Those interested in the political views of James should read the items on the Venezuelan crisis, the Philippines, and lynching (#'s 21, 48, 57-59). In this regard, don’t overlook #21. While his ideas on the regulation of medical practice seem libertarian (#'s 16, 46), his stance on animals experimentation (#3) is moderate.

Any academic will enjoy the items on faculty meetings, academic regalia, and student disorders in the Harvard College Yard. There are personal reminiscences of Agassiz, Royce, Chauncey Wright, Wundt and others. There is even a note to readers of Forest and Stream for help in obtaining observations on puppies.

The rhetoric of the letters varies from witty (#’s 41, 43) to the powerful "The Philippines Again" (#52), a good brief public challenge to certain aspects of US foreign policy, wonderfully relevant today. For historians of education there is material on the growth of Harvard, student discipline, the elective system, faculty debates and the honors system.

The introduction, Apparatus and Appendices are an impressive account of emendations, provenance and editorial methods. The Notes are very helpful.

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In terms of scholarship, substance and style, this book is a masterpiece in the original sense of this term. It is indispensable for comprehending Dewey’s project in the manner he himself conceived this project. In particular, "John Dewey’s Conception of Philosophy" (the subtitle of The Necessity of Pragmatism) is, in Prof. Sleeper’s hands, saved from Richard Rorty’s "insouciant reductionism" (p. 1) and, what is more important, from a familiar but misleading story about the genesis and development of pragmatism.

Unlike most other accounts of Dewey’s philosophy, this one exhibits the centrality of logic in Dewey’s approach. To be sure, the understanding of logic is reconstructed and, as a crucial aspect of this conceptual reconstruction, the concept of necessity is reconceived. In this reconstruction, our logical norms are seen to be emerge from actual processes of inquiry and to reflect the ontological structures encountered in those processes (p. 47); in this reconceptualization, "[n]ecessity means needed; contingency no longer required--because already enjoyed" (EW 4:29, quoted on p. 39). (Put another way, "Dewey would have us start with de facto examples in which cognitive structures emerge from action, as needed" [p. 59]). Moreover, "an adequate
'general theory of language' is an essential precondition of the philosophy of logic and inquiry" (p. 6). The Necessity of Pragmatism is especially impressive both for its masterful handling of the details of this reconstruction, reconception, and precondition and for its equally masterful conception of how the details fit together into a coherent and compelling whole.

Chapter 2 ("The Conception of a Philosophy") opens with a quotation from a letter written by Dewey in 1950: "As I see it now, tho not at the time, I've spent most of years trying to get things together; my critics understand me only after they split me up again" (p. 16). In The Necessity of Pragmatism Prof. Sleeper sets out to show that "Dewey had succeeded in pulling the various strands of his work together, that he had succeeded in developing coherent perspective on the problems of philosophy and culture, that his philosophy can be understood without 'splitting' him up" (p. 16; cf. p. 189). At the center of this project is a rejection of the conventional wisdom regarding Dewey's role in the development of pragmatism. Such wisdom "is inclined to dismiss Dewey's logic as vestigial psychologism,' in the manner of Russell, or to brush it aside—as Nagel did—as hopelessly out of date because of its failure to make use of the powerful new 'symbolic' techniques" (p. 5). In addition, "[c]onventional wisdom has it that pragmatism is a philosophy that issued from the joint efforts of Peirce and James. Peirce in the role of logician and James in the role of psychologist join forces to work out the plot, with the help of supporting actors . . ." (p. 47). While Dewey is accorded a supporting role, it is merely that. In contrast, Sleeper contends it is necessary to see Dewey reconstructing pragmatism virtually from the outset (p. 47). In addition, it is necessary to see how central Dewey's work on logic is to the whole of his philosophy (p. 17).

This emphasis on the centrality of Dewey's logic does not cause Prof. Sleeper to overlook or even to minimize Dewey's metaphysics of existence. Indeed, one of the author's chief concerns is to distinguish Dewey's actual metaphysics of existence from his alleged metaphysics of experience (pp. 6-7; 10-11); another is to relate Dewey's naturalistic metaphysics to his pragmatic logic. According to Prof. Sleeper we encounter already in 1891 the conception of the relation between logic and metaphysics that Dewey was to maintain until the end. "It is the conception of logic as the critical theory of experience, of experience as pedagogical, and of metaphysics as the critical theory of existence, the 'ground-map of the province of criticism,' which is sustained by logic, as inquiry" (p. 26; cf. p. 101).

An interesting and somewhat controversial feature of Prof. Sleeper's interpretation is his insistence that, in Dewey's development, we can discern a "turn in the direction of a reconstructed Aristotelean realism, distinctly naturalistic and worked out in a context of controversy concerning the very legitimacy of metaphysics as such" (p. 96). Larry Hickman in his excellent review of The Necessity of Pragmatism in the Transactions of the
Charles S. Peirce Society 23.2 (Summer 1987): 446-453 notes that Prof. Sleeper "has given us a lucid account of Dewey's unique theory of inquiry and the place it has in his wider philosophy" (p. 452). Nonetheless, he takes Prof. Sleeper to task for (among other things) using so misleading a term as "realism" to describe Dewey's position, claiming that this position resulted from a synthesis which "was sufficiently novel and important to warrant a new term" (p. 452). There is, no doubt, a point to this criticism. Even so, there is a warrant for using "realism" in connection with Dewey. And part of Prof. Sleeper's task is to establish just this warrant. (Incidentally, Peter Manicas in A History and Philosophy of the Social Sciences argues for a similar, if not identical, form of realism. Perhaps what we have on our hands is a school of thought--the Queens school of transactional realism!)

The Necessity of Pragmatism exhibits many virtues and only a very few deficiencies; and these deficiencies are almost all of a minor sort (cf. Hickman's review, pp 450-452). Not the least of its virtues is the manner in which the story of Dewey's reconstruction of pragmatism is told. The Critical Bibliographies at the conclusion of each chapter are an invaluable resource, especially given the size and unevenness of the secondary literature. Then there is the exquisite balance Prof. Sleeper achieves between a detailed historical account of the development of Dewey's thought and a penetrating critical sense of what was philosophically at stake in the various moves Dewey made in "trying to get things together."

In his desire to exhibit in detail the uniqueness of Dewey's reconstruction of pragmatism, Sleeper appears to drive a wedge too deeply between Peirce and Dewey. This desire even leads to misrepresentation, for (according to Sleeper) "at no time did Peirce describe logic as a theory of inquiry." (p. 49). In fact, we find just this description of logic in Peirce's writings. In addition, there is also the attribution to Peirce of "an ontology of fixed essences" (e.g., p. 47). Since Peirce himself asserts that the "very Platonic forms themselves have become or are becoming developed" (Collected Papers, 6.194), it would appear Peirce espoused an ontology of anything but fixed essences or static forms.

In order to appreciate the originality of Dewey, there is no necessity to exaggerate the differences between Peirce and Dewey. One possible reason for the exaggeration of these differences is that, in his interpretation of the philosophical relationship between Peirce and Dewey, the author of The Necessity of Pragmatism has apparently granted four Peircean texts ("The Doctrine of Necessity," Peirce's review of Dewey's Studies in Logical Theory [8.188-190], and two letters from Peirce to Dewey [8.239-244]) too authoritative a role in interpreting this relationship (however, see endnotes 3 and 4 to ch. 3, p. 218). Yet Prof. Sleeper writes with such authority I almost feel inclined to say (in words borrowed from the tradition of classical American philosophy): Let no person bring together what Sleeper has rent
asunder (cf. Hickman's review, p. 449).

It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of Ralph Sleeper's The Necessity of Pragmatism. Quite simply, it itself is a necessity in precisely Dewey's reconstructed, pragmatic sense of this term: it needed to be written and it needs to be read and discussed—not only to enhance our understanding of Dewey's reconstruction of pragmatism but also to carry on his project in a manner informed by his spirit. For Prof. Sleeper writes about this philosopher in a way which is, at once, scholarly and philosophical—a way which exhibits painstaking respect for Dewey's writings and yet also issues formidable challenges to the way we think about the problems of persons, as these problems emerge out of the evolved and evolving forms of transaction between persons and their world (see, e.g., p. 186; pp. 194-5; pp. 206-210).

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This book presents in a detailed and systematic way the views of seminal thinkers and then uses some of these views as the materials from which to construct or, at least, sketch a comprehensive theory of semiotic processes. Central to this theory is the formulation of a conception of metaphor (Chapter VIII, esp. pp. 126-134). (In this respect, Semiotics from Peirce to Barthes contributes to a growing body of literature, having its roots in Peirce's "sumeiotic" [or general theory of signs], on the nature and function of metaphor. The work of Carl Hausman, Douglas Anderson, and Michael Heley especially deserves mention in this connection.) In addition, there is an attempt to show the value of a comprehensive theory of semiotic processes by using this theory as a perspective from which to examine various kinds of semiotic phenomena (e.g., a U.S. postage stamp commemorating the First Amendment, political mottoes, artistic works). Thus, the aim of this book is both exegetical and constructive.

This study is divided into ten chapters. Six of these are devoted to the sign theories of philosophers from the United States: Chapters I, II, and III present Peirce's theory; IV examines "The Theory of Meaning of G.H. Mead," V "Language and Meaning in J. Dewey and J.H. Randall," and VII "Community, Communication, and Meaning in Buchler's Philosophy of the Human Process." However, it is (as the "Preface" makes explicit) the perspective of Peirce that most deeply informs the course of the inquiry. As the author himself notes in the "Preface," the unifying themes of the study are "(i) the triadic nature of semiotic processes as uncovered by Charles S. Peirce, (ii) the completely general scope of his theory of signs, and (iii) its applicability both to scientific discourse and forms of artistic