kind. Too prickly for society, he and the children of Concord had an easy, relaxed rapport. Still he did have a small group of loyal and close friends whom he rewarded in unusual ways, "he planted melons, a specialty for which he was famed locally and with which he gave summer melon parties for favored friends and neighbors" (314).

Why Thoreau went to Walden in the first place and why he later left are considerably demystified by Richardson. Thoreau was twenty-eight, he needed to sort out his life and he had no privacy at home, "he found his father's household had no fewer than nine people in it. Schoolteaching in Concord's one-room schools was anything but solitary, and even the evenings at Emerson's were apt to be crowded" (32).

"Thoreau went to Walden Pond for earnest, elevated reasons. He was in search of Life. He was also in search of simple living conditions that would permit him to concentrate on his writing" (153). Since he had finished A Week and the first draft of Walden he had, as he put it "several more lives to live, and could not spare any more time for that one".

Serious students of Thoreau ought read (or reread) Harding's celebrated The Days of Henry Thoreau and then Richardson's Henry Thoreau: A Life of the Mind before the real treat, the works of Thoreau.

St. Bonaventure University Patrick K. Dooley


Surely by now most SAAP members will be familiar with the monumental effort underway at Indiana University at Indianapolis. There the editors of the Peirce Edition Project, under the direction of Christian Kloesel, are at work on a thirty volume critical edition of the great bulk of Peirce's work, arranged in chronological order. The sheer mass of this project certainly eclipses the earlier standard 6 volumes of Hartshorne and Weiss (1931-1935). Not only will the project result in a critical edition, but it will be fully comprehensive,--allowing the Peirce scholar, for the first time, to easily trace the development of his work as a whole. Such a comprehensive survey should allow future scholars to trace, for example, all the connections between Peirce's highly speculative cosmology and his earlier work in logic and the theory of signs. How did the hard headed pragmatist of 1867 develop such notions as "evolutionary love?" A comprehensive critical edition should prove an invaluable tool for the solution to such puzzling Peircean paradoxes.

Moreover each volume contains an extensive biographical essay covering the period in question. The introduction to vol-
Volume 4 (51 pages) by Nathan Houser is particularly good, tracing the development of Peirce's thought during his years at Johns Hopkins. Historians of education will find Houser's treatment of interest, tracing as it does Peirce's work with his student philosophy club, "The Metaphysical Club," his impact on such American notables as John Dewey and Thorstein Veblen, as well as the details of his academic banishment. What exactly was the cause of his continued academic difficulty? Was it his reputed "agnosticism" (p. lxiv), and interesting charge against the author of the "Neglected Argument," or was it simply thought that he possessed a "broken and dissolute character" (p. lxxv)? Perhaps all very "gossipy" stuff but nonetheless offering a window onto the sensitivities of the American educational elite of the late 19th century.

The entire scholarly apparatus is indeed impressive: 35 pages of Notes useful in identifying obscure names, sources, etc., as well as rendering commentary on obscurer passages, a 7 page bibliography of Peirce's references during this period, an 11 page chronological list of manuscripts during the 1879-1884 period, a 16 page "Essay on Editorial Method." (There we are told that some 32 items of the total of 30 items, are published in toto here for the first time (p. 615), 51 pages of "Textual Apparatus" providing a complete record of what was done in the editing process, and finally, a comprehensive index. All of this is truly impressive. It goes without saying that any serious student of Peirce would be advised to acquire the entire set.

Volume 4 of this edition published in the sesquicentennial year of Peirce's birth covers the years of his tenure as a part-time lecturer in logic at the Johns Hopkins University, his only period of regular academic employment. Consequently, many of the writings in this volume focus on logic and mathematics. The most formal of the 4 volumes, volume 4 would appear to be a gold mine for the historian of logic and mathematics. Of particular interest are his papers "On the Algebra of Logic" (1880), and "A Theory of Probably Inference" (1881). This latter work (1883) deals with the nature and foundation of statistical reasoning as well as the connection between induction and probability (pp. lviii-lix); the earlier work (1880) produced, in Arthur Prior's view, a system of logic that nearly provides a complete basis for logic. It is in this paper that Peirce begins to set out his logic of relatives and, in Tarski's view, laid the foundation for the theory of relation as a deductive discipline (pp. xlvi- xlvii).

Not only historians of formal logic and mathematics, but historians of science will find a wealth of material in this volume,—it was during this period that Peirce wrote some of his most important scientific papers. Of particular interest is Peirce's work, "Comparison of the Metre with a Wave-Length of Light," a seminal paper in which he works at establishing the wave-length of light as a standard of length. His work, "Measurements of Gravity at Initial Stations in American and Europe," has become regarded a classic of geodesy and the first notable
American contribution to gravity research (p. xxviii). Also of note is Peirce's ground-breaking efforts at developing a theory of efficient research in "Note on the Theory of the Economy of Research."

How does one offer a critique of such a Herculean effort? Yet the reader must be advised that this fourth volume in the series is highly technical, being primarily of interest to the historian of science, mathematics, and logic. Apart from the Introduction by Houser, most non-technical readers would find this particular volume rather tedious, covering as it does such topics as the axiom of numbers, the proposition, and on the construction of the reversible pendulum. That being said, there is one very remarkably vital article near the end of the volume that has, in my opinion, considerable philosophical import that might be of interest to a wide range of readers.

The penultimate article, "Design and Chance," a paper read before the Metaphysical Club is a brilliant working out of the Darwinian notion of random chance as applied to the laws of nature themselves. In advancing a brilliant and bold hypothesis, Peirce asks, "May not the laws of physics be habits gradually acquired by systems. Why, for instance, do the heavenly bodies tend to attract one another? Because in the long run bodies that repel or do not attract will get thrown out of the region of space leaving only the mutually attracting bodies." (p. 553) Here we see the grandeur of Peirce's mind, extending the Darwinian notion of the long run, utilizing it as a means of explaining what science takes for granted, vis., why are there laws of nature in the first instance? Is their existence a mere brute fact, or is it possible to give an account of their origin without the postulation of design. This one article contains in seed the great cosmological speculations developed by Peirce in the 1890's. It is intriguing to see that such ideas were developed during the period of his most rigorous formal work. Is there, perhaps, a closer connection between these two poles of his work than was once thought?

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This is a thoroughly researched, clearly written intellectual biography which is excellent in every respect. But it is also a long book about a non-philosopher, hence it will be the purpose of this review to indicate why philosophers should take an interest in it.

First, Aldo Leopold is perhaps the thinker who best exemplifies for us the conflicting tendencies which must be resolved in any attempt to re-think nature in light of the current ecological crisis. He was, as Meine demonstrates, appreciative of both the