8. NIETZSCHE'S CONVALESCENCE

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ABSTRACT. Nietzsche wrote that he owed his philosophy to his long sickness, which he called "the teacher of great suspicion". The present paper considers the related ideas of the will to power and the eternal return in the light of Nietzsche's concepts of sickness and health. This reading of Nietzsche's works is guided by the interpretations of Gilles Deleuze and Pierre Klossowski, whose commentaries have been most influential in shaping French neo-Nietzscheanism since 1965; however, those passages literally or metaphorically employing the language of physical and mental illness and health are emphasized. After introducing the key concepts of will, force, affirmation, and self, the paper develops the idea of active and reactive forces, presents the eternal return as a selective doctrine, and considers the meaning of amor fati. It closes with remarks, based upon Nietzsche's views, on the interpretation of philosophical texts and on the relationship between the philosopher's life and works.

Nietzsche was dreadfully ill for most of his adult life—subject to extended bouts of migraine, nausea, and insomnia that made him "long for death". In 1880, he wrote that his existence was "a frightful burden":

I would have rejected it long ago, if I hadn't done the most instructive experiments in the intellectual and moral domain, precisely during this state of suffering and of almost total renunciation—that joyful mood, avid to know, elevates me to heights where I triumph over every torture and all despair. On the whole, I am happier than I've ever been in my life: and all the same! A constant pain, a sensation very close to seasickness, a semi-paralysis which makes speech difficult for me, alternating with furious attacks (the last one made me vomit for three days and three nights, I longed for death!) Not to be able to read! Writing only rarely! Not to be able to listen to music! Staying alone and going for walks . . . My consolation is my thoughts and my perspectives . . .

Given this "client's report", we may ask (with Gilles Deleuze and Pierre Klossowski) in what sense illness, even insanity, was present in Nietzsche's works.

Nietzsche himself averred that he was indebted to his poor health, which had excused him from teaching and freed him from philology, a
vocation chosen too young "in defiance of one's instincts," an accident and makeshift of [his] life" in which he seemed to himself "irrevocably incarcerated":

Sickness detached me slowly [from philology] ... gave me the right to change all my habits ... commanded me to forget ... bestowed on me the necessity of lying still, of leisure, of writing and being patient.--But that means, of not thinking ... I was delivered from the 'book'; for years I did not read a thing--the greatest benefit I ever conferred upon myself ... Never have I felt happier with myself than in the sickest and most painful periods of my life ...

That his illness made it possible for Nietzsche to abandon philology and to quit teaching--in the end, to repudiate scholarship itself, to "bang the door of the house of scholars behind him"--and to secure a pension from the University of Basel, is of some practical importance in view of his impact upon European intellectual history in this century. But, however desperate he may have been, and however ill-suited, in fact, to the life of a professor, this is not the only sense (nor by any means the most important) in which Nietzsche considered himself indebted to his sickness. In 1888, the year before his collapse, he wrote:

I have often asked myself whether I am not more heavily obligated to the hardest years of my life than to any others ... Amor fati: that is my inmost nature. And as for my long sickness, do I not owe it indescribably more than I owe to my health? I owe it a higher health--one which is made stronger by whatever does not kill it. I also owe my philosophy to it. Only great pain is the ultimate liberator of the spirit, as the teacher of great suspicion ...

Nietzsche didn't "owe his philosophy to his illness" in the received sense, the Boethian sense; it wasn't "his deprivations that philosophized", and he didn't "need his philosophy as a prop; a sedative, medicine ... " His thought was, in fact, a sustained and virulent attack on consoling "truths" of that sort; and his physical suffering, his great pain, was--to believe his own account--precisely that "teacher of great suspicion" which led him to identify and reject moral and metaphysical weakness as well. For instance, he attributed his insight into ressentiment, that hatred of the mediocre for the exceptional, that obsessive, exculpatory remembering and reliving of imagined grievances which so characterizes the age of the masses, our age--he attributed this insight to his own prolonged experience of physical pain:

Freedom from ressentiment, enlightened about ressentiment--who knows how much I am ultimately indebted, in this respect also, to my protracted sickness! ... If anything at all must be adduced against being sick and being weak, it is that man's really remedial instinct, his fighting instinct, wears out ... one cannot get over anything ... everything hurts. Men and things obtrude too closely; experiences strike one too deeply; memory becomes a festering wound. Sickness itself is a kind of ressentiment ...

In general, his sickness offered Nietzsche a point of view on health, a perspective from which to evaluate health; and his health--for
he was "healthy at bottom" and strong enough to bear his weakness—offered him a point of view on sickness, even equipped him, uniquely, for the "revaluation of all values". Again, by his own reckoning:

In the midst of the torments that go with an uninterrupted three-day migraine, accompanied by laborious vomiting of phlegm, I possessed a dialectician's clarity par excellence and thought through with very cold blood matters for which under healthier circumstances I am not mountain-climber, not subtle, not cold enough . . . . Looking from the perspective of the sick toward healthier concepts and values and, conversely, looking again from the fullness and self-assurance of a rich life down into the secret work of the instinct of decadence—in this I have had the longest training, my truest experience; if in anything, I became master in this. Now I know how . . . to reverse perspectives: the first reason why a 'revaluation of values' is perhaps possible for me alone.10

This "mobility", as Deleuze calls it, this "secret intersubjectivity within the same individual," this mastery, this authority, this psychological ability to change perspectives, to go back and forth at will between the viewpoints and valuations of sickness and health, constitutes a "higher health" which would become for Nietzsche the criterion of philosophical acuity and personal worth,12 arguably a model for the "great health", the "excessive health" of the overman. "I owe [to my long sickness]", we read earlier, "a higher health—one which is made stronger by whatever does not kill it". For Nietzsche was healthy at base, and, as he repeatedly asserts, what does not destroy the one who is healthy at bottom, the one who has turned out well, strengthens him.13 "That of which more delicate men would perish belongs to the stimulants of great health".14 We will not recall, suggests Deleuze, that everything ended badly: "For Nietzsche gone mad is precisely Nietzsche having lost that mobility, that art of displacement, no longer being able by his health to make of illness a point of view on health".15

After this long introduction, my program in this paper is to understand the related ideas of the will to power and the eternal return in the light of Nietzsche's concepts of sickness and health. My reading of Nietzsche will be guided, in spirit if not in detail, by Deleuze and Klossowski, whose interpretations have been most influential in shaping French neo-Nietzscheanism since 1965; however, the commentary advanced here will stress, in text and footnote, those passages literally or metaphorically employing the language of physical and mental illness and health—such terms as strength and weakness, vitality and decline, symptom, sickness, suffering, and insanity. In the next section, I will briefly introduce the key concepts of will, force, affirmation, and self. The third section will develop the ideas of the will to power and reactive forces, and the fourth section will consider the doctrine of the eternal return and the notion of amor fati. I will close, then, with some remarks on the interpretation of philosophical texts, and on the relationship between the philosopher's (or the artist's) life and works.
Nietzsche's critical method was "genealogical", in the sense that he sought to account for values in terms of their psychological origins. His philosophical style, however, was introspective, experiential, and personal: "... we others", he wrote, "who thirst after reason, are determined to scrutinize our experiences as severely as a scientific experiment—hour after hour, day after day". Nowhere is this approach more evident than in his concepts of willing and the will.

So familiar and automatic that "it all but escapes the observing eye", willing is, he remarked, generally supposed to be something simple and easily understood, not a problem at all but "a magically effective force". Even Schopenhauer "had faith"—this is, for Nietzsche, a religious question, a mythology—"in the simplicity and immediacy of all willing ...".

Nietzsche's attentiveness to his own hard experience of the Will, however, taught him otherwise: "Willing seems to me to be above all something complicated, something that is a unit only as a word. ..." In his view, willing was always a matter of commanding and obeying on the part of conflicting instincts, affects, or forces, whether within a society or within a single person, who is "at the same time the commanding and the obeying parties."

The notion of force is key to Nietzsche's understanding of will (and of the will to power). Just as will can work only on will, and not, magically, on matter,—not on nerve, for instance,—so one force can act only on another force. Forces, then, are essentially in relation to one another, and although it will lead to qualitative assessments this relationship is at base quantitative: "Wherever there is force, number will become mistress ..." And, just as wills are commanding or obeying, so forces are active or reactive.

Nietzsche introduces the notions of activity and reactivity in a passage on the origin of punishment in society. This passage incidentally reveals his contempt for mass values and illustrates the preferred genealogical method in contrast to utilitarian accounts of the origins of values and institutions:

The democratic idiosyncracy which opposes everything that dominates and wants to dominate, the modern misarchism (to coin an ugly word for an ugly thing) ... seems to me to have already taken charge of all physiology and theory of life—to the detriment of life ... since it has robbed it of a fundamental concept, that of activity ... [One] places instead 'adaptation' in the foreground, that is to say, an activity of the second rank, a mere reactivity: indeed, life itself is defined as a more and more efficient inner adaptation to external conditions (Herbert Spencer). Thus the essence of life, its will to power, is ignored: one overlooks the essential priority of the spontaneous, aggressive, expansive, form-giving forces that give new interpretations and directions ...; the dominant role of the highest functionaries within the organism itself in which the will to life appears active and form-giving is denied ..."
Thus, as a first approximation, active or "commanding" forces are dominant and "form-giving"; reactive or "obeying" forces, although forces in their own right, are inferior and adaptive. The struggle between them is central to Nietzsche's moral philosophy.24

Closely associated with the key concept of active and reactive forces, to which we shall return in the next section, are the ideas of ascending and descending life, on the one hand, and of affirmation and negation, on the other.

"I distinguish", Nietzsche wrote, "between a type of ascending life and another type of decay, disintegration, weakness. Is it credible that the question of the relative rank of these two types still needs to be posed?"25 Elsewhere, he asserted that life itself "is to my mind the instinct for growth, for durability, for an accumulation of forces, for power: where the will to power is lacking there is decline".26 And in Thus Spoke Zarathustra (fundamental theme): "Life wants to climb and to overcome itself climbing".27

But every age has its characteristic virtues, and the modern age is a period of sickness and decline, a time when the will to power is, if not entirely lacking, then at least disguised and perverted. "This modernity was our sickness: lazy peace, cowardly compromise, the whole virtuous uncleanness of the modern Yes and No".28 In Wagner he found the fullest expression of this modernity, this decline: Wagner, he wrote, was a "neurosis", a "disease", whom he "resisted like a sickness—not with reasons—one does not refute a sickness—but with inhibition, mistrust, vexation, and disgust . . .".29 And, in the epilogue to The Case of Wagner, he offered his conception of what is modern:

In its measure of strength every age also possesses a measure for what virtues are permitted and forbidden to it. Either it has the virtues of ascending life: then it will resist from the profoundest depths the virtues of declining life. Or the age itself represents declining life; then it also requires the virtues of decline, then it hates everything that justifies itself solely out of abundance, out of the overflowing riches of strength".30

It is in this context—in this complex of ideas: the concept of active and reactive forces, the centrality of the will to power, the "virtues" of ascending and declining life, the metaphors of sickness and health, and the "virtuous uncleanness of the modern Yes and No"—that Nietzsche's notion of affirmation and negation may first be understood. In The Will to Power he wrote that it was his "good fortune" to have "rediscovered the way that leads to a Yes and a No":

I teach the No to all that makes weak—that exhausts.

I teach the Yea to all that strengthens, that stores up strength, that justifies the feeling of strength.31

Nietzsche's "no" is not the dialectician's abstract negation,32 but an ethic. And it is, most emphatically, not the moralist's denial of the body, of the world, of life itself, the moral, metaphysical, and social pessimisms of the modern age, "phenomena of decay and sickness". Rather, it is "saying No and doing No out of a tremendous strength and tension
derived from saying Yes--peculiar to all rich and powerful men and ages".\textsuperscript{32} And Nietzsche's "yes" is not merely assent to a proposition, nor the braying of an ass who can only say "Yea-Yuh",\textsuperscript{33} but the affirmation of life itself, affirmation despite suffering, affirmation while suffering, Dionysian affirmation, "the ultimate, most joyous, most wantonly extravagant Yes to life":

Nothing in existence may be subtracted, nothing is dispensable--those aspects of existence which Christians and other nihilists repudiate are actually on an infinitely higher level in the order of rank among values than that which the instinct of decadence could approve and call good. To comprehend this requires courage and, as a condition of that, an excess of strength . . .\textsuperscript{35}

Merely to understand this requires courage, and an excess of strength. The philosopher faces hard, ugly truths, and suffers incomprehensibly.\textsuperscript{36} Nietzsche celebrated courage in the face of such suffering--"become hard!"\textsuperscript{37}; more than that, he found in the capacity to suffer, and to suffer joyfully, to suffer with pleasure, a source and condition of philosophical depth\textsuperscript{38} and a mark of nobility and personal heroism;\textsuperscript{39} indeed, still more, he maintained that the superior person suffers precisely from an excess of vitality. There are, Nietzsche said, two kinds of sufferers: "first, those who suffer from the overfullness of life . . . and then those who suffer from the impoverishment of life . . ."\textsuperscript{40} And there is, he suggests, not only the pessimism born of weakness, but also a pessimism of strength, an "intellectual predilection for the hard, gruesome, evil, problematic aspect of existence, prompted by well-being, by overflowing health, but the fullness of existence . . ."\textsuperscript{41}

On the basis of his correspondence as well as his published works, Klossowski argues that Nietzsche's health, generally, was so poor, and his migraines in particular so severe, that he saw himself in conflict with his body and came to associate, indeed, to identify philosophical thinking with suffering, and to wonder what thinking without suffering would be. "Then, to think suffering, to reflect upon suffering turned around--qua impossibility of thinking--is felt as the highest pleasure". But what is it to be in conflict with one's body, who is the self, the ego, apart from the body? "Who then suffers or enjoys? The brain?"\textsuperscript{42}

Zarathustra admonishes "the despisers of the body" that "the awakened and knowing say: body am I entirely, and nothing else; and soul is only a word for something about the body . . ."\textsuperscript{43} There is no soul, no self, no ego, "no 'being' behind doing, effecting, becoming; 'the doer' is merely a fiction added to the deed--the deed is everything".\textsuperscript{44} There is, in fact, and pace Descartes, no thinker, and no thought: "There exists neither 'spirit', no reason, nor thinking, nor consciousness, nor soul, nor will, nor truth: all are fictions that are of no use . . ."\textsuperscript{45}

But again, if the "inner world" is, in Nietzsche's view, full of phantoms, if substance and self, like will, are fictions--Christian fictions, grammatical fictions\textsuperscript{46}--then what is thinking? And who, or what, thinks?

Thought, the process of thinking, is, Nietzsche argued, largely unconscious; it is merely due to "the seduction of words" and "the superstitions of logicians" that we believe otherwise:
With regard to the superstitions of logicians, I shall never tire of emphasizing a small terse fact, which these superstitious minds hate to concede—namely, that a thought comes when "it" wishes, and not when "I" wish, so that it is a falsification of the facts of the case to say that the subject "I" is the condition of the predicate "think". It thinks; but that this "it" is precisely the famous old "ego" is, to put it mildly, only a supposition, an assertion, and assuredly not an "immediate certainty". After all, one has even gone too far with this "it thinks"—even the "it" contains an interpretation of the process, and does not belong to the process itself. One infers here according to the grammatical habit: "Thinking is an activity; every activity requires an agent; consequently—"\[47\]

A thought comes, then, "when 'it' wishes, and not when 'I' wish"; consciousness, arising from social intercourse,\[46\] is more modest than it pretends: "For the longest time conscious thought was considered thought itself. Only now does the truth dawn on us that by far the greatest part of our spirit's activity remains unconscious and unfelt. . . . Thinking, reasoning, even knowing are, at base, instinctive activities: "... we suppose that intelligere must be something conciliatory, just, and good—something that stands essentially opposed to the instincts, while it is actually nothing but a certain behavior of the instincts toward one another".\[48\] But we have seen that what is "instinctive" is that which enhances life and promotes growth; life itself is, we read, "the instinct for growth, for durability, for an accumulation of forces, for power . . ."\[50\] Truth, moreover, is to be invented or created, not discovered, and the "will to truth", the philosopher's pursuit of truth, is, psychologically, "not a moral force but a form of the will to power".\[51\]

If thinking is largely unconscious, what of the thinker? "Body am I entirely", said Zarathustra. But how then account for the sense of self? There is, we've seen, no reason to posit the existence of a substantive ego, and there is no need to assume the existence of one single subject; rather, "ego" is "a conceptual synthesis"\[42\] and, in Nietzsche's hypothesis, the subject is "a multiplicity".\[52\] The sense of self, the sense of personal identity, emerges over time from the history of actions, such that "self" is "sense" or signification. The self is not defined by any single, dramatic action: "After all, very few actions are typical actions and real epitomes of a personality; and considering how little personality most men have, a man is seldom characterized by a single action . . . A rage, a reach, a knife thrust: what of personality is in that?"\[54\] Rather, the self is constituted by "the history of every day"\[52\] and by the accidents of a lifetime, while the individual's "organizing idea" takes form:

To become what one is, one must not have the faintest notion what one is. From this point of view even the blunders of life have their own meaning and value—the occasional side roads and wrong roads, the delays, "modesties", seriousness wasted on tasks that are remote from the task . . . Meanwhile the organizing "idea" that is destined to rule keeps growing deep down—it begins to command; slowly it leads us back from side roads and wrong roads; it prepares single qualities and fitmesses that will one day prove to be
indispensable as means toward a whole—-one by one, it trains all subservient capacities before giving any hint of the dominant task, "goal", "aim", or "meaning".56

Thus, Nietzsche offers a concept of personal destiny, a fatalistic view of the irreversibility of events and the emergence of meaning from actions ("whence", Klossowski remarks, "the eternity of meaning once and for all").57 Not that any particular individual will necessarily understand his instinct aright, discover his own organizing idea, find his way. Only those whose lives are ordered and whose "inner systems" are coordinated by a "dominating passion" in the service of one end will develop in this way. But, Nietzsche adds, "this is almost the definition of health!"58

Thinking is, we said, for the most part an unconscious process, an instinctive activity in the service of life, growth, power. Nietzsche's conception of thought partially explains his contempt for the Socratic dialectic, which he called "rationality against instinct", a "dangerous force that undermines life".59

Socrates was a misunderstanding; the whole improvement-morality, including the Christian, was a misunderstanding. The most blinding daylight: rationality at any price; life, bright, cold, cautious, conscious, without instinct, in opposition to the instincts—all this too was a mere disease, another disease, and by no means a return to "virtue", to "health", to happiness. To have to fight the instincts—that is the formula of decadence: as long as life is ascending, happiness equals instinct.60

In fact, from Socrates forward, the history of philosophy itself is "a secret raging against the preconditions of life, against the value feelings of life, against partisanship in favor of life".61 Nietzsche's mission was not an easy one: philosopher in opposition to the philosophical tradition, philosopher against the rationality that undermines life, philosopher as explosive.62 Klossowski suggests that the many references to suicide in Nietzsche's works give veiled expression to his rage and hatred for his own rational, philosophical "self".63 Thinking is suffering, suffering, the impossibility of thinking; rationality is a dangerous force that stands opposed to life itself—how think this through, logically, how explain it? Only at the risk of his health, his sanity, his life.

And for all that Nietzsche envisioned the ideal of the "great health", Zarathustra's "physiological presupposition":

Being new, nameless, self-evident, we premature births of an as yet unproven future, we need for a new goal a new means—namely, a new health, stronger, more seasoned, tougher, more audacious, and gayer than any previous health. Whoever has a soul that craves to have experienced the whole range of values ... needs one thing above everything else: the great health—that one does not merely have but also acquires continually ...64

The "man of the future", the overman who "must come one day", the "Antichrist and antinihilist" whose advent Nietzsche proclaims, will
be the man of great health, strong enough to oppose the good, strong enough to affirm life, strong enough to revaluate all values. However, the sense of this "must" (the overman must come one day, a new and healthier class must arise) is ambiguous, and its hardness uncertain. It is not clear whether Nietzsche means to imply an historical inevitability or merely to express a fervent hope, for he also envisioned another, less optimistic future.

THE TRIUMPH OF REACTION

Nietzsche progressively extended the concept of willing, and the ascription of the will to power, from intellectual beings to living beings to nature. "The world viewed from inside", he wrote, "the world defined and determined according to its 'intelligible character'--it would be 'will to power' and nothing else". The will to power is not the will, and not perforce the human will, desiring power; the "will", we've seen, is a phantom, a grammatical fiction. Rather, power wills, always, everywhere, essentially: "In all events a will to power is operating". Thus, Nietzsche writes:

"The victorious concept 'force', by means of which our physicists have created God and the world, still needs to be completed: an inner will must be ascribed to it, which I designate as 'will to power', i.e., as an insatiable desire to manifest power; or as the employment and exercise of power, as a creative drive, etc. . . ."

Commenting on this text, Deleuze remarks that the will to power is at once a complement to force (the concept of force must be completed) and something internal (an inner will must be ascribed to it). Thus, the will to power is not attributed to force as a predicate, and we cannot say that force is what wills. Power wills; only the will to power is what wills. (Nietzsche: "But who feels pleasure:--But who wants power?--Absurd question, if the essence itself is power-will . . .") Force, we have observed, is difference--forces, active and reactive, are essentially in relation to one another, therefore essentially different--and the will to power is the "differential and genetic element", the "synthetic principle", which generates forces in their mutual relationships. Thus, Deleuze writes, "The will to power is the element from which flow at the same time the difference in quantity of forces placed in rapport [with one another] and the quality which, in this rapport, returns to each force". The will to power decides the relative value of the competing forces to which it gives rise. And if force is a basic scientific reality, the will to power is more fundamental still, not merely a philosophical notion or a psychological insight but an active cosmological principle: again, in Nietzsche's words, "not a being, not a becoming, but a pathos--the most elemental fact from which a becoming and effecting first emerge--".

We have seen that the philosopher's will to truth is one form taken by the fundamental, and therefore ubiquitous, will to power. In Nietzsche's perspectivism, there are no facts, only interpretations, and it is the will to power which interprets. It is also, we've remarked, the will to power which evaluates, which assesses the relative quality of forces-in-relation:
That the value of the world lies in our interpretation...; that previous interpretations have been perspective valua-
tions by virtue of which we can survive in life, i.e., in the
will to power, for the growth of power; that every elevation
of man brings with it the overcoming of narrower interpre-
tations; that every strengthening and increase of power
opens up new perspectives and means believing in new hor-
izons—this idea permeates my writing.76

Indeed, the will to power not only interprets and evaluates the
world, but invents it—"We can comprehend only a world that we our-
selves have made"77—and creates value in the first place. "There is",
writes Nietzsche, "nothing to life that has value, except the degree of
power—assuming that life itself is the will to power".78 The will to
power is, then, the source of all value.

Given that "moral evaluation is an exegesis, a way of interpret-
ing",79 Nietzsche maintains that what is needed is a typology and a criti-
tique of values, critique which he most systematically advanced in On
the Genealogy of Morals:

Let us articulate this new demand: we need a critique of
moral values, the value of these values themselves must
first be called in question—and for that there is needed a
knowledge of the conditions and circumstances in which
they grew, under which they evolved and changed (morality
as consequence, as symptom, as mask, as tartufferie, as ill-
ness, as misunderstanding; but also morality as cause, as
remedy, as stimulant, as restraint, as poison), a knowledge
of a kind that has never yet existed or even been de-
sired.80

In particular, as he would remark in The Will to Power, two types of
morality "must not be confused: the morality with which the healthy in-
stinct defends itself against incipient decadence—and another morality
with which this very decadence defines and justifies itself and leads
downwards".81

A disguised form of the will to power, decadent morality repre-
sents the triumph of reactive forces. Nietzsche distinguishes three man-
ifestations of unhealthy morality, morality against life, life against life.
They are, in turn, ressentiment, bad conscience, and the ascetic ideal.
Underlying his treatment of these historical developments, however, are
two convictions: that sickness has formed value judgments, such that
the prevailing morality is a disease82 and that the strong have to be
defended against the weak, whose numbers are overwhelming.83

Ressentiment is the hatred borne by the mediocre for the excep-
tional, the gregarious for the solitary, the base for the noble, the weak
for the strong. It is the bitterly cherished and nurtured "memory" of
imagined slights and injuries, and the petty need to cheapen and deni-
grate those achievements, those qualities, of which most people are and
secretly known themselves to be incapable. Masquerading as a thirst for
justice, freedom, and equality, it is at base the desire for revenge
against those who go their own way.84 Nietzsche finds the physiological
basis for ressentiment in the experience of suffering:
For every sufferer instinctively seeks a cause for his suffering; more exactly, an agent; still more specifically, a guilty agent who is susceptible to suffering—in short, some living thing upon which he can, on some pretext or other, vent his affects, actually or in effigy; for the venting of his affects represents the greatest attempt on the part of the suffering to win relief, anaesthesia... This alone, I surmise, constitutes the actual physiological cause of ressentiment, vengefulness, and the like: a desire to deaden pain by means of affects... "Someone or other must be to blame for my feeling ill"—this kind of reasoning is common to all the sick... 

Ressentiment leads to the herd instinct and, becoming creative, to slave morality. In this development, it stands opposed to noble valuations, and this, not just theoretically but historically, not just logically but politically. "Where someone rules", Nietzsche writes, "there are masses; and where we find masses we also find a need to be enslaved. Where men are enslaved, there are few individuals, and these are opposed by herd instincts and conscience". But the great masses of slaves desire power, the herd wants to be master. And so, again, the strong must be defended against the weak, the fortunate against the unfortunate, the healthy against the degenerate. "For Nietzsche", writes Klossowski, "the moral question as to what is true or false, just or iniquitous, is now posed in these terms: What is sick or healthy? What is gregarious or singular?"

Bad conscience is the sickness which arose with the development of society and the achievement of peace within the walls of the state. It is the interiorisation or "internalization" (Verinnerlichung) of violent affects denied healthier expression, ressentiment and aggressivity turned inward, the malice of the reactive person made "spiritual" and turned back against oneself. "But thus began the gravest and uncanniest illness, from which humanity has not yet recovered, man's suffering of man, of himself—the result of a forcible sundering from his animal past... " With the teaching that Christ died for our sins, that God sacrificed himself for the guilt of humanity,—doctrine which Nietzsche calls "that stroke of genius on the part of Christianity",—bad conscience becomes "an unexampled madness of the will". "Here is sickness", writes Nietzsche, "beyond any doubt, the most terrible sickness that ever raged in man..."

Finally, the ascetic ideal—the concepts of God, of the immortal soul, and of another, better world where all our tears will be dried—is a pia fraus, a holy lie, whose origin is the will to power and whose proximate cause is ressentiment. Another, more refined expression of slave morality, the ascetic ideal is, on one level, a denial of life, denial of the world—at least, a denial of this life, this world—and a "no" to health and strength, a "no" to ascending life. However, the ascetic ideal does not (nor could it) simply represent morality against life, "life against life": 

... such a self-contradiction as the ascetic appears to represent, "life against life", is... a simple absurdity. It can only be apparent; it must be a kind of provisional formulation... Let us replace it with a brief formulation of the facts of the matter: the ascetic ideal springs from the pro-
This sheds more light on the nature of reactive forces: they are not merely secondary or derivative forces; rather, reaction is an "original quality", and reactive forces are positive forces in their own right, contending for survival and dominion. On the "antagonism between the 'true world'", that is, the ideal world, and "a world possible for life", Nietzsche writes:

It is necessary to measure the meaning of all these 'ideal drives' against life to grasp what this antagonism really is: the struggle of sickly, despairing life that clings to beyond, with healthier, more stupid and mendacious, richer, less degenerate life. Therefore it is not 'truth' in struggle with life but one kind of life in struggle with another...

One kind of life in struggle with another: herd morality against "aristocratic" values and slaves against master; sickness against health and weakness against strength; declining life, degenerate life, against ascending life, and negation against affirmation. "While every noble morality develops from a triumphant affirmation of itself", Nietzsche writes, "slave morality from the outset says No to what is 'outside', what is 'different', what is 'not itself'; and this No is its creative deed".

It is here, remarks Deleuze, that Nietzsche's opposition of master and slave morality is most thoroughly antithetical to Hegel's dialectic of mastery and servitude—here, in this noble "yes" and base "no". For Hegel, those who are to become master and slave are driven, not by the will to power, but by the desire for recognition. In Nietzsche's opinion, this conception is based upon a misunderstanding, not only of the will to power, but of the nature of mastery. It rests, uncritically, upon the slave's view of the master and the slave's image of power: "It is the slave", Deleuze writes, "who conceives of power only as the object of a recognition, matter of a representation, outcome of a competition, and who therefore makes it depend, at the end of a combat, upon a simple attribution of established values". Hegel's master is the master as seen by the slave. Nietzsche's aristocrat, the hero, the overman, is by contrast the one who affirms life and affirms himself, the independent one, the singular one who does not look to the values and opinions of others: the healthy one.

Nonetheless, while announcing the advent of the overman and calling for a new class, a new aristocracy, Nietzsche also foresaw the triumph of reactive forces, the dominion of the herd. ("The two futures of mankind: (1) consistent growth of mediocrity; (2) conscious distinction, self-shaping.") In Klossowski's reading, not only does Nietzsche have no use for recognition and no need for the reciprocity of Hegel's master-slave relationship, but (banging the door of the house of scholars behind him) he goes on to revolt against the servile culture which emerges from that dialectic:

This entire cultural, historical, human world which servile consciousness has started to build under the constraint of the autonomous consciousness—by which the servile consciousness, in turn, becomes autonomous and triumphs in
the consciousness of the Master--this world of culture--it is precisely against this world, against this culture, of which Nietzsche is the product and the beneficiary, that Nietzsche revolts . . . .104

In effect, Nietzsche sees the "consistent growth of mediocrity", the "homogenizing of European man",105 prepared in the schools and advanced in the industrial economy. The democratic schools of this age teach students to endure boredom, "first prerequisite for future efficiency in the fulfillment of mechanical duties (as civil servant, husband, office slave, newspaper reader, and soldier)").106 In retirement, Nietzsche offers this parody "from a doctoral examination":

"What is the task of all higher education?" To turn men into machines. "What are the means?" Man must learn to be bored. "How is that accomplished?" By means of the concept of duty . . . .107

Already, work is distraction, weariness of life, the will to forget oneself.108 But in the global economy which Nietzsche foresaw--and resisted--the "dwarfing" of man will be complete:

Once we possess that common economic management of the earth that will soon be inevitable, mankind will be able to find its best meaning as a machine in the service of this economy . . . . It is clear, what I combat is economic optimism . . . .109

It is clear, too, that, should the herd mentality prevail, what will be lost is the master's capacity for otium, for leisure, and the creative arts, including philosophy, which depend upon it; our humanity will be diminished.

Modest, industrious, benevolent, temperate: is that how you would have men? good men? But to me that seems only the ideal slave, the slave of the future.110

THE EXPERIENCE OF THE ETERNAL RETURN

Nietzsche's ideal of the philosopher was, by his own admission, most difficult. Remarking that learning is not enough, he repudiated the life and the work of the hunch-back scholar, the decadent "parasite of the spirit" who "has to read before he can think", the "herd animal in the realm of knowledge . . . who inquires because he is ordered to and because others have done so before him".111 He also rejected the image of the philosopher as "the further development of the priestly type".112 Rather, for Nietzsche, the philosopher is on the one hand physician and, on the other, creator or legislator of values.

As a man of science, the philosophical physician can recognize the symptoms of unhealthy thinking and valuation, perceive "physiological needs [unconsciously disguised] under the cloaks of the objective, ideal, [and] purely spiritual", identify sickness as such and thus contribute to the solution of the problem of value, the determination of "orders of rank" among existing values.113
Beyond that, the "genuine" philosopher (unlike Kant, Hegel, and other "philosophical laborers") is commander and legislator; his task "demands that he create values", and his "will to truth is--will to power". Philosophers "apply the knife vivisectionally to the chest of the very virtues of their time", but they are people "of tomorrow and the day after tomorrow", looking to the future, seeking new ways, inventing new and healthier virtues, and redefining the concept of greatness.

The philosopher, metaphorically, is physician: this, in the view of one who was literally his own medical doctor. The philosopher is creator of values. And the philosopher is at base the one who goes his own way, the one who thinks for himself, the one who is attentive to his own experience:

A philosopher--is a human being who constantly experiences, sees, hears, suspects, hopes, and dreams extraordinary things; who is struck by his own thoughts as from outside, as from above and below, as by his type of experiences and lightning bolts; who is perhaps himself a storm .... A philosopher--alas, a being that often runs away from itself, often is afraid of itself--but too inquisitive not to 'come to' again--always back to himself.

For Nietzsche, the self, we have seen, is a multiplicity of contradictory forces, instincts, affects; there is no unitary self, no substantive ego. The sense of self emerges from one's own experience, one's own history, one's wandering down faux pistes and one's eventual discovery of the right road, and with it the discovery that all the wrong turns were necessary, too: the talents developed in errancy are needed for the task at hand. Health, which is always relative, is at best the coordination of affects, of inner systems, under the domination of a ruling passion. The self is multiplicity, chaos, like the world before we "invented" or "created" it, before we imposed logical order upon it and made it habitable.

Parable. -- Those thinkers in whom all stars move in cyclic orbits are not the most profound. Whoever looks into himself as into vast space and carries galaxies in himself, also knows how irregular all galaxies are; they lead into the chaos and labyrinth of existence.

The world is chaos, chaosmos, pure chance, pure necessity, without purpose or accident ("Once you know that there are no purposes, you also know that there is no accident . . . "). The world is becoming, flux, motion, and the will to power is its principle. The world is becoming, and--everything recurs eternally.

In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche wrote that his intuition of the eternal return was an inspiration or revelation: "like lightning, a thought flashes up, with necessity, without hesitation regarding its form--I never had any choice". Certainly, the experience influenced or informed his conception, cited above, of the philosopher as one "struck by his own thoughts as from outside". But, inspiration or revelation, the doctrine of the eternal recurrence is absurd, incoherent, inane: there is no self once and for all, no meaning once and for all, no beginning, no
end, and apparently no purpose; only existence, perpetually, only becoming, ever and again.

From the moment that this thought "occurred to him" Nietzsche feared for his sanity. He sought scientific support for his intuition, but concluded that theories of the conservation of energy presupposed a final state of equilibrium, which is "impossible": given the infinity of past time (there is no beginning), such a terminal state would already have been reached (and there is no end). He published his discovery only tentatively, hypothetically, poetically: "What, if some day or night a demon were to steal after you into your loneliest loneliness and say to you . . . ." He invented Zarathustra, and even Zarathustra was reticent.

In the received interpretation, the doctrine means that all things will recur, time and again, eternally; and many of Nietzsche's texts would support this reading. However, Deleuze and Klossowski advance another view. Eternal recurrence is not the return of the same, but the being of becoming, whose principle is the will to power; moreover, eternal recurrence is, first ethically and then metaphysically, a selective doctrine: the reactive forces will not return—the will will become "active", or they will be eliminated.

In Deleuze's reading, these two conceptions of the eternal recurrence—as return of the same, and as selection of the active and affirmative at the expense of the reactive, the negative—constitute, in turn, two disheartening trials for Zarathustra. Klossowski stresses the consequences for a political philosophy of Nietzsche's conviction that the strong must be defended against the weak, coupled with his delusive belief that the eternal recurrence was revealed to him so that a conscious and voluntary "selection" might be undertaken. In Klossowski's interpretation, this experimental program, this conspiracy of initiates, would aim for the creation of a new class of masters. For my part, while following their direction, in what follows I will focus on two themes more closely related to Nietzsche's central metaphors of sickness and health: first, Zarathustra's "convalescence", his nausea at the idea of the eternal return; second, Nietzsche's amor fati and the "meaning" of suffering.

Nietzsche's emotional response to the petty, mean-spirited modern person, the man of ressentiment, was contempt and disgust. "There are days", he wrote,

when I am afflicted with a feeling blacker than the blackest melancholy—contempt of man. And to leave no doubt concerning what I despise, whom I despise: it is the man of today . . . . And here begins my nausea . . . .

Indeed, along with pity, Nietzsche considered nausea over man to be his "greatest danger". Fear of man is desirable: it compels the strong to be strong. "What is to be feared . . . is that man should inspire not profound fear but profound nausea; also not great fear but great pity . . . ."

Accordingly, Zarathustra's reaction to the "first" idea of the eternal recurrence—the idea that everything which exists now has already existed innumerable times in the past, and will return ever and again--
is, likewise, disgust and nausea, for "the man of whom you are weary, the small man" will recur eternally too.

All-too-small, the greatest!--that was my disgust with man. And the eternal recurrence even of the smallest—that was my disgust with all existence. Alas! Nausea! Nausea! Nausea!132

Zarathustra's "disgust with man" arises not from the knowledge that man is evil, but rather from the observation that even "his greatest evil is so very small", so half-hearted, in the nature of reactive forces. And from the doctrine of the eternal recurrence Nietzsche derives an ethical principle:

If this thought gained possession of you, it would change you as you are or perhaps crush you. The question in each and every thing, "Do you desire this once more and innumerable times more?" would lie upon your actions as the greatest weight.133

This is "selection" as ethical principle. Following his own counsel, Nietzsche invents a new categorical imperative, which might be formulated: Act in such a way that you can wish your action to be repeated time and again for all eternity; act heroically, act whole-heartedly, act affirmatively.

But contempt of man, nausea at man, is Zarathustra's "greatest danger" because, with the first idea of the eternal recurrence—the first trial—it leads to "disgust with all existence", to the possibility that he himself will deny rather than affirm life (and thereby fail the second trial: selection as metaphysical principle, where the will to power decides as to the quality or relative value of active and reactive forces, and eliminates the latter forever).135 And along with nausea, there is the danger of pity, the Christian virtue which protects the weak and deprives the strong of their strength. "Quite in general", Nietzsche writes, "pity crosses the law of development, which is the law of selection. It preserves what is ripe for destruction . . ." He continues:

In our whole unhealthy modernity there is nothing more unhealthy than Christian pity. To be physicians here, to be inexorable here, to wield the scalpel here—that is our part, that is our love of man, that is how we are philosophers, we Hyperboreans.136

Finally, let us consider another aspect of the will to power (affirmation of existence), another aspect of the doctrine of eternal recurrence (justification of existence)—Nietzsche's "formula for greatness in a human being", *amor fati*, the love of fate: "that one wants nothing to be different, not forward, not backward, not in all eternity. Not merely bear what is necessary . . . but love it".137 This love of the necessary, this "yes" to life, means not only an heroic willingness to bear present suffering (in full knowledge that it will recur eternally), but also acceptance of the past—one's personal past, personal history, with all its pain, loneliness, and disappointments, and the past of all the world as well. "Zarathustra once defines, quite strictly, his task—it is mine, too—and there is no mistaking his meaning: he says Yes to the point of justifying, or redeeming even all of the past".138 Indeed, he teaches "will-
ing backwards", creatively willing the past: that is to say, he teaches accepting the past, in some sense accepting responsibility for the past, and affirming that all that has been, all that has happened, is good. And this "Thus I willed it, thus shall I will it" is, he says, "redemption". Nietzsche returns to this theme in *The Will to Power*:

> If we affirm one single moment, we thus affirm not only ourselves but all existence. For nothing is self-sufficient, neither in us ourselves nor in things; and if our soul has trembled with happiness and sounded like a harp string just once, all eternity was needed to produce this one event—and in this single moment of affirmation all eternity was called good, redeemed, justified, and affirmed.

This "all eternity", this "all of the past", must, I think, be taken seriously. In *Gay Science*, Nietzsche imagined—we may suppose that he merely imagined—the grief and the euphoria of experiencing "the history of humanity as a whole as [one's] own history":

> But if one endured, if one could endure this immense sum of grief of all kinds . . . if one could finally contain all this in one soul and crowd it into a single feeling—this would surely have to result in a happiness that humanity has not known so far: the happiness of a god full of power and love . . . .

This, from the philosopher who held that there is no unitary ego, that the self is multiplicity. In a letter dated January 5, 1889 and addressed to Jacob Burckhardt—one of the letters marking his sudden breakdown, his insanity, his loss, let us say, of an integrative ego, his loss of mental health—Nietzsche wrote, "What is disagreeable and offends my modesty is that at bottom I am every name in history . . . ." These were among the last coherent words he wrote. Within days he would be placed in an asylum, within weeks in his mother's care and later in his sister's; for the last eleven years of his life, his silence would be broken only by his rages, when he would howl like an animal. For the rest, he sat in a stupor, glassy-eyed, uncomprehending, uncommunicative.

*Amor fati*, then, means justifying or "redeeming" the past. More fundamentally, however (and, from an ethical point of view, perhaps more practically) it means affirming existence despite suffering: saying "yes" to one's own life in the face of one's own pain, and saying "yes" to all existence despite all grief. "And suffering might predominate, and in spite of that a powerful will might exist, a Yes to life, a need for this predominance." *Amor fati* has to do, in the end, with "the meaning of suffering: whether a Christian meaning or a tragic meaning".

In the former case, it is supposed to be the path to a holy existence; in the latter case, being is counted as *holy enough* to justify even a monstrous amount of suffering. The tragic man affirms even the harshest suffering: he is sufficiently strong, rich, and capable of deifying to do so. The Christian denies even the happiest lot on earth: he is sufficiently weak, poor, disinherited to suffer from life in whatever form he meets it . . . .
The tragic man affirms even the harshest suffering; the tragic artist, the Dionysian, is "precisely the one who says Yes to everything questionable, even to the terrible..." It is in these terms that, in 1888, Nietzsche finally defined philosophy itself as he had understood and lived it:

Such an experimental philosophy as I live anticipates experimentally even the possibilities of the most fundamental nihilism; but this does not mean that it must halt at a negation, a No, will to negation. It wants rather to cross over to the opposite of this—a Dionysian affirmation of the world as it is, without subtraction, exception, or selection—it wants the eternal circulation—the same things, the same logic and illogic of entanglements. The highest state a philosopher can attain: to stand in a Dionysian relationship to existence—my formula for this is amor fati.

PHILOSOPHY AND EXPERIENCE

In a moment of respite: "...what is it to us that Herr Nietzsche [was ill and] has become well again?"

This thematic reading of Nietzsche's major works has stressed those passages in which the metaphors of sickness and health figure most prominently. It is based upon the uncontroversial presupposition that philosophical texts are like works of art—more accurately, like "other" works of art—in that sympathetic observers, interested observers, can discuss them and point out to one another aspects which might otherwise remain unperceived. This "stand over here", this "look at it this way", presupposes, in turn, that the meanings are there to be discovered, that the artist or the philosopher "put them there", consciously or not, voluntarily or not, for our instruction. In the present case, the case of Nietzsche, most acutely introspective of philosophers, this second assumption is entirely justified; reflecting on his experience, he asserted, "I turned my will to health, to life, into a philosophy..." Given a clue like this by the author himself, the artist, it does not take much perspicuity to find supporting texts.

But there is—I would argue, for this may not be as uncontroversial, trivial, or self-evident—there is a point at which the interpretation of a philosopher's work is more like psychoanalysis than art appreciation (although, if so, psychoanalysis of the sort no longer much practiced in this country). It is, in this view, a question of learning the philosopher's style and attending to what he says, of listening for those repetitions and rephrasings, those hesitations, those logical lapses, those omissions, those tones of voice which signal or, more often, betray a commitment, a preoccupation, a conflict, or an unresolved problem. "Gradually", remarked Nietzsche, "it has become clear to me what every great philosophy so far has been: namely, the personal confession of its author and a kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir..."

In the passage just cited, Nietzsche goes on to say that the key interpretive question is to identify the philosopher's "moral (or immoral) intentions", that is, to determine at what morality the philosopher aims, and to establish which drive wants to be master and leads him to philosophize in that spirit. We might however broaden the question to ask...
what problem of being or meaning or value is most important to the philosopher, and how he defines that problem, and how, perhaps, he defines philosophical inquiry itself: what image, what ideal of the philosopher he proposes, or simply takes for granted, and what sort of problem or activity he admits to be "philosophical".

In the case of Nietzsche, we know or think we know some of the answers. Thus, for instance, the central problem is the "order of rank" among relatively "sick" or "healthy" values; the essential intuitions are that being is endlessly becoming, and that the will to power is the source of all value and all change; and the philosopher ("most of whose conscious thought . . . is secretly guided and forced into certain channels by his instincts") is both the physician who diagnoses current values, and the legislator who invents new values. This, at least, provisionally. Further reading, or more thoughtful reading, may lead us to revise these opinions.

The view of philosophical interpretation summarily advanced here is not, however, without inconveniences. Clearly, it is most pertinent to works falling towards the experiential and poetic end, as opposed to the logico-mathematical end, of the philosophical spectrum. Even there, it heroically assumes that insights can be achieved despite the writer's defenses and the reader's deficiencies. Pointing to the former, Nietzsche asked, "does one not write books precisely to conceal what one harbors"? It is doubtful that any philosopher ever expressed his "real and ultimate opinions" in books, doubtful indeed that such opinions are possible: behind every philosopher's cave there is another, deeper cave.

Every philosophy is a foreground philosophy—that is a hermit's judgment: "There is something arbitrary in his stopping here to look back and look around, in his not digging deeper here but laying his spade aside; there is also something suspicious about it." Every philosophy also conceals a philosophy; every opinion is also a hideout, every word also a mask.

The reader, for the rest, is limited and biased. Nietzsche's view, that "nobody can get more out of things, including books, than he already knows" is overstated; the present idea of philosophical reading would assert, precisely, that people can learn from books, that readers can increase the scope of their experience and the depth of their understanding. This much is certainly true, however: reading well comes with experience—of people, events, and things, especially books. That the reader is biased and systematically misunderstands the text is a more serious objection, for we do indeed read books in the light of our own times, personal experience, interests, and concerns. Nonetheless, rightly understanding what the philosopher meant to say, and perceiving more perhaps than he may consciously have "meant" to say, remains an ideal; moreover, all the critical apparatus of scholarship is at hand—and the text itself is at hand—to correct our more egregious misinterpretations.

What, then, of the relationship between the author's life and works? The philosopher, we read earlier, always comes back to himself, to his own experience of his self-in-process. "The great poet dips only from his own reality—up to the point where afterward he cannot endure his work any longer" It would seem, then, that an acquaintance with
the philosopher's life and times is useful, if not indispensable; and indeed there is an important place for historical and biographical studies of the philosopher's works. However, it is well to remember that, if it is successful, the work stands alone and explains itself.

Nietzsche himself was sensitive to the dangers of basing an interpretation upon factors external to the work. As creator of new values, the philosopher "seeks to overcome his time in himself". And we are warned against attempting to explain a genius in terms of his origins, his milieu: "The very same milieux can be interpreted and exploited in opposite ways: there are no facts". An individual responds to the "given" in a certain way because he is a certain individual. In terms by now familiar, Nietzsche offered this observation:

Principle: there is an element of decay in everything that characterizes modern man: but close beside this sickness stand signs of an untested force and powerlessness of the soul. The same reasons that produce the increasing smallness of man drive the stronger and rarer individuals up to greatness.

For these reasons, an historical account cannot adequately explain a work. Elsewhere, Nietzsche repudiates the biographical approach to interpretation, saying that the artist, who is only the "precondition" of his work, must be forgotten if the work is to be enjoyed. Thus the text, which was written by a specific individual in a certain historical situation, and which (perhaps despite his best efforts) conveys its author's personal experience, values, interests, and concerns, is nonetheless autonomous. And the text alone remains, the work alone matters. What is it to us that Nietzsche was ill? Nothing; it's not that he was sick, but what he made of his sickness, that interests us—the point of view he brought to his philosophical work.

ENDNOTES

1 I have used the following standard abbreviations: The Birth of Tragedy, GT; Human, All-Too-Human, MA; The Gay Science, FW; Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Z; Beyond Good and Evil, J; On the Genealogy of Morals, GM; The Case of Wagner, W; The Twilight of the Idols, G; The Antichrist, A; Ecce Homo, EH; Nietzsche contra Wagner, NCW; and The Will to Power, WM (numbering of WM is Kaufman's 1968 Vintage edition). I have used Kaufman's translations of Nietzsche's works wherever possible. All translations from the French are mine, and all italics are the authors'.


3 EH-MA 3.

4 WM 1005.
"For this is the truth: I have moved from the house of the scholars and I even banged the door behind me." Z II 16.

NCW X 1.

FW, Pref. to Second Ed., 2.

"This is the age of the masses . . . ." J 241.

EH I 6.

EH I 1.


I assess a man by the quantum of power and abundance of his will . . . . I assess the power of a will by how much resistance, pain, torture it endures and knows how to turn to its advantage . . . ." WM 382. ". . . the hidden history of philosophy, the psychology of its great names, came to light for me. 'How much truth can a spirit endure, how much truth does a spirit dare?'--this became for me the real standard of value." WM 1041.

See EH I 2; WM 934, 1003; G, Pref. and I 8.

WM 1013; see also FW 5.

Nietzsche, op. cit., 10.

FW 319; see also FW, Pref. for Second Ed., 2: "For a psychologist there are few questions that are as attractive as that concerning the relation of health and philosophy, and if he should himself become ill, he will bring all of his scientific curiosity into his illness . . . ."

FW 127.

Although more poetic than scientific, Z II 11 conveys Nietzsche's extraordinarily resolute character.

J 19.

Loc. cit.

J 36.

Z III 10 1.

GM II 12.

WM 642.

WM 857.

A 6.

Z II 7.
"Wagner est une névrose", W 5 [in French in the original]. "Resisted like a sickness", W, Postscript.


"Always to bray Yea-Yuh—that only the ass has learned, and whoever is of his spirit." Z III 11 2. See also Z IV 3 1; Z IV 12; Z IV 17 1 and Z IV 17 2 (the litany to the ass, suggesting that he is Christ: "He carries our burden, he took upon himself the form of a servant, he is patient of heart and never says No . . ."). And in Ecce Homo this extraordinary passage: "All of us know, some even know from experience, which animal has long ears. Well then, I dare assert that I have the smallest ears. This is of no small interest to women—it seems to me that they may feel I understand them better.—I am the anti-ass par excellence and thus a world-historical monster—I am, in Greek, and not only in Greek, the Antichrist". EH III 2. This is not the occasion to discuss Nietzsche's relations with or views on women,—Jacques Derrida's Eperons; Les styles de Nietzsche is a masterfully subtle study,—but it may be mentioned that small ears are an element in Nietzsche's magical identification with Dionysos as he approached madness. See "Ariane et le labyrinthe", in Klossowski, op. cit., 348-49, and G 19.

"Only great pain, the long, slow pain that takes its time . . . compels us philosophers to descend into our ultimate depths . . .." FW, Pref. for Second Ed., 3. "The discipline of suffering, of great suffering—do you not know that only this discipline has created all enhancements of man so far?" J 225.

GT, "Attempt at a Self-Criticism", 1. The passage is framed as a series of questions, to which the answers are clear. Nietzsche goes on to indicate that these two pessimisms, of degeneration and of strength, are the difference between the Socratic and the Dionysian.
"The 'inner world' is full of phantoms and will-o'-the-wisps: the will is one of them ... And as for the ego! That has become a fable, a fiction, a play on words ... What follows from this? There are no mental causes at all ..." G VI 3; see also A 14 and 15. On grammatical fictions, see the texts cited directly above (n. 45) and WM 562, where Nietzsche finds the "root of the idea of substance in language, not in beings outside us".

What is the history of every day in your case? Look at your habits that constitute it: are they the product of innumerable little cowardices and lazinesses or of your courage and inventive reason?" FW 308.

EH II 9. Nietzsche goes on: "Considered in this way, my life is simply wonderful ..." The admonition to "become who you are" appears in Z IV 1.

"dying at the right time"); Z III 12 17; Z III 15 2 (the dialogue with life); J 157; J 269; G XIII 36; and WM 916.

64 EHz 2, where Nietzsche reprints FW 382.

65 GM II 24.

66 See FW 127 and J 259.

67 J 36.

68 "Is 'will to power' a kind of 'will' or identical with the concept 'will'? . . .. My proposition is: that the will of psychology hitherto is an unjustified generalization, that this will does not exist at all . . .." WM 692.

69 GM II 12. See also WM 552: "All events, all motion, all becoming, as a determination of degrees and relations of force, as a struggle--".

70 WM 619.

71 WM 693.

72 Nietzsche et la philosophie, op. cit., 56. Deleuze also remarks, "Force is what can, the will to power is what wills". (57) I am indebted to James A. Leigh for his commentary in "Deleuze, Nietzsche, and the Eternal Return", Philosophy Today 22, No. 3 (Fall, 1978), 206-23, esp. 213-16.

73 WM 635.

74 "Is 'will to power' a kind of 'will' or identical with the concept 'will'? . . .. My proposition is: that the will of psychology hitherto is an unjustified generalization, that this will does not exist at all . . .." WM 692.

75 WM 643. This passage may throw some light on Deleuze's description of the will to power as synthetic principle.

76 WM 616. See also WM 258 and WM 259, where Nietzsche remarks that because "we forget that valuation is always from a perspective, a single individual contains within him a vast confusion of contradictory valuations and consequently of contradictory drives. This is the expression of the diseased condition in man, in contrast to the animals in which all existing instincts answer to quite definite tasks".

77 WM 495. See also J 9; WM 517; and WM 521, where logic is described as "a compulsion to arrange a world for ourselves in which our existence is made possible".

78 WM 55.

79 WM 254.

80 GM, Pref., 6. At the end of the first essay, Nietzsche goes beyond the metaphors of sickness and health which we note in the passage just
cited: "Indeed", he writes there, "every table of values, every 'thou shalt' known to history or ethnology, requires first a physiological investigation and interpretation, rather than a psychological one; and every one of them needs a critique on the part of medical science". GM I 17n.

WM 268.

"To be comprehended: That every kind of decay and sickness has continually helped to form overall value judgments . . . ." WM 39. See also WM 273; and GM III 14, on the "prevailing morality": "They monopolize virtue, these weak, hopelessly sick people, there is no doubt of it . . . ."

On the "anti-Darwinian" theme that the strong are to be protected from the weak, see GM III 14; G IX 14; and WM 252, WM 401, WM 685 (cited below), and WM 864.

Nietzsche's most sustained treatment of ressentiment appears in the first essay of GM. The masses' desire for revenge and will to equality are also presented in Z I 12, Z II 7, and Z IV 13.

GM III 15.

WM 53.

GM I 10. Nietzsche had thematically introduced master and slave morality in J 260.

See inter alia W, Epilogue, and GM I 4.

FW 149.

WM 215 and 216; WM 275.

WM 685.


GM II 16. On the redirection or turning-inward of ressentiment in the experience of guilt, see GM III 15.

GM II 22 and 23.

On the "holy lie" see WM 200 and A 43. Note that Nietzsche uses "lie" to mean "bad faith" in A 55.

WM 142.

A 24. See also GT, "Attempt at a Self-Criticism", 5.

GM III 13.

See WM 588.
WM 592. See also GM I 6 and 7, on the morbidity of priestly aristocracies, contrasted with the powerful physicality and overflowing health presupposed by knightly-aristocratic value judgments.

GM I 10.

Nietzsche et la philosophie, op. cit., 11.

WM 953.


WM 898.

WM 888. On democratic or universal education, see G VIII 4-5 ("Higher education' and huge numbers—that is a contradiction to start with . . .").

G IX 29.

Z I 9.

WM 866.

WM 356.

WM 77, 421, and 916. See also Z II 16 and IV 13; EH II 8 and III 1; and J 137. In Gay Science, Nietzsche's tone is kindlier and his assessment of scholars somewhat more generous (see esp. Sections 366 and 373).

WM 140. See also WM 396; and Z II 8 and III 12.

FW, Pref. for Second Ed., 2; GM I 17n: "All the sciences [not just medical science] have from now on to prepare the way for the future task of the philosophers: this task understood as the solution of the problem of value, the determination of the order of rank among values".

J 211; see also WM 972 and 979. In La Philosophie critique de Kant (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1963), Deleuze argued that the essential discovery of Kant's "Copernican revolution" was that the faculty of knowing is legislative, and he remarked, "When a philosopher, in appearance very alien to Kantianism, announces the substitution of Jubei for Parere, he owes more to Kant than he himself believes". 22-23.

J 212.

"From now on I will be my own doctor . . ." Letter to Nietzsche's mother dated July 1881, in Klossowski, op. cit., 45-6.

J 292; see also EH II 4.

WM 47: "What is inherited is not the sickness but sickliness: the lack of strength to resist the danger of infections, etc. . . . Health and sickness are not essentially different . . . In fact, there are only differences in degree . . ." See also WM 812: ", . . . by now we have learned better than to speak of healthy and sick as of an antithesis: it
is a question of degrees. My claim in this matter is that what is today called 'healthy' represents a lower level than that which under favorable circumstances would be healthy—that we are relatively sick—".

119 FW 322.

120 FW 109.

121 WM 617: "That everything recurs is the closest approximation of a world of becoming to a world of being:—high point of the meditation."

122 EH-Z 3.

123 Klossowski, op. cit., 146-7.

124 WM 55, 639, 708, 1062, 1066. For critical expositions of Nietzsche's views on science, especially in relation to the doctrine of eternal recurrence, see Deleuze, Nietzsche et la philosophie, op. cit., 50-3, and Klossowski, op. cit., 139-76.

125 FW 341.

126 See, for instance, WM 55, 293, and (especially) 1066; EH-GT 3; and Z III 2 2.

127 See Nietzsche et la philosophie, op. cit., where Deleuze presents the eternal return as "ethical and selective thought", and Différence et répétition (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1968), 376 seq., esp. 380-82, where he offers an interpretation of the two major sections of the third part of Thus Spoke Zarathustra in which the eternal return is taught: "On the Vision and the Riddle", where the dwarf speaks, and "the Convalescent", where Zarathustra's animals speak.

128 "Le Cercle vicieux en tant que doctrine sélective", in op. cit., 177-250.

129 A 38.

130 See WM 59; EH I 8; Z II 6, IV 3, IV 11, and IV 13.

131 FW III 14.

132 Z III 13.

133 FW 341.

134 "The fundamental laws of self-preservation and growth demand the opposite [of Kantian morality]—that everyone invent his own virtue, his own categorical imperative . . .." A 11.

135 On the "principle of selection", see WM 55, 134, 417, 864, and 1058.

136 A 7; see also WM 54 and 246. Zarathustra admonishes, "To the incurable one should not try to be a physician", III 12 17.

137 EH II 10.
134  EH-Z 8.
139  Z II 20 and III 12 3.
140  WM 1032. See also Z IV 19.
141  FW 337.
143  H.F. Peters gives an interesting account of Nietzsche’s last years in *Zarathustra’s Sister: The Case of Elisabeth and Friedrich Nietzsche* (New York: Markus Wiener, 1985).
144  WM 35.
145  WM 1052.
146  G III 6.
147  WM 1041.
148  FW, Pref. for Second Ed., Z.
149  Nietzsche explicitly rejected the Kantian definition of the beautiful as "that which gives us pleasure without interest". See GM III 6.
150  EH I 2.
151  This task is, needless to say, all the more difficult when reading philosophical texts in translation. Nietzsche remarked, "What is most difficult to render from one language into another is the tempo of its style ...." (J 28) Tempo—musical time—is a crucial element of style: "... there is art in every good sentence—art that must be figured out if the sentence is to be understood! A misunderstanding about its tempo, for example—and the sentence itself is misunderstood". (J 246.) And style, in turn, has chiefly to do with the communication of "inward states": "To communicate a state, an inward tension of pathos, by means of signs, including the tempo of these signs—that is the meaning of every style ...". (EH III 4) In this regard, those who approach Nietzsche’s works in English translation are fortunate that Professor Kaufmann was not only a fastidious scholar and a philosopher in his own right, but also a master of both languages.
152  J 6.
153  J 3.
154  J 289. In the next section, Nietzsche writes, "Every profound thinker is more afraid of being understood than of being misunderstood. The latter may hurt his vanity, but the former his heart, his sympathy, which always says: 'Alas, why do you want to have as hard a time as I did?'" As though to balance this text, however, in *The Will to Power* he wrote, "To those human beings who are of any concern to me I wish suffering, desolation, sickness, ill-treatment, indignities ... I wish
them the only thing that can prove today whether one is worth anything or not— that one endures". (WM 910.)

155 EH III 1.
156 EH II 4.
157 W, Preface.
158 WM 70.
159 WM 109.
160 GM 4.