ABSTRACT. In this paper I suggest that Searle's theory of reference is immune to the specific criticisms that have been levelled against it. I first present an overview of Searle's 'cluster' theory, followed by an overview of the Kripkean critique. I then examine in detail Kripke's objections and suggest that they are not sufficient for a rejection of Searle's theory. Finally, I consider several general objections to the cluster theory and argue that they, too, do not suffice to reject it.

"When I use a word", Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less".

"The question is", said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so many different things".

Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass

In *Naming and Necessity* Kripke rejects the Russellian theory of proper names as neither an adequate nor a correct treatment of ordinary (proper) names. Kripke argues (with many others) that the Russellian view fails to account for the significance of the fact that different descriptions may be (and are) used in place of a name to designate an object. So one person might think of Aristotle as 'the teacher of Alexander', another as 'the most famous student of Plato', yet another as 'the author of the *Metaphysics*', and so on. (Even a single speaker might use these various descriptions at different times when referring to Aristotle). No one of these descriptions could be the meaning of the name 'Aristotle' or else the meaning of the name would be in constant flux. Additionally, the notion of proper names as disguised or short-hand definite descriptions is faulty, for if 'Aristotle' means 'the teacher of Alexander', then the statement 'Aristotle was the teacher of Alexander' would be a tautology—something it is not. (Indeed, not only is this statement not a tautology, but we could
very well discover that it is false.) So, says Kripke, being the teacher of Alexander cannot be part of [the sense] of the name 'Aristotle'.

Kripke then goes on to say that the most common way out of this difficulty with such a view of names is to say that no particular description may be substituted for a name; rather what is needed is a family, or cluster, of descriptions. A good example of this, says Kripke, is found in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. Kripke quotes the following part of paragraph 79 as introducing the idea of family resemblances:

Consider this example. If one says 'Moses did not exist', this may mean various things. It may mean: the Israelites did not have a single leader when they withdrew from Egypt—or: their leader was not called Moses—or: there cannot have been anyone who accomplished all that the Bible relates of Moses—... But when I make a statement about Moses, —am I always ready to substitute some one of these descriptions for 'Moses'? I shall perhaps say: by 'Moses' I understand the man who did what the Bible relates of Moses, or at any rate, a good deal of it. But how much? Have I decided how much must be proved false for me to give up my proposition as false? Has the name 'Moses' got a fixed and unequivocal use for me in all possible cases?

Kripke then states:

According to this view, and a locus classicus of it is Searle's article on proper names [Searle (1958)], the referent of a name is determined not by a single description, but by some cluster or family. Whatever in some sense satisfies enough or most of the family is the referent of the name. (1980, p. 31).

Kripke further states that the cluster theory is "wrong from the fundamentals" (Ibid., 93) and adds that it "seems wrong to think that we give ourselves some properties which somehow uniquely pick out an object and determine our reference in that manner". (Ibid., 94).

In this paper I want to present the cluster theory of reference (at least Searle's version of it) as well as Kripke's criticisms of the cluster theory. I want to defend the cluster theory against those criticisms and suggest that the cluster theory is more sophisticated than it is given credit for being.

THE CLUSTER THEORY

Searle recognized the difficulties facing the Russellian theory of names as shorthand definite descriptions, and amended it by claiming that a name refers to an object in virtue not of a single description, but rather of a cluster, or disjunctive set, of descriptions. (In this essay I will use 'disjunctive set of descriptions' to indicate the
logical sum, or disjunction, of those descriptions associated with a name.) Says Searle:

Suppose we ask the users of the name "Aristotle" to state what they regard as certain essential and established facts about him. Their answers would constitute a set of identifying descriptions, and I wish to argue that though no single one of them is analytically true of Aristotle, their disjunction is. Put it this way: suppose we have independent means of identifying an object, what then are the conditions under which I could say of the object, "This is Aristotle"? I wish to claim that the conditions, the descriptive power of the statement, is that a sufficient but so far unspecified number of these statements (or descriptions) are true of the object. In short, if none of the identifying descriptions believed to be true of some object by the users of the name of that object proved to be true of some independently located object, then the object could not be identical with the bearer of the name. It is a necessary condition for an object to be Aristotle that it satisfy at least some of these descriptions. (1969, 169).

So, associated with a name 'N' is a disjunctive set of descriptions (or descriptive predicates), the satisfaction by an object of some of which is necessary for the object to be the referent of 'N'. Clearly, the disjunctive set of descriptions which is associated with a name can vary from speaker to speaker and from occasion to occasion; as new beliefs are accepted about an object, new elements may be added to the set of descriptions, and as old beliefs are rejected, some elements may be deleted from the set of descriptions. It is not clear how many of these descriptions must be true of an object for a name to refer to that object, and it is no oversight on Searle's part in failing to specify such a sufficient number. However, as Searle says, at least one of the descriptions must be true of an object in order for the name to refer to the object. That is, it couldn't be possible that all of the elements in the set of descriptions associated with a name turn out false and yet reference successfully occur.

The context within which Searle makes the above claims is that of reference as a speech act (i.e., an action performed by a speaker by the rule-governed language). The reason he concentrates his remarks on reference (and philosophy of language in general) within this context is that "all linguistic communication involves linguistic acts. The unit of linguistic communication is . . . the production or issuance of the symbol or word or sentence in the performance of the speech act". (1969, 16)³ In his more recent work Searle places his views of speech acts (and philosophy of language in general) within the context of intentionality and philosophy of mind. Philosophy of language, he says, is a branch of the philosophy of mind. "The capacity of speech acts to represent objects and states of affairs in the world is an extension of the more biologically fundamental capacities of the mind (or brain) to relate the organism to the world by way of such mental states as belief and desire, and especially through action and perception". (1983, vii).
Restricting his analysis to singular definite referring expressions (i.e., proper names, definite descriptions and pronouns), Searle claims that these referring expressions pick out or identity one object, or 'particular', apart from other objects or 'particulars' and then goes on to say something about that object or 'particular'. In discussing the success of a referring expression, he makes the distinction between a fully consummated reference and a successful reference. A fully consummated reference is one in which an object is identified unambiguously for the hearer; a successful reference (in the sense that we could not accuse the speaker of having failed to refer) is one in which an object could be, on demand, identified unambiguously for the hearer. A question the theory of reference must answer then becomes: What conditions are necessary for the utterance of an expression to be sufficient to identify for the hearer an object intended by the speaker?

The theory of reference which Searle proposes in order to answer this question is capsulized in seven 'rules of reference' (listed below). These rules presuppose two 'axioms of reference' and a 'principle of identification'. The axioms are:

A1. The axiom of existence: There must exist one and only one object to which the speaker's utterance of the expression applies.

A2. The axiom of identification: The hearer must be given sufficient means to identify the object from the speaker's utterance of the expression. (1969, 82).

The principle of identification is:

P1. A necessary condition for the successful performance of a definite reference in the utterance of an expression is that either the expression must be an identifying description or the speaker must be able to produce an identifying description on demand. (1969, 88).

Given these three conditions, we can now state Searle's seven rules of reference and consider an example to illustrate the theory. Searle states:

Given that S utters an expression R in the presence of H in a context C then in the literal utterance of R, S successfully and non-defectively performs the speech act of singular identifying reference if and only if the following conditions 1-7 obtain:

1. Normal input and output conditions obtain. 4

2. The utterance of R occurs as part of the utterance of some sentence (or similar stretch of discourse) T.

3. The utterance of T is the (purported) performance of an illocutionary act. 5
4. There exists some object X such that either R contains an identifying description of X or S is able to supplement R with an identifying description of X.6

5. S intends that the utterance of R will pick out or identify X to H.

6. S intends that the utterance of R will identify X to H by means of H’s recognition of S’s intention to identify X and he intends this recognition to be achieved by means of H’s knowledge of the rules governing R and his awareness of C.7

7. The semantical rules governing R are such that it is correctly uttered in T in C if and only if conditions 1-6 obtain.

These rules can be exemplified with the following sentence:

(T) Venus is hidden from view by thick cloud cover.

Taking ‘Venus’ as R, it is evident that the rules are satisfied. ‘Venus’ occurs as part of the utterance of T, where the utterance of T performs an illocutionary act (say, that of informing H). Venus exists and an identifying description (e.g., the planet at such-and-such a place in the sky at such-and-such a time) could be offered if needed. Additionally, it is intended that ‘Venus’ picks out Venus (and H knows this).

On the other hand, if not all of the rules are satisfied, then reference has not occurred. For example, if S uttered ‘Venus’ simply as part of a rhyming game (e.g., sound that rhymes with ‘wean us’), then rule 5 (and perhaps rule 2) would not be fulfilled and reference would not have taken place.

Having laid out these rules of reference as a proposed theory of reference, Searle turns directly to the problem of definite descriptions and proper names. As noted above, Searle amends Russell’s view by claiming that a singular referring expression refers to an object in virtue not of a single description, but rather of a cluster of descriptions associated with a name. Again, Searle claims: It is a necessary condition for an object to be Aristotle that it satisfy at least some of these descriptions.8 However, Searle’s theory is more complex than that. There are problems, he says, with the view that names have no senses. If names have no senses, then, as Frege pointed out, there would be no cognitive difference between a=a and a=b. In addition, negative existential statements (e.g., ‘Cerberus does not exist’) are meaningful (and, in this case, true), but they couldn’t be if names have no senses.

On the other hand, says Searle, strong arguments militate against the view that names do have senses. If names have senses, at least in the form of being shorthand descriptions, then “descriptions should be available as definitional equivalents for proper names” (1969, 166), but they are not. In addition, if names have senses, then if we substitute descriptions for names, then the following (non-intuitive) result
would ensue: some non-analytically true statements about an object using the name as subject would be analytic (e.g., 'Aristotle was the teacher of Alexander'). This, as noted above, is one of the criticisms leveled against Russell. Also, the meaning of the name, and perhaps the identity of the object, would change every time there was a change at all in the object, and the name would have different meanings for different speakers. Surely this is not the case.

With strong arguments available both for and against the hypothesis that names have senses, Searle reinterprets the question 'Do proper names have senses?' as having two forms (which he labels 'weaker' and 'stronger'). The weaker form is: 'Are any statements where the subject is a proper name and the predicate a descriptive expression analytic?'. The stronger form is: 'Are any statements where the subject is a proper name and the predicate an identifying description analytic?'. In answering these questions, Searle states:

My answer, then, to the question, "Do proper names have sense"?—if this asks whether or not proper names are used to describe or specify characteristics of objects—is "No". But if it asks whether or not proper names are logically connected with characteristics of the object to which they refer, the answer is "Yes, in a loose sort of way". (1969, 170).

This "loose sort of way" is the necessity that for an object to be X (e.g., Aristotle), it must satisfy the logical sum of the properties attributed to X (i.e., at least one description of the cluster must be true). Searle summarizes his position:

What I have said is a sort of compromise between Mill and Frege. Mill was right in thinking that proper names do not entail any description, that they do not have definitions, but Frege was correct in assuming that any singular term must have a mode of presentation and hence, in a way, a sense. His mistake was in taking the identifying description which we can substitute for the name as a definition. (1969, 170).

Criticisms of the Cluster Theory

Kripke suggests that the cluster theory contains the following six theses:

(1) To every name or designating expression 'X', there corresponds a cluster of properties, namely the family of those properties \( \Phi \) such that A [the speaker (or hearer?)] believes ' \( \Phi X \)'.

(2) One of the properties, or some conjointly, are believed by A to pick out some individual uniquely.

(3) If most, or a weighted most, of the \( \Phi \)'s are satisfied by one unique object Y, then Y is the referent of 'X'.
Kripke then presents a detailed critical analysis of these theses.

Thesis (1): This, Kripke tells us, is a definition. The import and legitimacy of this definition is to be borne out by theses (2)-(6) and so he does not offer a critical analysis of this thesis. Rather, an analysis of the subsequent theses will, if they are shown to be incorrect, yield the incorrectness (or irrelevance) of thesis (1) as well.

Thesis (2): Kripke offers two counter-examples to demonstrate that thesis (2) is incorrect. First, he gives a case to show that the thesis fails to be satisfied. If we consider the name 'Feynman', we note that many people who know very little about Feynman are nonetheless able to refer to Feynman when using the name 'Feynman'. When asked about Feynman, a person might say: well, he's a physicist or something. The person may not think that this picks out anyone uniquely (and in this case, probably wouldn't think that it does). Yet, says Kripke, it seems that such a person is still using the name 'Feynman' as a name for Feynman. Second, to show that the thesis is simply false, Kripke offers the following case. We can uniquely pick out Einstein as 'the man who discovered the theory of relativity'. However, many people can only say of the theory of relativity that it is 'Einstein's theory'. We are led, then, "into the most straightforward sort of vicious circle". (1980, 82). The problem here is that one property is believed to pick out Einstein uniquely, but only at the cost of circularity, for in this case the property which picks out Einstein contains reference to Einstein within it.

Thesis (3): Kripke asks, "Suppose that most of the Φ's are in fact satisfied by a unique object. Is that object necessarily the referent of 'X' for A"? (1980, 83). His answer is: no. To support this he presents the following example. Suppose someone says that Gödel is the man who proved the incompleteness of arithmetic. Suppose further that Gödel was not in fact the author of this theorem, but rather a man named 'Schmidt' was. On the cluster view, says Kripke, when the 'ordinary' speaker uses the name 'Gödel', "he really means to refer to Schmidt, because Schmidt is the unique person satisfying the description 'the man who discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic'." (1980, 84). So when the speaker talks of Gödel, he is in fact referring to Schmidt. Thesis (3) "seems simply to be false". (1980, 85).

Thesis (4): Concerning this thesis, Kripke states that his previous examples show it to be incorrect. Suppose, he says, that nothing satisfies most, or even any substantial number, of the Φ's. Does that mean that the name doesn't refer? Kripke says: no, it does not mean that, for just as one may have false beliefs about X which are in fact true of Y, so one may have false beliefs about X which are in fact true of no one—and
these false beliefs might constitute the totality of one's beliefs about X. For example, Einstein might be referred to as 'the inventor of the atomic bomb'. However, possibly no one really deserves to be called the inventor of the device (or, at least, no single person was the inventor). Yet, even if 'the inventor of the atomic bomb' were our only belief about Einstein, we would still be referring to Einstein as 'Einstein'. So, this thesis, too, is incorrect.

**Thesis (5):** About this, Kripke says that it is simply false. Even if theses (3) and (4) happen to be true, this hardly constitutes a priori knowledge that they are true. We certainly believe that Einstein was the man who discovered the theory of relativity, but this belief is hardly a priori.\(^{11}\)

**Thesis (6):** This thesis, according to Kripke, "need not be a thesis of the theory if someone doesn't think that the cluster is part of the meaning of the name". (1980, 65).\(^{12}\) This thesis, along with thesis (5), seems primarily to say that a sufficiently reflective speaker grasps this theory of proper names. Kripke's attitude toward this 'necessity' thesis is the same as toward the 'a prioricity' thesis (5), namely, it is obviously false. He states: "It would seem that it is a contingent fact that Aristotle ever did any of the things commonly attributed to him today, any of the great achievements that we so much admire". (1980, 75).

Having investigated each of the theses (1)-(6) above, Kripke concludes:

What I think the examples I've given show is not simply that there's some technical error here or some mistake there, but that the whole picture given by this theory of how reference is determined seems to be wrong from the fundamentals. It seems to be wrong to think that we give ourselves some properties which somehow qualitatively uniquely pick out an object and determine our reference in that manner. (1980, 93-94).

Now, we need to ask: are Kripke's criticisms legitimate (i.e., are they fair criticisms of what Searle's theory is committed to) and, if so, are they debilitating (i.e., can Searle's theory be defended or must it be abandoned)? In answering these questions each of the theses that Kripke attributes to the cluster theory will be investigated in turn.\(^{13}\)

**ANALYSIS OF THE CRITICISMS**

**Thesis (1):** "To every name or designating expression 'X', there corresponds a cluster of properties, namely the family of those properties \(\Phi\) such that A believes ' \(\Phi X\)''. Kripke regards this, as noted earlier, as a definition, the legitimacy of which hinges on (the fate of) the other theses. Granting this assumption, we will turn to the remaining theses.
Thesis (2): "One of the properties, or some conjointly, are believed by A to pick out some individual uniquely". The motivation for asserting this as a thesis of the cluster theory is statements such as the following: "In short, if none of the identifying descriptions believed to be true of some object by the users of the name of that object proved to be true of some independently located object, then the object could not be identical with the bearer of the name". (1969, 169).

As we saw, Kripke offers his Feynman example to show that one can refer even though one does not believe that an object has been uniquely picked out. Such a counter-example does indeed seem to violate the thesis (which does seem to be implied by the Searle quote above). However, in other places, Searle seems to allow for such cases. Before considering these cases, though, a preliminary distinction that Searle makes between the primary and secondary aspects of reference must be explained.

Donellan (1966) distinguishes between the referential and the attributive uses of definite descriptions. A speaker who uses a definite description referentially uses the description to enable the hearer to pick out whom or what the speaker is talking about and then states something about that person or thing. A speaker who uses a definite description attributively uses the description to state something about whomever or whatever is so-and-so. For example, if a speaker says "Smith's murderer is insane", meaning that particular person over there, Jones, the speaker would be using the term 'Smith's murderer' referentially. On the other hand, if a speaker says "Smith's murderer is insane", meaning not any particular person, but whoever it was who murdered Smith, the speaker would be using the term 'Smith's murderer' attributively.

Now, in arguing that the referential-attributive distinction is bogus, Searle distinguishes what he calls the primary and secondary aspects of reference (or, under which reference is made). Searle says:

Sometimes when one refers to an object one is in possession of a whole lot of aspects under which or in virtue of which one could have referred to that object, but one picks out one aspect under which one refers to the object. Usually the aspect one picks out will be one that the speaker supposes will enable the hearer to pick out the same object. In such cases... one means what one says but one means something more as well. In these cases any aspect will do, provided it enables the hearer to pick out the object. (It may even be something which both the hearer and the speaker believe to be false of the object... (1979, 144).

... provided that the speaker's intentions are clear enough so that we can say that he really knew what he meant, then even though the aspect expressed by the expression he utters may not be satisfied by the object he "has in mind" or may not be satisfied by anything, still there must be some aspect (or collection of aspects) such that if nothing satisfies it (or them) the statement cannot be true and if some
one thing satisfies it the statement will be true or false depending on whether or not the thing that satisfies it has the property ascribed to it. (1979, 145).

The primary aspect under which reference is made is that aspect which, if not satisfied, would yield a statement that is not true. The secondary aspect is any aspect which the speaker expresses such that the speaker utters it in an attempt to secure reference to the object which satisfies the primary aspect, but which is not intended as part of the truth conditions of the statement the speaker is attempting to make. For example, the speaker, looking at someone in the room, says, "Smith's murderer is insane". Now, the speaker and the hearer might agree that the speaker has referred to, and made a true statement about, that particular person being looked at even though that person (and perhaps everyone) fails to satisfy the expression 'Smith's murderer'. The speaker could, on demand, fall back on another aspect, say, one expressed by 'the person I am looking at'. If it turns out that there is no person being looked at, only a hologram perhaps, then the speaker could fall back on another aspect, say, one expressed by 'the person arrested by the police and accused by the District Attorney as Smith's murderer'. If it turns out that there is no such person, then the speaker could fall back on another aspect. Eventually, however, an aspect must be reached such that if no one satisfied it, then the statement would not be true. (And, though Searle does not say so explicitly, we must assume that in such a case no one has been referred to.) The primary aspect of reference is this 'last' aspect, the aspect which either works or results in a statement which is false. The other aspects (e.g., the one expressed by 'the person I am looking at') are secondary.

As mentioned earlier, Searle believes that the referential-attributive distinction is bogus. Having introduced his primary-secondary aspect distinction, Searle explains why. According to Searle, all of Donnellan’s cases are cases where the definite description is used to refer. The difference in the cases is that in the so-called referential cases the reference is made under a secondary aspect, and in the so-called attributive cases it is made under a primary aspect. Furthermore, since every statement containing a reference must have a primary aspect, then in the so-called referential use the speaker may still have referred to something that satisfies the primary aspect even though the expression uttered, which expresses a secondary aspect, is not true of that object and may not be true of anything.

Having Searle’s primary-secondary aspect distinction in hand, we are now ready to return to Kripke’s criticism of thesis (2). It seems that with respect to secondary aspects under which reference is made, Kripke’s thesis (2) is not a thesis of the cluster theory; however, with respect to primary aspects under which reference is made, Kripke’s thesis (2)—and his criticisms of it—are on target, at least for the cluster theory as Searle has fleshed it out. One might be able to slightly amend Searle’s theory, though, and handle the counter-examples which Kripke proposed. Both the Feynman and the Einstein-as-discover-of-relativity cases work because the speaker has (apparently) no primary aspect under which to refer to Feynman and Einstein respectively. However, if we allow that a speaker in such a situation could appropriately appeal to another speaker or source to supply other aspects by which to refer, then the counter-examples would fail. That is, I may only know Feynman as ‘a physicist or
something' and fully acknowledge that I have not uniquely picked out Feynman, but believe that reference has occurred successfully because I can add something like, "I don't know anything more about Feynman, but Keith does. He can tell you all about Feynman". I can recognize that the set of properties which I associate with 'Feynman' do not uniquely pick out Feynman, but also recognize that someone else could amend the set such that Feynman could be uniquely picked out. (It would not be necessary that Keith be the person from whom I heard about Feynman. I might simply rely on the fact that Keith is a physicist friend of mine whom I know, or have good reason to believe, is familiar with other physicists.) As noted before, though, even if such an amendment to Searle's theory is legitimate, the theory is still committed to the primary aspect under which reference is made as having to be satisfied in order for reference to occur. While this would entail that thesis (2) is indeed a thesis of the cluster theory, Kripke's particular counter-examples would no longer be lethal to that thesis. (Whether or not amended counter-examples to the cluster theory—in which this move to appealing to other speakers to secure reference is blocked—are possible or can work will be considered later.)

Thesis (3): "If most, or a weighted most, of the Φ's are satisfied by one unique object Y, then Y is the referent of 'X'." This thesis, Kripke tells us, says that the speaker's belief noted in thesis (2)—that 'ΦX'—is correct. That is, thesis (2) is purely doxastic, it states only that some property (or enough of them) is believed by the speaker to uniquely pick out some object, whereas thesis (3) states that some property (or enough of them) in fact does uniquely pick out some object. The motivation for making this a thesis of the cluster theory is statements such as those noted above for thesis (2): if none of the identifying descriptions believed to be true of some object by the users of the name of that object proved to be true of some independently located object, then the object could not be identical with the bearer of the name. This statement clearly implies that if an object is identical with the bearer of a given game (i.e., if Y is (identical with) the referent of 'X'), then at least one of the identifying descriptions believed to be true of the object by the users of the name of that object must be true of that (independently located) object (i.e., some of the Φ's are satisfied by Y). As Searle says: "Since the speaker is identifying an object to the hearer, there must, in order for this to be successful, exist an object which the speaker is attempting to identify, and the utterance of the expression by the speaker must be sufficient to identify it." (12969, 82).

Kripke's counter-example to this thesis was Gödel being identified as the man who proved the incompleteness of arithmetic, though, unbeknownst to the speaker, Schmidt was actually the author of the proof. Since the (only) descriptions associated with 'Gödel' are in fact satisfied by Schmidt, under the cluster theory, the speaker must be referring to Schmidt by 'Gödel'.

Searle's (explicit) response to this proposed counter-example is that depending upon our intention in a particular context of using the name 'Gödel', the referent of 'Gödel' could go in either direction. (1983, 251). Suppose, he says, that Jones proclaims, "On line 17 of his proof, Gödel makes what seems to me a fallacious inference". If we query Jones as to who is meant by (his use of) 'Gödel', Jones might re-
spond, "I mean the author of the famous incompleteness theorem". If then informed that Schmidt was the author, what would Jones say? Says Searle:

It seems to me that he might well say that by "Gödel" he just means the author of the incompleteness proof regardless of what he is, in fact, called. Kripke concedes that there could be such uses. They involve what I have called secondary aspect uses of proper names. (1983, 251).

On the other hand, if Jones says, "Kurt Gödel lived in Princeton" and we query Jones as to whom is meant by 'Gödel', Jones will likely be referring to Gödel and not Schmidt, and will associate a different set of secondary aspect uses than in the first case (and as well a different primary aspect use). In any case, for Searle, it is not a singular, given use of a name that determines reference, nor even the particular description associated with that singular, given use, but rather the underlying intentional content which is attached to the name. With the name 'Gödel', different intentional contents and primary (and secondary) aspects might be attached to the name for any given use of the name. It seems to me that Searle would say that the reason Kripke's intuitions are so strong that when we use the name 'Gödel' we mean Gödel and not Schmidt is because in most cases the intentional content attached to our use of a name in fact allows us to pick out the 'correct' (i.e., intended) object. The fact is that we usually pick out the right object when we use a name; the primary aspect under which reference is made (and usually the secondary aspect) does the job. This should work for 'Gödel', too. If it doesn't (i.e., if the intentional content is 'incorrect', if the ~'s associated with 'Gödel', or at the least the primary aspect associated with 'Gödel', turns out to identify Schmidt), then, for Searle, we have referred to Schmidt. Now, it seems to me that the motivation underlying Searle's position here is clear and very intuitive. It is clear to see why Searle would say that in the cases above where all of the ~'s (or the primary ~ or the intentional content) associated with 'Gödel' turn out to identify Schmidt, then we obviously have referred to Schmidt. On the other hand, Kripke's insistence that we refer to Gödel by our (every?) use of 'Gödel' seems to be based on our belief that we pick out the 'correct' object when we use names.

Once again: if 'the author of the incompleteness theorem' is the primary aspect under which reference is made to Gödel, then, a la Searle, we haven't referred to Gödel, but to Schmidt. But why think that in such a case we have referred to Gödel? What is underlying Kripke's claim that even in this situation we are in fact referring to Gödel? It is not clear to me, unless it is the belief that usually when we use 'X' we mean, and correctly pick out, X rather than Y. However, this hardly runs counter to Searle's theory; indeed, he agrees completely.

It is noteworthy that in a footnote Kripke makes some remarks that sound rather conciliatory with regard to his Gödel-Schmidt case and with regard to the cluster theory in general. The note reads:

The cluster of descriptions theory of naming would make 'Peano discovered the axioms for number theory' express a trivial truth, not a misconception, and similarly for other misconceptions about the his-
Some who have conceded such cases to me have argued that there are other uses of the same proper names satisfying the cluster theory. For example, it is argued, if we say, 'Gödel proved the incompleteness of arithmetic', we are, of course, referring to Gödel, not to Schmidt. But, if we say, 'Gödel relied on a diagonal argument in this step of the proof', don't we here, perhaps, refer to whoever proved the theorem? Similarly, if someone asks, 'What did Aristotle (or Shakespeare) have in mind here?', isn't he talking about the author of the passage in question, whoever he is? By analogy to Donnellan's usage for descriptions, this might be called an 'attributive' use of proper names. If this is so, then assuming the Gödel-Schmidt story, the sentence 'Gödel proved the incompleteness theorem' is false, but 'Gödel used a diagonal argument in the proof' is (at least in some contexts) true, and the reference of the name 'Gödel' is ambiguous. Since some counter-examples remain, the cluster-of-descriptions theory would still, in general, be false, which was my main point in the text; but it would be applicable in a wider class of cases than I thought. I think, however, that no such ambiguity need be postulated. It is, perhaps, true that sometimes when someone uses the name 'Gödel', his main interest is in whoever proved the theorem, and, perhaps, in some sense, he 'refers' to him. I do not think that this case is different from the case of Smith and Jones. If I mistake Jones for Smith, I may refer (in an appropriate sense) to Jones when I say that Smith is raking the leaves; nevertheless I do not use 'Smith' ambiguously, as a name sometimes of Smith and sometimes of Jones, but univocally as a name of Smith. Similarly, if I erroneously think that Aristotle wrote such-and-such passage, I may perhaps use 'Aristotle' to refer to the actual author of the passage, even though there is no ambiguity in my use of the name. In both cases, I will withdraw my original statement, and my original use of the name, if apprised of the facts. Recall that, in these lectures, 'referent' is used in the technical sense of the thing named by a name (or uniquely satisfying a description), and there should be no confusion. (1980, 85-86, note 36).

Several points need to be made here. First, although Kripke is obviously going to great lengths to put qualifiers on his remarks (e.g., "perhaps", "in some sense", "refer" as opposed to "refer"), he clearly concedes that not every use of the name 'X' results in X being referred to, and, in fact, a speaker might refer to Schmidt even when saying 'Gödel'. While Kripke admits that the cluster theory might be applicable in a wider class of cases than he originally thought, he states that other counter-examples remain to nonetheless prove the theory false in general. Part of the purpose of this paper is to suggest that none of the counter-examples which Kripke has given do the job, and I still see Kripke as bearing the onus to show that they do the job. Second, Kripke tries to overcome his concessions to the cluster theory by implying that the cluster theory works (or might work) in these Gödel-Schmidt cases because they imply that the names are ambiguous. However, Searle never makes any claim to that effect, nor is it necessary that he do so. Searle claims that we have different pri-
mary and secondary uses under which reference is made that result in the variation in reference. For Searle, a name 'X' has no meaning at all, so it certainly doesn't have an ambiguous meaning. Rather, we intend to refer to a given object by using a given name and we associate different descriptions with the name. Because a given description might express a given primary or secondary aspect under which reference is made, the same name 'X' might be used now to refer to X and later to refer to Y. Kripke's charge of ambiguity here is spurious. Third, in dismissing even his concessions to the cluster theory, Kripke emphasizes that we might refer to Y with 'X', but, of course, there's no confusion of reference here (since 'referent' is used in the "technical sense" of the thing named by a name), and happily we still refer to X with 'X'. (It is hard to believe that Kripke thinks that he has explained anything by saying: well, 'X' refers to Y, but 'X' refers to X.)

Perhaps a better candidate as a counter-example (because it is a more 'natural' example than the Gödel case) is one constructed by Donnellan (1972). Consider a case, he says, in which a young child is awakened during a party given by his parents. At this time the child encounters and speaks with one of the party guests and learns that the name of the guest is 'Tom'. Later, reflecting on the event, the child remarks, 'Tom is a nice man'. This is the child's only description associated with 'Tom', but it does not identify for the parents who Tom is, as they know many Toms. It might even be that Tom is not a nice man, but the child believes him to be so. Now, suppose that another man was at the party and this man, whose name is also 'Tom', is nice. However, the child did not meet this Tom. It seems that if thesis (3) is true, then the child referred to the Tom he did not meet, as this man was the unique objects which satisfied (a weighted) most—in this case all—of the Φ's. But this is surely incorrect. Surely the child was referring to the Tom he did meet, even though he did not satisfy the Φ's and another man did.

Again, it seems that Searle's response would be that as discussed above: the aspect expressed by 'is a nice man' is a secondary one in this case and could be replaced by the aspect 'is the man I met'. Probably this aspect would serve as the primary aspect under which reference is made, but if not, then eventually one could be found which would—or else reference would not have occurred. And, again, appeal could (theoretically) be made to other speakers to provide the requisite expression of the primary aspect.

Thesis (4): "If the vote yields no unique object, 'X' does not refer". The motivation for asserting this as a thesis of the cluster theory is statements such as the following: "There must exist not more than one object to which the speaker's utterance of the expression applies". (1969, 83). As noted above, Kripke believes his previous counter-examples show this thesis to be incorrect—just as one can have false beliefs about X which are in fact true of Y, so one can have false beliefs about X which are in fact true of no one or of more than one. So even if 'the inventor of the atomic bomb' is the only description which a speaker associates with 'Einstein', the speaker nonetheless refers to Einstein by 'Einstein'.

Now, as we saw above Searle explicitly admits that we sometimes use a description to identify an object even though no unique object is picked out by that de-
The reason, for Searle, that a description can work in making reference to an object even though the description may be true of more than one object or true of no one is that the description might express a secondary aspect under which reference is made. The particular description may work in identifying to the hearer the object to which the speaker is referring even though the description does not uniquely pick out the intended object. With respect to secondary aspects under which reference is made, then, it seems that thesis (4) is not a thesis of the cluster theory.

With respect to the primary aspect under which reference is made, it seems that if no object is uniquely picked out, the 'X' indeed does not refer, and thesis (4) is a thesis of the cluster theory. But in such a case, why think that reference has been made? If 'the inventor of the atomic bomb' is in fact the primary aspect under which a speaker (supposedly) refers to Einstein, then it is not clear why one should insist, with Kripke, that the speaker nonetheless referred to Einstein. As with the Gödel example, it seems that the motivation for claiming that the speaker has still referred to Einstein is that usually we successfully refer to the object to which we intend to refer; and again, this hardly contrary to Searle's position. So, as with theses (2) and (3), thesis (4) seems to be a thesis of Searle's theory only if it is restricted to the primary aspects under which reference is made (in which case, it is not at all obvious that it is false), and even then only if it is restricted such that reference can be made only through the descriptions which the given speaker associates with a name. These restrictions are certainly subject to challenge.

Thesis (5): "The statement, 'If X exists, then X has most of the \( \Phi 's \)' is known \textit{a priori} by the speaker. Kripke says only that this is wrong—even if the above theses happen to be true, a typical speaker hardly knows \textit{a priori} that they are.

Now, Searle says nothing explicitly to the effect that the statement 'If X exists, then X has most of the \( \Phi 's \)' is known \textit{a priori} by the speaker. An initial (minor) amendment to this supposed thesis is in order. The statement needs to be changed to 'If X exists, then X has some of (or the 'primary') \( \Phi 's \)' to be a thesis of Searle's theory. It remains to be seen if Searle's theory is committed to this amended thesis. In investigating this, several points need to be made. First, Kripke's claim makes sense only if Searle is proposing his theory as giving the meaning of a name. That is, only if 'Aristotle' means 'the most famous student of Plato' or 'the teacher of Alexander' or \ldots, can this proposed thesis be a thesis of the theory. However, Searle does not see the disjunctive set of descriptions as giving the meaning of a name, but rather as being an identifying mode of presentation of a name. The disjunctive set of descriptions associated with a name is the means of identifying an intended object, not the means of defining a name. (With respect to the thesis (6), Kripke notes that if one doesn't think that the descriptions are part of the meaning of a name, but only that they fix the reference, then the thesis need not be a thesis of the cluster theory. The same point, it seems, would hold for thesis (5), and it seems that this could well be the case for Searle, i.e., the descriptions only fix the reference.)

What if Searle's theory were committed to the view that the disjunctive set of descriptions associated with a name \textit{did} give (in some sense) the meaning of the name? Would this thesis then be a thesis of his theory, and, if so, would this show a
serious weakness in the theory? In answering these questions, we need to get clearer on exactly what Kripke is claiming. It is clearly not a thesis of Searle’s theory if the statement means that the speaker knows *a priori* that some particular \( \Phi \) is true of \( X \). Searle definitely denies that this must be the case. Searle does, however, say that although no single description is analytically true of a given name, the disjunctive set of descriptions associated with the name is analytically true. The doxastic corollary of this would be that the speaker knows this analytic truth *a priori*. This reading of Kripke’s claim, then, seems not unlikely to be a thesis of Searle’s theory, for it is not unreasonable to suggest, as Kripke does, that a sufficiently reflective speaker knows (or could come to know) this aspect of names and their uses. However, even if this is a thesis of Searle’s theory, it is not obvious that this fact carries the unwelcome stigma that Kripke attaches to it. The reason is that this reading of Kripke’s claim seems to say nothing more controversial than that the speaker knows ‘ahead of time’ (*a priori*, as it were) that some description (but no particular one) is true of \( X \). This is to say very little. In addition, it seems to be a statement not of our knowledge about the object or name in question, but rather of our knowledge of language and how names are used. That is, this reading seems to say nothing more than what Searle readily asserts: if I am to refer by using the name ‘Aristotle’, then I must believe that some of the descriptions which I associate with the name are true of the intended object (and I know this fact about names even before I use ‘Aristotle’). Under this reading of thesis (5), Searle is clearly committed to it, but then the apparent ruinous significance of this commitment is lost.

There is another reason to suggest that while thesis (5) may indeed be a thesis of Searle’s theory, that he would be glad to accept it as such (and in fact this could be seen by Kripke as not a point against Searle’s theory). It is this: if one believes that names have essences (or rather, that objects named have essences), and if one believes that at least one of the descriptions in the disjunctive set of descriptions associated with a name ‘picks out’ this essence, then one might be much more inclined to accept the claim that the disjunctive set is analytically true of the object, and, as a corollary, that the sufficiently reflective speaker knows this analytic truth *a priori*.

**Thesis (6):** “The statement, ‘If \( X \) exists, then \( X \) has most of the \( \Phi \)'s’ expresses a necessary truth (in the idiolect of the speaker).” As noted earlier, Kripke holds that this ‘necessity’ thesis, like the ‘a prioricity’ thesis (5), is false. He says: “It would seem that it is a contingent fact that Aristotle ever did *any* of the things commonly attributed to him today, *any* of the great achievements that we so much admire”. (1980, 75). Again, making the amendment from ‘most of the \( \Phi \)'s’ to ‘some of the \( \Phi \)'s’, such a statement is true of Searle’s theory, but it is not obvious that this is so objectionable or unintuitive. If Kripke is saying that for the cluster theory it must be the case that if \( X \) exists, then some description must be believed to be true of \( X \) (and is true of \( X \)), then indeed Searle is committed to this thesis (assuming Searle is committed to names having meanings). But again, as with thesis (5), this seems to be a commitment to a fact about language and the use of names, not a commitment to facts about any object. Furthermore, if one believes that names have essences (or that objects named have essences) and if one believes that at least one description of the disjunctive set of descriptions associated with a name ‘picks out’ this essence, then this thesis may be not only acceptable, but desirable.
FURTHER CONCERNS

What can be culled from this presentation and analysis of Searle's cluster theory of reference? It seems that his cluster theory is more sophisticated and defensible than it has been given credit for being. Searle's primary-secondary distinction staves off (or at least offers some promise at staving off) many of Kripke's objections. In addition, this distinction does not seem an ad hoc device; it has definite intuitive appeal. However, the distinction does not immunize the theory from the criticisms that Kripke has raised. Searle's notion of secondary aspects under which reference is made does disarm much of Kripke's attack, but the necessity of bringing in a primary aspect rearms Kripke's objections, for it still seems that much of the basic theory which Kripke claims as the cluster theory is indeed the view that is held by Searle. Of course, as I have tried to show, even to the extent that Searle holds a version of the theory that Kripke attributes to him, it is not obvious that such a theory is "wrong from the fundamentals." To those theses to which Searle is committed, it is not so obvious that they are false or implausible or even unintuitive. Minimally, something other than Kripke's proposed counter-examples is needed to show that Searle's theory should be rejected.

The most evident response to these claims is that even if Searle could successfully defend his theory from these particular counter-examples, others could be offered which can do the trick. All that is needed is one example where no descriptions (or at least no true descriptions) are associated by the speaker to a given name being used. For instance, the speaker might really know nothing at all about Godel. So, my attentive neighbor might remark to her friend, "My weird neighbor kept me up last night yelling something about 'that damn turtle' or 'Godel' or something like that. I had to pound on the wall to get him to quiet down."

Has my neighbor referred to Godel? The causal theory devoid of descriptivist assumptions we will see later must say: yes. Searle, it seems, would say: no. Why think that reference has not occurred? For Searle, the reason is that rule 5 of his theory (and perhaps rule 6) has been violated. [Rule 5: S intends that the utterance of R will pick out or identify X to H. Rule 6: S intends that the utterance of R will identify X to H by means of H's recognition of S's intention to identify X and he intends this recognition to be achieved by means of H's knowledge of the rules governing R and his awareness of C.] Why think reference has occurred? For the causal theory, the reason is that there is a causal chain linking 'Godel' to Godel. Apart from or prior to these theories, however, why think that reference has or hasn't occurred? It is clear to see why one would claim that reference hasn't taken place: the speaker didn't intend to refer to Godel; she didn't even know that 'Godel' is a name. On the other hand, it is not clear why one would say that reference has taken place.

Perhaps another example would be fairer to the causal theory: Suppose my obsession with Godel has gotten to the point that I often blurt out my innermost thoughts concerning him. On one such occasion, while standing at a bus stop, I mutter, "Ha! Godel couldn't hold a candle to Cantor. Now, there was a man!" Upon hearing this, a bemused and intrigued stranger next to me asks, "Who is Godel?" Has the stranger referred to Godel? The causal theory says: yes, because there is a causal
link from the stranger's utterance of 'Gödel' to Gödel. Searle would most likely say: no, because it does not seem that the stranger intended that the utterance of 'Gödel' would pick out or identify Gödel (i.e., Searle's rule 5 is violated). The theories, then, differ in the answer to whether the stranger has referred or not to Gödel. Which theory best matches our pre-theoretic intuitions here? It seems to me that it is not clear, but I must admit that Searle's theory comes closer to my intuitions. It seems to me that the very question, 'Who is Gödel?' shows that the speaker has no clear referent associated with the name, and in fact the question can be paraphrased with no loss of meaning with a different question, 'Whom are you talking about?' or 'Whom are you referring to when you say 'Gödel'?' For the present purposes, I think the following (minimally) can be said: there is no clear counter-example (in which reference occurs) to Searle's theory of a name for which the speaker has no descriptions associated with a name.

These examples illustrate a general point to which Searle responds (properly, I think) in connection with the variety of proposed counter-examples to his theory. The point is this: the cases generally offered as inconsistent with Searle's theory are singular, private instances of supposed reference. That is, these cases where reference supposedly takes place are cases of singular utterances of names, or singular statements in which the name occurs. All of the examples in which the speaker has at best (apparently) one description associated with a name are of this sort (e.g., 'Feynman is a physicist or something', 'Einstein is the inventor of the atomic bomb'). But it seems that such cases (if possible) are far from paradigmatic for reference. We usually have an assortment of descriptions associated with a given name, even if some of them are rather unilluminating in terms of identifying the object being referred to. In those cases (if any) where we have one or no descriptions associated with a name, it seems more plausible to either appeal to other speakers as a source of reference or to simply admit that reference has not occurred. It is in connection with the former alternative (appeal to other speakers as a source of reference) that I say that the usual counter-examples to Searle's theory are cases of private instances of supposed reference. By that I mean the following: generally the proposed counter-examples to Searle's theory are ones in which reference borrowing is not considered or allowed. Yet, as noted above in response to Kripke's examples, reference borrowing is natural and common move. To forbid such a move would be to make reference a 'private' matter, i.e., possible in a private language. This issue is significant, but beyond the scope of the present discussion, so I only mention it here with the caveat that I see such a condition minimally as debatable.

Now, Kripke and others have dealt explicitly with the issue of reference borrowing. Kripke, for instance, briefly discusses Strawson's (1959) comments on reference borrowing (cf. 1980, 90-92, 160-61) in connection with his remarks on his non-circularity condition (C). However, the notion of reference borrowing discussed there is that of appealing to another speaker as the historical source for the given speaker's ability to refer by using a name (e.g., 'By 'Gödel', I mean the man that Joe thinks proved the incompleteness theorem'). This is not the sense of reference borrowing which I am considering here, and while Kripke's condition (C) (see note 9 below) may well forbid cases of reference borrowing in the Strawsonian sense, it is irrelevant to the sense which I am using. That sense of reference borrowing is this: we can appeal
to other speakers to provide requisite information or descriptions in order to secure reference, not because they stand in the position of being the historical source of my acquisition or acquaintance of a name, but because they can stand in the position of providing the needed identifying descriptions (which I lack) in order to pick out the intended object. I don't necessarily get my acquaintance with a name from these other speakers, but I get identifying descriptions to help pick out the intended object. The other speakers who provide me with these identifying descriptions could well be different speakers than those from whom I first gained acquaintance of a name. So, for example, I could have first heard of Gödel from Alice, but appeal to Betty to provide me with an identifying description so that I (and Carol) can pick out Gödel. Such appeal to other speakers is clearly not in violation of Kripke's condition (C) (or Searle's non-circularity constraints). Objections to this sense of reference borrowing, it seems to me, only make sense if one presupposes a view of reference as a 'private' matter, and, as mentioned above, this issue is beyond the present discussion.

Finally, in connection with Searle's theory of reference, I want to remark that I have not tried to say that Searle is right and Kripke is wrong. Rather my point so far has been to give a somewhat detailed—and hopefully fair—treatment to the theory by presenting it and then considering criticisms of it from the perspective of someone external to the theory.\textsuperscript{180}

END NOTES

1 Russell's theory of proper names is taken to be a paradigm case of the 'descriptivist theory of names'. For Russell, ordinary proper names can be replaced by descriptions. That is, ordinary proper names can be replaced by descriptions (which the speaker associates with the name). For example, Russell (1912) states: "Common words, even proper names, are usually really descriptions. That is to say, the thought in the mind of a person using a proper name correctly can generally only be expressed explicitly if we replace the proper name by a description". (1912, 54). Russell's view is generally taken to be such that for reference to occur/succeed when using a proper name, the description which actually underlies the name must be true of the object to which reference is made. This results in the problem noted below by both Searle and Kripke. (An important feature of Russell's theory of proper names is that he discusses it within the context of discussing different kinds of knowledge, knowledge by acquaintance (e.g., immediate sensual knowledge) and knowledge by description (e.g., propositional knowledge). For Russell, the latter is reducible to the former.)

2 I believe Kripke is mistaken in ascribing the cluster theory to Wittgenstein, but that issue is beyond the immediate concerns here.

3 A few pages later Searle re-emphasizes this point of reference as a speech act: 'The term 'referring expression' is not meant to imply that expressions refer. On the contrary, as previously emphasized, reference is a speech act, and speech acts are performed by speakers in uttering words, not by words. To say that an expression refers (predicates, asserts, etc.) in my terminology is either senseless or is shorthand for
saying that the expression is used by speakers to refer (predicate, assert, etc.); this is a shorthand I shall frequently employ." (1969, 28).

By "normal input and output" Searle simply means to cover such things as: both the speaker and hearer understand the language, there are no physical impediments (such as laryngitis or deafness), both are aware of what they doing, they are not acting or telling a joke, etc.

An illocutionary act is the performance of an action (such as referring, promising, requesting) by the utterance of a sentence. Searle's point here is to rule out gibberish.

This condition is meant to capture the axioms and principle mentioned above.

This condition, says Searle, enables us to distinguish referring to an object from other ways of calling attention to it (such as hitting the hearer over the head with it).

A few pages later he reiterates this: it is necessary truth that Aristotle has the logical sum (inclusive disjunction) of the properties commonly attributed to him.

Kripke adds a condition (C): For any successful theory, the account must not be circular. The properties which are used in the vote must not themselves involve the notion of reference in such a way that it is ultimately impossible to eliminate. That is, among the properties associated with the reference of a term 'X' cannot be property 'is called "X"'. The motivation for this condition is obvious—to prevent a theory which does not lead to any independent determination of a reference. Searle makes the same point: "... we are only justified in calling [an object] 'Everest' if we can give a reason for supposing it to be identical with what we used to call 'Everest' and to give as that reason that it is called 'Everest' would be circular". (1969, 167).

While the Gödel-Schmidt example might seem a bit 'cooked up', Kripke provides other, more natural, examples. For instance, it is believed by some people that Columbus was the first man to realize that the earth is round and that he was the first European to land in the western hemisphere. Probably neither of these beliefs is true. If thesis (3) is correct, then when people use the term 'Columbus' they really refer to some Greek if they use the roundness of the earth, or to some Norseman if they use the 'discovery of America'. But they don't, says Kripke; they refer to Columbus.

Kripke never states in Naming and Necessity just what a priori knowledge is. He argues against its conflation with necessity. He says that "the notion of a priority is a concept of epistemology". (1980, 34). Beyond that, however, he says only what it is not (e.g., it is not the metaphysical concept of necessity). Since he is reticent about meanings and argues against a priority as knowledge that can be known prior to or independent of experience (because such a definition includes the modal notion of possibility, which is metaphysical rather than epistemic), it is not clear to me what Kripke takes a priority to be.
Kripke claims that there are two ways in which the cluster theory (or even the single description theory) can be viewed. One is that of saying that the cluster (or single description) actually gives the meaning of the name (e.g., 'Aristotle' means 'the most famous student of Plato' or 'the teacher of Alexander', etc.). Another is that of saying that the cluster (or single description) determines the reference (e.g., 'the teacher of Alexander' is used to determine to whom someone is referring when someone says 'Aristotle'). Apparently thesis (6) is a thesis of the cluster theory only if the descriptive referring expressions are used to determine the reference of X.

Michael McKinsey (1978) has done a somewhat similar critique and found Kripke's arguments lacking credibility. Other attempts have been made to defend the cluster theory, e.g., Boer (1972) and Ingber (1979).

Whether or not Searle succeeds in showing Donnellan's distinction to be bogus is not the main concern here. It should also be noted that Kripke (1977) criticizes Donnellan's distinction.

It is not clear if Kripke thinks that for the cluster theory the property (or set of properties) which the speaker believes uniquely picks out the object being referred to must be the same property (or set of properties) which in fact uniquely picks out the object being referred to. This is a minor point, however.

It might be that what Kripke is trying to get at in this footnote is his speaker reference/semantic reference distinction which he fleshes out in his (1977), so that the speaker reference refers while the semantic reference refers.

Actually, there is good reason to suspect that in the second case Searle thinks that reference does occur. For now, though, I want to portray Searle as a 'pure' cluster theorist, such that having the appropriate associated description is necessary and sufficient for reference to occur.

I want to thank Barbara Abbott, Rich Hall, Joe Hanna and Betina Henig for helpful comments.

REFERENCES


