developed.

One of the most interesting items of content is Hookway's attention to what he calls Peirce's "regulative hopes" and "indubitable acritical perceptual beliefs" that provide a kind of metaphysical glue for Peirce's system. One example of these is the hope that abduction works to tell us something of reality: that the human mind is somehow attuned to God's purpose. It is interesting because it is precisely the binding effect of these that someone like Goudge is unwilling to admit. Whether or not one likes these regulative hopes and acritical beliefs, it seems to me that Hookway is right in asserting their importance for Peirce. And he is also right in drawing some connections between these and Peirce's metaphysics. In short, Hookway tries to make sense of what he reads in Peirce and does not try to slough off that which he finds objectionable.

Peirce demonstrates Hookway's gift for clearly presenting difficult issues and his patience and caution in making judgments on Peirce's intentions. His ear is attuned more to the analytic tradition than to a broader historical approach, but this does not diminish the book's worth. It is a welcome antidote to those readings of Peirce that want to eradicate some aspects of his work to make way for a contemporary reading of other aspects; more generally, it is an important book for anyone interested in coming to grips with the whole of Peirce's philosophy.

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If the response to Victor Farias's Heidegger et le Nazisme is any indication, we are likely to find ourselves hard-pressed indeed to find whatever value there is in Martin Heidegger's life and voluminous philosophical work[1]. This has never been a simple task for American philosophers of any persuasion, but it will now be easier than ever to dismiss this thinker as a crazed mystic, intoxicated with the Teutonic myth of Blut und Boden, collaborator with Hitler and, last but not least (as Richard Rorty has contended), as a prophet of the demise of "Philosophy" altogether.

Mark Okrent's book on Heidegger, under the provocative title Heidegger's Pragmatism, is reason enough to question such dismissal. Published in the same year as Farias's book (in the French translation that first brought it to the attention of the philosophical world at large) Okrent's treatment is in no sense a response to Farias. Nor is it, as critics of American pragmatism like Max Horkheimer and Allan Bloom might suspect, an attempt to show why both pragmatism and Heidegger should be denied a place in the historical
canon of major philosophical achievements. On the contrary, Okrent conducts a careful analysis of the major stages in the development of Heidegger's thought, examines with painstaking care and objectivity the shifting structures of the arguments from the early "metaphysical" stage through the later "critique of metaphysics," and concludes that a clear strain of pragmatism runs like an undercurrent throughout the whole.

It is, indeed, Okrent's argument that it is this underlying strain of pragmatism with its explicitly holistic tenor that unites the earlier and the later Heidegger's work into something like a coherent body of philosophy. Okrent contends that Heidegger himself eventually came to recognize that a pragmatic attitude toward metaphysical problems -- the relation of the "Understanding" and "Being" of Okrent's subtitle -- is the only possible outcome of the project envisioned in Sein und Zeit. It is this delayed recognition, Okrent claims, that results in what has generally been seen as Heidegger's "anti-metaphysical" turn in the later works.

At the same time that he traces the decisive role of the pragmatic element in Heidegger's thought, Okrent makes it clear that he does not regard Heidegger at any point as a "pragmatist" and that Heidegger himself never did either. It is not that Heidegger ever chose the pragmatist path at all; it is rather that the pragmatist path was, in the end, the only one (in metaphysics) that remained open to him after the disappointing failure of the transcendental arguments that were promised in, and premised by, the problematic program envisaged in Sein und Zeit. What the early Heidegger failed to see was the decisive linkage (Zusammenhangenkeit) of the "use" theory of meaning implicit in both pragmatism and the inquiry launched in Sein und Zeit.

Marjorie Grene, Stephen Toulmin, Michael Heim and others have noted the similarity between Heidegger's concepts of "human being" (Dasein) and of "world" (or of "things-in-the-world") and the "naturalism" by means of which both John Dewey and Ludwig Wittgenstein contextualize the position of human beings, their experience, language and culture, in relation to the "objects" and "events" of nature. But such comparisons usually break off at the point where either Dewey's "problem solving methods" or Wittgenstein's "therapeutic analyses" portend both criticism of, and radical reconstructions in, both classical and modern epistemologies and ontologies. It is both a virtue and possible weakness of Okrent's approach that his concentration on the problem of "intentionality" and consequent emphasis on the "verificationist" and "instrumentalist" elements in pragmatism allows him to carry such comparisons much further, and in far greater detail (particularly as far as Heidegger's side of the comparison is concerned) than has been attempted before.

The virtue of this approach is the extent to which it allows us see how closely Heidegger's analysis of the problem...
of understanding the meaning of being is to the correlative analyses of both the classical pragmatists as well as such "neo-pragmatists" as Quine, Goodman, Davidson, Putnam and Rorty. The possible weakness is that by concentrating his attention so completely on these parallels, Okrent may be neglecting the fact that similar parallels exist between Heidegger's development and that of Wittgenstein and such of his followers as Gilbert Ryle, J.L. Austin and David Pears.

Nowhere is that weakness more apparent than in Okrent's conclusion that the late Heidegger's "pragmatic attitude" toward the problems of metaphysics led him to adopt a "pragmatic anti-realism in regard to traditional metaphysical issues while maintaining an anti-pragmatic stance regarding the conditions for intentionality." (p.280) By ignoring developments in pragmatism and neo-pragmatism that belie that it is committed to anything like the "anti-realism" that he ascribes to them here, Okrent may be missing the point of even Heidegger's critique of metaphysics. For it is at least a plausible hypothesis that the point of both pragmatism's critique of classical metaphysics and Heidegger's is the same; that both are aimed less at demolishing realism as such than at replacing the static structures of foundational realism in metaphysics with a dynamic and anti-foundational realism designed to succeed it. Moreover, if recent studies of Wittgenstein's work and influence are any indication, there may yet be discerned a convergence on that same objective by those who have embraced the pragmatic implications of the Philosophical Investigations[3].

There are bound to be complaints from Heidegger enthusiasts concerning Okrent's "neglect" of the phenomenological and hermeneutical sides of Heidegger's work. But these complaints will be, in the end, far outweighed by the fact that Okrent has opened up (in the sense of Aletheia) Heidegger's achievements to a far wider audience than they have appealed to at all until now. Moreover, it is simply not the case that Okrent's Heidegger is presented from a "one-sided" (pragmatic) perspective, as if his pragmatism were the only strain of importance that deserves our attention in understanding and evaluating his work. It is just that Okrent's Heidegger is shown to be incomplete unless, and until, we are willing to acknowledge the pragmatic strain that plays such a decisive role, early and late, in the development of his philosophy.

Certainly Heidegger's Pragmatism must be recognized as required reading for all those whose interest in pragmatism is not limited to its classical expression in the works of its "founders". And it is, surely, especially to be recommended to all those pragmatists who have been both puzzled and repelled by Richard Rorty's insouciant dismissal of Dewey's metaphysics. For what Okrent's analysis reveals is the remarkable extent to which Heidegger's critique of classical metaphysics, in both its Aristotelian and Kantian forms, resembles Dewey's. If neither Rorty nor Okrent have realized that both Dewey and Heidegger were engaged in reconstructing the role of metaphysics, and not in
dismissing it, that is neither Dewey's fault, nor Heidegger's.

NOTES


2. That Heidegger failed to recognize the explicitly metaphysical strain in American pragmatism is made clear in this text from Holzwege quoted by Richard Rorty: "Americanism is something European. It is an as-yet-uncomprehended species of the gigantic, the gigantic that is itself still inchoate and does not as yet originate at all out of the complete and gathered metaphysical essence of the modern age. The American interpretation of Americanism by means of pragmatism still remains outside the metaphysical realm." ("Overcoming the Tradition," Consequences of Pragmatism, University of Minnesota Press, 1982, p.58.)


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This book fills in a long-standing lacuna in Peirce scholarship. It provides a systematic account of Peirce’s philosophy of religion in terms central to Peirce’s presentation, and it refutes "the claim of the editors of Peirce’s Collected papers that his religious writings have ‘rather tenuous connection with the rest of his system’" (p. 3, "Editorial Note" on p. v of Collected Papers: 6). Supplementing Donna Orange’s Peirce’s Conception of God (Bloomington: Indiana UP), Raposa offers a more extensive and synthetic account, focusing on the theistic semiotics which are central to Peirce’s religious philosophy (in his concluding chapter, Raposa ingeniously calls this "theosemiotics"). At heart, the book is an extended reflection of Peirce’s "Neglected Argument for the Reality of God" (CP 6.452-91, 1906), where, in Raposa’s words, Peirce argued "that a vague belief in God is instinctive, the natural result of free meditation [or "musement"] upon the nature of the universe" (3). Raposa shows that,