7. A CONCEPT OF HAPPINESS

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ABSTRACT. I propose a broad concept of happiness as an ultimate moral goal that is consistent with what reflective people desire and what people generally approve. Broad happiness includes many and various pleasures, a minimum of pain, a predominately active life and awareness of what can be attained. Besides these characteristics, which are found in Mill, I add that mental and physical faculties must be developed in accord with biological potential, people must be able to choose activities that exercise their developed faculties and must be able to achieve many of the goals toward which their activities aim. This claim can be established by considering scientific data and analyzing what moralists usually approve. According to it, intellectual activities will be found to be the most important aspects of happiness.

My concept will differ from Mill's in that I reject the notion that happiness is synonymous with pleasure and the absence of pain, although both are part of happiness. Because Mill adopted this definition, his theory produced many anomalies. For example, in order to maintain that intellectual activities are morally superior, Mill was led to introduce qualities of pleasure. This maneuver is inconsistent with his empiricism. Moreover, the activities that are most approved from a moral point of view cannot be explained by the pleasure principle. The broad concept of happiness can account for the primacy of intellectual activities and those activities that are most often morally approved.

MILL AND THE PLEASURE PRINCIPLE

Utilitarians would have little difficulty in convincing their peers that pleasure is a good; the difficulty lies in convincing moralists that pleasure is the good. On the surface at least, people seek goals not involving pleasure, approve the lives of non-pleasure seekers, and often treat such lives as models. Great moral systems generally approve striving, hard work, and altruism, while disapproving of pleasure for its own sake. Specifically, seeking artistic perfection, intellectual development, and scientific knowledge are looked on as worthwhile goals. Altruism, when it is not fanatically expressed, is treated as desirable. These goals are usually approved for their own sake.
A utilitarian, like John Stuart Mill, attempted to retain the pleasure principle by probing more deeply into the concept of pleasure. This led to the famous claims (a) there are qualities of pleasure and (b) people would prefer the higher pleasures over the lower pleasures if they were familiar with both. Mill's arguments accomplished two things. First, it accounted for the *prima facie* fact that people sometimes seek goals that are not reducible to the pleasurable. Second, an explanation was given for the fact that most people are content to seek the so-called lower pleasures, that is, people luxuriate in the lower pleasures because they are unfamiliar with the higher pleasures.

Mill's analysis has been found to be unacceptable to subsequent generations of philosophers. There are at least two well-known problems with it. The first is that the notion of qualities of pleasure is contrary to the way we ordinarily talk. Intellectual activities are not treated in ordinary discourse as the highest forms of pleasure. For example, young people are generally advised to avoid pleasure and to work hard and discipline themselves to appreciate intellectual activities. In this typical advice, intellectual exercises are opposed to pleasure. Intellectual prowess is thought to lead those who possess it to persevere through strife, accomplish difficult tasks, have the knowledge of the right and the courage to stand for it, and/or simply to have an advantage in the job market.

Even intellectual activities considered productive of pleasure, like reading Shakespearean tragedy and listening to classical music, are often recommended as if they were medicine for the mind. Youths are often cajoled by their parents into engaging in such activities. When young people resist because they prefer sensual pleasures, parents shift their ground. They maintain that these activities make people better.

The aforementioned case is not meant to demonstrate that intellectual activities never produce pleasure. Obviously, a significant minority of people obtain pleasure from fine literature and serious music and a portion of this minority obtains greater pleasures from these activities than from experiencing sensual activities. The point of this analysis is people do not usually treat intellectual activities as pleasurable, but, even when they do, the pleasure produced by them is not thought to be that which makes them worthwhile.

The second problem with Mill's analysis is that it seems as if the so-called intellectual pleasures are considered higher because Mill valued them more. In other words, Mill's normative judgment established the hierarchy of values. If this interpretation is correct, then Mill covertly introduced a normative judgment into a process in which he was supposedly categorizing pleasures descriptively. This criticism has often been made because empirical evidence seems to side with the point of view expressed in the discussion of the first problem—most people do not rate most intellectual activities as pleasurable, and when they do, they rate them below sensual activities.

Because of these traditional criticisms, I reject Mill's thesis. Nevertheless, I believe that Mill was on the right track in elevating intellectual activities above sensual activities. I will develop a concept of happiness that goes beyond the pleasure principle and does not introduce normative judgments into a descriptive process. That concept will
be called the broad concept of happiness. It will have the advantage of
being a plausible fundamental human goal, that is, it is consistent with
what reflective people desire and what we generally approve. However, I
will not try to establish that broad happiness is the moral end. Another
paper is required to broach this problem.

A second limitation that I place on the scope of this paper is that
I will discuss happiness for the individual (personal happiness) and will
put aside the question of the general happiness. This judgment is made
to simplify my problem. It seems to me that this limitation is justified
because many utilitarians—Mill is noteworthy in this regard—begin their
argument for utilitarianism by noting that each person desires his own
happiness.

THE BROAD CONCEPTION OF HAPPINESS

The inspiration for the broad concept of happiness is found in the
second chapter of Utilitarianism. Mill was led into an eloquent exposition
of the concept in answering the charge that happiness cannot be the
rational choice of people.

If by happiness be meant a continuity of highly pleasurable
excitement, it is evident enough that this is impossible . . . .
Of this the philosophers who have taught that happiness is
the end of life were as fully aware as those who taunt them.
The happiness which they meant was not a life of rapture;
but moments of such, in an existence made up of few and
transitory pains, many and various pleasures, with a decid-
ed predominance of the active over the passive, and having
as the foundation of the whole, not to expect more from life
than it is capable of giving. A life thus composed, to those
who have been fortunate enough to obtain it, has always
appeared worthy of the name of happiness.a

For the length of this passage and the rest of the paragraphs as-
associated with it, Mill was not identifying happiness as pleasure. He
stated that happiness includes many and various pleasures and "mo-
ments of rapture" (intense pleasure?). Now if happiness includes ple-
sure, it cannot be the same as pleasure. I am applying here the notion
that a composite or whole is not the same as any of its parts. If "ani-
mate being" is defined as including human beings, animals, and vegeta-
tive beings; then none of these inclusions—human beings, animals, or
vegetative beings—can be used as a synonym for animate being. Similar-
ly, if God is defined as the universe, He cannot be said to be wholly
present in a particular human being.

Besides including pleasure in happiness, Mill adds that one must
be active and more active than passive. Now, it is apparent that many
activities are not pleasurable. Writing poetry or music are, if we can
believe poets and composers, arduous, tension-filled tasks and are active
processes that are not usually pleasurable. The same conclusions can be
drawn about researching to increase knowledge, promoting social reform,
and other similar endeavors. They are highly active behaviors that are
generally approved, yet do not usually directly produce pleasure. It is
often maintained that these behaviors make the actors happy, but would
not necessarily fill them with pleasure.
In the quoted passage, Mill also stated "an existence made of few and transitory pains" is part of happiness. That the avoidance of pain is not the same as pleasure, and consequently is a departure from the pleasure principle, has frequently been noted by commentators. The moral is Mill could not have "his cake and eat it too". If happiness is pleasure, then it is not also the avoidance of pain; if happiness is pleasure and the avoidance of pain, then it is not pleasure.

Lastly, Mill contended a person could only be happy if he had reasonable expectations about what his achievements could be. This contention supports Robert Browning's famous epigram, "One's grasp ought not to exceed one's reach". Surely, having realistic expectations in life is not the same as desiring pleasure. In fact, it might require that a person obtain exceedingly little pleasure even though he has a great capacity for pleasure. It is not unusual to say that wise people, who learn to curb their passions are happy, while pleasure-seekers whose appetites are unbounded are not always happy. In amplifying the necessity of wisdom for happiness, Mill said:

The main constituents of a satisfied life appear to be two: tranquility and excitement. With much tranquility, many find that they can be content with very little pleasure; with much excitement many reconcile themselves to a considerable quantity of pain. Mill used the expression, 'a satisfied life', as a synonym for the expression 'a happy life'.

It seems clear from this analysis Mill departed from the claim made in other sections of *Utilitarianism* that happiness is the same as pleasure (and the absence of pain). Since this paper is not intended to be an exposition or a defense of Mill's position, I will not discuss the seeming inconsistency in his work. I mention Mill because the quoted passages are the starting point of my thesis.

Broad happiness, as I use this expression, includes Mill's characteristics; many and various pleasures, a minimum of pain, a predominately active life, and an awareness of what can be attained. These are necessary, but not sufficient conditions of happiness. It is sometimes observed that people live charmed existences in that they achieve most of their goals with a minimum of frustration, yet feel emotionally empty and dissatisfied and claim to be unhappy. We have heard successful people say "I thought success, wealth, and fame would make me happy, but they haven't". On the other side of the coin, people whose lives are marked by hard work, struggle, and frustration claim to be happy.

In order to dissolve these paradoxical findings, other characteristics must be added to Mill's characteristics. They are (1) mental and physical faculties must be developed in accord with the biological potential of each individual, (2) the person must be able to choose activities that exercise the developed faculties, and (3) the person must be able to achieve many of the goals toward which the chosen activities aim.

The first addition affirms that those who are not mentally retarded or do not have congenital health problems have mental and phys-
A CONCEPT OF HAPPINESS

ical potential and that this potential must be exercised. How mental and physical potential are balanced varies individually, as does the amount of potential each person has. Although this implies all people cannot achieve happiness by obtaining the same amount of things, it does not imply that people need different kinds of things to be happy. In the next section, I will argue that a person can be maximally happy only if mental development takes precedence over physical development. This does not preclude me from admitting now that every individual does not require great mental development in order to be happy. The world is made for athletes and accountants, as well as poets and musicians. It is the case, however, that people who fill the former roles underestimate their own need for mental development more often than not.

The second and third additions indicate that people must act out their plans in accommodating environments. For example, a person who has highly developed sexual drives would be highly frustrated in a monastery because he would not be able to choose activities that would satisfy him. A ghetto dweller, who has developed his poetic sensibilities to a high degree, might be able to choose activities that would exercise his developed faculties, but his goals would not be attainable because those in his society would not appreciate his activities. The third addition points out that most people require social approval; they are not satisfied simply by doing what they desire.

With these additions to the list, the previously-mentioned paradox can be dissol

The overriding characteristic of these three additions is that the individual must be able to control himself (the first and second additions) and his environment (the third addition) in order to be happy. The extent to which self--and environmental--control are necessary to happiness has not been emphasized sufficiently. A person wants not only to control his own passions and actions, he wants to work his way through the world so that physical and social phenomena do not unexpectedly interrupt his prospects. He wants to know what is in his way and he wants to have the skills to successfully deal with that which he meets.

Besides my three additions, Mill's characteristics are also essential ingredients of happiness. Possibly, the most important of Mill's characteristics is not to expect more from life than it is capable of giving. As I have said, to have this attitude is to be wise. It not only implies one should be aware of environmental limitations, but also one must be aware of one's own limitations. To achieve happiness, one must know one's abilities and environmental opportunities so that he can set achievable goals.
I conclude that the aforementioned goal of knowledge, together with control, are the overriding conditions of happiness. When pleasure, a minimal amount of pain, and activity in accord with personal potential are added, happiness will be realized.

Before I leave the discussion of broad happiness, I would like to offer a possible explanation for the failure of many to apprehend that happiness should be broadly characterized and ought not to be defined as pleasure or pleasure and the absence of pain. Happiness is sometimes used to describe a whole life (as when it is said "he led a happy life"), a period of life (as when it is said "that was the happiest period of my life"), or a way of life (as when it is said "that would be a happy way to live"). In these judgments, happiness is used to identify positive modes of existence. By using the term "positive", I am implying that a happy life is evaluated as having features that would be approved, all else being equal; I am not asserting that a happy life is the morally good life. The broad concept of happiness emphasizes the aforementioned states. The second way we generally use happiness is to identify particular instances which are viewed positively. Examples of this would be when we say "it makes me happy to eat well-prepared food", and "I am happiest when I play tennis". In particular circumstances, we tend to identify happiness as pleasure.

It is not hard to explain why we tend to define happiness differently when we are considering a whole life or a long span of life and when we are thinking of particular experiences. In the former case, we may be aware, as Mill was, that a life of continual pleasure is impossible. Also, we may be led to consider how a person develops through education and social communication and what affect a person has on others. Simply stated, the longer the period that is characterized as happy, the more likely the broader the conception will be. In the latter case, since we want to describe individual experiences, the likelier it is that we will characterize these experiences narrowly because it is psychologically easier to isolate a particular experience. In these latter contexts, people often identify happiness as pleasure.

When we think of the moral good, we think broadly (What is a good life?; What general states of affairs ought to be brought about?) and particularly (What individual actions are wrong?, What specific behaviors are right?). The latter questions are made fundamental by deontologists because they believe that morality consists in a series of rules prohibiting and recommending particular actions. Utilitarians are concerned primarily with the former questions and, as such, should define good broadly. For utilitarians particular cases are secondary and their status should be determined by reference to the broader conception.

THE INTELLECTUAL FACULTY AND HAPPINESS

The argument in this section will be that the intellectual faculty is the highest faculty because its development leads to the greatest personal happiness. Another reason why the development of intellect is highest is that it contributes most to the general happiness. Since my topic is limited to a discussion of personal happiness, I will not discuss this second reason.
The other faculties are physical and sensual. The former develops bodily skills, like those found in sports; the latter satisfies appetites, like sexual exercise. I will not discuss these faculties in detail, but I will note that their development is necessary, but of a lower priority than intellectual development.

The development of the intellectual faculty is rated above the development of physical and sensual faculties on the neo-Aristotelian ground that human beings are complex biological organisms who essentially require intellectual development. Furthermore, as the intellectual capacity increases through use, a person desires more complex intellectual activities. John Rawls has made an admirable exposition of this view.

... it will be recalled that the Aristotelian Principle runs as follows: other things being equal, human beings enjoy the exercise of their realized capacities (their innate or trained abilities), and the enjoyment increases the more the capacity is realized, or the greater its complexity. The intuitive idea here is that human beings take more pleasure in doing something as they become more proficient at it, and of two activities they do equally well, they prefer the one calling on a larger repertoire of more intricate and subtle discriminations. 4

Rawls states in support of his theory the claim that people who play chess and checkers equally well prefer the former game to the latter. (One would not have to interpret Rawls as implying that the imagined person would always prefer to play chess to checkers. There might be times when the player, motivated by fatigue or the need for a change of pace, might prefer to play checkers. Generally, he would prefer playing chess.) Rawls calls the Aristotelian principle both a principle of motivation and a principle of rational choice.

Despite my general approval of Rawls' contention, there is an ambiguity in his assertion that should be cleared up. Rawls says that people obtain more pleasure from an activity when they become proficient at it and they prefer activities which require intricate and subtle discriminations to those that are simple and obvious. "Prefers" and "pleasure" are only contingently related terms, that is, one may prefer non-pleasurable things. 5 Therefore, how these terms are related by Rawls is unclear. If it is implied that people obtain more pleasure from a mastered activity, but prefer intricate and subtle discriminations, I agree. On this interpretation, what is preferred may or may not be pleasurable; what activities are mastered are more pleasurable than those that are not mastered—the latter activities being marked by frustration. On the other hand, if it is implied that our preference for activities which require subtle and intricate discriminations is based on the pleasure obtained from them, I disagree.

The exception that I make to the latter interpretation of Rawls (and I am not sure that this interpretation is correct) is consistent with my rejection of Mill's defining happiness in terms of pleasure and introducing the notion of qualities of pleasure. Before "intellectual activity as the highest happiness" is defended, I want to give my reason for rejecting the claim that intellectual activity is engaged in for the pleasure it produces.
I contend that people do not obtain pleasure primarily from the performance of highly complex intellectual tasks more often than not. The chess expert may not obtain pleasure from playing a championship match. Compare the behavioral indicators of the gourmet eating a meal rated three stars by Michelin Guide and those of the chess player. The former eats smiling, intently savoring each bite (but, still smiling), sitting back relaxedly after each course, sighing peacefully while trying to place permanently in his memory each flavor, expostulating on the art of cooking and eating, and, when the meal is completed, benevolently talking about all that comes to his mind. Observation reveals that his activities are pleasurable. In contrast, the excellent chess player—if he is involved in a challenging match—sweats, is irritable before and during the game, strives to concentrate, etc. He is anxious and his anxiety increases the more proficient he becomes when he is playing a game which forces him to use his realized capacity to the fullest. Observation reveals that his activity is not pleasurable. This is not to say that he will not experience pleasure when he makes a good move or when he feels he is about to win the match or when the match is completed victoriously. The same can be said of great musicians, writers, and artists. Philosophers and scientists respond similarly. The pleasure that is experienced in such situations is "after the fact".

I am making three contentions. First, pleasure does not usually accompany the exercise of the higher faculties when we develop our intellectual capacities to a significant degree (although pleasure surely accompanies our exercise of intellect some of the time). The aforementioned observable differences between sensual activities and intellectual and highly skilled activities indicate this. The former clearly give pleasure; the latter do not. The burden of proof would be on the claimant who maintains that both are pleasurable activities to demonstrate that the observable behavioral differences are only apparent.

Second, few people develop their higher faculties in order to obtain pleasure. Once again, ordinary observation points to different motives. Those who develop these faculties do so, very often, because they find satisfaction in the performance of these faculties. The term, satisfaction, is not to be treated as a surrogate for pleasure, although it is related to happiness. One who is satisfied is "emotionally content". We often say, "I am satisfied with my actions even though they gave me no pleasure" or "I am content with what I have done, although I obtained little pleasure from it". Satisfaction expressions refer to approval states. When we approve our actions, we feel emotionally tranquil. Those who find satisfaction from the expression of the higher faculties often do so because they require the stimulation of their most highly developed organs. If one considers individuals who devote their lives to the development of their higher faculties, one often finds that these people possess a self-need that borders on compulsion. If we consider individuals like Albert Einstein and Richard Wagner, we can obtain evidence for my claim. From their early lives, they became fixated on intellectual activities. They seem to be drawn to the activities in which they excelled and were content only when they were engaged in their desired activities. When they were not so engaged, mental frustration resulted. This evidence is consistent with my claim that people who choose to develop their higher faculties often require this activity as a person requires physical exercise. I will say more about the relationship between physical and intellectual exercise later.
A CONCEPT OF HAPPINESS

My third contention is that pleasure often comes after the exercise of intellectual capacity. The winner of a chess tournament will most likely be elated after a victory. However, when one considers the years of study and practice that precede tournament victories, it is hard to believe that the brief periods of pleasure that supervene successful tournaments are the motives for high achievements. Certainly, high achievers rarely claim that their motive is pleasure.

I would conclude on this point that observation shows quite different behaviors attend pleasure-seeking and most examples of the exercise of the higher faculties. The fact that the latter activities give those who exercise their higher faculties post hoc pleasure from their achievements does not establish that these exercises are done in order to obtain pleasure. In the first section, I argued that the notion of qualities of pleasure is not the motive for achievements that primarily utilize the higher faculties.

Reiterating the goals of this section, first, I want to endorse Mill's and Rawls' contention that human beings who cultivate their higher faculties will prefer activities that emphasize intellectual activities. Second, relating what I have said in this section with what was said in the previous section, I maintain that the development of the higher faculties constitutes the highest human happiness. A defense of these claims will be taken up next.

The evidence of history demonstrates that the great achievers, i.e., those who developed their higher faculties to a great degree, consistently downplayed the exercise of their lower faculties and sought continual exercise of their higher faculties. Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Russell, etc., sought knowledge until the ends of their lives. Shakespeare wrote plays long after he became wealthy. He did not simply repeat himself. His greatest works, which were more complicated, intellectually deeper, and wiser than the plays of his early and middle periods, were written toward the end of his writing career. Verdi composed his greatest works at the age of 61 (Messa de Requiem), 75 (Otello), and 80 (Falstaff). Many critics contend that this last work was his greatest achievement and the finest jewel in Italian operatic literature. What was true of Verdi was true of Beethoven. The great Austrian composer never ceased growing intellectually and employing his realized capacities in musical composition. The great military geniuses--Napoleon, MacArthur--continued their quests for achievement until age or opportunity prevented a continuation of their careers.

I cite these few examples to remind the reader of what he already knows—that people who have developed their higher faculties prefer this exercise to the exercise of the lower faculties. For such people, the intellect must be exercised if they are to be happy. Sensual and physical pleasures, if they are experienced in place of intellectual exercise, are not desired by the great achievers. Happiness can only be achieved by these people if their higher faculties are used.

Of course, the exercise of the intellect alone will not guarantee that people, even the great achievers, will be happy. It is my contention that exercise of the intellect is a necessary condition of happiness for those who have developed intellectual skill. The thesis being advanced here is that happiness is attained for those who have developed intellectual skills when intellectual activity dominates their behavior and
When they fulfill the conditions suggested by Mill in the passage quoted in the last section—one must experience a great variety of pleasures, avoid pain, live actively, and set realistic goals.

As my argument stands, it is insufficient to establish that intellectual development produces the highest happiness. Dissenters might admit, for people who have developed their higher faculties, that the exercise of intellect might produce the highest happiness, but they would counter that, since intellectual achievers are rare, what satisfies intellectual achievers cannot be used as a standard for humankind. In order to overcome this rejoinder, I would rely on scientific evidence. What distinguishes human beings from animals is the highly complex development of the brain and the central nervous system. As Aristotle might have said if he had modern scientific data at his disposal, it is the activity of the central nervous system that identifies unique humanness. It is the exercise of intellect, which springs from brain activity, which permits human beings to plan for the long haul, to postpone immediate gratification, to obtain a great variety of choices, and to develop a great variety of behavioral strategies to obtain what they choose.

Now, just as the failure to exercise physical and sensual capacities atrophies the relevant organs and produces frustration and unhappiness, the failure to exercise the most highly developed human organ, the brain, will result in a physical deterioration of that organ and produce frustration and unhappiness. We know that many middle-aged people undergo much mental unhappiness because they live sedentary existences. Despite the fact that such people rarely have the will to revive their physical skills, the needs remain. Physicians cajole them to re-discipline their bodies and promise health and happiness in the long run.

If there is a need for physical stimulation and exercise, surely a comparable need must exist regarding intellectual activity given the fact that the central nervous system (of which the brain is the main part) is the most highly developed human organ. Its range of influence within the body is greater than that of any other physical system. This is why mental problems produce physical problems—ulcers, various diseases—and this is why a positive mental attitude sometimes produces recovery from a physical illness. I conclude that, just as the body needs exercise or physical organs atrophy, the human intellect needs exercise or the relevant organs atrophy. Just as the atrophy of a physical organ produces frustration and unhappiness, the atrophy of the intelligence produces frustration and unhappiness. Just as the exercise of a physical organ produces gratification and happiness, the exercise of intellect produces gratification and happiness. (Other conditions have to be fulfilled if happiness is to result.)

My reason for concluding that intellectual activity produces the highest happiness has already been indicated. Intellectual activity is the expression of the most developed human organ and system and has the widest range of influence within the body. It can be inferred that the development of intellectual capacity produces the highest happiness of which human beings are capable.
A CONCEPT OF HAPPINESS

DEGREE OF HAPPINESS

Thus far, I have been talking about an ideal of happiness, i.e., I have been referring to a life in which all of the faculties are developed and a proper balance set among intellectual, sensual, and physical activities. If this balance is achieved, then intellect would gradually dominate life. Physical and sensual activities would continue so long as health endures, but would not be the primary focuses of life. However, there would be times when attention would center on them.

For a person to realize the ideal, he must grow up in an accommodating social environment. He must live in a society which provides freedom to develop intellectual and physical skills, appreciates and rewards intellectual achievements, and deals unashamedly with sensual matters. A person's family environment must reflect the aforementioned social conditions.

It is obvious that these social conditions are rarely met in most societies. Although more people are literate in the developed world than ever before, they are minimally literate, that is, they have not developed learning skills so that they can appreciate the more complex intellectual activities. In the developing world, innumerable people are illiterate. The social attitudes in most societies will still promote family attitudes that perpetuate prejudice against high intellectual attainments and repressive sexual attitudes. The alternative to repressive sexual attitudes that developed society puts forth is unbounded sexual (and sensual) adventurism. A person who follows this social lead will not have time for developing any other faculty, because he will relentlessly pursue new thrills. Sexual adventurism is often accompanied by physical adventurism. In such societies, those who pursue intellectual development do so not because of an internal need to express a part of themselves, but because they feel unable to compete in the sensual-physical world. For such people, intellectual activity is a sublimation for other activities. As such, it cannot produce a personal condition that approaches the ideal of happiness, although it may produce moderate happiness.

Recognizing the aforementioned realities, it should be the goal of social architects to reconstruct the environment to accommodate the ideal of happiness. The psychotherapist or counselor should lead individuals to obtain the degree of happiness that is possible for them. This means that many people will never obtain a balance among the faculties. In some cases, life can only be made tolerable. Given social reality, this is probably a desirable goal.

I admit that some people will not be able to develop their intellectual potential because of extreme social barriers. The illiterate peasant in India will be preoccupied with satisfying basic physical needs—obtaining sufficient food to avoid malnutrition and adequate shelter to protect himself against hostile weather. Intellectual achievement would not be recommended for him. It can be said, however, that his potential for happiness is severely limited.

A second admission that I make is that most people cannot aspire to achieve what an Einstein or Shakespeare has achieved. The lives of the great achievers are set as ideals by which a person sets his goals and measures his accomplishments. People can be happy without attain-
ing the highest intellectual development. As Mill states, happiness de­

pends on not expecting "more from life than it is capable of giving".

Even though many people can only realize lower degrees of happy­

ness because of the presence of social barriers, the need for complex

intellectual activity becomes acute for numerous people as they grow

older. The emergence of this need is a product of the development of

intellect (even through "trial and error" living) and the concurrent de­

cline of physical and sexual prowess. A trial-and-error development of

intellect will occur in those who do not confront severe social barriers

or extreme physical debilities. One of the reasons why so many people

are unhappy in middle life is that they have not developed intellectual

skills to replace declining physical ones.\(^6\)

A recent psychological study of Americans concluded that a major­

ity of people desired to watch television for extended periods of time

every day, fulfilled their desire, and were frustrated and depressed

during and after watching television. These people desired mental stim­

ulation, but found none on television. These people would not expose

themselves to more complex intellectual fare because they have not de­

veloped sufficient skill to understand and appreciate it. While these

people do not realize it, they would be happier if they developed intel­

lectual ability.

In this section, I have argued that high intellectual achievement

balanced with physical and sensual development constitutes an ideal of

happiness. Given social and genetic barriers, all people cannot attain the

ideal. Nevertheless, the closer people approach the ideal, the greater the

happiness. For those people whose social limitations are severe, life may

be only made tolerable. This is a desirable goal.

THE NEED FOR KNOWLEDGE

One of the empirical claims implicit in my argument is that people
generally would rate intellectual developments and attainments as the
most important contributors to happiness if their social environment ac­

commodated a realization of these states. A satisfactory empirical inves­
tigation of these claims has not been made. Nevertheless, it cannot be
objected to my claims that \textit{prima facie} evidence is against them because
many people do not choose to realize intellectual goals even when they
have an accommodating social environment.

I would respond to this objection in a way that Mill answered a
similar objection. In order to test the desirability of intellectual activi­
ties relative to sensual and physical activities, the subjects of the test
must know intellectual, physical, and sensual activities through practice.
In this context, "knowing" is not being aware of the existence of intel­
lectual, physical, and sensual lifestyles by observing others. "Knowing" is
practicing the various activities so that the subject experiences the
emotional responses that each activity is capable of producing.

By analogy, the test of whether people would prefer \textit{haute cuisine}
over franchise food is not by placing a platter of each before an indi­

vidual and asking him to indicate his preference after consuming both.
The initial reaction of most people is to prefer that with which they are
familiar. A fair test would require that the subject be exposed to both
over a period of time so that he can acclimate himself to each style of cooking. It is very likely that those who are familiar with both will become bored with simple franchise food and prefer the more complicated, subtle, and varied haute cuisine fare. Similarly, if one develops intellectual skills so that he can understand more, he will prefer intellectual activities to lower activities. The final verdict regarding my claim, of course, must await proper empirical investigation.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The broad concept of happiness is an improvement over the pleasure principle because it is consistent with the kind of life that is usually recommended. The great achievers have sought to attain great skill and intellectual mastery. Rarely, have they been pleasure-seekers. Their lives have been placed as models. Second, moral systems have approved self-sacrifice, controlling pleasure-seeking, striving for intellectual attainment, etc. The list of those who have upheld moral ideals overlaps the list of the morally-neutral great achievers somewhat. The former list will exclude those who have sought primarily selfish goals and include those who, although not having great intellectual powers, promote altruistic goals. There are other differences between the two lists, but what is remarkable is that they overlap at all. Their common ground is those who make both lists have generally sought the development of their higher faculties and have not primarily sought pleasure. The utilitarian insight is to recognize that a person who develops his higher faculties will achieve, if other conditions are fulfilled, the highest personal happiness.

ENDNOTES

1 I make no judgment as to whether one can ever derive an "ought" from an "is". The absolute separation of facts and values are not endorsed. It is being maintained, as A.C. MacIntyre has maintained, that a minimum interpretation of Hume prohibits unjustified intrusions of values into a descriptive process. When one talks about higher and lower pleasures as a preliminary move to establishing the morally good, it is improper to base the division of pleasures on value judgments.


3 Ibid., 18.


5 Although many utilitarians maintain that reflective people always prefer pleasurable things as ends-in-themselves to non-pleasurable things, the relationship between preferences and pleasure remains contingent. The utilitarians contend that an empirical study would uphold the connection.
Although human beings need intellectual activity as they grow older, they need physical exercise when they are young. The dominance of physical needs in youth is a factor that impedes the development of intellectual skills. Intellectual ability is developed gradually through disciplined study. The physical need for immediate gratification is a barrier to the development of intellect. This is an important reason why so few people develop their intellects.