to a wider and more diverse range of equally valid interpretations.

Corrington is concerned to reverse this tendency by developing a hermeneutics based upon a community of interpretation, and he finds the basis for this in the American philosophers C. S. Peirce and Josiah Royce. Interpretation is not an individual act, but essentially involves a community of interpreters interacting with one another, according to common standards. He further argues that Emerson's transcendentalism decentralized the biblical texts in order to establish the priority of nature, thereby making nature the ultimate text for hermeneutics. Finally, the metaphysics of Justus Buchler is shown to provide the most adequate categorial framework for understanding such persistent hermeneutic problems as the nature of horizons and the structure of the "objects" of hermeneutic inquiry.

One chapter return hermeneutic inquiry to its origin, the biblical texts, by discussing Royce on Paul and the primitive church. Royce found the "historical Jesus" and his sayings an inadequate basis for the living church. These sayings cried out for further interpretation. Paul by conceiving of the church as "the Body of Christ" provided just such an interpretation, and formed a community of interpretation. Salvation of the individual came about by incorporation within the right sort of community. Loyalty, Royce's key virtue, is "the practically devoted love of an individual for a community" (70).

Sin is disloyalty, betrayal of the community, a moral burden which cannot be overcome by the individual's own acts. Atonement depends upon divine grace whereby an individual within the community of love can overcome this estrangement (78 ff). "This religious community, the Beloved Community, is somewhat akin to the Absolute of the pre-1912 writings. In fact, Royce even hints that the community is itself divine. 'Man, the community, may prove to be God...' " (82) but this is qualified by Royce's more traditional commitments.

This study shown a refreshingly different way hermeneutics can proceed.

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Konstantin Kolenda's Cosmic Religion presents a combination of style and content uncharacteristic of contemporary philosophy even within the American tradition. The informal narrative reminds the reader of Emerson and McDermott; yet the voice is more soft-spoken and straightforward. The topics of discussion are reminiscent of late-19th and early-20th century humanisms; through them Kolenda projects a deeply religious perspective that remains ultimately non-theistic. The outcome is a book that is worth reading--one that should appeal to philosophers and non-
Cosmic Religion describes a cosmological journey that stops at many ports and call for the reader's participation. As Kolenda becomes the universe in order to tell us its story, we meet with a text that is at times both frustrating and inspiring, on that is on both accounts compelling.

The frustrations are to be found if one reads the book wearing the hat of the critical philosopher. There seem to be too many loose ends and bald assertions. For example, the narrator attacks determinism, yet develops a naturalistic worldview that seems to demand some kind of determinism. From another angle, the narrator denies reductionism, but defines almost everything genetically. He says, for example, that the human concept of God "is but my mask for propagating those values [of personhood]" (11). At another instance, Thomas Kuhn is defended from charges of relativism by the assertion that science can be defined genealogically without presupposing or entailing and kind of teleological element--that is, science has "arrived from," but it is not "proceeding toward." The problem is not that these claims can be squared up, but rather that they are passed through too quickly. These are grounds for battle here, but the narrator never takes the field.

Having said all that, let me step back. The narrative style is bound to lead to such frustrations on the part of the critical/analytical reader. Kolenda is surely aware of this and his employment of the style must therefore indicate that he seeks the reader's indulgence--his task is not so much to argue as it is to present. The metaphorically personified cosmos/narrator is neither a dialectician nor a strictly analytical thinker; rather, he takes on Vergil's role as guide for a journey that maps the development and significance of fundamental human concerns. It is here I find the book inspiring.

Kolenda leads us optimistically but common sensically through a number of contemporary and historical issues: mysticism, love, meaning, racism, etc. The optimism is not naive however; it is tempered by a Jamesian awareness of evil that quietly assumes that the only meaningful response is not despair, but hope. Kolenda's handling of issues of sexism with sincerity, clarity, and passion, but without a grating self-righteousness is a good example of his skill. He gives us a sense that these are issues and problems with which we are all involved and for which we (each and all of us) are ultimately responsible.

Let me conclude, then, by recommending the book to all kinds of readers. It reminds those of us who are philosophers that we must occasionally speak in and listen to other voices; it reminds the lay reader that philosophers, both in the past and the present, can and do speak to issues of universal concern.

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