ABSTRACT: Adding to A.O. Aldridge's 1951 list, this list of British eighteenth-century references to Shaftesbury provides further evidence that the philosophy of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson is an important rival to Lockean empiricism during the early and middle decades of the century. The peak of Shaftesbury's influence occurs during the 1740's and 1750's when the deist controversy was at its height. A more conservative political and religious climate of opinion after 1759 is one reason for the decline of Shaftesbury's reputation as a philosopher. Another is Shaftesbury's displacement by Hume as an important enemy of orthodox Christianity. During the 1760's and later, Hume is attacked by the Scottish "common sense" philosophers, who find anticipations of Humean scepticism in Locke and Berkeley (but not in Shaftesbury), thereby unwittingly helping to provide the foundation for the eventual establishment of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume as the "big three" of eighteenth-century philosophy.

Thirty-five years ago A.O. Aldridge published a useful list of eighteenth-century references to Anthony Ashley Cooper, third Earl of Shaftesbury, as an appendix to his article "Shaftesbury and the Deist Manifesto" [Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, 41, pt. 2 (Philadelphia: 1951), 297-385]. I present here a list of additional references as a further contribution to the study of Shaftesbury's influence in eighteenth-century Britain. Robert Voitle does not discuss this influence in his recent biography The Third Earl of Shaftesbury 1671-1713 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1984), and recent scholarship has seemed to underestimate it.¹

As this is a finding list, not a bibliography, the documentation is the minimum required for identification of the item. Titles are shortened, periodical essays are cited by year and number only, and in most cases it has not seemed necessary to indicate whether the work consulted was the original or a modern facsimile reprint. The place of publication is London unless otherwise noted. This list is not complete. Many references not noticed by Aldridge or myself may probably be found, especially in periodicals. Like Aldridge, I list references to Frances Hutcheson, whose Inquiry Into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (1725) is, as Aldridge says, "the most important book in the Shaftesburian tradition"(374).

Clarke, John. The Foundation of Morality in Theory and Practice Considered. A "rationalist" argument against Hutcheson's reduction of "all Morality to Benevolence, or a disinterested Love of others".


Balguy, John. The Foundation of Moral Goodness, Pt. 1, 1728; Pt. 2, 1729. This, Balguy's chief work, is a "rationalist" argument against Hutcheson's ethical theory.


Gentleman's Magazine (hereafter GM) 2: 788. Of Painting. Shaftesbury's "fine Critic is little known among the present Professors" of painting.

GM 4: 139. Of False Taste in Persons of Quality. As Shaftesbury says, honesty is better than "adventitious Ornaments, Estates or Preferments".

Collins, Anthony. A Discourse of the Grounds and Reasons of the Christian Religion. Quotes Shaftesbury approvingly on the peaceful nature of religion "among the antient Greeks and Romans" (xxv-xxvi).

Birch, Thomas, et. al. A General Dictionary, Historical and Critical, 9:179-86. This brief life of Shaftesbury by his son emphasizes Shaftesbury's life-long devotion to liberty as against "zealots for despotic power". The lengthy notes summarize and defend Shaftesbury's writings.

GM 9:176. Letter to Mr. Urban. Shaftesbury's "disinterested Principle of Virtue is a mere Chimera".

Warburton, William. A Critical and Philosophical Commentary on Mr. Pope's ESSAY ON MAN. Shaftesbury "discovered" that Je-
sus and his followers had preached up love and charity the better to enable the Christian clergy "some Centuries afterwards to tyrannize over those whom the engaging Sounds of Charity and Brotherly Love had intrapped into Subjection" (184).


Whitehead, William. An Essay on Ridicule. Poem. Shaftesbury tells us mirth's the test of sense, but some awkward epithet "with skill apply'd" can right and wrong "most courteously confound".

1744? Collins, William. Lines Addressed to James Harris. Harris adds "new Brightness ev'n to Ashley's race/Intent like Him in Plato's polish'd style/To fix fair Science in our careless Isle".

1745 Cooper, John Gilbert. The Power of Harmony. Poem. Cooper's prefatory "Design" praises Shaftesbury and Hutcheson as "the great disciples among the moderns" of "Plato and the other philosophers of the academic school".


1748 Melmoth, William. Fitzosborne's Letters. Although Christian moralists have unduly "depreciated" human nature (letter 34), the moral sense is an insufficient guide for "the generality of mankind" (letter 46). The authority of an established religion (once paganism, now Christianity) must be added.

_________. The Letters of Pliny the Consul. 3d ed. Quotes Shaftesbury approvingly (1:195n) on the alliance between virtue and the fine arts. Agrees with Shaftesbury (2:387n) that reading many books does not necessarily make a man well read.

Shenstone, William. Letter to Lady Luxborough, 16 June. Of James Hervey's Meditations Among the Tombs (1746): "I remember my Lord Shaftesbury, speaking of many that are vulgarly stil'd good Books, says, they may be so in the Main, but he is sure the Writers of them are a sorry Race".


"humbug" as exemplified in "all its invincible champions from Lord SHAFTSBURY to Orator HENLY" (2:133).


1751 Coventry, Francis. Pompey the Little. Lady Sophister (bk. 1, ch. 7) had read Hobbes, Malebranche, Locke, Shaftesbury, Wollaston "and many more", all of whom she obliged to give testimony to her "paradox" that the soul is not immortal. The works of John Dennis, Descartes, Shaftesbury, and Warburton all treat of the same immortal subject, that is, "nothing" (bk. 2, ch. 1).


Smollett, Tobias. Peregrine Pickle, ch. 47. The doctor "made a transition to the moral sense of Shaftesbury, and concluded his harangue with the greatest part of that frothy writer's rhapsody, which he repeated with all the violence of enthusiastic agitation".

1752 Byron, John. Enthusiasm: A Poetical Essay. A defence of Christian enthusiasm against undue secular enthusiasms, including an undue passion for "fine writings" such as those of "A Cicero, A Shaftesbury, A Bayle".

Murphy, Arthur. The Gray's-Inn Journal, no. 10. Satire on Mr. Plastic, "a compleat Shaftesburian Philosopher" who rejects "the Christian System", and besides the five senses "has a moral Sense, A Sense of Honour, a public Sense, and many other Powers of Perception, not mentioned in Locke's Essay". The last clause is a hit at Hutcheson, well known for his multiplication of "senses".

1753 Armstrong, John. Taste. An Epistle to a Young Critic. Poem. "Ashley once turn'd a solid barber's head: / ... Ashley has turn'd more solid heads than one".


1754 Colman, George and Thornton, Bonnell. The Connoisseur, no. 9. The unbeliever's creed: "I believe not the Evangelists; I believe in Chubb, Toland, Tindal, Morgan, Mandeville, Woolston,
Hobbes, Shaftesbury: I believe in Lord Bolingbroke; I believe not St. Paul".


Warburton, William. *A View of Lord Bolingbroke's Philosophy*. Bolingbroke steals "a paltry joke" from Shaftesbury (32). Shaftesbury is quoted on bigotry (58-9) and on freethinkers (61).

1755

Stanhope, Philip Dormer, Earl of Chesterfield. *The World*, no. 112. If a cobbler thought he should "study the Characteristics, the Moral Philosopher, and thirty or forty volumes more" before he could justly call himself an honest man, he should no longer be Chesterfield's cobbler.

1755?

Talbot, Catharine. Letter to Elizabeth Carter, in *Memoirs of the Life of Mrs. Elizabeth Carter*, ed. Montagu Pennington (1807), 132: "Fine gentlemen will read it [Carter's translation of Epictetus] because it is new; fine ladies because it is yours; critics because it is a translation out of Greek; and Shaftesburian Heathens because Epictetus was an honour to Heathenism, and an idolater of the beauty of virtue".

1756


1757


Jenyns, Soame. *A Free Inquiry into the Nature and Origin of Evil*, in *Jenyns, Miscellaneous Pieces* (1761), 2:111-12. Some have placed the criterion of virtue "in conformity to truth [William Wollaston], some to the fitness of things [Samuel Clarke]", while others have extolled "the truth, beauty, and harmony of Virtue, exclusive of its consequences [Shaftesbury and his followers]". Criticizing all three schools, Jenyns argues for utility as the true criterion of virtue.

readers because Brown "had the ideas of beauty and virtue, the origin of poetry and eloquence, and all the beautiful reasonings and flights of imagination of lord Shaftsbury to discuss and criticize. But the Estimate deals with "political enquiries" which may be "dry" and hence not "not palatable to every reader" (2:126).

Ibid. A reviewer of Cooper's Letters Concerning Taste remarks that Cooper "adopts those tenets of philosophy, of which Plato is the original author, and which have been admirably enforced of late years with all the graces of fine writing, by Lord Shaftsbury, Hutchinson and doctor Akinside, that beautiful master of didactic poetry" (2:135).

1758
Ibid. In the May issue the author of an article on the history of the English language argues that while Shaftesbury's diction is beautiful, "it is a beauty that upon near inspection carries with it evident symptoms of affectation". This has had a bad effect upon the language because Shaftesbury has had a great many imitators "who have faithfully preserv'd all his blemishes without one of his beauties" (3:198-9).

Price, Richard. A Review of the Principle Questions in Morals. The most important of the "rationalist" critiques of Hutcheson's ethical theory.

1759

1760

1762
Sheridan, Thomas. A Course of Lectures on Elocution. The modern conception of taste is a "fantastic principle" as we may see "when we find the dominion of fancy so far extend-ed, as that risibility has been constituted sovereign over rationality, and ridicule made the standard of truth" (150). But Sheridan cites Shaftesbury's disciple James Harris approvingly (159-60) on the "hyperbole" of the "the Asiatic style" of a Cyrus or a Mahomet as contrasted with that of the ancient Greeks and Romans.

1762-63

1764
Shenstone, William. Essays on Men, Manners, and Things, in Shenstone, Works (1764), 2:196. "LORD Shaftsbury in the genteel management of some familiar ideas, seems to have no equal. He discovers an eloignment from vulgar phrases much becoming a person of quality. His sketches should be studied
REFERENCES TO SHAFTESBURY 1700–1800

like those Raphael. His Enquiry is one of the shortest and clearest systems of morality”.

1766

1768
Tucker, Abraham. *The Light of Nature Pursued*, 3d ed. (1834), 1:196. "Much ado has been made of late days about certain moral senses", and the notion of a moral sense "seems introduced to supply the place of innate ideas, since their total overthrow by Mr. Locke". But "this supposed sixth sense" is "an acquired faculty" (pt. 1, ch. 24, sect. 13).

1769

1770

1772
Wesley, John. *Journal* 5:494-95. Of Hutcheson’s *Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions* (17 December): "He is a beautiful writer, but his scheme cannot stand unless the Bible falls. I know both from Scripture, reason, and experience that his picture of man is not drawn from the life. It is not true that no man is capable of malice, or delight in giving pain; much less that every man is virtuous, and remains so as long as he lives; nor does the Scripture allow that any action is good which is done without any desire to please God".

1774
Home, Henry, Lord Kames. *Sketches of the History of Man*, 2d ed. (Edinburgh: 1778), (bk. 3, sketch 2, sect. 3), 3:27-8. Both the selfish system of morality (Helvetius) and the system of universal benevolence (Shaftesbury) are contradictory to human experience.


Priestley, Joseph. *A Course of Lectures on Oratory and Criticism*. Ridicule is not the test of truth. "It is reversing the order of nature to judge in consequence of laughing. It is evident, we ought rather to forbear laughing till we have employed our judgment, to see whether we have reason to laugh or not" (213-15).

Melmoth, William. *The Letters of Marcus Tullius Cicero*. 3d ed. Shaftesbury is quoted approvingly concerning the ancients who boasted of their labor in composition as contrasted with moderns who boast of "genius alone" (1: 460n). But the existence of homosexuality among the ancient Romans proves "that the best of dispositions are not proof against fashionable vices, how detestable soever, without a much stronger counterpoise than a mere moral sense can supply" (2: 165n. 4).

Craig, William. *The Mirror*, no. 3. Quotes Hutcheson in support of the proposition that external beauty which really affects us "has always some apprehended morality, some natural or imagined indication of concomitant virtue, which gives it this powerful charm".

Blackburne, Francis (ed.). *Memoirs of Thomas Hollis*, 2:505. Hutcheson was "one of Mr. Hollis favourite philosophers".

Harris, James. *Philological Inquires in Three Parts*. References to Shaftesbury 18, 47, 105.

Boswell, James. *The Hypochondriack*, no. 62. Opposes Lord Kames's acceptance of "the celebrated proposition of a noble author, that Ridicule is the test of truth".

Young, John. *A Criticism of the Elegy Written in a Country Church-Yard*. Being a continuation of Dr. Johnson's Criticism, 2d ed. (Edinburgh: 1810). Johnson is made to say (85) that Gray's comments on Shaftesbury show that Gray himself was "a Christian, although a polite man".

Hawkins, Sir John. *Life of Samuel Johnson*, 2d ed. There are "three sects or classes of writers on morality". These are the followers of "the characteristic Lord Shaftesbury, Dr. Samuel Clarke, and Mr. Wollaston" (253).

Seward, Anna. Letter to George Hardinge, 21 November, *Letters of Anna Seward* (Edinburgh and London: 1811), 1:371-2. Of authors who see nothing worthy in the present: "Shaftesbury canted in this style during that very period which the back-gazers of our time extol, and dignify with the title of Augustan".

______. Letter to Thomas Christie, 27 January, *Letters*, 2:26-7. Seward does not think much of the "celebrated elegance of Lord Shaftesbury's style", but thinks Johnson's reason for excluding Shaftesbury and Bolingbroke from his list of authorities in the *Dictionary* "a most ridiculous one".

1790

Alison, Archibald. *Essays on the Nature and Principles of Taste* (Boston: 1812), (ch. 6, sec. 6), 419. Alison's view coincides with that maintained "by several writers of eminence—by Lord Shaftesbury, Dr. Hutcheson, Dr. Akenside, and Dr. Spence, but which has no where so firmly and so philosophically been maintained as by Dr. Reid... the doctrine to which I allude, is, that matter is not beautiful in itself, but derives its beauty from the expression of MIND".

1792

Ferguson, Adam. *Principles of Moral and Political Science* (Edinburgh). Notwithstanding "the vulgar contempt", the Stoic philosophy "has been revered by those who were acquainted with its real spirit, Lord Shaftesbury, Montesquieu, Mr. Harris, Mr. Hutchison, and many others" (1:8). But the moral sense of Shaftesbury and the ancients does not adequately account for "the phenomenon of moral approbation" (2:127).

1793

Stewart, Dugald. *Outlines of Moral Philosophy* (Edinburgh). Shaftesbury lays too little stress on the supreme authority of conscience, and this omission "is the chief defect of his philosophy" (145). Hutcheson is cited (92) on "Secondary Desires", i.e., desires for dress, equipage, etc., "on account of the estimation in which they are supposed to be held by the public".

1798


1799

More, Hannah. *Strictures on the Modern System of Female Education.* "No maxim has been more readily adopted, or is more intrinsically false, than that which the fascinating eloquence of a noble sceptic of the last age contrived to render so popular, that, 'ridicule is the test of truth'" (1:12).

1800

Hall, Robert. *Modern Infidelity Considered with Respect To Its Influence on Society in Miscellaneous Works and Remains of Robert Hall*, ed. Olinthus Gregory (London: Bohn, 1853), 261. "The system of infidelity is not only incapable of arming virtue for great and trying occasions, but leaves it unsupported in the most ordinary occurrences. In vain will its advocates appeal to a moral sense, to benevolence and sympathy; for it is undeniable that these impulses may be overcome".

Aldridge lists some 182 British references to Shaftesbury and Hutcheson. I add 78, making a total of 260. Of this total, 181 or nearly 70% occur during the period 1700-1759, the 1750's alone accounting for 67 references, or over 25% of the total. These figures reinforce the conclusion reached by C. A. Moore seventy years ago that "with the possible exception of John Locke, Shaftesbury was more generally known in
the mid-century than any other English philosopher". These figures also point to an apparent decline of interest in Shaftesbury after 1759.

Certainly, no works published after 1759 bear so obvious a Shaftesburian stamp as James Harris' well known treatise on happiness (1744), John Gilbert Cooper's Letters Concerning Taste (1753; and with additions, 1757), or the most widely read of all Shaftesburian productions, Mark Akenside's poem, The Pleasures of Imagination (1744). And certainly, Shaftesbury's admirers regarded him as a true philosopher, not just a writer of talent. Even his enemy William Warburton admitted that Shaftesbury had "imbibed the deep Sense" of Plato.

The Shaftesburians were adherents of the classical tradition in philosophy. They were less concerned with the Lockean question, what can we know? than with the question asked by the moralists and philosophers of classical antiquity, how should we live? In The Pleasures of Imagination Akenside shows how man, combining Pleasure with Virtue, may live happily in full accord with the intentions of a benevolent God. Cooper is convinced that this God has endowed us with the ability "to live beautifully" once we rid ourselves of bad education, bad customs, and bad religion, and Harris' treatise on happiness offers a Stoic prescription for the good life.

It is no accident that the peak of Shaftesbury's influence occurred when the deist controversy was at its height. Akenside, Cooper, and Harris were deists although, like Shaftesbury himself, they avoided direct attacks on Christianity. They wrote during a period when liberal opinions in religion, including opinions more radical than their own, found relatively free expression. Had the admirers of Sacheverell triumphed, had Convocation been permitted to sit, had Whig bishops like Hoadly been replaced with Tories, it is doubtful that the openly deistic works of a Tindal or a Collins would have appeared. The Shaftesburians were optimists about human nature. Akenside, as John E. Sitter has said, "writes as if on the edge of a new era in which the 'high capacious powers' now 'folded up in man' will be realized". Such optimism may have seemed less warranted during the reign of George III, a period of great social and political turmoil accompanied by a protracted and unsuccessful war.

More specifically, it can be argued that important aspects of Shaftesbury's thought were preempted, so to speak, by later writers. Aldridge, reviewing Voitle's biography, concludes that Shaftesbury's historical importance "lies in his success in carrying on the classical tradition of moral values in life, in fostering the separation of religion and superstition, and in insisting upon the union of morality and esthetics". As to the first and last of these, it can be argued that from about 1725, the date of Hutcheson's Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, it is Hutcheson's version of Shaftesbury's moral sense theory and Hutcheson's esthetics which are influential.
According to Peter Kivy, although Shaftesbury "is generally credited with have established the notions of the moral sense and sense of beauty in Britain", the doctrine "which represented moral and aesthetic judgments as perceptual or emotive rather than rational, was the work, mainly, of Hutcheson".9 It was Hutcheson's "emotive" doctrine which influenced Hume and Adam Smith among others, and it was Hutcheson's doctrine, not Shaftesbury's, which provoked the attacks of "rationalist" critics from that of John Clarke in 1726 to that of Richard Price in 1758.

There remains what Aldridge ambiguously calls Shaftesbury's influence "in fostering the separation of religion and superstition", that is, the impact of Shaftesbury's deism. Hutcheson, who publicly deplored Shaftesbury's anti-Christian "prejudices"10, is not a factor in the controversy over Shaftesbury's religion. This controversy came to a head with the publication in 1751 of the first book-length critique of Shaftesbury, John Brown's Essays on the Characteristics. For Brown as for his mentor William Warburton it is Shaftesbury's deism which is important. Warburton regarded Shaftesbury as a writer in whom the freethinking party "most glories", and Brown attacks Shaftesbury as "a very celebrated Writer, who took it into his Head to oppose the solid Wisdom of the Gospel, by the Visions of false Philosophy".11

Brown's book was extensively reviewed. Lack of space prevented Aldridge from listing these reviews, but two seem especially worthy of note. Appearing in the Gentleman's Magazine and the Monthly Review, the leading periodicals of the day, these two reviews were probably more widely read than others. Both are lengthy, that in GM extending over the May, June, July, and August (1751) issues, and both are favorable to Brown. An editorial note at the conclusion of the GM review hopes no apology is necessary for the length of the "foregoing extracts" from Brown's book because these serve to show Brown's "clear and comprehensive manner of reasoning; and with what superiority he treats a noble and admired author, whom most other defenders of the christian religion seemed cautious of attacking". As Donald D. Eddy has said, "Brown's book added fresh fuel to the fires of controversy, and the defenders of Shaftesbury did not remain silent for long". Eddy lists four separately printed attacks on Brown's book, all published between 1751 and 1753.12 Responding to the main thrust of Brown's attack, these writers defend Shaftesbury as a good Christian. In addition, we have John Leland's very extensive criticism of Shaftesbury as a "deistical" writer in 1754, and again in 1756. Shaftesbury's admirers had objected to his classification as a deist but Leland, replying to these objections in 1756, insists that he was right the first time--Shaftesbury was a deist.13

But as the controversy over Shaftesbury's religion reached its peak, a new entrant appeared on the scene. In 1748 David Hume published his Philosophical Essays, a work which included the inflammatory essay "Of Miracles". Refutations of Hume, largely focussed on the miracles essay, "began to pile up during the 1750's". Hume's biographer cites two in 1751, four in 1752, five in 1753, three in 1754, and two in 1755.14 Moreover, 1754 saw the publication of Bolingbroke's posthumous works. Leland devotes many pages to Bolingbroke, and Warburton wrote a book-length refutation, regarding this as among the best things he had written.15 I consider 1759 as marking the true end of the deist controversy. By this date the opinions of deists from Toland to Boling-
broke had been thoroughly discussed in print. It would appear that all interested parties had had their say, pro or con. The subject, one may believe, had been exhausted until revived at the end of the century by Thomas Paine’s *Age of Reason*. This accounts in part for fewer references to Shaftesbury after 1759 since at a conservative estimate over half of all references to Shaftesbury during the 1750’s form part of the debate over deism.16

Exhaustion of the subject affects the debate over Hume as well, although the most thorough refutation of Hume’s miracles essay, George Campbell’s *Dissertation on Miracles*, did not appear until 1762. But as Hume’s history of England began to appear during the mid 1750’s, attacks on Hume’s irreligion are paralleled and perhaps outweighed by attacks on his politics. As a critic of religion, however, Hume is in a class by himself. Hume inaugurates a second phase in the British “enlightenment” debate over religion.17 John Leisand, ignoring Hume in his first edition, soon corrected this “considerable omission”, finding not a few things in Hume “which strike at the foundation of natural, as well as the proofs and evidences of revealed religion”.18 Casting doubt upon the First Cause argument as well as arguments in favor of God’s moral attributes, Hume attacked the conception of Deity common to deists as well as Christians. Hume seemed to be saying that if a God exists human beings can never know anything about him. Religion, deistic or orthodox, is therefore useless as a guide to conduct. Arguments that might appear convincing against Shaftesbury’s deism were of little use against Hume’s critique of religion. A new strategy had to be devised.

This new strategy appears in Thomas Reid’s *Inquiry into the Human Mind* (1764), and in his later publications, his *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man* (1785) and his *Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind* (1788). Reid and James Beattie, the best known writers of the Scots “common-sense” school, hardly mention Shaftesbury. Their books are directed against Hume, and so far as religion is concerned, may be read as attempts through use of the principle of “common sense”—a term now invested with the highest philosophical importance—to preserve a place for Christianity against a scepticism which, according to Reid, “leaves nothing in nature but ideas and impressions, without any subject on which they may be impressed”. The “tremendous vogue” of Beattie’s *Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth* (1770) marks the change that had occurred. Shaftesbury is mentioned just once, neutrally, in a footnote.19 The virulence of Beattie’s attack on Hume and the popularity of his book are measures of the fears Hume inspired among the orthodox. For Reid and Beattie, as presumably for their readers, Shaftesbury is no longer an important enemy of Christian faith. That position now belongs to Hume.

Finally, although this is a long term development, the Scots “common sense” philosophers inaugurated an “ordering” of British philosophy which excludes Shaftesbury. If for a period during the 1740’s and 1750’s Shaftesbury was regarded as a philosopher of the very first rank (“our British PLATO”),20 he failed to retain this position. Examining Hume’s debt to earlier thinkers, Reid found the seeds of “modern” philosophical scepticism in the Cartesian *Cogito*. These seeds descended to Locke and Berkeley, coming to full flower in Hume. And so the Locke-Berkeley-Hume succession appears in Reid, and later in Beattie, as a major philosophical “school”. Combating this school, Reid and Beattie failed to dethrone these philosophers from the dangerous eminence they themselves
had accorded them. Eventually, for reasons too complex for discussion here, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume became the "big three" of eighteenth-century philosophy, the "British empiricists" of the philosophy textbooks.

But although Locke may have "ushered in a new world of rational empiricism" as Clive Probyn has said, the demise of the classical tradition in philosophy was not a sudden affair. Although Cooper and Akenside speak respectfully of Locke, Locke was irrelevant to their classically oriented philosophic interests. For them as for others Shaftesbury was a more important philosopher than Locke.

ENDNOTES

1 For this underestimation and a counter argument, see Chester Chapin, "Shaftesbury and the Classical View of Human Nature" Cithara 22 (May 1983), 32-47.

2 "Shaftesbury and the Ethical Poets in England, 1700-1760" PMLA 31 (1916), 277. My totals are of titles only, but individual entries under a particular newspaper or periodical title are added together to form part of the total. Thus Aldridge's 1757 London Chronicle entry (380) adds 5 items to the total. My listing of Law's 1731 translation of King adds 2 items since this book contains the work of two authors. All works of Shaftesburian relevance mentioned in my text or notes but not included in my list, are listed by Aldridge.

3 Chapin, "Shaftesbury and the Classical View"; Warburton, The Divine Legation of Moses, 2d ed. (London: 1738), xxvi (Dedication "To the Free-Thinkers").


5 Chapin, 36, 40.


7 "Theodicy at Mid-century: Young, Akenside, and Hume" ECS 12 (1978), 98, n. 10.

8 ECS 19 (Winter 1985-86), 259.


11 Divine Legation (London: 1738), xiv; Brown's dedication to Ralph Allen.


16 By "all references" I mean the total of British references to Shaftesbury as listed by Aldridge and myself. Of this total for the 1780's, some 53% comment directly on Shaftesbury's religion. I exclude reference to Shaftesbury's ethics and theory of ridicule although some critics were undoubtedly motivated by the belief that Shaftesbury's views were anti-Christian. Peter Gay regards "the end of the 1740's" as signaling the close of the debate over deism, but I see no justification for this date if we agree, as I think we must, that Shaftesbury and Bolingbroke are deists. Gay, Deism: An Anthology (Princeton, NJ: D. Van Nostrand, 1968), 9.

17 E. Graham Waring seems to me entirely right when he says that Hume's outlook on religion represents "a radical departure from the Western religious tradition, not a 'half-way house' of the deist type". Deism and Natural Religion: A Source Book (New York: Frederick Ungar, 1967), xvi.

18 View of the Principal Deistical Writers, 3d ed. (London: 1757), 1: v, 259.

19 Reid, Inquiry into the Human Mind. Ed. Timothy Duggan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), (ch. 1, sect. 5), 14; Mossner, Life of David Hume, 579; Beattie, Essay on Truth, 2d ed. (Edinburgh: 1771), 33n. This may be the place to correct the only notable error I have found in Aldridge's list. A third Scots common sense philosopher is the Rev. James Oswald (1703-1793), whose An Appeal to Common Sense in Behalf of Religion appeared in 1766 (vol. 1) and 1772 (vol. 2). Aldridge describes Oswald's book as "devoted to a defense of Hume" (380), and implies that Oswald's references to Shaftesbury are approving or neutral. But as befits a clergyman and a common sense philosopher, Oswald is both anti-Hume and anti-Shaftesbury. Aldridge has perhaps confused James Oswald the philosopher with Hume's friend James Oswald of Dunnikier (1715-1769). This mistake is made by the old and new CBEL (1940, 1971), both of which ascribe the Appeal to Oswald of Dunnikier. For Oswald the philosopher, see Gavin Ardley, The Common Sense Philosophy of James Oswald (Aberdeen, Scotland: Aberdeen University Press, 1980).

20 James Geddes, An Essay on the Composition and Manner of Writing of the Antients, Particularly Plato (Glasgow: 1748), 139.
"Johnson, James Harris, and the Logic of Happiness" MLR 73 (April 1978), 266.

Letters Concerning Taste (1757), 183-85 (Essay 5); Akenside's note to Pleasures of Imagination, bk. 2, line 31.