1. Abstracts of papers to be read at the Annual Meeting.

   Shortly before his death Josiah Royce stated that after writing The Problem of Christianity (1913) the two ideas of Community and of Spirit had become far more vital and meaningful for him. Yet when presenting the mature Royce (1912-1916), most scholars usually regard his idea of Community as his only central category. This divergence occasions the present essay. Like Royce's, our method starts from those presences of spirit found within ordinary human experiences and then inquires serially whether his other usages of "spirit" point to partly superhuman encounters or even to a Spirit transcendently beyond our perceptual-conceptual experience. We find the mature Royce referring to spirit as: 1) constituting individual personal human mind; 2) guiding the process of interpretation; 3) transforming the individual human self; 4) schooling human communities; 5) constituting the Beloved Community; and 6) most fittingly symbolizing the divine nature. In conclusion, we measure how this tentative finding of six major philosophical senses of "spirit" affects our understanding of the mature Royce and of secondary studies of him.

B. John Ryder, "Buchler, Ordinal Metaphysics and God."
   This paper is concerned with the implications of an ordinal ontology for two specific characteristics of God--God as creator of what is and God as preserver of what is. The discussion is couched in the ontological categories presented and developed by Justus Buchler in his Metaphysics of Natural Complexes. It is argued that the categorial relations of an ordinal ontology preclude the possibility of a being that created the world and one that preserves or sustains the world. Among the most significant categories that serve to frame the analysis are ordinality, prevalence, scope, contour, integrity and relation. A creator God would be a being that ordinally locates what it creates but would not itself be located. The possibility of something not being ordinally located does not obtain in a metaphysics of natural complexes. A God that preserves or sustains whatever is would be one that stands in relation to everything that is. The concept of relation is examined in terms of scope, contour and integrity, and it is shown that a complex, any complex, cannot stand in relation to every other complex.

   This essay traces Cohen's view on the nature of logic--a view which might be called logical realism. This view occurs, never fully developed, in writings such as Reason and Nature (1931) to Essays in Philosophy and Science (1949). This paper also presents Ernest Nagel's criticism of Cohen's logical realism. It would have been usual to present Cohen's response to criticism, viz. how he elaborated his position in greater detail, or how he modified his position in consequence of criticism directed against it. Unfortunately--and also surprisingly--Cohen did very little of this. He was very dogged in his notion of the relation between logic and ontology.

D. Jim Campbell, "Emerson's Perspectival Philosophy of Nature."
   Nature plays a vital role in the thought of Ralph Waldo Emerson. Nature is the shadow of the soul; and the individual is an eyeball through which the power of existence passes in a physical guise. Ultimately, we cannot understand ourselves without adequately understanding our natural context. However, it is not clear that Emerson's notion of nature, as distinct from his recognition of its value, is as viable today as it once was. In
particular, we must re-examine his optimistic tone and belief in compensation, his celebration of ordinary experience which might better be denigrated to encourage change, and his ruralist bias in an increasingly urban world. Perhaps through a reconstruction of the notion of nature we could develop our own original relation to the universe which would play in our lives the powerful role it once did in Emerson's.

E. Thomas Olshewsky, "Peirce's Pragmatic Maxim."
Several features serve to distinguish Peirce's pragmatic maxim from its offspring and near relations. These include his treatment of it as a rule of clarity rather than as a theory of meaning, his insistence on focus on concepts (thirdness) rather than terms or referents, and the fundamentally subjunctive character of his formulation. James' formulation, by contrast, shifts to subjective possibilities rather than objective, and obliterates the distinctions that Peirce maintained between mediating concepts and immediate sensations. These differences have practical implications not only for their treatments of truth, but also of community, purpose and concepts. Similar nominalistic tendencies in neo-positivism and in ordinary language analysis distinguish these movements from the thrust of Peirce's pragmatism. The realistic base for his pragmatism, which he contended was a necessary condition in later years (1905), was already present ten years before he first published the maxim, and serves throughout his work to give that maxim its distinctiveness.

F. Sandra B. Rosenthal, "The Pragmatic World of Charles Peirce."
Peirce never explicitly clarifies his understanding of "the real world," though he refers to it frequently throughout his writings. Such a lack of explicit clarification can well go unremarked, for it is a common sense term which slides easily into a common sense identification with "what is the case" or "what there is." The ultimate nature of "what there is" may receive various philosophic labels, depending upon whether one interprets Peirce as a realist, an idealist, or a phenomenalist, but the unquestioned common sense identification of "what there is" with Peirce's statements concerning the real world is the unquestioned basis for the application of any of these labels. When such an identification is questioned, however, and Peirce's various statements concerning the real world are interrelated for a development of their systematic import, it will be seen that "the real world" fits inadequately within the confines of any of the above labels, for it is a distinctively pragmatic world.

G. Gregg E. Franzewa, "The Empiricist and Other Paradoxes of Translatability."
It is the thesis of this paper that there is a "paradox of empiricist translatability" which is manifest in C. I. Lewis's notion of a terminating judgment; and further that this is one of a larger family of such paradoxes that arise from attempts to establish meaning connections between different metaphysical categories.

I maintain that in Mind and the World Order and in Book I of An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation Lewis treats the notion identified as "sense meaning" as reflective of analytic connections between concepts in the category "physical objects." But then in Book II of An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation he tries to use this criterion of meaning in a theory of confirmation, preserving the analytic relations but shifting the reference of "sense meanings" to particular given passages of sensation. And while he has been widely criticized for that move, it has not been previously noted that such criticisms do not apply to the analysis in Book I. In short, there are two sorts of judgment in AKV which get labeled "terminating."
G. (continued)

Finally, I will propose a model of the relation between categorial concept sets, taking analytic relations to hold only inside such a set and correlation relations to hold between sets. Thus I wish to show that the empiricist translation problem is very similar to problems found in other traditional philosophical paradoxes.

H. Joseph C. Flay, "C. I. Lewis and the Presupposition of Totality."

There are at least two presuppositions of common sense which have been accepted in one form or another by modern philosophy (e.g. from Descartes through Hegel): (1) experience is given to some degree independently of our will, and (2) the referent for the principle of totality and the referent for intelligibility (in a fundamental sense) are the same. C. I. Lewis is one of the first philosophers to seriously challenge the second presupposition. The result of that challenge is a radical break with the tradition and proof that recognition of a plurality of frameworks of intelligibility, not grounded in or reducible to one, homogeneous, fundamental ground of intelligibility, does not necessarily lead to the relativism and nihilism predicted by the tradition. Furthermore, Lewis is able to accept the "absolutely" given, recognizing its "surdal" nature, and yet using it to give stability to intelligibility frameworks, rather than discounting it as simply the ineffable. Seen in the light of his rejection of this presupposition of the identity of referent for intelligibility and totality, the long-recognized importance of his pragmatic a priori is underscored and augmented as a way to avoid problems of reductionism and endless debate over realism, phenomenalism, and idealism. This leads us to a new view of the relationship between the respective referents for totality and intelligibility.

I. John Underwood Lewis, "Morris R. Cohen's Conception of Legal Science: Its Relation to Philosophy and Importance to Contemporary Jurisprudence."

Cohen's writings in legal philosophy came at a time when Austinian positivism dominated Anglo-North American jurisprudence. Its foundation was the proposition that "the existence of law is one thing; its merit or demerit is another." (The Province of Jurisprudence Determined.) Cohen said this was "near-sighted" and insisted that legal science must be inherently normative. This presupposes a certain idea of what law is, which in turn presupposes a certain understanding of the nature of philosophical speculation. This paper attempts to clarify Cohen's views of these conceptual relationships.

J. Joseph Grcic, "Rawls and Socialism."

In this paper I argue that Rawls' theory of justice as presented in his book of the same name is not only compatible with a certain kind of socialism, but is, indeed, entailed by it. I show that "individuals" in the Original Position would choose a form of socialism based on the values of self-respect and social union. A further analysis of self-respect reveals its relationship to Marx's theory of alienation. Finally, a discussion of Rawls' theory of human nature will suggest the presence of an ambiguity which further undermines the possibility of fully realizing Rawls' theory of justice in a capitalist society.

K. Andrew Altman, "John Dewey and Contemporary Normative Ethics."

John Dewey would be heartened to see that contemporary American philosophers are becoming increasingly concerned with normative problems. However, he would be disheartened to see that many such philosophers are treating these problems on the basis of a method of which he was extremely critical. In this paper, I describe that method, indicate which prominent American philosophers employ it, and examine Dewey's critique of the method. In the concluding section, I defend Dewey's own approach to ethics.
L. Peter T. Manicas, "John Dewey and the Politics of Social Change."
The essay argues that Dewey's politics of social change was radical and incrementalist, but that he was neither a revolutionary nor a reformer. The deep theoretical reasons for his posture are detailed and include his instrumentalism, his notion of the ideal society and his theory of society itself.

M. David L. Miller, "G. H. Mead's Last Course: His Theory of the Past."
This paper is based on notes taken by me and by John M. Brewster on twelve two-hour lectures given by Mead during the Winter quarter, 1931. In this graduate course Mead discussed problems presented in The Philosophy of the Present, the Carus Lectures not published at that time, nor were they in final form. The chief problem concerned the meaning of time and especially the meaning of history and the past. Mead began by giving a history of the contemporary evolutionary theory. He discussed the Hebraic-Christian theory of time, the Greek, the mechanistic, the seasonal theories, as well as the Kantian-Newtonian theory of space and time and relativity theory. His main concern was to show how there can be novel, unpredictable events that are continuous with the past. This can be done, he explained, only by subscribing to a new theory of time, and especially a new theory of the past. This paper aims to show how he did it.

N. Edward I. Pitts, "Ideal and Reality: The Early Years of the American Philosophical Association."
When the American Philosophical Association was founded in 1902 the ideals which guided its organization reflected the concern that philosophy had lost its way as an academic pursuit, and that it needed to be revitalized. The attempt by a small group of philosophers to remake philosophy on the model of the natural sciences is examined, and the results of their efforts analyzed. Special attention is focused on the effort to conduct discussion sessions at the annual meetings of the APA which had as their aim the actual settlement of certain key philosophical issues.

O. King J. Dykeman, "Lizzie Orr Jones: 'The Modest Lady from Jacksonville.'"
The life and work of the American Philosopher Lizzie Orr Jones (1824-1891) typifies much of what it was to be an American, a woman and a philosopher in the middle of the United States in the 19th century. Lizzie Orr Jones's role in philosophy is almost unknown at this moment and her influence is presently so dissipated as to be unfelt. Yet her story is that of the majority of women who have done philosophy in the United States and her work provides keen insight into the problem and the resolutions that are offered by philosophy. The intent of this paper is to make her story known and to point out the power of her philosophical work.