NOTES

1. In this quotation, and hereafter, I have altered the punctuation, capitalization, etc., to conform to standard usage. Cf. the discussion of the translation below.

2. In the Avant-propos of the French edition of this book, Deledalle makes it clear that in adopting the tack of "chronological reconstruction," and "without claiming to resolve all the problems posed by Peirce's philosophy," he has attempted to neutralize the "pseudo-problems which, notwithstanding the care taken by the editors of the Collected Papers in dating each of the texts they juxtaposed, the critical edition of Peirce's writings has already solved, and cannot fail to solve" in the future (when the critical edition has been completed). See note 3 for more on this part of Deledalle's book in the French.

3. Also, regarding the fidelity to the French, for some reason, Petrilli has made numerous and substantive changes in Deledalle's "Avant-propos" (the part Petrilli calls the "Presentation" at the beginning of the book). Perhaps Deledalle himself wrote this new piece for the English edition of the book, but if so, it does not say this anywhere in the text.

Randall E. Auxier
Emory Georgia


Ever since George Dykhuizen's The Life and Mind of John Dewey came out in 1973 Dewey buffs have been waiting for this book, or an even better one. As its author admits, "The book is not quite the full intellectual biography that, unfortunately, Dewey has yet to receive." Even so, Westbrook comes close; so close, indeed, that it will be difficult to exceed the very high standard that this book sets. Moreover, as far as an account of the development of Dewey's political activism is concerned, it is not easy to see how it can be improved upon by the present generation of political critics and theorists of democracy who lack Westbrook's historical training.

Aye, but there's the rub. Westbrook's approach is that of an historian. Following in the tradition of such political historians as Jack Hexter and Barton Bernstein -- the latter was his mentor at Stanford-- Westbrook has immersed himself in the political milieu in which Dewey lived and wrote and acted up. He has dogged Dewey's political footsteps from his early contact with Franklin Ford and the abortive "Thought News"
experiment, all the way to Dewey's engagement with the radical thought of Reinhold Niebuhr and his brief, but exciting, look at the tasks of democracy in the post-war world of the late forties and early fifties.

Along the way we get full coverage of Dewey's tangles with Randolph Bourne and Walter Lippman, with Roosevelt's "brain trust" and the "New Deal" Congress, his hesitations and ambiguous pronouncements about war and democracy in the years leading up to both World Wars, and his final warnings of the dangers of totalitarian communism in the waning years of his life. Unfortunately that is about all that we get to help us understand the depth of Dewey's commitment to democracy, or the character of the society in which Dewey felt that democracy belonged as its melioristic instrument. It would, perhaps, be churlish to even suggest that Peter Manicas does as well, or better, in the few pages that he devotes to the task in War and Democracy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), a valuable resource, along with Manicas's many essays on Dewey, unaccountably neglected by Westbrook.

What Westbrook seems to miss, in short, is the fact that Dewey was far less concerned with the mechanics of our democratic political institutions than with the social structures, dynamics, experiences, individual and cultural values of which the institutional embodiment of democratic freedom was simply a natural outcome. The portrait that Westbrook draws, thus, is more than adequate as a record of Dewey's political activism, but is far less adequate as an account of the development of the critical conception of philosophy of which that activism was a constant and ever changing outward expression. It is not that Westbrook has not tried mightily and at length to fill in the philosophical background of Dewey's rich and extraordinarily influential conception of human nature and culture. The book offers as good a treatment of how Dewey's philosophy of education relates to his social thought as I am aware of, and that is saying a lot. We should be thankful for it in view of how distorted a picture we are accustomed to getting from even sympathetic critics these days.

The trouble is that Westbrook has almost as much difficulty in getting inside the "life and mind" of John Dewey as Dykhuiizen did. (Sidney Hook used to refer to Dykhuiizen's as a "Who's Who" account.) Although Westbrook is by far the better philosopher--yes, I know he doesn't pretend to be anything but an historian--his treatment of the rich experiential background that Dewey brings to his writings on democracy is thin in comparison, for example, with the way Ray Monk draws upon Wittgenstein's background and life experience to show how it bears on his philosophy, and vice versa, in Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius (New York: Free Press, 1990). Or, better and more to the point, by comparison to the

It may be that, in understanding Dewey's conception of democracy, we need Rockefeller's treatment of Dewey's view of the religious element in human nature and culture just as much as we need Westbrook's far more complete account of Dewey the political activist. For, as Richard Rorty has rightly observed in his own appreciative review of Westbrook's book: "Dewey's 'cosmic impiety' was the product of a bolder philosophical imagination, and a more passionate social hope, than those of any of critics, past or present." (LRB, 7/25/91:7).

There are some surprising omissions in Westbrook's account of the influences that moved Dewey's thought along the tortuous path that it took. Although he gives full credit to Alice Chipman Dewey for moving her husband off dead center (to the left), he gives Mead's influence too short a shrift and Tufts' none at all. While the Anzia Yezierska affair is perhaps given too much attention, Dewey's connection with Holmes and the legal realists at the Columbia Law School is given far too little. In fact Westbrook omits, almost entirely, consideration of Dewey's richly developed philosophy of law. One scarcely gets the impression, from Westbrook's account, that Dewey had any role at all in the criticism of constitutional "strict constructionism" or that he was profoundly affected by Jefferson's conception of human nature and of the critical necessity of community (read "ward") representation.

These omissions make Westbrook's conclusion that Dewey was, on the whole, a partisan of "participatory democracy" subject to considerable qualification. It may well be that certain members of the SDS in 1968-9 held Dewey's *The Public and Its Problems* as justification for their "non-negotiable demands," or that certain Chinese students carried copies of that same text into their protests in Tienamin Square. But we should be wary of thinking of such incidents as confirming any deep grasp of Dewey's political philosophy or his unique version of socialism. It is still too early to tell how well either socialism or its integration with democracy will fare in the future despite the posting of foreclosure notices here, there and elsewhere. But, as Timothy Kaufman-Osborn contends (in *Politics/Sense/Experience: A Pragmatic Inquiry into the Promise of Democracy*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991) there is sure to be felt a Deweyan presence in whatever the outcome. And Westbrook's book will have done its part in making sure that is so.

Critics are already calling *John Dewey and American Democracy* a "magisterial" book. Unfortunately, it isn't. But it is an
extremely valuable addition to the still very sparse literature which attempts to put Dewey's social thought into contemporary perspective. Like JimTiles's superb *Dewey*, it shows that Richard Rorty's influence on the way Dewey ought to be read does not yet command the field. Westbrook wisely prefers John McDermott's "angle of vision" (expressed in his familiar *The Culture of Experience* and *Streams of Experience* essays), and it is only to be regretted that he does not that vision more completely.

This review should not be closed without a word of congratulation to both Westbrook and his publisher for the splendid style and format adopted for the book. The author's prolific footnotes actually have been allowed to appear as footnotes, i.e., at the foot of the pages where they belong and not at the back of the book. (Gertrude Himmelfarb would love this book!) I could spot only a single editing erratum; on page 244 Dewey's use of the phrase "generalized antinomies" has been hilariously rendered as "generalized antimonies"!

Westbrook writes clearly and gracefully even if he is sometimes a bit wordy and inclined to perpetuate the canard that Dewey, somehow, never did master the English language. His research into Dewey's correspondence (with characters like Bourne and Klyce as well with Alice and other family members) is alone worth the price. Certainly, no serious scholar of Dewey's work can afford to be without this book.

R.W. Sleeper (Emeritus) Queens College, CUNY

**Cognitive Economy: The Economic Dimension of the Theory of Knowledge.** Nicholas Rescher. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1989. x plus 168 pp. $29.95

In recent years, more and more philosophers and social scientists have come to the belief that scientific knowledge is not produced under conditions that make possible a sharp distinction between "epistemic" and "pragmatic" factors in its production. This conclusion has been viewed with great suspicion by traditional epistemologists, many of whom view the insulation or autonomy of epistemic considerations from social context as representing the last bastion for the justification of scientific knowledge and method. But there is little consensus today on how to interpret the philosophical consequences of a breakdown of this distinction.

Nicholas Rescher's short book is an extremely timely and well-written excursion into the economic dimension of the theory of knowledge, a dimension that cuts radically across the epistemic/pragmatic distinction. A range of cognitive values are

14