extremely valuable addition to the still very sparse literature which attempts to put Dewey's social thought into contemporary perspective. Like Jim Tiles's superb *Dewey*, it shows that Richard Rorty's influence on the way Dewey ought to be read does not yet command the field. Westbrook wisely prefers John McDermott's "angle of vision" (expressed in his familiar *The Culture of Experience* and *Streams of Experience* essays), and it is only to be regretted that he does not that vision more completely.

This review should not be closed without a word of congratulation to both Westbrook and his publisher for the splendid style and format adopted for the book. The author's prolific footnotes actually have been allowed to appear as footnotes, i.e., at the foot of the pages where they belong and not at the back of the book. (Gertrude Himmelfarb would love this book!) I could spot only a single editing erratum: on page 244 Dewey's use of the phrase "generalized antinomies" has been hilariously rendered as "generalized antimonies"!

Westbrook writes clearly and gracefully even if he is sometimes a bit wordy and inclined to perpetuate the canard that Dewey, somehow, never did master the English language. His research into Dewey's correspondence (with characters like Bourne and Klyce as well with Alice and other family members) is alone worth the price. Certainly, no serious scholar of Dewey's work can afford to be without this book.

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In recent years, more and more philosophers and social scientists have come to the belief that scientific knowledge is not produced under conditions that make possible a sharp distinction between "epistemic" and "pragmatic" factors in its production. This conclusion has been viewed with great suspicion by traditional epistemologists, many of whom view the insulation or autonomy of epistemic considerations from social context as representing the last bastion for the justification of scientific knowledge and method. But there is little consensus today on how to interpret the philosophical consequences of a breakdown of this distinction.

Nicholas Rescher's short book is an extremely timely and well-written excursion into the economic dimension of the theory of knowledge, a dimension that cuts radically across the epistemic/pragmatic distinction. A range of cognitive values are
discussed, but special focus is placed on the status and theoretical role of simplicity. Rescher's work appears to expand on what might be used as a companion publication, Rescher, ed. Aesthetic Factors in Natural Science (Lanham: University Press of America, 1990), which came out of a symposium on the role of simplicity in the construction and acceptance of scientific theories.

Rescher warns against the "ideological attachment to such abstractly theoretical factors as generality, simplicity, testability, explanatory power, robustness, coherence, and novelty" (p. 129). His critique of logical empiricist treatment of cognitive values underlines why an economic rationale of such virtues has been bypassed. Such criteria of theory appraisal were considered by Carnap and Reichenbach to be justified within the theory of probability and induction. Indeed they had to be so presented in order for the logical empiricists to treat them as part of the "logic of science," since the distinction between logic and value judgment is so basic to their philosophy of science. This justificationism and its metaphysical basis Rescher sees as bankrupt: "We need no longer argue directly, on independent substantive grounds, for the explanatory significance of these various parameters of epistemic virtue." "Even the purest and most theoretical of inquiries has its practical and mundanely economic dimension" (p. 32).

One aspect of the debate that bears upon metaphysics is the attitude towards cognitive risk recommended by various philosophies. Rescher's position is anti-skeptical, and his refutation of this position is a pragmatic one, in that it argues that cognitive risk-taking is the only viable means to the ends we generally want to attain. Cognitive deprivation is as debilitating for us as dietary deprivation; the basic demand for information and understanding is such that risk-taking is unavoidable, and the skeptical attitude is not cost effective in the satisfaction of our cognitive needs and wants (p. 31).

If pragmatism is a matter of monitoring our cognitive resources and commitments on the basis of their usefulness, or efficiency and effectiveness in application, then those factors at issue in economy represent different aspects of usefulness. The mapping of the economic dimension of knowledge implements and fills in this picture of the pragmatic quality-control of our epistemic processes.

This is one of the reasons I can highly recommend Rescher's book for philosophy students and teachers alike. In contrast to thinkers like Bas van Fraasen, who carry over from Carnap and other logical empiricists and insistence on a sharp distinction between epistemic factors and pragmatic interests affecting theory acceptance, Rescher's methodological pragmatism treats the epistemic as defined through the situated values, goals and
interests of actual inquirers. If science and the interests of scientists are enmeshed with other practices—economic, political, aesthetic, etc.—then our epistemology should reflect this fact. This, it seems to me, leads to bridging the artificial chasm that the received view has had the effect of constructing between science qua investigative method or body of knowledge, and science policy. The need to bridge this chasm is a point I think many contemporary philosophers, sociologists and others interested in science and technology studies agree upon, and they will find much support for this effort in Rescher's work.

University of Hawaii

Guy S. Axtell

A MESSAGE FROM YOUR SAAP NEWSLETTER EDITOR:

I welcome short notices, notes and queries about on-going work and long-range projects in American philosophy. In addition I will continue, hopefully even expand, the books review section including the third annual special book review issue, #62, June 1992. I solicit your advice (and help) in bringing to the attention of our membership recent works on American philosophy. Please send requests for the books you would like reviewed and/or one you would be willing to review for the Newsletter to:

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