosophers famous in the twentieth century were developed and popularized by these two famous men of the seventeenth century.

Most of the book is rooted in the study of seventeenth-century logic. Morris understood the importance of logic in its humanist form that included what is now epistemology, metaphysics, psychology, and the feelings, will, instincts, and innate knowledge that make up "human nature." There has been much work in Continental and English humanist logic since the 1970s and Morris's work should be read in the context of recent works by especially E. J. Ashworth and Lisa Jardine. (For a start, see Ashworth's The Tradition of Medieval Logic and Speculative Grammar from Anselm to the End of the Seventeenth Century: A Bibliography from 1836 Onwards, Toronto, 1978.) Morris relies on Walter Ong's MA thesis on Ramus for the sources of post-Medieval logic and therefore does not understand the context of Bergersdicius and Heereboord as revealed in more modern scholarship. Recent publications and conferences in The Netherlands have helped shore up English-speaking knowledge of Rudolph Agricola, Bergersdicius, and a host of other Dutch authors. In the field of humanist logic, Morris could have used the work of later scholars; however, it is surprising how much he anticipates the work of scholars in the last decade. In my own case, I found that Morris summed up the basic theme of my own article on "The Alliance between Puritanism and Cartesian Logic at Harvard, 1687-1735," Journal of the History of Ideas LI (1990).

Besides putting Ramus and Locke in context, Morris also takes up other influences that have been proposed and discussed by more recent scholars. Morris shows the error of later statements by Flower and Murphey that Edwards' idealism was parallel to Berkeley's. Berkeley, Morris believed, would not have claimed Edwards as a disciple since "Edwards' whole method is a direct negation of all that Berkeley stood for." Morris shows that Edwards worked in the "great tradition of Plato and Aristotle, Spinoza and Leibnitz, and that long line of thinkers who refused to separate 'nature and nature's God'" (pp. 330-331). Like Fiering, Morris sees the importance of the third earl of Shaftsbury's influence on Edwards. Morris places his emphasis on Shaftsbury's esthetics of mathematics. Morris notes that Edwards showed very little reading of Augustine and Calvin, but was well read in the Augustinian-Calvinist tradition of the seventeenth century—especially Ames and Arnauld. Surprising for those who have read Fiering is the slight mention of Malebranche, Norris, and Gale.

The work is old but not dated. As a daunting and massive dissertation, it has lived in suspended animation. Now with publication it can attain its deserved stature among the most important works in Early American intellectual history.