ABSTRACT. Philosophers have developed various systems of individuation for handling questions of identity regarding works of art. But even a casual survey of different arts reveals that questions of individuation in one art form are markedly different from questions of individuation in another. Though distinctively philosophical concepts can go a short way in clarifying these issues, it is hardly likely that any single philosophical system can do justice to them all.

INTRODUCTION

The distinction between types and tokens is a well-known feature of modern aesthetics. Philosophers distinguish between works of art which are types, like symphonies, plays, dances, novels, engravings, and etchings, from the performances, copies, and prints which are the tokens of these types. This distinction between tokens and types is not exhaustive of works of art: there are some works, like paintings and statues, which are neither tokens nor types, they are simply particulars. These three classes of types, tokens, and plain particulars, however, take in everything of esthetic importance.

I have no deep objections to this terminology, provided that we do not go around considering art types to be Platonic forms or universals or anything like that. Art types are created at a point in time; Platonic forms are not. Art types bear specifiable and intelligible relations to their tokens; Platonic forms bear no intelligible relation to the particulars that participate in them. The Eroica, even if it is a type, was created in 1803; then and now, it is related to its tokens by performing artists. Literary works are related to their tokens by pen and printing press; etchings, engravings, and other sorts of prints are related via the printing process. No such performative or mechanical process relates a form like humanity to particular men; all that can be said is that particular men "possess the qualities" necessary and sufficient for being men. But this hardly clears the air.

Careful adherence to the type-token distinction and its consequences forces a necessary but fussy precision of speech. One can no longer say that one heard a sym-
phony, only that one heard a performance of it. Even more oddly, one never reads a novel, only a copy of a novel, and one never sees an etching, only a print of one.

The denial that art types are not Platonic universals is not necessarily an endorsement of nominalism. Certainly there can be symphonies which are never played, and plays which are never performed. At least in such cases, the type is something apart from its tokens, and so a nominalistic reduction of art types to art tokens fails.

My concern in this article is with the individuation of works of art, whether they be individuals or they be types. "Individuation" in esthetics differs from "individuation" as it is construed in the other departments of philosophy. In metaphysics, individuation consists principally in establishing criteria which will distinguish a person or a material thing from all other persons or material things, and in providing rules by which persons or material things may be reidentified in diverse situations. In esthetics, individuation consists, in the case of works of art which are particulars, in the discrimination of originals from copies, and, in the case of works of art which are types, in the development of criteria which indicate which particulars are tokens of a given type.

Questions regarding individuation in art can be helpfully rephrased as questions about labelling. It is a neglected but important fact of esthetics that works of art commonly have labels by which they are identified. Many of the standard labels, however, suffer from ambiguity. 'David', for example, is an ambiguous label of statues because it may denote a statue of Michelangelo or a statue of Donatello, or many other statues. In this case, the ambiguity may be removed by specifying, 'Michelangelo's David', 'Donatello's David', and so on. In the case of 'Judith with the head of Holophernes', the ambiguity cannot be removed by merely mentioning the artist: Artemesia Gentileschi alone painted dozens of versions of this subject. In such a case, ambiguity can be removed by specifying 'Artemesia Gentileschi's first version of Judith', 'Artemesia Gentileschi's second version of Judith', etc. Let us call a label which unambiguously denotes a work of art a proper label. (Henceforth in this essay 'PL' will stand as an abbreviation for any proper label.)

The use of distinct proper labels is hardly ever problematic. If someone puts the label 'Beethoven's Fifth Symphony' on Beethoven's Seventh Symphony, he is not making a deep philosophical mistake, just an ignorant error that can be easily corrected. Real philosophical difficulties in the application of labels begin when a suffix is added to a proper label of a work of art to create what I call a cognate label. If 'PL' is a proper label, 'PL copy', 'PL forgery', 'PL version', 'PL translation', 'PL condensation', 'PL fake', 'PL variation', 'PL production', etc. are all cognate labels of PL.

In the case of works of art which are particulars, the proper label of the work of art denotes the only genuine example of the work; all cognate labels denote non-genuine examples of the work. In the case of works of art which are types, the proper label denotes the type; some cognate labels denote tokens of the type, other cognate labels do not denote tokens of this type. Let us call the class of particulars and types denoted by all cognate labels with a common PL prefix the cognate class of the work of art PL. The cognate class, for example, of Michelangelo's David includes all repro-
duction, pictures, copies, verbal descriptions, and what have you, of Michelangelo’s
David. Individuation in art, then, consists in drawing a line between the genuine and
non-genuine members of a cognate class. One must speak carefully here. "Non-gen-
une members" of a cognate class are bona fide members of the class. They are "non-
genuine" in the sense that they do not denote the genuine examples or tokens of the
work of art in question.

In the literature of criticism the line between the genuine and the non-gen-
une is drawn three different ways. Causal individuation isolates a member of the
cognate class as genuine if it bears a definite causal relation to the productive activi-
ties of the artist. A Rembrandt painting, for example, is said to be genuine if the ar-
rangement of paint on the canvas was actually caused by Rembrandt. This sort of in-
dividuation is dubbed "autographical" by Nelson Goodman. Qualitative individuation
isolates a set of qualities which are necessary and sufficient for a member of the cog-
nate class to be considered genuine. Individuation by intentions picks out certain
members of the cognate class as genuine on the grounds that these members come
closest to fulfilling the intentions of the artist.

Causal individuation cannot be reduced to qualitative individuation. In a
system of qualitative individuation, if A is a genuine member of the cognate class,
then any X which is qualitatively identical to A in all esthetically essential respects
must also be considered a genuine member of the cognate class. But with causal indi-
vividuation, if A is a genuine member of the cognate class, the most exact reproduction
of A need not thereby be counted as genuine, since it may lack the causal connection
with the artist which the particular system of causal individuation considers essential
for genuineness.

Individuation by intentions is in some ways like the system of qualitative indi-
vividuation. Certain qualities are singled out as those intended by the artist, and any
object that has these qualities must be considered genuine. On the other hand, indi-
vividuation by intentions shares with autographical individuation the feature that it is
possible to reclassify an item, from genuine to non-genuine or vice versa, without
making a single further observation concerning its qualities. If a decision concerning
genuineness is made causally, then the mere discovery that the artist was not involved
in the production of the object suffices to classify it as non-genuine, even if this dis-
covery does not in any way change our perception of the object. Similarly, if an ob-
ject has been classified as genuine because it is thought to fulfill the intentions of the
artist, then the discovery that in fact it does not fulfill his intentions forces a reclassifi-
cation, even if the object looks exactly the same as it did before.

Each cognate label isolates a subclass of a cognate class. In certain cases, the
suffix in the cognate label clearly indicates whether or not the members of this iso-
lated class are genuine. 'PL fake', never denotes a genuine token of PL, nor does 'PL
imitation', 'PL simulation', or 'PL travesty'. 'PL performance' and 'PL print', on the
other hand, almost always denote genuine tokens. Other suffixes lean in one direction
or the other. 'PL copy' usually denotes non-genuine tokens, but in the case of photog-
raphy, e.g., 'a copy of Capra’s D-Day', it can denote genuine tokens. 'PL version' usu-
ally denotes genuine tokens, but one can easily think of cases, e.g., 'the dubbed version
of *Les Enfants du Paradis* in which it denotes a non-genuine member of the cognate class (at least if you agree that an English language version of *Les Enfants* is not really *Les Enfants* at all).

**PAINTINGS**

According to Nelson Goodman, paintings are (1) unique particulars and (2) causally individuated. If this is correct, then the proper label of a painting denotes one and only one particular; that particular has no tokens, and so all cognate labels of paintings denote non-genuine examples of the work of art in question.

According to Goodman, the theses that X is causally individuated and that X is a particular are not synonymous, since prints are causally individuated but are not particulars. Nevertheless, it should be observed that if one assumes that a painting is a unique particular, it follows necessarily that paintings are causally individuated. And if one assumes that paintings are causally individuated, it follows necessarily, given the nature of the medium of painting, that paintings are particulars. In the case of paintings, Goodman's two theses are logically linked, and hence one cannot be used as evidence for the other. Independent evidence must be supplied to support (1) and (2).

One piece of evidence that paintings are particulars is that two paintings by the same painter of the same subject are still considered two paintings. Two versions of "Judith" by Gentileschi are versions of the same theme, but they are not versions of the same painting. The reader may feel that this is so because two paintings of the same thing will always in fact be qualitatively different. But this does not really seem to matter, since even if, *per impossible*, the two versions of the same theme are visually indistinguishable, apart from esthetically irrelevant qualities like the spatial location of the painting, we would still consider these to be two paintings, and not two versions of one painting. From this we may infer that paintings cannot be types which have tokens.

Paintings are never individuated by reference to intentions. In the case of PL-restorations, either the restored painting is one which was actually painted by the painter, in which case it is genuine, or it is one which was not actually painted by the painter, in which case it is not genuine, no matter how faithfully it fulfills the intentions of the artist. Furthermore, the individuation of paintings is not purely qualitative, since if we had two esthetically indistinguishable *Night Watches*, one of which was painted by Rembrandt and another of which was not painted by Rembrandt, we would consider only the one painted by Rembrandt to be genuinely *The Night Watch*. It appears that the individuation is purely causal. But suppose that the following situation arose. On May 10th, 1975, *The Night Watch* hangs as usual on its wall in the Rijksmuseum. On May 11th, right before everyone's eyes, *The Night Watch* disappears, and, on May 12th, right before everyone's eyes, it suddenly reappears. Extensive investigation fails to reveal where the painting was on May 11th, and the reasonable conclusion to draw is that it was nowhere at all on May 11th. Furthermore, the painting of May 12th is qualitatively indistinguishable from the painting on May 10th.
One point that seems clear, should such a situation ever arise, is that the painting on May 12th is really *The Night Watch*, and if it is, then we are not individuating *The Night Watch* causally, since the painting of May 12th does not have any causal connection with Rembrandt; it was not in fact, *painted* by Rembrandt. (The principle to which I appeal here is that A cannot causally interact with B unless the world line of A intersects the world line of B.) I conclude, then, that our individuation of paintings is usually causal, but, in certain unusual cases, qualitative individuation may suffice.

**MASTER DRAWINGS AND CARVED STATU ES**

The consideration advanced above for paintings applies equally to master drawings and carved statues. Replace the example of the disappearing *Night Watch* with a disappearing *David*, and the conclusion follows that the individuation of the *David* is usually causal, but, in extraordinary circumstances, qualitative individuation would suffice. The situation, however, is different when we consider cast statues, since these, unlike carved statues, are types. According to Goodman, cast statues, as well as carved ones, are causally individuated. A cast statue, on Goodman's principles, is truly Rodin's *Thinker* if it was cast from a mold actually made by Rodin. Similar considerations are advanced by Goodman for prints. A print is a genuine print of Rembrandt's *Three Trees*, on Goodman's principles, if and only if it has been taken off a plate etched by Rembrandt. I cannot see any force in Goodman's suggestions, however, either as regards cast statues or as regards prints. We individuate paintings causally because we boggle at the thought of two genuine *Mona Lisas* or two genuine *Night Watches* hanging on the wall. We do not boggle at the thought of many genuine copies of *Three Trees*. If a print of *Three Trees* is produced which is qualitatively indistinguishable from one taken off the plate etched by Rembrandt, then that print is a genuine print of *Three Trees*. Of course, if it has been produced by some process other than etching, we cannot say that it is Rembrandt's *etching Three Trees*, but it is *Three Trees* nonetheless. Such a print will cost less than a print taken off the original plate, but this is a matter of economics, not esthetics.

My tentative conclusion is that cast statues and prints are individuated qualitatively and not causally. If so, we have achieved a considerable simplification over Goodman's theory: works of art which are types are never causally individuated. We will consider later whether they are always qualitatively individuated, or whether, in certain cases, they are individuated by intentions.

**ARCHITECTURAL WORKS**

The labels of works of architecture denote unique particulars, like the labels of paintings and the labels of carved statues. But whereas the individuation of paintings and carved statues necessarily requires reference to conditions of production in which the artist himself participates, the individuation of an architectural work is accomplished by (a) the plans of the architect and (b) the spatio-temporal location of the first work constructed in accordance with the plans. Thus 'The Parthenon' denotes the building with a certain design that stood at the top of the Acropolis in the 5th
century B.C. Notice that it is not possible to say 'The Parthenon' denotes a building with a certain design which now stands on top of the Acropolis, since if the original Parthenon were destroyed and a qualitatively identical building took its place, the new building would still not be the Parthenon, but a Parthenon-copy, and if the original Parthenon were transported to some other location, it would still be the Parthenon, just as London Bridge is still London Bridge, even though it now stands in Arizona.

It appears, then, that works of architecture are particulars which are qualitatively individuated, except for a special proviso picking out a particular space-time location. Similar provisos concerning spatio temporal location perhaps hold for other works for which spatio location is of special esthetic importance, like frescoes, mosaics, stained glass windows, formal gardens, earth-art works, etc. The reason that spatial location is a factor in the individuation of such works, and not in the case of others, like easel paintings, is that in the creation of such works many of the decisions of the artist are influenced by his knowledge of where the work is to be located. The surrounding environment is not part of the work of art, but it is part of its individuation. 'London Bridge' does not denote London Bridge in situ on the Thames; the Thames, however, is sufficiently important in individuating the bridge that 'London Bridge' is defined in reference to it.

MUSICAL WORKS

Works of music are types; the performances of these works, if they are genuine, are tokens of these types. Different critics, however, have very different methods for distinguishing the performances which are genuine.

Some feel that genuineness requires that the performer play the music "as it was intended to be played." This is individuation by reference to intentions in music, and presumably the intentions involved are the intentions of the original composer. The intentions of the composer are difficult to determine, but within limits, they can be sketched. 18th century composers, for example, certainly "intended" that their compositions be played on 18th century instruments. Contemporary performances of Baroque compositions, played on 18th century instruments, or on replications of them, are accordingly billed as "authentic" performances. Furthermore, if the composer chose to perform or conduct his own composition, then these performances can be considered definitive indications of his intentions, and other performances can be considered genuine to the extent that they resemble these paradigm performances.

The alternative position is to define genuine performances qualitatively as those performances that conform to the score. "Conformity to the score" implies that everything which is on the score must be played; this is no bar, in the rule of conformity to score, to the addition of elements during performances—ornaments, for example, which are not expressly indicated in the score (provided that these additions do not render anything which is expressly in the score inaudible).

The score, in qualitative individuation, must be taken literally: if specific instruments are indicated in a score of PL, then these are the instruments which must
be employed if PL is to be played at all. On these grounds, then, what Segovia plays is not the Bach Chaconne, but a Chaconne-transcription; what Glenn Gould played is not Beethoven's Fifth but a Beethoven's Fifth transcription, and so on.

There are advantages and disadvantages in both approaches. One disadvantage of individuation by intentions is that the intentions of the composer are simply not available for many details of performances, especially for compositions of some antiquity. But an even greater disadvantage is that individuation by intentions does not permit real variety of interpretations in music, and this goes contrary to a very general principle in esthetics, that a work of art can be subject to different but equally legitimate interpretations. If individuation by intentions is correct, there is only one correct performance-type\textsuperscript{2} for a given piece of music, and anything that falls outside this type must be dismissed as not genuine. This type consists of all the performances esthetically indistinguishable from a certain performance—usually the first performance of the work in question. But all performances are in fact esthetically distinguishable, and if this approach is correct, it follows that there has been but one genuine performance of Bach's Fifth Brandenburg Concerto—the first one, and we do not even know when it took place!

Qualitative individuation of musical compositions has its paradoxes, but I do not find them as severe as the paradoxes surrounding the individuation of music by intentions. Given qualitative standards of individuation, if a composer takes liberties with his own score, then he is not performing his own composition, even if he intends to perform that composition and is playing as he intends. If qualitative standards are employed, then a performance that conforms to score must be considered a genuine performance, even if the composer himself regards it as an abomination, and refuses to acknowledge it as his own. These results, however, can be borne.

Individual performances of music are sometimes themselves referred to as "works of art," and so the individuation of performances should be discussed. The proper labels of performances usually include the name of the performer and a reference to the time of performance and it follows that performances are causally individuated. One has heard a Rubenstein performance if and only if one has heard Rubenstein, not if the music was played by anyone else, no matter how much that someone else played like Rubenstein.

The matter of performance individuation has been complicated by the advent of high-fidelity recordings, which can reproduce a Rubenstein performance so accurately that experts when blindfolded cannot tell the difference between Rubenstein live and Rubenstein on record. We cannot say that Rubenstein's recorded performance on May 7th, 1960 is a type, of which all the record playings are tokens, since performance on May 7th, 1960 is an event-like concrete particular, and simply cannot be a type. We cannot, then, call the record playings performances by Rubenstein, and the result, ironically, is that when you hear a record of Rubenstein playing Chopin's Preludes you hear a genuine token of Chopin's preludes, but not a token of a Rubenstein performance. Some would go so far as to say that you are not hearing a Rubenstein performance at all.
Perhaps this prejudice in favor of live performances is due to the belief that what one experiences at a live performance is not just a pattern of sound but the exercise of freedom and creativity. Within certain limits, the performer has the freedom to choose what he will do, and, in the view of many concertgoers, these choices are still open up to the instant that the instrument is struck. The sense of freedom is absent when one listens to a record; the recording is of a past performance, and everything about it is settled. To the extent that the performer is free to improvise, the record of a performance is less and less true to the event; that is why, perhaps, records of jazz are dismissed as being "about as interesting as yesterday's newspaper." I do not know if this theory accounts for our distinction between performances and qualitatively indistinguishable playings of records, but this is the sort of explanation that is required. My conclusion is that musical compositions should be qualitatively individuated, that musical performance should be causally individuated, and that tokens of works of music may be either performances or record playings.

**Ballet and Dance**

The ballet and dance companies of the world are each said to have works in "in repertory", and the same labels for dances appear in the program year after year. This is prima facie evidence that dances are types, and can be individuated like works of music. The various systems of choreographic notation, however, have not proved nearly so successful in the preservation of dances as has musical notation in the preservation of music, and hence the rules of "conformity to score" used to qualitatively individuate musical works, cannot, for practical reasons, be applied in the case of dance. Suppose, for example, that the American Ballet Theatre, following a labanotted script down to the last detail, put on a performance in 1975 of Balanchine's Jewels, and, further, that Balanchine denounced this production as a complete violation of his ideas about the dance. Balanchine does not claim that only his company (the New York City Ballet) can perform his works, but that this particular production simply does not fall within the scope of legitimate interpretations. In such a case, we would have to say, I believe, that the American Ballet Theatre has not performed Balanchine's Jewels, but another work which they happened to call "Jewels."

One option that is always open to solve the problem of dance individuation is to say that dances are not types but particulars: each performance of dance, then, is a new dance, causally individuated by reference to the activities of the dancers and the time of dancing. But this option goes contrary to all the labels on dance programs, and to the common opinion that dances can be revived and revised. Other alternatives for individuation of dance types should be explored before this lapse into a nominalistic theory of dance labels.

It appears from our discussion of Jewels that appeal to the intentions of the choreographer can be decisive in the individuation of dance. Some connoisseurs go further, and will accept a dance as a genuine rendition of a work only if the performance is actually supervised by its choreographer. This stance parallels Goodman's stance as regards prints, and all the criticisms advanced against Goodman's view on prints apply to this demand for choreographer participation. What is worse, since the
choreographer leaves nothing behind him analogous to the plates that a printmaker leaves behind, the position of the connoisseur has the consequence that there can no longer be a genuine performance of a certain dance from the moment that its choreographer dies, a result that does not seem to apply in any of the other arts. Furthermore, the demand for participation by the choreographer does not suffice to guarantee the authenticity of a dance. If the choreographer lives for a long time, it is unlikely that he can remember accurately the dances he choreographed decades before; Balanchine, it is said, often relied on the memory of his dancers for details about dances no more than a few years old. For all these reasons, the demand for participation by the choreographer, which is a demand for the causal individuation of a type, should be abandoned.

By process of elimination, we are left either with nominalism or with individuation of dance types by intentions. The rigidity of individuation by intentions, discussed above in connection with the individuation of music, applies here as well—to perform the Petipa-Ivanov Swan Lake, one must conform to the rather narrow range of interpretation which Petipa and Ivanov would consider a legitimate fulfillment of their intentions. This does not mean that ballet companies are forbidden to dance in any other way, merely that if they do dance in any other way, they have not created a genuine token of the type denoted by 'the Petipa-Ivanov Swan Lake'.

PHOTOGRAPHS

The individuation of photographs is not much discussed in the literature of esthetics, and there is little consensus of critical opinion upon which to base an analysis. I do not think that we are inclined to individuate photographs in quite the same way as we are inclined to individuate prints, even though both prints and photographs are types of tokens of which are produced by mechanical processes. If a plate is etched by Rembrandt or Goya, but printed by somebody else, we are inclined (at least if the plate is not seriously worn down) to consider the results as genuine Goya or Rembrandt prints. But most professional photographers do their own printing, and many connoisseurs would not accept a photograph as a 'genuine Edward Weston' if it was not in fact printed by Weston. I presume that these connoisseurs make this demand because positive prints actually printed by Weston indicate definitely his intentions as to how the positive print should look.

The quality of photographs can vary so drastically with even minor changes of shading that I am inclined to be sympathetic to the demand that the positive print fulfill the photographer's intentions. If a printer took Weston's negatives, and printed positives which were repudiated by Weston, then I would be inclined to say that the prints are not tokens of any Weston photographs. Similarly, one cannot accept a photograph as a Weston if it was merely snapped by Weston and developed by somebody else. But, although I am sympathetic to the reference to intentions, the only way this can be fulfilled is to have the picture taken, developed, and printed by Weston himself. To go so far would be equivalent to declaring that only Beethoven can play a Beethoven sonata. Some of Weston's sons are recognized as master printers, and, provided that certain limitations are observed, e.g., the positive prints must be the
same size as Weston's original run of positives, we should be willing to accept positives taken by Brett Weston off his father's negatives as genuine tokens of Weston photographs. I conclude, then, that the individuation of photographs is causal as regards picture taking and development of negatives, and intentional as regards the production of positives. The demand for fulfilling the photographer's intentions, however, is not so strong that it cannot be fulfilled by printers other than the photographer himself.

**MOTION PICTURES**

Motion pictures, like still photographs, are clearly types, the tokens of which are the various positive prints of the film. The relation between types and tokens is mechanical, and hence the cinema, though it requires performers, is not a performing art.

That the cinema is not a performing art is confirmed by our attitude toward remakes: we do not consider remakes to be tokens of a general film type. Each of the six versions of *The Three Musketeers*, the original and five remakes, are different films, not different interpretations of one film. The different versions of the *Three Musketeers*, then, do not stand to each other the way the different performances of *Hamlet* stand to the play *Hamlet*. The reason that films differ from plays in this respect is that the visual aspects of a film are essentially constitute of the film, and these visual aspects differ from remake to remake. A play is defined by its script, but a film is not defined by its screenplay. remakes are different films even if every line of dialogue from the original film is maintained. For two showings of a film to be tokens of one type, they must be visually alike in all esthetically essential respects, and films produced at different times cannot be visually alike, if for no other reason than that the actors will either be different or older in the later film. The result is that there can be no "fakes" of Buster Keaton's film *The General*—even the rankest amateur knows that Disney's *Great Locomotive Chase* is not a fake Keaton but a wholly different film.

It is necessary, in discussing the individuation of films, to distinguish remakes from versions. For example, there is an American version of Greta Garbo's film "The Temptress" (1926) in which at the end she marries the leading man, and a European version in which the leading man, at the end, discovers Garbo as a drunken prostitute, gives her some money, and leaves her. I am inclined in such cases to say that we have two versions of the same film, and thus the proper label "The Temptress" denotes a type which has two distinct version-tokens. These tokens, in turn, are types, which have as their tokens the positive prints of the different versions of the film. If we accept this theory, we have a dramatic demonstration that story line, though important in film, is not definitive of it. Two versions of the same film may have different stories, and two different films may have the same story line. The reason, I believe, that the two versions of "The Temptress" are versions of the same film is the overriding visual similarity between the versions—a long stretch of the two versions is the same, and Garbo's face, which is the esthetic center of the film, is still the same in the sections that have different stories. On matters of central esthetic importance in film, the
two versions differ much less than, say, Toscanini's versions of Beethoven's Ninth differs from Furtwangler's.

PLAYS

Plays are clearly types—as in music, we can have, without question, successive performances of the same play. In the preceding section, I suggested that plays were defined by their scripts; if this is correct, then we have a qualitative criterion of individuation, "conformity to script," which is analogous to the criterion of "conformity to score" which served as the standard for individuation in music. By this standard, two performances faithful to the same script are performances of the same play.

Conformity to script is clearly a sufficient condition for two performances being performances of the same play. The real problem is whether it is a necessary condition, i.e., whether two performances from two different scripts are necessarily performances of different plays. If we demand 'conformity to script' as a necessary condition for the genuineness of a play-token, then scarcely anyone has seen a genuine performance of a play by Shakespeare, since uncut productions of Shakespearean plays are extremely rare. But it seems a bit absurd to say that all the different productions of Hamlet in the twentieth century were productions of different plays, when the principal characters are the same, the general plot is the same, and all the lines of the play are lines from the complete version of Hamlet. The rule of conformity to script is not absolute.

The rule we unconsciously employ here seems to be that production of an author's play will be his play if the plot, the principal characters, and some sub-set of his dialogue is employed. The addition of dialogue not written by the author will result in a version which is not a token of the original type. These standards perhaps seem hidebound to those familiar with the exigencies of commercial theater, in which characters come and go, dialogue is added and dropped, and the plot is altered at will before "the play" arrives on Broadway, and a few commercial shows are impervious to changes even after the Broadway opening. But despite the ease with which the same name is applied to all these different versions, my feeling is that each version is a new play, provided that it differs in plot, or in principal characters, or in dialogue, from the previous versions. The application of the same label to the different versions is an understandable but confusing equivocation.

WORKS OF LITERATURE

In considering the individuation of works of literature, we face two main problems: first, the question of alternative versions of the same work; second, the question of the authenticity of translations. Let us consider the latter question first.

The consensus of the literary critics is that one has not genuinely read a poem until one has read it in its original language. No serious literary critic would write a critical essay on a poem unless he had the original at hand; few would say that
a man who knew no Greek had ever read Homer. On the other hand, prose works of literature can be successfully translated. One can claim, I believe, that one had read Crime and Punishment even if one does not read Russian.

The decision as to whether or not a given work has been successfully translated should be left to a consensus of trained experts employing qualitative criteria. \( W_2 \), by qualitative standards, is a successful translation of \( W_1 \) if, in the opinion of the critics, \( W_2 \) preserves the literal meaning of \( W_1 \) and also its essential expressive qualities. I do not think that intentional or causal individuation will serve here at all. The intentional criterion in this case would be that \( W_2 \) is a successful translation of \( W_1 \) if \( W_2 \) fulfills the intentions that the author happened to express in the language of \( W_1 \), a judgment, presumably, which is to be made by the author himself. The trouble with this approach is that authors have proved to be poor judges of translations: the English translation of the Tractatus authorized by Wittgenstein is inferior to the unauthorized translation of Pears and McGuiness, and the authorized translations of Croce's works into English are all fairly poor. A causal criterion of translation would say that \( W_2 \) is a successful translation of \( W_1 \) if the translation has been done by the author himself. There have been such cases of successful translation, Beckett's translations from French to English for example, but skill in literary composition is not the same as skill in translation, and for successful translation the participation of the author seems neither necessary nor sufficient.

It should be noted that in the case of literary works, one traditional criterion for successful translation cannot be employed. If \( W_1 \) is a non-literary work, then, so at least many philosophers have alleged, \( W_2 \) is a successful translation of \( W_1 \) if all the conditions that would make \( W_1 \) true make \( W_2 \) true, and all the conditions which make \( W_1 \) false would make \( W_2 \) false (assuming that \( W_1 \) is not a tautology or a contradiction). Even if this theory is correct, it cannot be applied to literary works, since successful translations of literary works requires the preservation, not only of the truth conditions of the sentences in the work, but also of the work's expressive qualities, which cannot be analyzed in terms of truth conditions.

Thus far we have considered the verdict of the experts that poetry cannot be translated. We must now consider the reasons why this is so. One possible explanation is that a poem, treated as an esthetic object, is merely a phonetic surface, and hence change of sound, which occurs in translation, implies change of poem. But I do not find this explanation satisfactory, since it implies that a falsetto and a basso cannot recite the same poem, which is clearly absurd. Even if we modify this explanation slightly, and define a poem as a phonetic surface plus a meaning (a definition which still yields the result that change of sound is change of poem), we do not have a satisfactory account, since to divide a poem into a sound component and a meaning component is to deny the possibility for general principles of poetic criticism, which it is a function of esthetics to provide. A second and more plausible explanation for the untranslatability of poems is that poems are strict functions of word choice, and hence that change of words, which occurs in translation, implies change of poem. If this second explanation is correct, the common view that poems are more organically unified and indivisible than prose works will have to be discarded, since our analysis reveals that it is the capacity of poems to be divided into separate words, units each one
of which makes its separate contribution to the meaning of the poem, which renders them untranslatable.

It remains to apply these considerations to the individuation of PL-versions and PL-revisions of literary works. Poems, on our analysis, should be defined strictly as types which are sequences of words. The words are themselves types, and hence a token of a poem consists of a sequence of utterances (or inscriptions) such that the first utterance (or inscription) is a token of the first word of the poem, the second utterance is a token of the second word of the poem, and so on. It follows from this definition that two versions of what is called "the same poem" are really two different poems. This goes contrary to the prejudices of common speech, but it is a consequence of the view that change of word is change of poem.

Since we have allowed that prose works can be translated, it follows that we need not deny that there can be two versions, employing different words, of the same prose work. Two versions of a novel, then, need not be different novels, though of course, in cases where the differences are considerable, like the differences between Stephen Hero and Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, it is necessary to say that we have here two different novels. Certain necessary conditions for the individuation of prose works can be proposed. Two novels with different plots can justifiably be called different novels, and the same goes for novels that have different principal characters. I would say that two prose tokens, one of which is twice the length of the other, must be considered tokens of different types. It is difficult to specify further qualitative criteria, and the other modes of individuation provide little assistance. Causal individuation fails to discriminate between versions and new works, since, in the usual cases, the same author is involved in all the revisions, and hence all the revisions are equally "genuine." The same difficulty arises with intentional criteria, since every version fulfills the intentions of the author, at least at the time that the version was written. For all prose works, qualitative individuation is rough, and causal and intentional modes of individuation are useless. I conclude that prose literary works are inherently vague, and lack the identity and finality characteristic of works in the other media.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Problems of individuation in art are little discussed by nonphilosophers, and criteria of individuation, I have discovered, are usually detested by artists. What difference does it make to say that "Hamlet" in French is not really Hamlet, but that Voyage au Bout de la Nuit in English really is Voyage au Bout de la Nuit? What difference does it make to say that the Naked Maja is a different painting from the Clothed Maja, and not two versions of one and the same painting? One cannot settle this question by pointing out that principles of individuation indicate the "ontological status" of works of art, since it is not yet established that theories about the ontological status of works of art are of any importance to esthetics, or that such theories do anything to illuminate esthetic experience. In my view, the purpose of discussions of individuation in esthetics is to demarcate the essential features of works of art in the different media. A version of Hamlet is one which contains all the important features of Hamlet; a Hamlet-simulation lacks something essential. To
draw, in all the media, and in all these different ways the lines that divide versions from simulations, originals from copies, genuine works from fakes, is to declare what is important, and one's experience of art is illuminated to the extent that one learns to attend to the important, and forget the rest.

ENDNOTES

1 A quality of a work of art is "esthetically essential" if it is a quality which has been chosen by the artist. In easel paintings, for example, the distribution of paint on the surface of the canvas is esthetically essential, since the distribution of paint is chosen by the artist, but the spatial location of the painting is not esthetically essential, since this is not (usually) chosen by the artist. Two paintings can thus differ in spatial location and yet be alike in all esthetically essential respects.

2 A performance-type is a type that has as its tokens a given performance and all performances qualitatively identical with the given performance.

3 This is the case with the films Ball of Fire (1941) and A Song is Born (1948), both directed by Howard Hawks.

4 This point is made by Arnold Isenberg in "The Esthetic Function of Language", Journal of Philosophy, 1949.