ABSTRACT. In this paper I present the basic outlines of a non-standard interpretation of *Sein und Zeit*. The merit of this interpretation is that it brings out and develops some of the radical possibilities contained in this rich text, possibilities which, I believe, have yet to be given their due. On the basis of this interpretation it is clear not only how Heidegger's ontology departs from its Cartesian and Kantian predecessors, but also how his ontology puts the traditional mind/body problem, and the problem of the external world, onto radically new grounds. However, unlike standard interpretations of *Sein und Zeit*, I argue that these new grounds neither resolve, nor dissolve, these problems, and that Heidegger's discussion of the so-called "scandal of philosophy" is misleading at best.

I

The goal of this paper is to present the basic outlines of a way of interpreting Heidegger's ontology in *Sein und Zeit*. I believe this interpretation is significant for several reasons.

First, this interpretation highlights generally what is radically different about Heidegger's ontology contrasted with a Cartesian, Kantian, and Platonic perspective. It also highlights clearly the implications of Heidegger's ontology for the traditional mind/body problem and the problem of demonstrating the existence of an external world. In particular, I show that although Heidegger's ontology would put these Cartesian problems onto radically new grounds, his ontology would not in fact resolve, or dissolve, these problems as some have believed.

Second, although my interpretation is inspired and guided by the text, it is also critical of it. For the purposes of this paper, I basically take Heidegger at his word when, as late as 1962, he wrote that *Sein und Zeit* was, *inter alia*, the outcome of "a tangled process" which was "inscrutable" even to himself, and that this process was marked by "inadequate explanations of its own intentions". In other words, I accept that in order to achieve greater clarity regarding "the ontology of *Sein und Zeit*" than does *Sein und Zeit* itself, one must move beyond the text to develop an interpretation
whereby it becomes clear how, in some places, the text is either misleading or in need of correction. It is therefore more accurate to say that I intend to present the basic outlines of "an ontology which is based on Sein und Zeit", rather than "Heidegger's ontology in Sein und Zeit".

Nevertheless, I shall continue (perhaps misleadingly) to refer to "Heidegger's ontology" or "Heidegger's position in Sein und Zeit" for two reasons. First, simply as an expository device, it is more convenient. Second, although I am critical of the text in several places, the text is still the leading guide for the interpretation. What I have tried to do is to take hold of some of the most basic concepts and principles, and to work out their role in an overall program as clearly and as consistently as possible, even if this means placing some parts of the text in opposition to others, and even if this sometimes leads to what may appear to be initially implausible positions. The merit of this approach is that it helps to bring out and to develop some of the more radical possibilities contained in the text, possibilities which, hitherto, may not have been given their due. What was initially implausible then becomes, or so I believe, the basis for a new ground to stand on in interpreting and evaluating previous metaphysical thinking.

The following is divided into four additional sections. In Section II, I baldly summarize the most general principles of my interpretation of Heidegger's ontology. In Section III, I explain these principles in some detail, and, in Section IV, I examine their significance in terms of the traditional mind/body problem and the problem of proving the existence of an external world. Section V contains some brief concluding remarks.

II

The basic structure of Heidegger's ontology can be seen in terms of a broad and rough three part analogy with a Platonic counterpart.

First, Plato's most fundamental ontological division of Being is into what is intelligible, on the one hand, and what is sensible, on the other (the former being eternal, perfect, and knowable, the latter being temporal, imperfect, and a matter for opinion). By analogy, Heidegger's most fundamental division of Being is into what is present-at-hand (vorhanden), on the one hand, and being-in-the-world (In-der-Weltsein), on the other (the latter being a horizontal consciousness of the-world and one's self qua horizons, the former being the general category of all beings which appear and make sense within these horizons).

Second, for Plato, human beings have an important dual ontological status since they have, as it were, a foot in both intelligible and sensible being. Human beings partake of both the sensible and the intelligible orders (though their higher calling is toward what is intelligible). By analogy, for Heidegger, my self (Dasein) also has an important dual ontological status since it exists both qua present-at-hand being and qua horizontal component of being-in-the-world.
Third, for Plato, a complete ontology would include not only an understanding of the two basic divisions of Being, but also an understanding of how they come together. It is here that Plato's ontology faces some difficulties in that neither the problem of how sensible beings partake of the forms, nor the problem of the immortality of the soul given its present embodiment, get clearly resolved. By analogy, Heidegger's attempt at working out a completed and *a priori* ontology must face the problem of understanding how my self (*Dasein*) exists both *qua* present-at-hand being and *qua* horizontal component of being-in-the-world. It is, however, the more modest goal of this paper simply to clarify a way of interpreting Heidegger's two basic divisions of Being (i.e., being-present-at-hand and being-in-the-world). For only on this basis can it then be determined whether or how it is possible to have a completed and *a priori* ontology grounded on my self (*Dasein*) *qua* unifying principle of being present-at-hand and being-in-the-world.

A few summary points can also be made regarding the general structure of being-in-the-world and the category of being present-at-hand. As the most original (*ursprünglich*) horizon for what occurs, being-in-the-world includes (1) a horizontal component of my self, for example, my self *qua* mood (*Stimmung*) and possibility (*Möglichkeit*), (2) a horizontal component who is other than my self, namely, no one in particular (*das Man*), and (3), a horizontal non-self component constituted by what is ready-to-hand, namely, the-world. Furthermore, categories such as physical, mental, real and imaginary being, are all derivative with respect to the category of present-at-hand being (i.e., physical, mental, real, and imaginary objects, in so far as there are any such objects, are all present-at-hand), which also means that being-in-the-world is neither a mental, physical, real, nor imaginary object.

I also should point out that the following account of Heidegger's ontology, an account which further develops and explicates the principles baldly asserted above, takes a different route from that of *Sein und Zeit*. It does not begin with an analysis of everydayness, but with a highly distilled concept of the-world. It is in light of this concept that I introduce the guiding analogy of horizontal being, the category of present-at-hand being, and the corresponding senses of *a priori* and original (*ursprünglich*). Only later do I introduce the concepts of *Dasein* and being-in-the-world, and only at the end of Section III do I discuss in-order-to seeing (*umsicht*). That is, the-world is to be thought as the horizon for the occurrence of anything that makes sense to me at all. That is, the-world is the horizon for the occurrence of anything real, imaginary, mental, physical, material, immaterial, natural, supernatural, particular, universal, concrete, or abstract, in so far as it makes any sense to me. This is not to say that anything mental, physical, material, immaterial, etc., really does occur, since, for example, it could be true that all immaterial things are imaginary things; nevertheless, in so far as such things, imaginary or not, physical or otherwise, make any sense to me at all, the-world is the horizon for their occurrence.
The-world also can be thought as the horizon "within which" or "in front of which" anything that makes sense to me occurs, or, alternately, the-world can be thought as being "behind" or "prior to" or "more original than" any of those occurrences which make sense to me. The particular preposition one uses is not important, although, by itself, any one preposition can become misleading. For example, "within" tends to encourage spatial analogies which are inappropriate in so far as the-world is also the horizon for non-spatial things which make sense to me as well.

So far, then, I have introduced two basic, contrasting and correlative ways (or categories) of Being, namely, that way of Being which belongs to what occurs "within the-world" and that "original" or "horizonal" way of Being which belongs to the-world itself (I shall mostly refer to the-world as being more "original" than what occurs "within it" since these phrases more closely parallel Heidegger's discussion of what is ursprünglich and innerweltlich, respectively). In addition, I shall also mark as present-at-hand that way of being which belongs to whatever occurs within the-world. Heidegger himself tries to distinguish two categories of being within the-world, namely, being present-at-hand (Vorhandenheit), and being ready-to-hand (Zuhandenheit), but I shall argue shortly that the ready-to-hand is better conceived as forming part of the structure of the-world itself, rather than as occurring within the-world. Thus present-at-hand beings are all of those beings which make any sense to me at all, whether they turn out to be real, imaginary, mental, physical, material, immaterial, or what have you, and all of these present-at-hand beings occur within a more original horizon called the-world.

In Sein und Zeit, Heidegger also marks what is ursprünglich as the Apriori [sic].8 This is significant because it connects Heidegger's discussion with Kantian philosophy by introducing a sense of a priori which can be compared and contrasted with a Kantian sense. Indeed, sketched in brief, such a comparison is helpful in order better to establish Heidegger's position relative to a more standard landmark.

Briefly put, the a priori for Heidegger is similar to the a priori for Kant in that (1) it functions as a condition for the possibility of the appearance of objects which make sense to me, and (2) my way of knowing what is a priori is distinguished from my way of knowing objects which appear by virtue of these a priori conditions. But Heidegger's account of the a priori differs from Kant's in at least three basic ways. First, what is a priori for Heidegger are those original or horizonal structures which are the conditions for the occurrence of anything which makes sense to me, rather than only those objects which conform to the conceptual scheme of natural science (another way of putting this is that what is a priori for Heidegger are those horizonal structures which are the conditions for my conscious involvement with anything whatsoever, which is to say, for any and all of my doing, rather than only for my knowing). Second, these a priori horizonal structures have a basic ontological status which, as I shall show in Section IV, puts debates over substance dualism and the existence of an external world onto radically new grounds. And third, there is a sort of "non-intervention" which marks the Heideggerian a priori horizons in contrast to Kantian categories and forms of intuition. That is, for Heidegger, it is not just that nothing can be known beyond these horizons, but that nothing makes any sense beyond them. Or, more precisely, it is not just that there is nothing beyond, or on the other side of, the-
world *qua a priori* horizon, but that there is "not even nothing" beyond, or on the other side of, the-world (since "there being nothing there" is itself something about the other side of the-world which would make some sense).

The same point can also be made by stressing that, for Heidegger, the guiding analogy for the *a priori* remains one of horizons rather than lenses. In other words, there can be concern about what is on the other side of the forms of intuition only on the supposition that *there is something* on the other side of the "lenses", even if what is on the other side can only make sense as an "it" about which I can not know anything (the point being that this presumes that there is at least an "unknowable it", and this makes some sense). On the contrary, for Heidegger, to posit that there is even an "it" on the other side of the horizon of the-world is already to suppose more than one properly can; the-world is the absolute boundary for meaningful experience because outside of the-world there is neither an "it", nor "nothing at all" (since to suppose that there has to be either something or nothing there would be a way of making sense out of what, *ex hypothesi*, makes no sense). Thus, for Heidegger, the-world does not intervene between me and some unknowable thing; rather, the-world, *qua* horizon for all occurrences which make sense, is a horizon, the other side of which there is "not even nothing" (or, if one prefers, the-world is that horizon which simply has no other side).²

It is, in part, by virtue of this novel conception of the *a priori* that Heidegger's ontology aims to put western metaphysics onto radically new grounds. The construction of such grounds can roughly be described as an attempt to overcome one of the basic metaphysical differences between Kant and Aristotle by taking a cue from post-Kantian, absolute idealism. That is, for Aristotle, there are no *a priori* structures of intuition which prevents us from thinking things as they are in themselves. For Kant there are, and hence he distinguishes between phenomena and noumena. For Heidegger, there is also an *a priori* structure, but this original horizon (which includes the-world) is not a lens worn by subjectivity, but a consciousness of the-world and of the self which is the absolute limit for meaningful experience.¹⁰

By entertaining the idea of such an original and *a priori* horizon for the occurrence of what makes sense, the question naturally arises as to my possible mode of access to such a horizon. That is, am I led to posit its existence purely on discursive grounds, as a logical possibility which can be formulated, discussed, and which may even have a formal appeal to the intellect? Or do I also have a sort of "intuitive" (i.e., "perceptual" in some very broad sense) access to this original horizon for what makes sense?

Heidegger's position is that there is a kind of "intuitive" or "perceptual" access which I have to the-world, though I use scare quotes because this sort of access to the-world is not had in terms of a sharp distinction sometimes found in epistemology between perception and cognition, but instead, in terms of the thesis that all perceiving is itself a form of interpreting (*Auslegung*), whether one is perceiving something within the-world, or the-world itself.¹¹ And just as Heidegger draws a distinction between the-world and what is within it, he also draws a distinction between the "perceiving" which perceives something within the-world and the "perceiving" which
perceives the-world itself. The former is what Heidegger calls *Vemehmen*, and I shall translate this as "perceiving" or "perception".12 "Perception" is thus a term for our mode of access to beings which are present-at-hand in general. Tasting, seeing, smelling, touching, and hearing are all examples of perception, as are various forms of introspection such as perceiving one's inner thoughts or after images, or having various pains and internal sensations. In addition, the former modes of perception (tasting, seeing, etc.) presumably provide access to present-at-hand beings which are physical, whereas introspection presumably provides access to present-at-hand beings which are mental (though many would argue that such mental phenomena are physical phenomena when properly understood).

In contrast to perception (*Vemehmen*), which is my general mode of access to what is within-the-world, Heidegger has several different names for my mode of access to original, horizonal being, which includes the-world. Moreover, all of these names actually refer to the same phenomenon, while at the same time each tends to highlight a slightly different structural component of it. Some of these names for my access to horizonal being include understanding (*Verstehen*), mood finding (*Befindlichkeit*), in-order-to seeing (*Umsicht*), consideration (*Rücksicht*), and fore-conceiving (*Vorgriff*).13 But to see why Heidegger has so many names for the same phenomenon, as well as what some of these terms mean and why on the surface many of them may seem to have little to do with the-world as I have defined it, it is necessary to introduce Heidegger's most important claim.

Heidegger claims that my access to the-world is inseparably united with my access to my self, or, in other words, that I have (or, strictly speaking, that I am) a form of self-awareness which is essentially and simultaneously united with an awareness of the-world (qua horizon for the occurrence of anything that makes sense). Moreover, my self, whose disclosure to me is bound up with the disclosure of the-world, has an important dual ontological status: it occurs both within-the-world and as itself on the level of the-world in the sense that it merges into the-world as part of an overall horizonal structure for the occurrence of all beings within the-world. Heidegger's term for the self which has this dual ontological status is *Dasein*. Thus *Dasein* (my self) occurs both horizonally (i.e., originally), as involved with the-world, and derivatively, as present-at-hand within-the-world.14 It is this simultaneous awareness of the-world and my self that Heidegger calls "being-in-the-world." Being-in-the-world is thus an awareness of my self and the-world as forming original horizons within which present-at-hand beings (including my self) occur. In-order-to seeing (*Umsicht*), consideration (*Rücksicht*), understanding (*Verstehen*), mood finding (*Befindlichkeit*), mood (*Stimmung*), and possibility (*Möglichkeit*), are all different names for being-in-the-world, and each refers to a slightly different aspect of this overall horizonal self and world awareness.

In *Sein und Zeit* Heidegger seldom uses the term "consciousness", and when he does, it is usually with an implicit reference and contrast to Husserl. It should be apparent, however, that I could have just as well have said that being-in-the-world is a consciousness of my self and the-world as forming original horizons within which present-at-hand beings (including my self) occur. Heidegger, I believe, recognized this, but shied away from using the term "consciousness" for several reasons. First, he be-
lieved that the general tendency in philosophy before him was to conceive of consciousness as a being within-the-world (as a mental substance, for example) and to miss entirely the distinction which he wanted to make between original, horizontal being, and what occurs within it (this applies not only to Cartesian schools which associated consciousness with the subject and treated subjectivity as "soul substance", but to those schools which overtly rejected the "thinghood of consciousness", or "denied that persons were objects", but still tacitly conceived of the self as originally present-at-hand). Second, Heidegger may have thought that it was possible to carry out a transcendental analysis of consciousness in which consciousness was conceived as a mode of being within-the-world, and he tended to associate at least the possibility of such a project with Husserl. Thus the term "consciousness" would be reserved technically for this project only. Third, even if one is careful to avoid conceiving of consciousness as anything but horizontal (in which case conceiving of being-in-the-world as a form of self-consciousness is formally correct), Heidegger thought that there was still a tendency to overlook the phenomenal content of this horizontal self-consciousness if one relied too heavily on a term taken from a metaphysics which had missed this content and for the most part failed to distinguish horizontal being at all.

Since I am not, however, emphasizing in this paper the phenomenal content of the-world or self qua horizons, but have instead focused on a highly distilled concept of being-in-the-world, it is appropriate to stress that being-in-the-world is a form of self-consciousness, or, more precisely, a horizontal consciousness of self and world qua horizons for what is present-at-hand. And since the goal of this paper is to bring to light some of the radical implications of this ontology as they are conceived more formally, I shall allude only briefly to the phenomenal circumstances of being-in-the-world, circumstances which Heidegger tries to describe at length in Sein und Zeit, and which others have repeated and paraphrased extensively in much of the secondary literature on the subject. Instead, I would like now to develop an analogy with vision in order to show more clearly how the structure of horizontal being is supposed "to come into view" in contrast to what is perceived as occurring within-the-world.

Pretend for the moment that our access to beings is restricted to vision. In this analogy, all those discrete objects which occur to me within my visual field are analogous to present-at-hand beings which occur within the-world. The basic point is that I can focus on such objects within my visual field, but not on the horizons within which these objects occur. Various objects come in and out of my view, but no one of these objects, nor any combination of these objects taken as a set of discrete objects, are identical with the overall horizons of my visual field within which such objects, or groups of objects, are seen. Instead, the access which I have to the horizons of my visual field is a constant sense of them as they are there in the background, but I cannot bring them into discrete focus because they are precisely those formal structures which remain always in the background. That is, I can turn my head to bring new content into view, but turning my head does not bring into view the formal structures which still compose the overall horizon within which any such content occurs. Hence, the best I can do in terms of seeing these formal structures "directly", is to "look out of the corner of my eyes", as it were, in an attempt at "lateral seeing". It is then incumbent upon me to try to put into words what I "see laterally", although such a description is difficult since it is not terribly clear what I do see, and, moreover, much of my
descriptive vocabulary, and perhaps even some of my grammar, is better suited for picking out discrete contents which occur within my visual field, rather than describing formal structures of the horizons within which such contents occur.

By analogy, then, my access to being-in-the-world, as the overall horizon for what is present-at-hand, is a constant sense that this formal structure is there, but since it is always in the background, my most "direct" access to it is only through a kind of "lateral seeing" (where here one is of course no longer limited to vision). It is then incumbent upon me to try to put into words what I do "see", and such a description is difficult since it is not terribly clear what structures are there horizontally to be "seen". Much of Sein und Zeit thus consists of Heidegger's own attempt at putting these phenomenal circumstances into words, and, as I have already said, Heidegger claims that what he does "see" is a horizaonal awareness of self and the-world qua horizons. His descriptions of the phenomenal circumstances of these horizons then include descriptions of the structure of the-world qua signifying totality (Bedeutungskeit), and descriptions of the self qua mood (Stimmung), possibility (Möglichkeit), and no one in particular (das Man). In the end, it is this entire horizontal consciousness of self and the-world qua horizons which Heidegger tries to lay out as temporality (Zeitlichkeit).

Before we leave this analogy with vision, there is an additional point to be made which also prepares the ground for considering the status of the category of being ready-to-hand (Zuhandenheit). This point can be seen in terms of my visual field by noting that whatever other sense of its horizontal circumstances which I have, there is a sense that I have of my self as forming part of this overall horizon (the part which might be called the "back part", as it were). In addition, it is also evident that my self qua "back part of the horizon" does not comprise the entire horizontal structure of my visual field since the entire horizon extends well out "in front of" and "to the sides of" me as well. There is thus both a "self" and "non-self" component of the horizon of my visual field, although it is also the case that any attempt to specify exactly along these circumstances where my self, qua horizon, stops, and what is other than my self begins, is impossible. It is impossible because the horizon of my visual field is never there in front of me as an objective or discrete presence (like a line, for example, within my field of vision) upon which I can focus and mark out distinct measurements or boundaries; instead, this horizon is "present" always and only as a kind of "absence" "within which" objects occur, and "within which" sharp digital distinctions can be drawn. In other words, horizontally, the non-self component of the overall horizontal structure is given as inseparably united with the self, though not digitally distinguishable.

By analogy, then, very similar points can be made with regard to my self and the-world qua horizons for the occurrence of present-at-hand beings in general. That is, being-in-the-world is a horizontal awareness of the horizon for what is present-at-hand in general, where this horizon includes both a self and non-self component. The non-self component consists of the-world which, I shall argue later, is structured in part by in-order-to assignments among what is ready-to-hand. The self component of being-in-the-world includes mood, possibility, and no one in particular. My horizontal access to the non-self component of being-in-the-world is primarily in-order-to seeing
my horizontal access to the self components of being-in-the-world primarily includes mood finding (Befindlichkeit), consideration (Rücksicht), and understanding (Verstehen), although these latter modes of sight (Sicht) also disclose the-world as well, just as in-order-to seeing is inseparably united with mood finding, consideration, and so forth, so that all together these horizontal accesses to horizontal structures comprise the unitary phenomenon which Heidegger calls being-in-the-world. Moreover, by analogy with the self and non-self components of my visual field, it is also impossible to mark out clear boundaries, or to make digital measurements, between the non-self and self circumstances of being-in-the-world. As in the case of the analogue, the non-self circumstances of being-in-the-world are given as inseparably united with the self, though not objectively and digitally distinguishable.

In Sein und Zeit, the issue of the non-self circumstances of being-in-the-world is not well resolved, and the result is a tension (or even contradiction) in the text regarding the ontological status of what is ready-to-hand. On the one hand, Sein und Zeit has it that the structure of the-world is made up of significance (Bedeutsamkeit), and that significance, qua original totality, includes (though is not limited to) the signifying (be-deuten) in-order-to assignments which ontologically constitute what is ready-to-hand. According to this, then, the ready-to-hand appears horizontally as a component of the phenomenal circumstances which constitute the-world. On the other hand, however, Sein und Zeit also has it that beings ready-to-hand occur "within the-world", which would suggest that such beings are not constitutive of the-world, but form another category, along with being present-at-hand, of beings which occur within the original circumstances of being-in-the-world.

This latter position, however, is weaker than the former, and it also commits Heidegger to a form of subjectivism which is unnecessary and ontologically inappropriate. This form of subjectivism is exemplified by Heidegger's claim that, ontologically, the-world is not something other than my self (Dasein). The effect is to purge being-in-the-world of all non-self circumstances, and this can only be accomplished by turning the category of what is ready-to-hand into a kind of ontological middle ground (or middle horizon) between being-in-the-world and what is present-at-hand. But this neither does justice to the phenomenal circumstances of the ready-to-hand, nor does it recognize properly the non-self circumstances of my original horizon.

This does not do justice to the phenomenal circumstances of the ready-to-hand because, as Heidegger himself marks it, what is peculiar (Eigentümliche) about the ready-to-hand is the manner in which, qua in-order-to assignments, it withdraws (zurückziehen) into the background in contrast to whatever is present-at-hand. It is this horizontal (or "absent") presence which marks the ready-to-hand, and which distinguishes it ontologically from categories such as "useful tools" or "available tools". That is, "a tool", even "a useful" or "an available one", is still some discrete object that can be perceived (in the sense of Vernehmen) in the foreground as something present-at-hand (though such a perception would be phenomenally distinct from a perception of a useless tool); moreover, as long as one is dealing with a tool, useful or otherwise, or even a group of related, but discrete tools (such as the set of all the tools it takes to build a house), one is not yet dealing ontologically with what is horizontally there as in-order-to assignments which are ready-to-hand. For, strictly speaking, there is no such...
being as "a" being that is ready-to-hand. As a withdrawing horizontal presence, what is ready-to-hand never occurs discretely, as one or more separate beings, but only globally, as an orienting background of in-order-to assignments in front of which this or that presently available tool or group of tools occurs as present-at-hand. It is this global orienting background which in part forms the original totality of significance (Bedeutsamkeit) which makes up the structure of the-world. In particular, the ready-to-hand forms the essentially non-self component of the-world, although, as Heidegger points out, the in-order-to assignments which constitute the ready-to-hand are inseparably united with original "towards-which", "with-whom", and "for-the-sake-of-which" assignments which do involve the horizontal self. But just as before, these non-self circumstances of being-in-the-world are given as inseparably united with the horizontal self, though not objectively and digitally distinguishable.

In summary, I argue that the category of being ready-to-hand is not a category of beings which occur within-the-world, but instead, a category of non-self and horizontal being which forms part of the structural circumstances of the-world, and, as such, what is ready-to-hand is a part of that horizonal consciousness of self and the-world qua horizons which is called being-in-the-world. In other words, the basic ontological division is between what is present-at-hand and being-in-the-world, where the latter is an original, horizontal, and complex phenomenal circumstance which includes both self and non-self components. It is then just a matter of linguistic convention whether one calls this a division between two "categories" of Being, or whether one follows Heidegger's convention whereby he distinguishes between existentia (i.e., structures of being-in-the-world) and categories, and calls these the two basic possibilities for characters of Being (die beiden Grundmöglichkeiten von Seinscharakteren).

IV

Having sketched the essential outlines of an interpretation of Heidegger's ontology, I shall now make explicit some of its implications with regard to two of the classical problems of modern philosophy, namely, the mind/body problem, and the problem of proving the existence of an external world. I shall not consider numerous and slightly differing formulations of these problems, but by operating at a level of generality, I shall be able to give some indication of how Heidegger's ontology does, and does not, resolve certain issues by placing them into a new perspective. Indeed, more emphasis will be placed on the latter since, in my opinion, advocates of Being and Time, as well as Heidegger himself, have tended to make more sweeping assertions about what Heidegger's ontology manages to overcome than are in fact warranted. Moreover, such assertions tend to conceal what I take to be the genuinely original (in the ordinary sense of this word) and potentially positive contributions to ontology intimated by Sein und Zeit.

Consider the mind/body problem as it is traditionally posed. Here the issue is raised in terms of the relation between mental and physical phenomena (or talk about such phenomena), and various positions are taken in light of this basic ontological distinction. Such positions include substance dualism, which posits causal in-
Interaction between non-physical thinking substances and bodies, epiphenomenalism, which posits a one-way causal relation from bodies to minds, various forms of the identity theory, which posit various type-type or token-token identities between mental and physical states or processes, and various forms of eliminative materialism which hypothesize that our ordinary "mental talk" about beliefs and desires is actually so confused that it manages to refer to nothing at all, hence nothing that is identical to any physical states or processes.

With regard to Heidegger's ontology, the point to see is that even though it would put these discussions onto radically new grounds, it would not dissolve any of these issues, nor does it offer any assistance when it comes to trying to arbitrate or select between them. This is because the entire mind/body debate is predicated on the distinction between mental and physical occurrences, but in Heidegger's ontology mental and physical occurrences, even if it turns out that mental occurrences are in some sense unreal, are both present-at-hand occurrences. In terms of Heidegger's ontology, the mind/body problem is thus a dispute about how to categorize and to understand beings which occur within-the-world, and this dispute does not directly touch upon the issue of the ontological status of being-in-the-world. Moreover, a Heideggerian is free to adopt a kind of radical empiricism with regard to whatever happens to occur within the-world. Such a position, loosely sketched, would hold that knowledge of what occurs within the-world is strictly a matter for the positive and special sciences which are based on at least the possibility of weakening explicit hypotheses or theories on the basis of regular sense experience, which is to say, on the basis of some form of perception (Vemehmen).

To be sure, Heidegger's ontology is inconsistent with the thesis that one can have an encounter with a raw, uninterpreted given which is discovered by perception, prior to, and independent from, any theory or historical situation. This is because, according to Heidegger, all perception is a form of interpretation which takes place out of a background of significance which is always already given. In terms of a philosophy of natural science, Heidegger's ontology thus leads to a similar conclusion as many non-Heideggerian positions which also have endeavored to point out the "myth of the given". Heidegger's ontology is therefore incompatible with strictly foundationalist views of natural science (e.g., any form of phenomenalism which would posit an incorrigible encounter with raw, uninterpreted sense data), though as philosophers of science continue to show, there need be nothing essentially anti-empiricist or anti-scientific about recognizing the theory (or even value) ladenness of all perception.

In particular, then, Heideggerians are free to approach the arguments found in contemporary philosophy of mind in such a way that they find some version of computationalism (either in terms of a limited identity theory or a more radical eliminative materialism) to be the most promising current theory which can lead to additional knowledge about the human mind (or about the minds of other animals). To be sure, Heideggerians would have to disagree with computationalists who would go on to assert that one's self is absolutely nothing else besides a computational device, since the latter is a being within-the-world, whereas one's self, according to Heidegger, is also part of a non-physical, horizontal circumstance called being-in-the-world. There is thus room for a metaphysical dispute between absolute physicalists (or
"materialist metaphysicians"), on the one hand, and Heideggerians, on the other, who would posit the existence of at least one form of non-physical Being (i.e., being-in-the-world) as well. But this metaphysical problem is a different one from the traditional mind/body problem (defined as working out the relation between mental and physical phenomena within the-world), and as long as one is working within the latter, there is nothing in Heidegger's ontology per se which can be used either to support or to attack computationalism, or any other recent theory within philosophy of mind. In other words, the issue of whether some version of computationalism (which does not tie itself to the metaphysical doctrine of absolute physicalism) is correct is not an issue for fundamental ontology (which works out the relation between being-in-the-world and being present-at-hand), but for the special sciences and the derivative ontologies developed therein. In this sense, with regard to everything that occurs within the-world, a Heideggerian is free even to adopt a Quinean perspective whereby ontological decisions come not so much at the "beginning" of inquiry, but at the "end", when one decides what kinds of beings one needs to include in the universe of discourse so that the sentences in one's best theories to date come out true.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to resolve the apparent disagreement between absolute physicalists and Heideggerians as I have defined them; but by taking a closer look at the status of being-in-the-world as neither "being real" nor "making sense", and by outlining more clearly the contrast between knowing emotions qua physical processes and finding one's mood qua horizontal, non-physical circumstances of one's self, some headway can be made in this direction.

First, Heidegger does not claim that being-in-the-world is a real being. On the contrary, Heidegger reserves the category of what is real for those beings which are known (Erkennen) on the basis of some form of perception (Vernehmen). In other words, the sciences (which in this case would include mathematics as well as the empirical sciences broadly conceived) are our mode of access to what is real. It is up to the sciences to tell us, as well as they currently can, which of the occurrences within the-world (that is, which, among all the things that make any sense to us at all) are real, and which, though they appear within the-world, are not real. For example, such things as life on Mars, phlogiston, and the perfect sphere of the moon, are things that make sense to us within the-world; but natural science has provided evidence that such things are not real beings. Or, and this is also consistent with Heidegger's ontology, it may turn out that among what is present-at-hand, the category of the real is superfluous, so that everything which can be known about beings within the-world can be said just as well, or better, by using a set of categories which does not include a separate category of "the real". This is just to say that Heidegger's ontology does not include "the real" as a necessary and fundamental category. In so far as this category can be applied to phenomena, he does suggest that the logical candidate, provisionally at least, for what is "real", are those beings which are known on the basis of perception (Vernehmen). But such beings would not include the original circumstances of being-in-the-world. Being-in-the-world, in this sense, cannot be a real being, but neither can it be unreal, if by "unreal" one means something which makes sense to us within the-world, but which turns out, on the basis of perceptions and inferences from such perceptions, to be fake or imaginary. Heidegger is therefore prepared to give to the
materialist the concept of the real, and they are free to pursue as far as they can the thesis that only physical beings are real.

Second, strictly speaking, being-in-the-world does not "make sense" at all; rather, being-in-the-world is "sense" (Sinn) itself. In other words, Heidegger argues that being-in-the-world is "sense" (Sinn), in the sense that "sense" (Sinn) is one existentiale along with the other existentia/ia, such as in-order-to seeing (Umsicht), mood finding (Befindlichkeit), understanding (Verstehen), and so forth. In particular, "sense" (Sinn) most closely resembles existentia/ia such as being-in-the-world and temporality since, rather than referring to some partial circumstances of the original horizon for present-at-hand occurrences, "sense" (Sinn) refers to the original circumstances as a whole, which is to say, to the entire horizional consciousness of self and the-world qua horizons which is called being-in-the-world.

Heidegger's position is that when beings which occur within the-world are understood, such beings "have" (or, as I have been saying, "make") sense. But what is strictly speaking understood in this case is not "sense" (Sinn), but the being which occurs within the-world. Thus "sense" (Sinn) is an existentiale, which means that it is an original (horizontal) way of being which includes horizontal aspects of my self. In this way, my self, qua original horizon, exists ontologically as being full of sense (Sinnvoll) and as not making sense (Sinnlos), whereas everything that occurs within the world, even though it makes sense, is not "sense" itself, which is to say, it is "non-sense" (unsinniges). In other words, being-in-the-world both (1) is full of sense (Sinnvoll), since sense (Sinn) is just what being-in-the-world is, and (2) makes no sense (Sinnlos), since only beings which occur within the-world "have" or "make" sense (hat Sinn). And even though beings within the-world make sense, such beings are in a different ontological category than "sense" (Sinn), and are marked as belonging to what is non-sense (unsinniges) instead.

Word play aside, however, the important issue is whether or not we can understand sense (Sinn), which is to say, being-in-the-world, as a one-sided boundary "between" what occurs within it (and makes sense), and what occurs beyond it (where this "beyond" is, as I have put it, "not even nothing"). Or, to put it otherwise, how on earth is one ever to decide whether or not Heidegger is correct? One can, of course, try "laterally" to see being-in-the-world for oneself, one can try to put this into words, one can compare these results to Sein und Zeit, and one can try to obtain as much conceptual clarity as possible about these results and the overall program. But ultimately, the problem of trying to evaluate the results of Heidegger's ontology involves the problem of working out the relation between fundamental ontology and logic (where logic, roughly speaking, gives directions for determining what is more and less reasonable). The issue is thus whether or not, or in what sense, there can be a logic which is prior to, or independent of, the fundamental ontological distinctions which Heidegger wants to make between being-in-the-world and being present-at-hand. And although I am uncertain what form such a logic might take, I believe that there is a great deal that needs to be worked out in this area.

Short of this larger project (i.e., working out a logic by which one can evaluate Heidegger's ontology), there is at least something else that can be said which
might help to win over materialists who objected to the thesis that there are non-physical circumstances of my self. For consistent with Heidegger's ontology is the thesis that, for example, whatever emotion a subject is having, it is possible that this emotion can be studied and known on the basis of the physiological condition of the organism. Heidegger's point would simply be that whenever one has such knowledge of an emotion qua physical process (whether this emotion belongs to someone else or to one's self), there is also always and simultaneously a mood (Stimmung) and possibility (Möglichkeit) which form part of the overall horizontal circumstances within which this knowledge has taken place. This overall horizontal circumstance, which Heidegger variously refers to as being-in-the-world, sense (Sinn), or temporality, remains precisely what is unknown (either qua physical being or qua any other category of being) in this situation. This unknown horizon, however, does appear, which is to say that whenever one has knowledge of an emotion (or even a cognition) qua physical process, one also always and simultaneously is finding (Befindlichkeit) a mood and understanding (Verstehen) possibilities which form part of the unknowable horizontal circumstances which are the conditions for the possibility of knowing an emotion (or cognition) qua physical process. There is thus no suggestion of a kind of inexplicable hiatus within the-world of physical phenomena, nor of a kind of mysterious, non-physical force which causally interacts with what is physical.

In summary, then, even if I have not resolved the debate between absolute physicalism and Heidegger's ontology, I hope that I have at least shown that Heidegger's basic distinction between being-in-the-world and what is present-at-hand is not a distinction which has anything positive to say regarding the truth or falsity of substance dualism, various forms of the identity theory, and/or computationalism, in so far as these latter issues are posed in terms of the problem of the relation between mental and physical occurrences (or between mental and physical discourses). By holding the view that being-in-the-world is a way of Being which exists prior to the distinction between what is mental or physical, Heidegger's ontology would pose the mind/body problem on radically new grounds, but these grounds would not provide any solution to the problem of how mental phenomena are related to physical phenomena. Heidegger's ontology is thus consistent with a wide range of possibilities (including eliminative materialism), although it is not consistent with the thesis that there is absolutely nothing at all besides physical beings.

Consider finally the problem of proving the existence of an external world. It is often thought that Heidegger does away with this problem, and I want to show in terms of my interpretation how this is and is not the case.

To begin with, Heidegger's ontology is also consistent with the claim that there is nothing physical at all. Heidegger's fundamental distinction is between what is present-at-hand and being-in-the-world, and it is a different issue altogether when it comes to deciding which categories there are to distinguish among beings which are present-at-hand. In particular, consider the following sort of idealism which is consistent with Heidegger's ontology. All phenomena which are present-at-hand are in fact states of my own mind. In other words, the principal being within the-world is my own mind, and all other beings within the-world are ideas in my mind. There is therefore no external physical world.
Of course, even though Heidegger's ontology is consistent with this sort of idealism, there are also some important differences between it and "non-Heideggerian" idealism. For even though, according to a Heideggerian idealism, the only two categories of beings within-the-world are my mind and ideas within it, this would not mean that there is nothing else at all besides my mind and my ideas. For, according to any Heideggerian idealism, there is also being-in-the-world, which is a horizontal consciousness of the-world and my self qua horizons. This means that in addition to my self qua mind (and the ideas within it), there is also (1) my self proper qua non-mental horizon for the appearance of my mind qua present-at-hand being, (2) the-world qua non-self horizontal circumstance of Being, and (3) a horizontal, non-mental self which is other than my self, namely, that part of being-in-the-world which is formed by no one in particular (das Man). This sort of idealism, which is consistent with Heidegger's ontology, is not solipsistic, since Being includes both what is other than my self proper and other than self, namely, no one in particular and the-world respectively.

Finally, consider the following problematic idealism which is also consistent with Heidegger's ontology. This is the view that the only present-at-hand phenomena which my mind (which is also present-at-hand) directly encounters are ideas. There might be a physical world external to my mind, but if there is, I must demonstrate it. In this way, the question of whether there exists a physical world outside of my mind is a difficult problem about which it makes sense for philosophers to argue, and there is nothing in Heidegger's fundamental ontology per se which dissolves this problem so stated since all that Heidegger's ontology adds, once again, is that besides my mind and its ideas, there also must be being-in-the-world, which is the non-mental, non-physical horizon for the appearance of such mental objects as my mind and its ideas.

In other words, in his discussion of the "scandal of philosophy", Heidegger distinguishes two types of worlds, namely, the-world qua original horizon of significance, and the world qua set of present-at-hand objects. The point he actually makes is only that it is impossible and unnecessary to prove the existence of these two worlds because, according to his view, these two worlds are already discovered simultaneously with the discovery of one's self. But, and this is the crucial point, neither of these two worlds are either physical or mental (though the world qua set of present-at-hand beings might include mental and/or physical beings). Thus the "scandal of philosophy" for Heidegger is not that philosophers have tried to prove the existence of an external physical world, but that philosophers might take it upon themselves to try to prove that there is the-world (qua original horizon) and beings which are present-at-hand within it. This also means that Heidegger's famous assertion that 'the 'scandal of philosophy' is not that this proof has yet to be given, but that such proofs are expected and attempted again and again" is very misleading. It is misleading because prior to Sein und Zeit, no one was working in terms of the categories of the-world and being present-at-hand, and thus neither Kant, nor anyone else, actually tried to demonstrate that there are the-world and beings present-at-hand within it. It is also easy to see how many would interpret Heidegger as saying that the scandal of philosophy is that proofs of the existence of an external physical world have been attempted again and again (since such proofs have been attempted). Yet this is just to
confuse the-world qua non-physical, original horizon, with the world of physical objects.

V

The preceding has been an attempt to present the basic outlines of one way of untangling a rich text which, by its author's own admission, could stand constructive reinterpretations. Moreover, I believe that my interpretation has the merit of beginning to develop certain possibilities which have yet to be given their due in the secondary literature thus far. To be sure, I have not discussed specific issues regarding what I take to be some of the strengths and weaknesses of other interpretations, but have instead tried to develop in a positive fashion an alternative reading which offers a global perspective of its own. It is clear that my interpretation differs sometimes a great deal from what others have said; however, to examine in particular instances, the details of these differences, the reasons for them, and their philosophical significance, would be a lengthy process which would itself require the preceding explication as background material. The situation is further complicated since, for the purposes of this paper, I am assuming that Sein und Zeit is not univocal, but rich and polyvalent. This is not to say that I believe that any interpretation of it is as good as an other, but it is to say that weighing varying interpretations of it is not, on this assumption, a matter of tracing interpretations back to see which is favored by the greatest quantity of textual support. In this sense, I am not interested, in this paper, in arguing which interpretation of Sein und Zeit is in fact the best rendition of Sein und Zeit itself. Instead, I am interested in developing alternative philosophical possibilities which spring from the text, and, in particular, I am interested in understanding the foundations, functions, and problems associated with the development of transcendental ontologies.

ENDNOTES


2 For example, I argue that Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Neomarius Verlag, 1953) is contradictory with regard to the status of what is ready-to-hand, that its discussion of proofs of the external world is misleading at best, and that Heidegger often fails to distinguish clearly which of three senses of Dasein he has in mind.

3 I am unaware of any secondary sources which work out in any detail an interpretation of Sein und Zeit which closely resembles my own, though I am indebted to many sources which have provided insights and opportunities for developing my views. Such sources include various articles and the following books: Joseph J. Kockelmans, Martin Heidegger (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1965); Joseph J. Kockelmans, Heidegger and Science (Lanham: University Press of America, 1985); Hubert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement (The Hague: Harper & Row, 1960); William J. Richardson, Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought (The
The point is only that each fundamentally divides Being into two, not that what is present-at-hand coincides with what is intelligible and being-in-the-world with what is sensible. In Section III I discuss the use of the term "consciousness" in the context of Heidegger's ontology.

"My self" is, of course, a non-standard translation of *Dasein*, which many commentators leave untranslated. I believe that "my self" is an appropriate choice for several reasons. First, Heidegger says that *Dasein* is that being which each of us is himself, and that the being of *Dasein* is in each case mine (*Sein und Zeit*, 7, 41). A being that each of us is is "a self", and that self which is mine is "my self". Or, similarly, Heidegger asserts that, in the analysis of *Dasein*, the beings which are analyzed are we ourselves, and that the being of these beings is in each case mine (*Sein und Zeit*, 41). The being of "my self" is mine, and "my self" is a self which is included in "we ourselves". Thus, once again, "my self" is a perfectly straightforward way of expressing what Heidegger means by *Dasein*. The issue is somewhat complicated because, later on, Heidegger claims to uncover an original structure of *Dasein* who is other than my self proper, namely, *das Man* (which I shall translate as "no one in particular"). Thus, for Heidegger, the original structure of my self (*Dasein*) is a complex structure which includes both a "my self proper" (whose original structure Heidegger identifies as the Säuberlichkeit des Selbst), and a "non-my self" who is marked as no one in particular (*Sein und Zeit*, 322). Accordingly, "the self" would also be a possible translation of *Dasein*, in which case one would say that the original structure of "the self" includes both a "my self proper" and a "non-my self" who is marked as no one in particular. But since Heidegger begins by putting stress on the "mineness" of *Dasein*, and since "my self" tends to fit the description of "the being that each of us is himself" better than "the self" does, I have stuck with "my self". To be sure, just plain "self" might be the best translation, since it fits the description "the being that each of us in himself", and it does not prejudice the issue from the outset in favor of "my self" as opposed to "no one in particular"; however, in English, using the world "self", rather than "the self" or "my self", in such phrases as "the original structure of self", is itself a non-standard usage (although we are comfortable with "the original structure of *Dasein*", and "the original structure of consciousness" is standard usage, whereas "the original structure of the consciousness" is not). In any event, "human being" is a poor translation of *Dasein* because human beings are the objects of biological, anthropological, historical, and sociological investigations, whereas the analysis of *Dasein* is conceived as part of an a priori ontology, rather than as any sort of empirical investigation. In this regard, for Heidegger, there are three basic senses of my self (*Dasein*): my self *qua* horizontal component of being-in-the-world, my self *qua* present-at-hand being, and my self *qua* overall synthesis of both. An analogous, though by no means
identical distinction in Kant would be between oneself \textit{qua} phenomenal being and oneself \textit{qua} transcendental subjectivity. See also Note 14 below.

6 Strictly speaking, mood and possibility are horizontal components of \textit{my} self only in so far as they form an "owned" (\textit{eigentlich}) horizontal self. According to Heidegger, such an "owned" horizontal self is always "falling" into an "unowned" (\textit{uneigentlich}) horizontal self who, \textit{qua} no one in particular (\textit{das Man}), is other than \textit{my} horizontal self proper. In this paper, however, I mostly ignore the distinction between being \textit{eigentlich} and being \textit{uneigentlich}, and speak as though (for example) mood (\textit{Stimmung}), possibility (\textit{Möglichkeit}), mood finding (\textit{Befindlichkeit}), and understanding (\textit{Verstehen}) were thoroughly \textit{eigentlich}. This is because the division between \textit{eigentlich} and \textit{uneigentlich} being does not itself penetrate to the fundamental division in \textit{Being} between being-in-the-world and being present-at-hand, but instead marks different ways in which the horizontal self component of being-in-the-world exists. In terms of explicating the phenomenal circumstances of being-in-the-world, the distinction between \textit{eigentlich} and \textit{uneigentlich} being is significant, but in terms of explicating the most basic principles of Heidegger's ontology, this distinction can be provisionally overlooked.

7 We shall see later how this does entail that the-world, \textit{qua} horizon, "makes no sense" at all. A response to the obvious objection (namely, if the-world makes no sense, then how can we even talk about it?) is that rather than "making sense", the-world \textit{is} sense (\textit{Sinn}), or at least one of the principle components of sense (\textit{Sinn}), which is another name for being-in-the-world. And though this might appear like cheap sophistry, the real issue has to do with whether or not we can conceive of an absolute boundary (or horizon) for experience (where "experience" means all occurrences which make sense). As the boundary for what makes sense, such a horizon is distinguished from occurrences which make sense within it. In other words, in the loosest sense of the phrase "make sense", Heidegger's position is that we can "make sense" out of the notion of the horizons of experience, although technically, such horizons are distinguished from what occurs within them by understanding the former as constitutive of "sense" itself, and the latter as occurrences which "make sense". Outside of such horizons, nothing either makes sense, nor is sense.

8 For example, see \textit{Sein und Zeit}, 41, 50, 53, 111, and 131.

9 The "nothing" to which Heidegger refers in his lecture \textit{Was ist Metaphysik?} is not this "not even nothing" which is "beyond-the-world". Rather, Heidegger's discussion of the nihilating of the nothing is a further attempt to work out the sense in which original \textit{Being} (e.g., the-world) is not itself any discrete object, but a kind of "circumstantial no-thing". For a further discussion of Heidegger's \textit{Was ist Metaphysik?}, see Brent A. Singer, "Spinoza, Heidegger, and the Ontological Argument", \textit{The Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology} (forthcoming).

10 Two additional points regarding the contrast between Kant and Heidegger deserve to be mentioned. First, Kant ties the \textit{a priori} to what is necessary and universal. Corresponding (though contrasting) senses of necessity and universality are also intimated by \textit{Sein und Zeit}, but these concepts are not fully developed, and it is be-
beyond the scope of this paper to examine them in any detail. Second, Heidegger's ontology does not so much contradict Kant's, but potentially subsumes it. For example, noumenal being can be reinterpreted as including those beings within the-world which make some sense to us, but which we can never know about on the basis of natural science. In this way a neo-Kantian could argue that whether or not I possess an immortal soul is something which empirical science cannot answer, and that having an immortal soul is a way of being that makes some sense to me. Immortal souls would be noumenal beings, and I can have faith that somehow I am one, although I cannot know it empirically. Thus, within the-world, a division might still be made between the phenomenal and the noumenal if it turns out that one can mark off a set of beings, among those which are present-at-hand, which are necessarily immune from empirical investigation. Moreover, whether or not the latter is possible is not a matter for Heidegger's fundamental ontology to decide, but a matter for philosophy of science. Given Heidegger's fundamental ontology, it could just as well turn out that Kant thought he could mark off a set of beings which are immune from empirical investigation only because he labored under an inadequate and narrow conception of what constitutes empirical thinking.

11 It is the interpretive nature of our access to the *a priori* which, for Heidegger, opens up the possibility of a non-dogmatic, non-apodictic transcendental philosophy.

12 *Sein und Zeit*, 61-2.

13 It is extremely difficult to pick suitable translations for these terms, as anyone who has dealt with Heidegger realizes. Any translation which opts for ordinary terms is misleading since no ordinary terms refer to our mode of access to horizonal being; translations which coin new phrases are difficult since they introduce odd vocabulary and tend to differ from one translation to the next.

14 In *Sein und Zeit*, Heidegger sometimes refers just to Dasein (my self) when, strictly speaking, he should refer to the original being or structure of Dasein (my self) in contrast to Dasein (my self) qua present-at-hand. This is especially true for Chapter I of Division One, although in Chapter II of Division One Heidegger starts to be more careful about this because it is here that he first tries to take up the kind of being present-at-hand that is peculiar to Dasein. That is, in contrast to beings which are only present-at-hand, Dasein is both present-at-hand and horizonal, and Heidegger provisionally marks the distinction in terms of a contrast between the Tatsächlichkeit of present-at-hand beings which are other than Dasein (i.e., other than my self), and the Faktizität of Dasein (my self) qua being who partakes of both present-at-hand and horizonal being. See *Sein und Zeit*, 56-7. This distinction between Tatsächlichkeit and Faktizität remains problematic, however, in so far as the status of Dasein as a connecting term between fundamental ontological divisions (namely, between being-in-the-world and being present-at-hand) is itself problematic. The result is that in Chapter V of Division One Heidegger tries to connect Faktizität with mood (Stimmung), but since mood is clearly horizonal, the overall effect is to gloss over this problem by equivocating on the term Faktizität (i.e., in Chapter II it marks how Dasein is within the-world, but in Chapter V it gets identified with horizonal being). A possible, although radical solution to this problem could involve the claim that, in the end,
there is no sharp distinction between being-in-the-world and what is present-at-hand, but rather, Being is spread on a gradual continuum between these two extremes, and is never entirely one as opposed to the other. In this way, all beings, and not just my self (Dasein), would be spread between these poles (i.e., would partake of transcendence).

15 Sein und Zeit, 114.

16 For example, see Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, translated by Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), 21 and Sein und Zeit, 115.

17 See Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 158-9. The "phenomenal content" of being-in-the-world is Heidegger's term for how this horizonal being appears to me. As I said, Heidegger believes that I do have a kind of "perceptual" access to being-in-the-world (though not "perceptual" in the sense of Vermehmen). This means that however "slim" being-in-the-world may be, there is still something there "to see". What is thus "seen" is the "phenomenal content" of this horizon, or, as Heidegger also sometimes puts it (e.g., Basic Problems, 159), the "phenomenal circumstances". The term "circumstances" is particularly appropriate since it picks up on the notion that horizons "stand around" what occurs within them; "phenomenal circumstances" are thus what is seen of being-in-the-world as it "stands around" what is present-at-hand.

18 Theodore Kisiel expresses this well when he writes "it is a matter of catching oneself 'in the exercise of the act' (in actu exercitu) of living in order to outline conceptually the horizon which defines it and to articulate the structures which guide it. We must explicitly interpret what we already implicitly understand in a kind of lateral perspective upon a suppressed background, but take for granted and thus pass over in silence". Theodore Kisiel, "A Prefatory Guide to Being and Time", in Heidegger's Existential Analytic, edited by Frederick Elliston (Mouton Publishers, 1978), 17.

19 "Sight" (Sicht) once again does not refer to the purely visual. See Sein und Zeit, 146-7.

20 Sein und Zeit, 69, and 97.

21 For example, Sein und Zeit, 83, 88, 201.

22 Sein und Zeit, 64, 87.

23 Sein und Zeit, 69, 70.

24 Sein und Zeit, 45.

25 Sein und Zeit, 202.
Sein und Zeit, 151-2. I believe that "sense" is a slightly better translation of Sinn than is "meaning", although the reasons for this do not bear directly on the issues raised in this paper.

"Wenn innerweltliches Seiendes mit dem Sein des Daseins entdeckt, das heisst zu Verstandnis gekommen ist, sagen wir, es hat Sinn". Sein und Zeit, 151.

"Verstanden aber ist, streng genommen, nicht der Sinn, sondern das Seiende". Sein und Zeit, 151.

This is one of those places where Heidegger fails to distinguish between my self (Dasein) qua being within the-world and my self (Dasein) qua original horizon. By insisting on this distinction, it turns out that my self is a being which both (1) makes sense to me by occurring within the-world, and (2) does not make any sense to me in so far as it also forms part of an original horizon of "sense" (Sinn) itself.

This also helps to explain Heidegger’s assertion that the supporting ground of beings is accessible only as sense which is itself the abyss of not making sense ("Der Sinn von Sein kann nie in Gegensatz gebracht werden zum Seienden oder zum Sein als tragenden ‘Grund’ des Seienden, weil ‘Grund’ nur als Sinn zugänglich wird, und sei er selbst der Abgrund der Sinnlosigkeit"). Sein und Zeit, 152. The point is that Sinn, qua condition for the appearance of beings (here Heidegger uses the metaphor of "ground" rather than "horizon"), does not make any sense (it does not hat Sinn) since it is sense (Sinn).

For example, the law of non-contradiction does not standardly apply to being-in-the-world. This is because being-in-the-world, qua unified phenomena, is marked by contradictory predicates (e.g., it is both my self and no one in particular, it is both self and non-self, it is both past and futural, and it is both thrown and projected). Moreover, it does no good to argue that these different "aspects" of the over-all horizon make up different parts of being-in-the-world so that no one part is in fact marked at the same time by contradictory predicates. Unlike a pointilist painting, for example, which can be resolved into its discrete elements upon closer examination, being-in-the-world can never be brought "in front of" the-world for closer examination and digital division. If one likes, one can try to imagine being-in-the-world as being my self "toward one side" and no one in particular "toward the other", but one would also have to imagine that (rather than there being a sharp boundary between these sides) these sides gradually and totally merge into one another. The result, once again, is that there are no discrete boundaries, no digital distinctions, but only, as it were, 'green areas' which are simultaneously both yellow and blue, or, as Heidegger says of being-in-the-world, it is "durch und durch geworfene Möglichkeit". Sein und Zeit, 144. Being-in-the-world is thus a kind of unity of opposites, a way of being in which the switch, as it were, is neither on nor off, but both; or, if I may extend this metaphor, being-in-the-world is like the line between opposites, a line which gets drawn into a sphere in which discrete opposites can occur.
"Unknown" in the sense that there is no perception (Vernehmen) of these horizontal structures, and hence no empirical knowledge (Erkennen) of them.

This horizontal self (i.e. das Man), who is other than my self qua present-at-hand and my self proper qua horizontal being, should not be confused with other people or other minds. Other people (e.g., Fred, Carolyn, and Wayne), or their minds, are present-at-hand beings which occur within the-world. In other words, the fact that there is a horizontal self who is no one in particular does not necessarily mean that there are any other present-at-hand beings besides my self, or that any other present-at-hand beings besides my self have minds. In terms of the idealism I just sketched, this means that Fred, Carolyn, and Peter are simply ideas in my mind (that appear within an overall non-mental horizon which includes no one in particular), rather than beings outside my mind who also have minds.

See Sein und Zeit, 202-5.

"Welt als das Worin des In-Seins und 'Welt' als inner-weltliches Seiendes ... sind zusammengeworfen, bzw. gar nichts erst unterschieden. Welt aber ist mid dem Sein des Daseins wesenhaft erschlossen; 'Welt' ist mit der Erschlossenheit von Welt je auch schon entdeckt". Sein und Zeit, 202-3.

Sein und Zeit, 205.