nating comment on Peircean conditions for truth and falsity.

These criticisms, however, are relatively minor. All in all, Misak presents a clearly written and well argued account of a Peircean based pragmatic philosophy of truth. She goes a long way in the job of defending pragmatism against the direction in which the "new pragmatists" want to take Pierce and pragmatism, a direction that "follow[s] Peirce in eschewing a 'transcendental' view of truth, but...[goes] much further than Pierce in arguing that there is no sensible notion of truth to be had at all" (p. 1).

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Charles Hartshorne has revived philosophical theology through a striking combination of modal logic, temporal categories, and an implicit phenomenological method. His reconstruction of the ontological argument, and the corollary assertion that God is not only that than which nothing greater can be conceived, but is itself infinitely self-surpassable, has opened up new possibilities for our conception of the divine life. What makes Hartshorne unique, is his insistence that no account of God is adequate that fails to delineate the basic features of the world, and of the human process as it finds itself in an evolutionary cosmos. Consequently, Hartshorne has lavished great care on his analyses of perception (as a species of memory), concepts of relation (both symmetrical and asymmetrical), the nature of causality, the structures of temporality, and the elusive status of purpose within the neo-Darwinian synthesis.

This volume, like the others in the series, brings together a number of interlocutors who collectively probe into the basic categories of their subject. Hartshorne, in keeping with the format of the series, has written an intellectual biography and detailed replies to each of his critics. The replies combine both personal reminiscences and conceptual responses that greatly clarify many less well known aspects of Hartshorne's panentheism. The personal asides in the replies give the volume the flavor of a rare historical document on the history of twentieth century philosophy. After all, how many living philosophers can describe their studies and/or encounters with such figures as Husserl, Heidegger, and Whitehead? Hartshorne has been a first-person witness to two of the most important philosophical movements of our time: phenomenology and process metaphysics. While his own relation to phenomenology has begun to clarify itself in recent years, it is clear that he has taken its account of human experi-
Hartshorne's intellectual biography details his childhood and subsequent studies at Haverford and Harvard. Readers will be interested to know that Hartshorne spent two years (1917-1919) working as a medical orderly in France. During this intense period Hartshorne had an epiphany that largely shaped his subsequent philosophical perspective:

One day, looking at a beautiful French landscape, I had a vivid experience. A phrase of Santayana (coming to me second hand, I think) defining beauty as "objectified pleasure" popped into my mind. "No," I said to myself, and then something like the following: "the pleasure is not first in me as subject of this experience and then projected onto the object as in the experience. It is given as in the object, or at any rate some sort of feeling is so given. Nature comes to us as constituted by feelings, not as constituted by mere lifeless, insentient matter.

The concept of prehension, namely, that relations involve feeling of feeling, is crystallized in this experience. In addition, his commitment to panpsychism (or psychicalism), namely, that matter is actually a muted form of experience, is manifest in his sense that the qualities of feeling are part of the objective world of relation rather than being confined to the human process and its modes of awareness. This experience during the War years has obviously remained normative for Hartshorne's subsequent conceptual framework.

The experience of prehension, as the means by and through which all occasions are brought into relation, early on reinforced Hartshorne's commitment to the idea that bird song exhibits many of the fundamental features of a processive universe that has as one of its primary manifestations the drive for greater harmony of aesthetic contrasts. Insofar as birds seek to get past a kind of "monotony threshold" and to elaborate on antecedent song patterns, they participate in the natural drive toward more vital and complex prehensions. One of the most striking aspects of this volume is that it brings together, both conceptually and anecdotally, Hartshorne's dual interests in metaphysics and bird song. Since this reviewer has had the privilege of hearing Hartshorne lecture on both subjects, this conjunction is especially welcomed! The essays on Hartshorne are grouped into four categories: A. Empirical Inquiries (dealing with his study of bird song, his aesthetics, and his conceptions of sensation and will), B. Philosophy of Religion (dealing with his panentheism, relation to other religions, and his sense of community), C. Logic, Phenomenology, and Metaphysics (dealing with his concepts of: time, modality, order, and creativity), and D. Historical Antecedents (dealing with his relation to: Plato, Aristotle, Hegel, pragmatism, and Japanese thought). Needless to say, it is impossible to detail the criticisms of all 29 articles
in these four sections. Some representative essays will be selected that shed light on the larger conceptual issues involved in Hartshorne's neo-classical theism.

Charles Birch, in his essay, "Chance, Purpose, and Darwinism," details Darwin's ambivalence on the nature of chance and purpose in the universe. Birch argues that Darwin was more open to both possibilities than commonly suspected and that he is thus not as far away from a process perspective as might be assumed. He formulates his own sense of evolution (close to that of Hartshorne) in the phrase, "Only entities that have a degree of creativity can evolve." [57] Creativity is manifest throughout nature and finds a particularly interesting expression in bird song where, as noted, birds seek to surpass the mere repetition of antecedent songs. In doing so, they enhance, and at the same time go beyond, their mating and territorial needs.

John Hospers, in his essay, "Hartshorne's Aesthetics," deals with such interesting themes as color sensitivity (for example, the role of the color yellow in human culture and feeling), the role of unity-in-diversity in aesthetic value, and the analogy between aesthetic and religious experience. He criticizes Hartshorne for imposing his concept of "the life of feeling" on all art, preferring instead to make the Wittgensteinian-like claim that theory should play only a limited role in aesthetics. B. Cobb, Jr., in his essay, "Hartshorne's Importance for Theology," provides a thorough and precise account of the major outlines of Hartshorne's panentheism. Cobb, at the center of much of the creative work being done in process theology, details how Hartshorne rethinks the traditional concepts of divine power and divine love. He gives a very clear summation of the concept of the "whole" in Hartshorne:

Every entity within the world includes other entities within it. But this inclusion is fragmentary and limited. The whole, on the other hand, includes every entity perfectly. Similarly, every entity within the world can in principle be improved upon, can be superseded by something superior to it. But in the case of the whole, it can be surpassed only by later states of itself. No part could ever surpass the whole that completely includes it. [175-176]

Needless to say, a different logical structure applies to included entities than to the all-inclusive whole that functions in a distinctive manner. Cobb shows that Hartshorne's conception of God opens out new territory by correlating the forms of inclusion that obtain between God and the world. He has some difficulties with Hartshorne around the issues of eschatology and personal survival of bodily death. As is well known, Hartshorne denies the importance of subjective immortality, preferring instead to speak of our objective immortality within the consequent dimen-
sion of God (who retains our past in divine memory). For similar reasons, Hartshorne shies away from Christian eschatological language that would evoke a qualitative inversion at the end of human (and cosmic) history. Hartshorne prefers to remain reticent on these issues.

Jacquelyn Ann Kegley, in her essay, "The Divine Relativity and the Beloved Community," masterfully contrasts Hartshorne and Royce on their respective social views of reality. Both thinkers use the argumentative strategy which states that "...the will to deny a thesis wills its affirmation," [217], first developed by Royce in his famous "Argument from Error." Hartshorne, of course, develops this strategy in the context of contemporary modal logic. The upshot of this logical maneuver is that all basic categories have a secure foundation that lies beyond empirical criticism. Both thinkers share the sense that the self is what it is only because it emerges from social contrast and a larger communal order. Kegley summarizes the differences between Royce and Hartshorne as follows:

For Hartshorne God's work appears to me that of an artist, building unity in variety, balancing harmony and intensity, while Royce's God functions as interpreter of a world, also building unity in variety but with the ethical command on individuals in communities to be loyal to loyalty, i.e., to build ever-widening community and understanding, and the moral imperative on communities to build ever better environments for fostering individuality within a social context. [227]

Here it can be seen that Hartshorne gravitates toward aesthetic analogies and metaphors to enrich and, in a deeper sense, support his categorial structure, while Royce, always in some sense attuned to Christian considerations of sin and redemption, gravitates toward ethical images to enhance his sense of the spirit-filled community. In addition, as noted by Kegley, Royce develops a hermeneutic ontology that makes the triadic structure of interpretation central to both cosmic and personal growth. In his reply to Kegley's article, Hartshorne makes it clear that the concept of "sin" has played very little role in his conception of God, "I definitely disbelieve in a punishing deity..." [621]. Further, Hartshorne distances himself from any notion that the universe might exhibit an overall purpose (a vision that tempted Royce again and again), "...there is no long-run achievement, no rational aim of aims or purpose of all purposes." [622]

Nancy Frankenberry, in her essay, "Hartshorne's Method in Metaphysics," details the various strategies employed by Hartshorne as he develops his basic categories. She argues that he relies more on modal logic than on phenomenology and that the basic underlying commitment animating his categorial choices is
the "principle of contrast" (also known as the "principle of polarity"). Within any contrast of terms, one will be inclusive while the other will, by definition, be included. For Hartshorne, the more concrete term will include the less concrete one. Thus, for example, abstractness is included in concreteness, and the eternal is included in the temporal. The relation between any two metaphysical concepts is asymmetrical. One of the terms will be internally related to the other, while that other will be externally related to the former term.

Frankenberry concludes that Hartshorne, in addition to reworking Whitehead's categories, makes interesting use of Peirce's three primal categories of "firstness," "secondness," and "thirdness." There is a sense in which Peirce opened up the possibility of a novel future in a more dramatic way than did Whitehead. Hartshorne insists that the future is the domain of thirdness, that is, future possibilities and laws that are not sufficiently determined by antecedent conditions (secondness). Frankenberry carefully traces out the tensions between modal logic, induction, and phenomenology in Hartshorne's overall strategy.

Lewis S. Ford, in his essay, "Hartshorne's Interpretation of Whitehead," refines upon the comparison between both thinkers made in 1973 by David Ray Griffen. Two of these differences are crucial: 1) that God is not a single actual entity (Whitehead), but an "unending temporal series of divine occasions," [314] and, 2) that eternal objects are actually possibilities that emerge within the temporal process (Hartshorne). By pluralizing God and by temporalizing eternal entities (Peirce's "thirds") Hartshorne dramatically refines panentheism and makes it possible to show more clearly how God and the world of actuality/possibility interact. Hartshorne argues that the process of actualization is the movement toward definiteness, where possibilities become chosen by the actual occasion and brought into a concrete configuration. Time is the most basic form of asymmetry because all movement toward actualization involves the temporal movement toward definiteness in the present. The future has less definiteness/actuality than the present and past, and thus remains modally open. Ford's essay is especially valuable for those seeking to clarify the status of eternal entities within a process perspective.

Robert C. Neville, in his essay, "Time, Temporality, and Ontology," puts pressure on Hartshorne's conception of time and argues that we must reintroduce some sense of eternal time if we are to understand the depth logic of temporality. Neville distances himself from panpsychism and refers to his own position as that of "pan-naturalist." In his own conception of time's ontological makeup, Neville insists that the togetherness of the three modes of time can only be explained by an appeal to the eternal. The eternal is the primal act of creation that produces
temporal products but is not itself temporal. Neville gives his own account of the nature of the "ontological ground":

Apart from creating things, there is no character to the ontological ground or divinity, since all "character" requires essential and conditional features, all of which must be created. The identification of the ontological ground comes from noting that there are indeed finite, temporal things which must be grounded. I call the ground "divine" because creation makes the affinity of essential features for each other that have no worldly contact save through conditional features; this is profound love or compassion, deeper than the conditional connections of things which can be brutal beyond belief. [389]

This account of the eternal (or pre-temporal) ontological ground moves decisively away from Hartshorne's notion of contrasts, insofar as the relation between the ontological ground and the innumerable orders of the world is not an included/including one. I am increasingly persuaded that Neville advances beyond Hartshorne here and that he has probed more successfully into the depth-structures that underlie the manifest orders of the world. The ontological ground is indeed outside of time altogether and represents a novel form of togetherness. In his reply to Neville, Hartshorne argues that he has a place for the quasi-Tillichian sense of a "ground of Being" that is not an order within the world. On this issue, Neville seems to come down more strongly on the side of Tillich, and thereby to open out a depth-structure that Hartshorne's modal approach fails to exhibit.

Daniel A. Dombrowski, in his essay, "Hartshorne and Plato," makes a very strong case for the relevance of Plato in Hartshorne's conception of God and the world. This essay is not only a brilliant piece of Plato scholarship, but an extended reflection on the understanding of soul and psychic process in both thinkers. Dombrowski shifts the discussion of Plato away from the doctrine of the forms toward an analysis of the "World-Soul" in the Timaeus. Put in different terms, the shift takes place when we focus less on the forms and more on God, a God who is understood in terms of Hartshorne's di-polar theism.

For Dombrowski, Plato's God is both a creator and the created (primordial and consequent). The Demiurge is the creator God, while the World-Soul is the created God. The World-Soul dimension of God is, in some respects, the more important one. This is the dimension of God as self-moved soul, and "as the soul aware of all things." [476] The World-Soul becomes the divine coordinator who, through sympathy, holds the world together. Dombrowski rethinks Plato's Timaeus in such a way as to bring it much closer to panentheism. His summation of the Plato-Hartshorne
comparison is illuminating:

Hartshorne agrees with Burnet that Plato's greatest discovery regarding God does not concern the forms but soul or psychical process. This discovery allows us: to understand the primordial and everlasting ideal for the cosmos—the good—in the supreme soul; to realize that "creativity" is the true transcendental, which applies to creator and creatures alike; to claim that cosmic order requires one soul to order the others, yet disorder does not require one soul (e.g., Satan), only a multiplicity of agents able to get in each other's way; to urge that the classical theistic "problem of evil" could not so much as arise in Plato's thought because God is not totally responsible for the world. [483]

Panpsychism is thus prefigured in Plato and the di-polar conception of a creator/created God was a possibility within the classical Greek period. Dombrowski not only revives an often overlooked aspect of Plato, but helps us to reshape the early history of panentheism. This in turn makes it possible to break out of the usual readings of the history of Greek thought as it impinges on the still self-transforming world of process theism.

John E. Smith, in his essay, "Neoclassical Metaphysics and the History of Philosophy," examines Hartshorne's explicit treatment of Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel. He argues that Hartshorne is at his historical best in his treatment of Aristotle, especially in the modal analysis of time and eternity. When it comes to Kant and Hegel, however, the plot thickens. The problem becomes most acute in Hartshorne's reading of Hegel's dialectic. For Hartshorne, Hegel understood the principle of contrast but applied it without proper restrictions or limitations. He accuses Hegel of imposing a doctrine of internal relation that makes all otherness suspect (hence having no room for genuine contrast). Smith defends Hegel on the grounds that his dialectic not only takes otherness seriously, but emphasizes content over form. Smith accuses Hartshorne of giving an ahistorical reading of the tradition. The case of Hegel is one of the more instructive ones insofar as Hartshorne has had little sympathy with either Hegel's ontology or his conception of method. There are occasions where Hartshorne allows his historical sensibility to become clouded by his modal strategies. Recent scholarship, to which Smith has contributed, has shown that Hegel was far from a wooden dialectician, and that he immersed himself in content (especially that of the world religions).

Donald S. Lee, in his essay, "Hartshorne and Pragmatic Metaphysics," contrasts his own categorial scheme with that of Hartshorne, arguing in turn that Hartshorne has an ambiguous
relation to pragmatism. While there are many points of agree­
ment, pragmatism's naturalism contrasts with Hartshorne's super­
naturalism. It should be noted, of course, that the term "natu­
ralism" does not have an agreed upon meaning, any more than does
the more elusive term "supernaturalism." However defined, the
tension remains between a perspective that deals with external
relations within the world and one that envisions internal rela­
tions between a divine and a natural order. Lee sees some ten­
sions between Hartshorne's ubiquitous use of the concept of
"feeling" and the pragmatic sense that feelings are confined to
the animal kingdoms.

In addition to the problems of supernaturalism and prehen­
sion (feeling) is the problem of continuity. Just where is
continuity located? Is it located in the realm of possibility (Hartshorne), or in the realms of actuality (Peirce, Mead, &
Dewey)? The issue is a complex one because Hartshorne shares the
pragmatic commitment to the idea that all relations are as real
as the relata. Are the relations within the actual continuous or
discrete? Hartshorne's atomism (derived from Whitehead) compels
him to affirm that given actualities are discrete (as novel
concrescences). Lee thus argues that Hartshorne cannot be a
pragmatist on the three issues of: supernaturalism, the scope of
feeling within nature, and the locus of continuity. In his reply
to Lee, Hartshorne points out that Peirce had a doctrine of
feeling close to his own. This is a fair counter claim to Lee
(cf., Peirce's "A Guess at the Riddle"). Hartshorne accepts that
he is not a Peircean on the issue of discrete actualities, but
invokes James to support his claim that the ultimate constituents
of the world are, "...drops, unit instances, of experiencing..."[716]. Finally, Hartshorne sees hints of his own conception of
"dual transcendence" in the religious ideas of the pragmatists.

This volume represents a formidable array of essays that
collectively shed great light on Hartshorne's panentheism. While
I have long been an admirer of Hartshorne, even though deriving
my philosophical nourishment from other sources, I have not fully
understood the scope of his achievement until reading this vol­
ume. Lewis Hahn has brought together an impressive list of
independent thinkers, each of whom has sketched an important
aspect of Hartshorne's conception of the world and the divine.
Hartshorne's extensive reply (running to over 160 pages) stands
as a powerful coda to his many published works. If this volume
does not convert the reader to di-polar theism, it will certainly
convince him or her of the fecundity and sheer categorial power
of this perspective. In addition, it will remind the reader of
the possibilities still available to philosophy once it sheds its
concern with provincial perspectives and subaltern orders of
meaning.

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