
Misak's aim in this book is to show that from a Peircean perspective a pragmatic account of truth, although unique, has closer affinities to philosophical positions rooted in the analytic tradition (as well as others) than is often supposed. Misak's discussion of Peirce's notion of truth centers around truth characterized in the biconditional: Hypothesis "H is true if and only if it would be believed at the end of a prolonged inquiry" (p. 42). Much of the book is dedicated to showing that, even though this biconditional captures Peirce's notion of truth, it is not a logical equivalence: "it is neither a definition nor a criterion of truth. It is a specification of what one can expect of a true hypothesis" (p. 42).

In the lengthy first chapter, Misak argues effectively that for Peirce truth cannot go beyond inquiry; or, the left-to-right conditional of the above biconditional (i.e., "if H is true then if inquiry relevant to H were pursued as far as it could fruitfully go, H would be believed" (p. 43)) holds for a Peircean account of truth. Misak explains that the pragmatic notion of truth partly involves being able specify "what to expect," or the consequences of, hypotheses we believe to be true (or false) (p. 5). For Peirce, criteria for determining consequences rests between the too limited verification principle of the logical positivists and the too broad idea of truth as involving an unknowable ding an sich, an idea often characteristic of correspondence, or "transcendental" theories of truth.

In the next two chapters, Misak essentially clarifies and defends the legitimacy of the left-to-right conditional as a partial characterization of truth. In chapter 2 Misak rescues Peirce from the charge that the left-to-right conditional suggests that any belief is identical to truth. Through a fairly thorough discussion of "The Fixation of Belief," Misak establishes that genuine belief (freedom from a non-Cartesian type of doubt that a hypothesis will be proven false by recalcitrant experience) is the only kind of belief we can legitimately call true. Misak also provides a brief, but unusually lucid, discussion of Peirce's complex doctrine of the categories to illustrate his belief in the importance of experience as a constraint on inquiry and to provide a basis for Peirce's argument that only the scientific method is sensitive enough to experience to fix genuine belief.
Misak bolsters her argument for the legitimacy of a notion of truth as a relation to inquiry in her discussion of Peirce's logic. She emphasizes that Peirce's logic as a method of inquiry, linking abduction—deduction—induction to the hypothetico-deductive model of scientific investigation. Misak's treatment of Peirce's logic is very general, but timely and well-done for her purposes; she establishes successfully that Peirce can retain the notion of truth as a result of inquiry without relegating truth to "cognitive hedonism" (p. 84).

In the fourth, and final, chapter Misak argues that Peirce's account of truth preserves our pre-theoretical notion of objectivity as the belief that "whether a hypothesis...is true or false is not a matter of what some inquirer or group of inquirers happens to think" (p. 126). Misak shows that a Peircean account of truth can consistently add the idea that truth is a relation to inquiry to a Tarskian model of truth, while at the same time avoiding the transcendental fallacy of positing a ding an sich. In short, Misak shows that for Peirce objectivity is indeed what is agreed upon, but what is genuinely agreed upon is not a matter of choice among inquirers: "facts...will impinge upon us", Peirce maintains (p. 82).

Also in chapter 4 Misak argues that a pragmatic account of truth is not inconsistent with the principle of bivalence, even though the right-to-left conditional of the Peircean biconditional prima facie suggests otherwise (that is, the conditional: "if H is true, then if inquiry is prolonged as far as it could fruitfully go, we would arrive at H" (p. 126). For Peirce, Misak argues, the principle of bivalence is not itself a proposition with a truth value, rather it is a "regulative assumption" of any inquiry; a necessary condition of all inquiry is that we must assume that for any "hypothesis which is thought to be objective...there is a chance that inquiry would eventually settle on its truth value" (pp. 140,1).

Chapter 4 probably contains the book's most provocative and controversial claims. Misak's arguments here, although powerful, would be strengthened if at certain points she made more explicit the Peircean pragmatist's handling of the distinction between epistemological and metaphysical claims—a distinction that grounds many of the realist's intuitions she is addressing. Occasionally Misak seems to gloss over this distinction at critical moments; for example, at one point she says Peirce answers the question "What is the power of external things to affect the senses" (a metaphysical question) by discussing "the way in which we discover such a power" (an epistemic answer)(p. 133).

Misak's study might also be more complete if she included some mention of Peirce's notion of tychism and the evolutionary nature of reality. Some discussion of how the process nature of reality relates to Peirce's fallibilism might supply an illumi-
nating comment on Peircean conditions for truth and falsity.

These criticisms, however, are relatively minor. All in all, Misak presents a clearly written and well argued account of a Peircean based pragmatic philosophy of truth. She goes a long way in the job of defending pragmatism against the direction in which the "new pragmatists" want to take Pierce and pragmatism, a direction that "follow[s] Peirce in eschewing a 'transcendental' view of truth, but...[goes] much further than Pierce in arguing that there is no sensible notion of truth to be had at all" (p. 1).

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Charles Hartshorne has revived philosophical theology through a striking combination of modal logic, temporal categories, and an implicit phenomenological method. His reconstruction of the ontological argument, and the corollary assertion that God is not only that than which nothing greater can be conceived, but is itself infinitely self-surpassable, has opened up new possibilities for our conception of the divine life. What makes Hartshorne unique, is his insistence that no account of God is adequate that fails to delineate the basic features of the world, and of the human process as it finds itself in an evolutionary cosmos. Consequently, Hartshorne has lavished great care on his analyses of perception (as a species of memory), concepts of relation (both symmetrical and asymmetrical), the nature of causality, the structures of temporality, and the elusive status of purpose within the neo-Darwinian synthesis.

This volume, like the others in the series, brings together a number of interlocutors who collectively probe into the basic categories of their subject. Hartshorne, in keeping with the format of the series, has written an intellectual biography and detailed replies to each of his critics. The replies combine both personal reminiscences and conceptual responses that greatly clarify many less well known aspects of Hartshorne's panentheism. The personal asides in the replies give the volume the flavor of a rare historical document on the history of twentieth century philosophy. After all, how many living philosophers can describe their studies and/or encounters with such figures as Husserl, Heidegger, and Whitehead? Hartshorne has been a first-person witness to two of the most important philosophical movements of our time: phenomenology and process metaphysics. While his own relation to phenomenology has begun to clarify itself in recent years, it is clear that he has taken its account of human experi-