projects. The key to conservation, he thought, was to induce the private landowner to conserve his own land—the ecological version of democracy. (It is significant that Leopold eventually became a reluctant defender of public lands.) But his individualism, like Thoreau’s, was not unreflective. And like Thoreau, Leopold loved his little shack in the sand country of Wisconsin in that a good scholar, he thought, is like good land in being part tame and part wild. Finally, like Thoreau and all naturalists he faced (and saved himself from) the hazard of misanthropy.

This book is a must for those who are interested in these three areas. And those who have only read Leopold’s classic, A Sand County Almanac, should not assume that they know Leopold well if they have not read Neine’s book.

Seattle University

Daniel A. Dombrowski


Intellectual historian James Hoopes traces the rise and eventual transformation of what he calls the “consciousness concept” from the 17th century to the 19th. He distinguishes among three models of the self operative within New England thought and experience. The first stage, referred to as that of “faculty psychology,” was basic to Puritan experience and emphasized the conflict between the independent faculties of the will and the understanding. Central to this model was the concept of conversion that realigned the will so that it conformed to the will of God. The Puritan sense of the self required a period of profound humiliation, often brought on by the authorities in the community, so that mere self-will could be broken and allow for the entrance of saving grace.

The second model of the self derived directly from Locke and made central the “consciousness concept.” Unlike the Puritan model, which stressed the importance of struggle and conflict within the sinful self, the consciousness concept related all experience to immediate ideas. The Lockean revolution undermined not only innate ideas but the concept of the will and its corollary, the conscience. Hoopes makes it clear that the older faculty psychology did not fully recognize that the consciousness concept was actually a Trojan horse designed to overthrow it.

The third model of the self, called the “modern model,” emerged in the 19th century as a compromise with the consciousness concept. Ironically, the modern model was reactionary in that it went back to the pre-Lockean position in emphasizing conflict at the heart of the self. Instead of speaking of the self as a conflict between will and understanding, however, the modern view spoke of a conflict between the consciousness and unconscious minds, thereby reawakening some sense of conscience.
and conversion. At the same time, the modern model made its peace with the Lockean theory of Ideas by insisting on an important role for consciousness in the economy of the self.

Hoopes adds one final model to these three, perhaps best termed the "realist semiotic" model of the self. Derived from Peirce, this model de-centers the self and makes thought, as expressed through signs, the basis for the self, which is thus derived from sign systems. Rejecting Locke's notion of immediate intuitive knowledge, Peirce argued that all thought is mediated in and through signs. The semiotic model is held to be more powerful and generic than the other three, which focus too directly on the self rather than on signs and thought. Hoopes insists that the semiotic model is not "glottocentric" (in Thomas Sebeok's phrase) but based on all forms of semiosis, linguistic or not. It rejects the consciousness concept by deriving the self from semiosis rather than semiosis from the self.

Of particular importance is how Hoops deals with thinkers who combine aspects of two or more of these models and thereby reveal the tensions within New England consciousness. Jonathan Edwards is examined in terms of his rejection of the consciousness concept. At the same time, he had to make compromises with the Lockean position, especially in his own notion that holiness is a percep. Hoopes puts a great deal of emphasis on Edwards's Berkeleyian idealism which insisted that the unity of the self is established by the Ideas in the mind of God. Edwards would allow no limitation to divine sovereignty and thus limited human freedom to our mere physical mobility.

By the 19th century the consciousness concept had firmly rejected the concept of determinism, and its religious corollary of predestination and election, for an emphasis on the free moral growth of the self. Yet the rise of scientific analyses of causality reintroduced determinism into the debate. A compromise was struck by locating freedom in the conscious mind and determinism in the unconscious. Ironically, psychoanalysis returned to a form of crypto-Calvinism by making the battle between the consciousness and the unconscious the locus for moral transformation.

Hoopes traces the consciousness concept through James and Royce and argues that James failed to move beyond a kind of reconstructed belief in Ideas. His treatment of James's Principles of Psychology will strike many readers as cavalier and ideological. Hoopes states, "James, however, was the rawest empiricist of them all, and his view were simplistic, even by late nineteenth-century standards . . ." (p. 206). Royce fares slightly better if only because he had the good fortune to know something of Peirce's semiotic! While Hoopes does recognize the epoch making quality of Royce's The Problem of Christianity he fails to see the subtle tensions among the various phases in Royce's development.

Dewey is dismissed as a biologizer of the self who failed to
develop an adequate metaphysics within which to locate the human process. By now, this view of Dewey as anti-metaphysician (Richard Rorty) should have been put firmly to rest.

Philosophers often take issue with intellectual historians for their seeming historical determinism and corollary tendency to reduce novel conceptual frameworks to specific Sitze im Leben. While Hoopes sometimes errs in this direction, his subtle and evocative book does shed light on an inner trajectory of the New England mind that needs to be taken seriously.

The College of William and Mary
Robert S. Corrington

CALL FOR DUES AND APPEAL FOR DONATIONS

Dues for the 1990-91 are now due (as of the last annual meeting. Regular dues are $15 for those earning $20,000 or more annually and $5.00 for others. There are no dues for students, retirees, and unemployed persons. In addition, the Society’s Executive Committee has recently created two other membership categories: "Sustaining Member" and "Benefactor," with dues of $50.00 and $100.00 respectively. Those who can afford to are urged to contribute at those levels. Please complete the form below and send it with your check payable to "SAAP" to:

Kenneth Stikkers
Department of Philosophy
Seattle University
Seattle, WA 98122

Please continue/begin (circle one) my membership in the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy. I enclose my dues for 1990-91.

________ $100.00, Benefactor ________ $50.00, Sustaining Member
Regular membership: ________ $15.00 ________ $5.00
No dues: ________ student ________ retiree ________ unemployed
________ I also enclose a contribution of ________ for the Society’s special projects fund.

Name
Address

Telephone: at work ________ at home ________