This book is a translation of Professor Deledalle's *Charles S. Peirce, phénoménologue et sémioticien* (Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 1987). I will discuss Professor Deledalle's work first, and afterwards say something of the degree of Petrilli's success at getting the book into English.

Deledalle's book is an excellent, general introduction to Peirce's thought. In approaching the difficult matter of how to arrange so brief a presentation, Deledalle chooses an enlightening philosophical metaphor to accompany the chronological order of presentation, and he constantly returns to this image in the process of helping us to understand Peirce's development. Deledalle breaks Peirce's thought into three stages: the "New England period," 1851-1870; the "cosmopolitan period," 1870-1887; and the "Arisbe period," 1887-1914. Deledalle's "metaphor" is co-ordinated to each stage, from the successive stages in the journey out of Plato's cave. Each stage in the journey outward constitutes a chapter in Deledalle's book.

The first phase of Peirce's development is entitled "Leaving the Cave." Because Peirce's earliest reading was weighted towards the British empiricists, Deledalle claims that "empiricism could have kept [Peirce] chained forever in the depths of the cave had he not read Kant" (p. 5). Deledalle follows this with an illuminating explanation of how Peirce's new list of categories arose from a reading and criticism of Kant's logic. Then, in summarizing the article itself "On a New List of Categories" (1867), Deledalle highlights the points which recur throughout Peirce's work, and which are therefore crucial for understanding his development. Finishing out the first chapter, Deledalle considers Peirce's critique of Cartesianism, and the emergence of his conception of logic as a normative science. The former of these underlines, among other things, (1) Peirce's conclusion that we cannot think without signs, and (2) the development of his notion of habit and his philosophy of mind. Regarding logic as normative, Deledalle gives a very clear account of how Peirce arrived at this conclusion --a crooked path made straight via Deledalle's considerable interpretive prowess.

Chapter two is entitled "The Eclipse of the Sun (1870-1887)," and it begins by discussing Peirce's scientific activities during this period. These activities, when combined with Peirce's simul-
emerging interest in the logic of scientific methodology understandable. Against this backdrop, Deledalle treats Peirce's famous series of articles for The Popular Science Monthly (1877-1878). Regarding these, Peirce's most influential articles, Deledalle says that "the pragmatic articles of 1877 and 1878...marked on the whole a step backwards with respect to the 1868 articles" (p. 33). The emphasis of the later articles upon the sensible effects of our conception of an object are evidence, Deledalle believes (and Peirce later suggested this himself, CP, 6.103; Deledalle p. 67), that some traces of nominalism still lurked in the early formulations of the pragmatic maxim (making them difficult to fully reconcile with the new list of categories). "It is only when Peirce sets aside the problem of the nature of firsts that all traces of nominalism disappear..." (p. 33), Deledalle concludes.

In the course of this chapter, Peirce's theory of probability is examined, as well as why he later repudiated it (due to its inability to accommodate possibles). Deledalle also reviews Peirce's contributions to Boolean logic, to the logic of relatives, to predicative logic and to propositional logic. During the "eclipse period," Peirce "seems to have lost interest in philosophy, devoting himself almost exclusively...to mathematics and to logic..." (p. 36). But near the end of the eclipse period, Peirce began closely reading the ancients, and this was to have a great effect upon his thinking. Characterizing Peirce's entire development, Deledalle says:

The history of Peirce's thought is a return to origins. From English empiricism he passed to the Middle Ages from which he learned classical logic, and through Duns Scotus he became familiar with the reality of universals. From the Middle Ages he then turned to Greek antiquity, and all the more eagerly as he was on the verge of finding the solution to all his cosmological problems --as well as the reply to unformulated questions concerning the nature of categories, signs and science (p. 43). It was this discovery of the logic of the ancients which launched Peirce's interest in devising a semiotic.

The third and final phase Deledalle calls "The Sun Set Free," which covers all of the years in which Peirce lived in Millford, Pennsylvania. Deledalle organizes this period according to the plan of the "system" Peirce was trying to develop, instead of repeating the strict chronological treatment of the previous two periods. Thus, he skips around through Peirce's various texts from the period, selecting those which can best be made into a system according to the spirit of Peirce's thought and his stated aims. Discerning a coherent thread through this tangle is a bedeviling task, and one which Deledalle has accomplished as well as anyone might hope.
Beginning with a brief summary of the architectonic classification of the sciences, Deledalle structures the chapter around the three truly philosophical activities: phenomenology (or the doctrine of categories), normative science (ethics, aesthetics and logic), and metaphysics (general, physical, and religious).

Phenomenology, or the firstness of philosophy, "depends on pure mathematics" (p. 47), but insofar as it depends upon nothing else which is classified under the heading "philosophy," phenomenology is the foundation of all philosophy. Normative science, or the secondness of philosophy, is broken down as follows: "First, esthetics relates to feeling; second, ethics relates to action; third, logic relates to thought" (p. 52). Aesthetics was not Peirce's long suit, but regarding ethics, his views are much more thoroughly developed. Citing CP 1.633, and 1.666, Deledalle points out that Peirce adopts conservatism and the, albeit fallible, authority of practice as his ethical position. But, "Peirce is above all a logician and a theorizer" (p. 53), and so the lion's share of his late work in normative science falls to this area. This emphasis on logic as an approach to the subordinate study of ethics and aesthetics is explained through noting that "if the starting point in philosophy is no longer sensation nor methodological doubt...philosophy cannot but rest upon belief" (pp. 53-54). Settling belief (the basis upon which ethical action must proceed), is the domain of logic. Logic, ethics and aesthetics are intimately bound up with one another, and Deledalle does an admirable job of untangling them, seeing what each contributes towards determining good and evil -- the aim of all normative sciences. The final section of this third chapter takes on the topic of Peirce's scientific metaphysics. Here we finally come to understand that "the three phenomenological or phaneroscopic categories are ontological categories" (p. 64).

In a short concluding section, Deledalle asks what relation Peirce's logic bears to Hegel's, and the illuminating answer is that Hegel emphasizes thirdness in his logic to the exclusion of what is first and second. This is to treat a cosmos which is not yet in perfect and complete relation to itself as though it had already attained such a state.

In assessing the book as a whole, it is appropriate to consider for a moment just how difficult Peirce's thought is to learn. Perhaps it is the patchwork nature of the Collected Papers which presents an obstacle to the assimilation of his thinking, but whatever the cause may be, Deledalle's book solves the problem in my view. His approach renders Peirce much easier to learn (if not "easy," per se). It should be required reading for all who wish to learn Peirce's thought hereafter. The book will also be useful to many who already know Peirce's thought well, for it nicely organizes many things which may remain obscure in the dark corners of even an expert's mind. This book is
also a clinic in the economy of language. It will not be accessible reading to any but the most advanced of undergraduate students, however. Yet, one need not be well-versed in the classical American tradition to follow the discussion. It presupposes grounding in both symbolic logic, its twentieth century development, and in the history of philosophy. The book will be of tremendous value for the professional philosopher who wants to learn Peirce's "system" without investing an inordinate amount of time in combing the Collected Papers.

In contrast, Susan Petrilli's introductory essay misses its mark, insofar as it is supposed to introduce an introductory book on Peirce's life and philosophy. Within three paragraphs Petrilli will have lost those who are not experts in semiotics. Her discussion is narrow and carried out in the jargon of the experts, while her prose is rough and fragmentary. When Petrilli finally gets around to discussing Deledalle's book, it is too little and too late. The essay not only fails to properly introduce the book, it also might serve to discourage many would-be readers from ever gazing upon the first word of the translation itself.

With regard to Petrilli's success in rendering Deledalle's book into English, the results are mixed. The translation is generally readable, but the fidelity to the French is not constant. For instance, Deledalle often intersperses short quotations within his own longer sentences in the course of making his analyses. Petrilli has an annoying habit of simply placing block paragraphs of quotation from Peirce in place of those interwoven with analysis. Thus, the analysis itself is sometimes lost.

In addition, the translation is marred by continual grammatical errors, transgressions of the American conventions of style, and small mistakes of all sorts. It is hard to know whether one ought to blame this on the copy editor or the translator. Most of the mistakes are more of a hindrance to the literary effect of the book than to gaining a substantive understanding of its contents. But the presence of so many errors (almost every page contains an error of some sort) is a pity since Professor Deledalle's French is clear, even, and grammatically sound. Occasionally these problems with the English text do affect the meaning.

In spite of the fact that Petrilli frequently retains the exact French sentence structure in her English translation, this usually renders the passages comprehensibly, if a little awkwardly. In all, it is better to have this translation available, even with these shortcomings, than for Deledalle's fine work to remain unavailable to the English-speaking world.
NOTES

1. In this quotation, and hereafter, I have altered the punctuation, capitalization, etc., to conform to standard usage. Cf. the discussion of the translation below.

2. In the Avant-propos of the French edition of this book, Deledalle makes it clear that in adopting the tack of "chronological reconstruction," and "without claiming to resolve all the problems posed by Peirce's philosophy," he has attempted to neutralize the "pseudo-problems which, notwithstanding the care taken by the editors of the Collected Papers in dating each of the texts they juxtaposed, the critical edition of Peirce's writings has already solved, and cannot fail to solve" in the future (when the critical edition has been completed). See note 3 for more on this part of Deledalle's book in the French.

3. Also, regarding the fidelity to the French, for some reason, Petrilli has made numerous and substantive changes in Deledalle's "Avant-propos" (the part Petrilli calls the "Presentation" at the beginning of the book). Perhaps Deledalle himself wrote this new piece for the English edition of the book, but if so, it does not say this anywhere in the text.

Randall E. Auxier

Emory Georgia

John Dewey and American Democracy, Robert B. Westbrook.

Ever since George Dykhuizen's The Life and Mind of John Dewey came out in 1973 Dewey buffs have been waiting for this book, or an even better one. As its author admits, "The book is not quite the full intellectual biography that, unfortunately, Dewey has yet to receive." Even so, Westbrook comes close; so close, indeed, that it will be difficult to exceed the very high standard that this book sets. Moreover, as far as an account of the development of Dewey's political activism is concerned, it is not easy to see how it can be improved upon by the present generation of political critics and theorists of democracy who lack Westbrook's historical training.

Aye, but there's the rub. Westbrook's approach is that of an historian. Following in the tradition of such political historians as Jack Hexter and Barton Bernstein -- the latter was his mentor at Stanford -- Westbrook has immersed himself in the political milieu in which Dewey lived and wrote and acted up. He has dogged Dewey's political footsteps from his early contact with Franklin Ford and the abortive "Thought News"