dismissing it, that is neither Dewey's fault, nor Heidegger's.

NOTES


2. That Heidegger failed to recognize the explicitly metaphysical strain in American pragmatism is made clear in this text from Holzwege quoted by Richard Rorty: "Americanism is something European. It is an as-yet-uncomprehended species of the gigantic, the gigantic that is itself still inchoate and does not as yet originate at all out of the complete and gathered metaphysical essence of the modern age. The American interpretation of Americanism by means of pragmatism still remains outside the metaphysical realm." ("Overcoming the Tradition," Consequences of Pragmatism, University of Minnesota Press, 1982, p. 58.)


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This book fills in a long-standing lacuna in Peirce scholarship. It provides a systematic account of Peirce's philosophy of religion in terms central to Peirce's presentation, and it refutes "the claim of the editors of Peirce's Collected papers that his religious writings have 'rather tenuous connection with the rest of his system'" (p. 3, "Editorial Note" on p. v of Collected Papers: 6). Supplementing Donna Orange's Peirce's Conception of God (Bloomington: Indiana UP), Raposa offers a more extensive and synthetic account, focusing on the theistic semiotics which are central to Peirce's religious philosophy (in his concluding chapter, Raposa ingeniously calls this "theosemiotics"). At heart, the book is an extended reflection of Peirce's "Neglected Argument for the Reality of God" (CP 6.452-91, 1906), where, in Raposa's words, Peirce argued "that a vague belief in God is instinctive, the natural result of free meditation [or "musement"] upon the nature of the universe" (3). Raposa shows that,
for Peirce, abduction, or hypothesis-making, plays a definitive role in the life of inquiry; that the scientific inquirer's most general abduction is that God is author of our universes of experience; and that this abduction moves the inquirer to desire shaping the whole of conduct in conformity with it. This conduct is the religious discipline of scientific inquiry.

An elegant teacher as well as writer, Raposa introduces the reader to each of the essential elements of Peirce's theosemiotic, as displayed in his various reflections on religion. Here is a brief synopsis. In his opening chapter on Peirce's "Scientific Theism," Raposa shows how Peirce's understanding of abductive inference enabled him to offer a theist's response to Darwin as well as a realist's response to Hume. In Ch. II, he shows how, as metaphysician, Peirce adopted elemental concepts of logic and mathematics, per hypothesis, as icons of the Absolute Mind. For Peirce, this Mind is not God, but rather the universe understood as a symbol of God. As a vernacular word, 'God' is vague (CP 6.494), while the Absolute Mind represents a continuum of highest dimensionality: "... that one, incredibly complex, general idea that renders intelligible everything that exists" (104). For the scientific inquirer, the reasonableness of the Absolute Mind is "concretized in the actual universe, even though it continues to embody possible further determinations beyond all multitude" (Ibid). In Ch. III, Raposa explains that for Peirce, this is an evolving universe, whose intelligible character is displayed in a religious metaphysics of "evolutionary love." According to Peirce's pragmatism (examined in Ch. IV), this concept of love displays its meaning only to the extent that it engenders habits of conduct which are themselves interpretants of God's presence in the universe. These habits are available to the mind instinctually, but their availability is obscured by our "moral and intellectual aberrations" (MS #10, cited p. 109). To recover them, "one must be 'born again and become as a little child' in order to 'look upon the world with new eyes' (1.219). Such is the strategy of Musement" (109).

Musement (the subject of Ch. V) is thus a means of recovering instinctual habits of seeing by interrupting habits that obscure seeing. To interrupt these habits is to achieve self-control, which Peirce called "the capacity for rising to an extended view of a practical subject .... This is the only freedom of which [humanity] has any reason to be proud .... Because love of what is good for all .... is the essence of Christianity, .... the service of Christ is perfect freedom" (CP 5.39n1, cited p. 116). The ultimately extended view of all praxis is to see the universe of action as "a representamen .... of God's purpose" (CP 5.11191; cited p. 117). This is the seeing which the free play of Musement allows. Peirce's Neglected Argument identifies this Musement as the abductive stage of scientific inquiry, recommended by instinct and having as its consequence the transformation of the Muser into scientific theist. Raposa reminds us that Peirce also called this Musement prayer.
It is a remarkably comprehensive, lucid and convincing account which brings coherence to Peirce's religious thought at the cost only of quieting the tensions which may persist between Peirce's pragmatism and his system.

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Peter Ochs


These twelve papers were selected from a symposium commemorating the two-hundredth anniversary of the Virginia Statute held at the University of Virginia in 1985. The statute is reproduced as passed, and without two philosophically interesting passages included in Jefferson's 1777 version. The inclusion of several of Jefferson's relevant letters (to: Danbury Baptists, Peter Carr, and Thomas Law), as well as Madison's "Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments" and "Detached Memoranda" would have been helpful. Two of the best articles deal primarily with Madison's views on religious establishment. Still, this is a well edited collection of essays on the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom.

The authors develop the themes of the religious dimension of American life and the roles of Madison and Jefferson in limiting its public place. Sometimes there is direct dialogue between the authors: J.G.A. Pocock's remark that Rorty's view of democracy gives priority "to those for whom the universe has become disenchanted ..." (71). More often the exchange is brought about by editors. They place Rorty's "the Priority of Democracy to Philosophy" immediately after David Little's contribution which urges us to treat with care the claim that "... a liberal society can survive only by means of its members affirming and sharing a particular set of religious values." (253)

The articles of most interest to this philosopher were those by Martin Marty, Edwin Gaustad, Thomas Buckley, Lance Banning, and Rorty. Marty tackles the question of how to interpret the religious views of Jefferson given the inconsistency of his "wall of separation" between church and state and his practice as a public figure. Marty claims Jefferson redefined religion as primarily a matter of opinion, not practice. It is this aspect of Jefferson's thought he finds most difficult since religion is more properly regarded as a major source of motivation.

Gaustad explains that the defenders of establishment felt a common faith was necessary for the preservation of society and peace. Pocock charges Jefferson with intellectualizing experience in defining religion as a matter of opinion, and with relegating religious traditions such as the pentecostal to the private sphere. Ironically, he quotes Eisenhower, "Our country is founded on a fundamental religious faith, and I don't care what