of Darwinism, in addition to the more general and abstract effect of "science", on the philosophers of this period. More about how philosophical conceptions of science themselves dramatically evolved, so that the conception invoked by Peirce in his prescription for "a religion of science" differs dramatically from that employed decades later by the logical positivists. Something about George Herbert Mead, who fails to get a mention in this volume, yet who both lived through (1861-1931) and was engaged in many of the intellectual struggles described here. But these "criticisms" would have force only on the clearly mistaken assumption that Wilson perceives his inquiry as something other than a communal and an ongoing activity.

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These two volumes present a cogent case for a return to both systematic metaphysics and to the thought of Alfred North Whitehead. A systematic, integrated interdisciplinary matrix for our actual "lived-world" experience is a much needed antidote to our present narrowness and disciplinary specialization with its resultant tunnel vision. Whitehead, as these volume make clear, offers us a systematic metaphysical perspective, but one with a fallibilistic base, namely, it is presented as a hypothesis subject to further revision.

The Raupp-Wiehl volume presents contemporary Whiteheadian scholarship from the perspective of the German-speaking world. This perspective is stimulated by Whitehead as a metaphysician who gives serious consideration to the methods and results of contemporary science. Two essays in the volume are particularly outstanding: Ivor Leclerc on "Whitehead and the Dichotomy of Rationalism and Empiricism," and Hans Poser on "Whitehead's Cosmology as Revisable Metaphysics." By a precise and astute tracing of the transformation of ontological premises from Plato through Neoplatonism through Descartes, Leclerc establishes clearly that, contrary to Hartshorne, Whitehead is not a panpsychist nor does he fall into the trap of rationalist apriorism. Whitehead's actual entities as the real beings and bearers of all activity involve simultaneously a mental and physical pole. Further, "all perceptions of things and all thought about things necessarily must arise from the integration of physical acting and mental acting" (15). Further, physical things-in-themselves are received and "objectified" in the perceiving and knowing subject. One result of this view is that a metaphysical theory cannot claim 'apodictic certainty,' but can only be asymptotically'
These conclusions lead directly to the excellent essay by Hans Poser in which he develops the notion of cosmology as "revisable metaphysics." In doing so, he explicates what he believes are the preconditions of a metaphysics of nature, i.e. one dependent upon empirical science, that is non-absolute but which also combines the insights of rationalism and empiricism. Poser argues that such a metaphysics should be properly seen as both a "creative production" of speculative reason as well as a form of practical philosophy.

George Lucas also holds that Whitehead's metaphysics is a recovery of Kant's notion of the "public use of Reason." Such a metaphysics, argues Lucas, is necessarily informed by other fields while it also informs them. Lucas's goal in his book is to "rehabilitate" Whitehead, that is, to recover and restore his significance for current issues in philosophy. He highlights significant anticipations by Whitehead of work by contemporary philosophers such as Popper, Rorty, Kripke, Searle, Putnam, Williams, Perry and Parfit. A second part of Lucas's rehabilitation project is to overcome the tendency to isolate Whitehead from the main historical stream of European and Anglo-American philosophy.

Lucas's critical historical analysis provides some highly illuminating insights into various aspects of the history of philosophy as well as about significant relationships of Whitehead's thought to mainstream philosophical thought. For example, we learn how little Whitehead was actually influenced by his contemporaries in "evolutionary cosmology." We discover strong affinities, on the other hand, to neglected aspects of Hegel's philosophy of nature. Further, in revealing Whitehead's antipathy of Kant, Lucas also lays bare a present ignorance of Kant and a narrow view of him as "merely an analytical epistemologist."

In an outstanding chapter on the relationship between Whitehead and Russell, we discover Whitehead's central role in the realist revolt against unrestrained speculative inquiry while also learning of Russell's evolution toward a Whiteheadian metaphysics. In this chapter, Lucas makes a claim worth much fruitful philosophical discussion, namely, "... that it is Whitehead who provides the only account of induction and causality that can respond to Hume while preserving a genuine role for empiricism, for experience, and for the stubborn grain of realism that remains deeply and perhaps forever embedded in the scientific enterprise" (114).

In Part III of his book Lucas critically assesses major issues and figures in the contemporary philosophical scene. This assessment provides much illumination of that scene while also
highlighting major areas of confluence of Whitehead's thought with contemporary analytic thought as well as current contemporary Continental thought represented by Gadamer, Foucault and Habermas. However, Lucas argues cogently that Whitehead avoids, as do the major classic American philosophers, the prevalent bifurcation in contemporary Continental philosophy between cultural studies, the social sciences and the philosophy of person and logic, epistemology and the hard sciences.

These volumes clearly demonstrate strong affinities between Whitehead and major classic American philosophers. They also issue a call, I believe, to a program of critical historical analysis so that figures such as Royce and also James and Dewey can be restored to a central historical place as well as seen as providing novel insights for many of the significant issues in contemporary philosophical discussion.

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Dewey would have loved Art and Engagement. Listen: "Appreciation does not emanate from a mental beacon trained on an object of art. Rather an essential reciprocity binds object and appreciator as they act on and respond to each other through an indivisible interplay of forces. Appreciative perception is not merely a psychological act nor even an exclusively personal one. It rests on a mutual engagement of person and object that is both active and receptive on every side" (45). The title Art and Engagement indicates the thesis of the book: art results from an engagement between object and subject. Berleant rejects the disinterested aesthetics that has been dominant since the Enlightenment, and the Cartesian metaphysics on which it rests. He favors instead an aesthetics of participation based on a metaphysics that acknowledges the union of knower and known. Aesthetic engagement includes integration of all of the senses in aesthetic perception, a continuity with ordinary life including the fortuitousness as well as the objects of ordinary life, and the union of participator and objects--art is a situation not an object.

Clearly, this new aesthetics is in the tradition of Dewey: Berleant grapples with the big questions in aesthetics: How is art related to life? What does art reveal about the world and ourselves? How should we approach art? Berleant incorporates the ideas of thinkers like Dewey, James, and Buchler, as well as the insights of psychology of perception, some continental philosophy, Japanese notion of 'ma' and quantum mechanics. The most exhilarating aspect of Arnold Berleant's beautifully written book is that he ties all of these ideas together and makes each under-