4. KANT ON HAPPINESS

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ABSTRACT. This paper explores Kant's definition of happiness as it appears in the Groundwork and the Critique of Practical Reason. Three accounts of happiness are considered: contentment, the satisfaction of all one's inclinations, and, the satisfaction of a system of inclinations. The paper discusses the extent to which there is textual evidence for each of these accounts and considers the arguments of Watson, Paton, Gregor, and Beck in support of these various accounts. It concludes by arguing that the first account of happiness is the weakest and that the third account is the strongest.

Attention has been focused recently on Kant's concept of happiness. There is renewed interest in discovering what happiness is for Kant and in understanding the role happiness plays in Kant's ethic. These two issues are obviously related. What happiness can do in Kant's ethic (what its role is) depends on what happiness is. If happiness is more than one thing then happiness may play more than one role in Kant's ethic. Or if happiness does play more than one role in Kant's ethic, then it may be that there is more than one meaning of happiness.

Both of these questions are crucial ones for ethicists and Kant scholars. Kant's ethic is often characterized as one in which the notions of duty and motive supplant the notions of happiness, pleasure, and ends. In Kant, many readers see only a stern, Pietist emphasis on fulfilling one's duties. However, this is not Kant. We must return to the notions of happiness, pleasure, and ends and see exactly what Kant says about them.

I have argued elsewhere that Kant's Groundwork reveals two views of the role of happiness. Kant speaks negatively about happiness as a principle of ethics though he speaks positively about it as a purpose of practical reason (as an end). Thus, while happiness ought not serve as the motive for action, it may serve as the object of the will. In other words, while happiness is not the basis for ethics, it plays a part—a morally valuable part—as an object of the will, in Kant's categorical ethic.

Our concern here will be with what Kant means by happiness, with what happiness is for Kant. We will look at Kant's descriptions of happiness in his two major ethical works, the Groundwork and the Critique of Practical Reason. There is general agreement that Kant has no coherent, precise definition of happiness. In fact, it is argued, Kant does not
claim to provide a precise definition of happiness. Kant says: "the concept of happiness (Glückseligkeit) is so indeterminate a concept that although every man wants to attain happiness, he can never say definitely and in unison with himself what it really is that he wants and wills" (47/P, 85). Therefore, happiness "is an Ideal, not of reason, but of imagination" (48/P, 86).

Although a particular person at a particular time may find it difficult to say whether this is his happiness, it is possible to say generally what happiness is. For instance, is it pleasure, is it moral contentment, is it utility? We are not interested at the moment in whether this or that would further our pleasure, contentment, or utility. For Kant, happiness as a concept or an Ideal does not seem subject to the rigors of reason, however it behooves us to be as specific as we can regarding what Kant means by happiness.

We will consider three ways of interpreting Kant's claims about happiness, in other words, three views of what Kant means by happiness. The first view is that happiness can be identified with contentment. The second view proposes that happiness is the satisfaction of all one's inclinations and desires. The third view suggests that happiness is the satisfaction of a systematic, integrated complex of inclinations. The first view does not link happiness necessarily with the inclinations while the latter two views do. It will be argued that the first treatment of happiness as contentment is the weakest. Kant is generally quite explicit in distinguishing happiness from contentment. Kant frequently says about contentment that it is not happiness (211/B, 91; 248/B, 123). And he says that any so-called contentment which rests on the satisfaction of inclinations "can never be adequate to that which is conceived under contentment" (247/B, 122). On the other hand, both the second and the third interpretations of happiness are plausible though the third does the best job of accounting for Kant's various claims about happiness.

Let us first review what Kant says about happiness in the *Groundwork* and in the *Critique of Practical Reason*. Glückseligkeit is the term which is translated as happiness. Kant claims that "complete well-being and contentment with one's state... goes by the name of 'happiness'" (18/P, 61). Happiness, he says, refers to the total satisfaction of one's needs and inclinations (32/P, 73). Happiness is "a rational being's consciousness of the agreeableness of life which without interruption accompanies his whole existence" (129/B, 20). In the Idea of happiness, Kant claims, "all inclinations are combined into a sum total" (25/P, 67). So, "there is required for the Idea of happiness an absolute whole, a maximum of well-being in my present, and in every future, state" (47/P, 85). Thus, the satisfaction of "[a]ll inclinations taken together (which can be brought into a fairly tolerable system... )" is called happiness (193/B, 75-76).

Gary Watson, in an article called "Kant on Happiness in the Moral Life", proposes the first interpretation; namely, happiness is contentment. Watson distinguishes between the "inclination-conception" of happiness and the "contentment-conception" of happiness. He acknowledges that there are passages in which Kant speaks of happiness as the satisfying of inclinations or the satisfying of a system of inclinations. How-
ever, Watson argues that the contentment-conception is "the most fundamental" though he warns that he offers this interpretation "tentatively". He admits that "there is no direct evidence that Kant held it [this view]."

Watson bases his contentment-conception on two passages. In the second Critique, Kant says that happiness is one's "consciousness of the agreeableness of life" (129/B, 20) and in the Groundwork Kant states that "complete well-being and contentment (Zufriedenheit) with one's state goes by the name of 'happiness' (Glückseligkeit)" (18/P, 61). On this view, happiness is not tied to the inclinations, rather it is "one's basic attitude toward one's life on the whole".

Watson concludes that a person may be discontent, that is, not happy, even though all his inclinations are satisfied. Similarly, a person may be content, that is, happy, even if he fails to realize his system of inclinations. In short, Watson suggests that happiness (Glückseligkeit) is contentment (Zufriedenheit) and that happiness is not necessarily brought about by the satisfying of all inclinations or even by the realizing of a system of inclinations. Happiness as contentment is in some sense independent of the inclinations.

There is some additional evidence besides the two passages above that seems to support Watson's claim that happiness is contentment. (However, it is not the evidence Watson believes there is.) Lewis White Beck, in his Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason, considers an early fragment of Kant's work (Duisburg Fragment 6; published just after the first Critique, according to Beck). He summarizes part of it as follows: "But to feel that we are the authors of a state of being worthy of happiness . . . is itself a positive feeling of self-contentment, and this constitutes the human worth of morality and is a necessary factor in happiness." This passage too links contentment and happiness by naming self-contentment a necessary factor in happiness.

H.J. Paton also speaks of some connection between happiness and contentment. He suggests that "we might even say—though Kant himself at times denies this—that it [contentment] may be an important element in happiness". Paton states that later in the Metaphysics of Morals Kant "goes farther and recognizes that it [contentment, Zufriedenheit] may well be called happiness". Hence, there is this additional evidence of a connection between happiness and contentment. But is this evidence together with Watson's claims enough to show that happiness is contentment? I think not. Let us look at three reasons why this account of happiness as contentment fails.

First, and most important, there is significant textual evidence to the contrary. Although Watson does point to one passage in the Groundwork where Kant says contentment "goes by the name of" happiness, I found no other place in the Groundwork or in the second Critique where Kant says Zufriedenheit goes by the name of Glückseligkeit. In fact, in both the Groundwork and the Critique of Practical Reason, there are numerous passages which distinguish contentment from happiness. Kant says in the Groundwork: "the more a cultivated reason concerns itself with the aim of enjoying life and happiness (Glückseligkeit), the farther does man get away from true contentment (Zufriedenheit)" (20–21/P, 63). He goes on to speak of reason's two purposes: the production of a good will and the attainment of happiness. He observes that the cultivation of
reason which is necessary to establish a good will sometimes limits the attaining of happiness. Reason, he says, in establishing the good will "is capable only of its own peculiar kind of contentment (Zufriedenheit)—contentment in fulfilling a purpose which in turn is determined by reason alone, even if this fulfillment should often involve interference with the purposes of inclination" (22/P, 64). Happiness appears to involve the inclinations and it is said to be separate from the contentment that follows from reason's success in producing a good will.

Kant is even more straightforward in the second Critique. He asks:

Do we not have a word to denote a satisfaction with existence, an analogue of happiness which necessarily accompanies the consciousness of virtue, and which does not indicate a gratification, as "happiness" (Glückseligkeit) does? We do, and this word is "self-contentment", (Selbstzufriedenheit) which in its real meaning refers only to negative satisfaction with existence in which one is conscious of needing nothing. (247/B, 122)

Kant refers again to this negative satisfaction with existence when he speaks of the comfort that a righteous man finds in knowing he carried out his duty. This comfort, insists Kant, "is not happiness (Glückseligkeit), not even the smallest part of happiness" (211/B, 91). Kant maintains that one's consciousness of oneself as pure practical reason produces a consciousness of mastery over inclinations and brings forth "a negative satisfaction with one's condition, i.e., contentment (Zufriedenheit)" (248/B, 123). According to Kant: "This cannot be called happiness (Glückseligkeit), since it does not depend on a positive participation of feeling" (248/B, 123). Hence, while happiness is a positive satisfaction which involves feelings and inclinations, contentment is a negative satisfaction which results when pure practical reason masters the inclinations.

Second, most commentators reject the "happiness is contentment" view. Although Beck and Paton do posit a relationship between happiness and contentment, they do not corroborate Watson's view that happiness is contentment or that the contentment-conception of happiness is the most fundamental. Beck claims only that contentment may be a factor in happiness (as we saw above) though Beck does not take this passage to be representative of Kant's critical writings on ethics. Paton says contentment may be an element in happiness or may be called happiness. Neither proposes that happiness is or means contentment. Paton stresses the distinction between happiness and contentment when he speaks of that "special satisfaction which springs from consciousness of having acted well. We may not call it pleasure...and we may not call it happiness... We may call it contentment or self-approval". Paton reiterates:

He [Kant] always insists that the moral life brings with it its own peculiar satisfaction or contentment (Zufriedenheit). It is true that he interprets it rather negatively as a special kind of satisfaction in doing without, and regards it as something analogous to, but distinct from, happiness... Paton reiterates:

O'Connor is another commentator who insists that happiness is not contentment. The mistake of confusing contentment with happiness
amounts, he claims, to the mistake of confusing "the consciousness of (negative) freedom with the consciousness of (positive) satisfaction of inclinations".16 Thus, most commentators agree that Kant generally reserves the term contentment for a type of satisfaction analogous to but different from the satisfaction which is happiness. The source of the satisfaction which is contentment is moral, i.e., practical reason, the moral law, while the source of the satisfaction which is happiness is natural, i.e., involves the inclinations. Kant tends to label the moral satisfaction which is contentment "negative" and the natural satisfaction which is happiness "positive".

Third, Watson himself recognizes that there are problems in identifying happiness with contentment. He admits that Kant's theory of value does not "sit well with" the view that happiness is contentment.17 He observes that "some of Kant's remarks fit the inclination-conception of happiness best".18 Watson acknowledges that his view of happiness as contentment does not mesh with Kant's overall ethic, that there is no direct evidence Kant held it, and that it is not well supported by the textual evidence. In those passages where Kant links happiness and contentment, Kant allows contentment to "stand under the name of happiness" or to "go by the name of happiness" but he never explicitly equates the two. Therefore, even though in some of Kant's writings there is proposed some connection between happiness and contentment, this fact is not sufficient to warrant an interpretation of Kantian happiness as contentment. Kant means by happiness something fundamentally other than contentment and contentment is a moral satisfaction which is not happiness. Happiness must therefore be tied to the inclinations.

II

We must now consider the second and third interpretations of happiness which propose respectively that happiness is the satisfaction of inclinations and that happiness is the satisfaction of a complex system of inclinations. These two interpretations have in common the view that happiness is the satisfaction of inclinations. They differ in that the first focuses on the greatest number of inclinations and the second refers to a hierarchy, a complex system of inclinations.

It is difficult to separate these two interpretations though they seem to be in theory separable. The difficulty is due in part to the imprecise way Kant talks about happiness though subsequent commentators (Paton, Gregor and Beck) refer to these two separate interpretations. Another reason for the difficulty is that commentators have related the issue of pleasure to these concepts of happiness. Some commentators (Paton and Gregor) have associated the first interpretation—happiness as the satisfaction of inclinations—with the view that happiness is pleasure (see below). At least one commentator (Beck) has linked the second interpretation—happiness as the satisfaction of a system of inclinations—with the "happiness is pleasure" view (see below). We have seen that Kant's account of happiness includes terms like well-being (Wohlbefinden) and the agreeableness of life (Annehmlichkeit des Lebens). In the second Critique, for example, pleasure (Lust) is said to be the determining ground of choice for principles of happiness (Glückseligkeit) (129/B, 20-21). So it is not unreasonable to posit a relationship between happiness and pleasure. It is not clear however that one of these two interpretations of happiness is more closely aligned with the
"happiness is pleasure" view than the other. Happiness, it seems, can be linked to well-being, the agreeableness of life, and pleasure whether happiness is the satisfaction of inclinations or the satisfaction of a system of inclinations. For that reason, pleasure is not the central issue which separates these two accounts of happiness. The issue is whether happiness is the satisfaction of a **collection** of inclinations or the satisfaction of a **system** of inclinations.

As evidence for the view that happiness is the satisfaction of a collection of inclinations, there is Kant's claim that happiness refers to the total satisfaction of one's needs and inclinations (32/P, 73). In this Idea of happiness, Kant says, "all inclinations are combined into a sum total . . . yet men cannot form under the name of 'happiness' any determinate and assured conception of the satisfaction of all inclinations as a sum" (25/P, 67). This view makes happiness the satisfaction of the greatest number of inclinations with no apparent concern for the priority of any inclination over any other. Friedman refers to this interpretation when he says: "Happiness, according to Kant, is the fulfillment of all of one's wants".

In contrast, Kant mentions the need for a system of inclinations when he calls happiness the satisfaction of all inclinations taken together "which can be brought into a fairly tolerable system" (193/B, 75-76). The idea of a system of inclinations could mean, though it does not have to mean, that the satisfaction of all inclinations is not possible. Some inclinations may have to be sacrificed in order to achieve other (higher?) inclinations or the system of inclinations. This view makes happiness the satisfaction of a system of inclinations in which some inclinations may be more valuable than others (more valuable in themselves or more valuable since they further the realization of the system) or at least in which some inclinations are to be realized before others. In order to separate these two views of Kantian happiness, let us review what Paton, Gregor and Beck have said about them.

H.J. Paton recognizes these two notions of happiness in Kant. Both have to do with the inclinations and neither is identified with contentment. On the one hand, Paton says, Kant "takes a hedonistic view and seems to regard happiness as little more than the greatest possible amount of continuous or uninterrupted pleasure throughout the whole of life". Under this interpretation, practical reason is concerned with the means of achieving a known end, i.e., happiness or continuous pleasure. On the other hand, says Paton, Kant speaks of practical reason as concerned with constituting the end of happiness. In this sense, practical reason "must aim at satisfying as many as possible of our needs in an organized life or (as Kant puts it) at bringing our natural inclinations into harmony with one another in a whole called happiness". Paton concludes:

At times Kant himself speaks as if the pursuit of happiness were merely a search for the means to the maximum possible amount of pleasant feeling throughout the whole course of life. At other times he recognizes that it involves the choice and harmonizing of ends as well as of the means to them.

Thus, Paton clearly sees that the first concept of happiness refers to a simplistic obtaining of the greatest possible amount of pleasant feeling and the second involves a more complex harmonizing of desires.
in an organized life. Paton maintains that the "second view is much more satisfactory than the first".\textsuperscript{23} He reasons that: "It is absurd to suppose that the only object we desire and the only end we seek is continuous pleasure and the avoidance of pain".\textsuperscript{24}

Mary Gregor concurs with this interpretation. In her book, \textit{Laws of Freedom}, she states:

\begin{quote}
Kant’s writings seem to contain two concepts of happiness: that of a maximum of pleasure accompanying our whole existence and that of an integration of our subjective ends, among which pleasure is only one.\textsuperscript{25}
\end{quote}

Gregor explains that if happiness is taken to be the greatest amount of pleasure, then reason must determine how the satisfaction of any particular inclination will affect one’s overall pleasure. And if happiness is taken to be the integration of subjective ends then reason must determine which ends can be integrated into a whole and which must be sacrificed for the sake of the whole. In either case, Gregor emphasizes, the content of the concept of happiness "is supplied by the individual’s inclinations".\textsuperscript{26} Thus, Gregor clearly ties happiness to the inclinations and notes that happiness has these two meanings for Kant.

Lewis White Beck also quotes Kant’s various accounts of happiness though he does not speak of them as conflicting interpretations. He notes that for Kant, "a state of happiness is one in which there is continuous satisfaction of all desires".\textsuperscript{27} This reflects the first concept of happiness. Beck concludes that "a being who desires pleasures desires happiness, and conversely, [a being who desires happiness desires pleasures]".\textsuperscript{28} However, he says, the desire for happiness is not merely the sum of one’s desires for pleasure. Rather, happiness is our concept of a systematic whole of pleasures.\textsuperscript{29} Here again Beck’s comments reflect two concepts of happiness: one which refers to the satisfaction of all desires and one which refers to the satisfaction of a system of desires.

In sum, this review of Paton, Gregor and Beck has reiterated that there are two distinguishable concepts of happiness in Kant’s writings. The question arises as to which concept reflects the "true" Kantian view. Paton has argued in favor of the latter concept which identifies happiness with an integrated system of desires and I believe there are persuasive reasons in favor of this view.

\section*{III}

Let me summarize what the discussion has achieved so far before defending this third view and drawing some final conclusions. First, we have rejected Watson’s account of happiness as contentment. The evidence fails to support this interpretation. Perhaps Watson was too easily persuaded that happiness is contentment since it is then simpler to argue, as he goes on to do, for the importance of happiness in Kant’s theory of value. However, it is not a true reflection of Kant’s overall view to say that happiness is contentment. Second, we saw that happiness involves the satisfaction of inclinations. We have found that even this is not a precise account of happiness given that Kant speaks of the satisfaction of all inclinations and of the satisfaction of a system of inclinations.
Now, what reason is there for preferring the third interpretation of happiness? Paton's reason is that: "It is absurd to suppose that the only object we desire and the only end we seek is continuous pleasure." Since for Paton the second view—that happiness is the satisfaction of all inclinations—makes happiness the realization of the maximum amount of pleasure, he believes we must reject it and choose the more reasonable view that happiness is the satisfaction of an organized system of inclinations. Put another way, it seems unlikely that Kant, a master of distinctions, would fail to distinguish among inclinations. Is any desire as worthy of being satisfied as any other, regardless of what additional desires it may prevent us from realizing? And more importantly, could Kant, for whom reason is everything, have failed to give reason a role in organizing our desires? Given that happiness is a legitimate purpose of practical reason, it seems unlikely that practical reason would have no role in the formulation of that end. Since happiness is a moral purpose for finite rational beings, shouldn't reason play a part in constituting that purpose? It seems more like Kant to posit a role for reason in organizing our system of inclinations which is happiness than to not have reason play such a role.

Another reason why the third account of happiness appears to be the best is that it does not necessarily exclude the second account of happiness. If happiness is a system of inclinations (third account) it is still possible to aim at the satisfaction of all inclinations (second account) albeit in an ordered way. It is theoretically possible that in realizing a system of inclinations we may ultimately satisfy all our inclinations. An ordered realizing of inclinations does not preclude the possibility of realizing all our inclinations. For example, let us suppose that all my inclinations are four; a, b, c, and d. To realize a system of inclinations might be to realize c, b, a, and d. In realizing my system of inclinations I have also realized all my inclinations. Thus, talk of satisfying a system of inclinations is not necessarily at odds with talk of satisfying all my inclinations, although it seems the reverse is not true. To realize all my inclinations is to realize a, b, c, and d as they come to me and in no particular order and that is precisely not to realize a system of inclinations. The satisfaction of a collection, an aggregate of inclinations excludes the possibility of a system of inclinations. Even if in aiming to realize all my inclinations, I happen to realize c, b, a, and then d, it is still the case that I have realized them as they came to me and not because of any system of ordering inclinations. There is a resemblance then between satisfying c, b, a, and d while aiming to realize all my inclinations and satisfying c, a, and b while aiming to realize a system of inclinations, but the resulting states are different too. In the first case, I have accidentally duplicated an ordered system of inclinations while randomly satisfying my inclinations. But only in the second case, have I deliberately, systematically, with reason chosen to realize an ordered system of inclinations.

There is, I believe, a parallel in ethics. For Kant, two actions may resemble each other (say, both involve keeping a promise) though one may lack moral worth since it merely conforms with duty while the other has moral worth since it is done for the sake of duty (33/P, 74). Thus, two identical actions are distinguishable in terms of whether or not they were performed for the sake of duty, for the sake of a principle. The situation regarding the definition of happiness in terms of inclinations is the same. In acting to realize all my inclinations, I may happen to real-
ize them in a way that conforms to a system, a principle, but I will not have realized them for the sake of a system or a principle. A collection or a sum of inclinations makes impossible—except in an accidental way that lacks moral worth—the ordering implied by a system of inclinations. Thus, the second account (all inclinations) is at odds with the third account (system of inclinations). It is not possible in any meaningful way to realize a system of inclinations while aiming to satisfy all my inclinations. Hence, if Kant meant the second interpretation to be the preferred interpretation, then the third interpretation would be excluded, meaningless. But if the third interpretation is the preferred one, then the second interpretation is not excluded. Because the third interpretation allows both these interpretations to peacefully co-exist, it seems to do the best job of accounting for Kant's claims about happiness.

IV

Let us consider one further issue; namely, why Kant's account of happiness is so imprecise and subject to these three interpretations. Obviously, happiness is not the central aspect of Kant's categorical ethic, so perhaps Kant simply did not take the time to work out a theory of happiness. My suggestion however is the following. The reason for Kant's various claims about happiness is that Kant makes apparently conflicting claims about the role happiness plays in an ethic. Thus, we have several ways of defining happiness because there is more than one task happiness fulfills in Kant's ethic. To put it simply (and obviously I have not proven this claim), the ambiguity in Kant's definition of happiness is a necessary consequence of a similar ambiguity in Kant's description of the role happiness plays in a categorical ethic. It is impossible for Kant to tell us precisely what happiness is because happiness serves more than one function in his ethic.

This is not the place to try to resolve the question of why Kant's definition of happiness is unclear. But let me offer a few further remarks to support my claim that problems in the definition of happiness are tied to problems in understanding the role of happiness. First, Kant makes various claims about the place of happiness in an ethic, not all of which seem to be compatible. For instance, Kant speaks of the attainment of happiness as one of practical reason's purposes (22/P, 64). Happiness in proportion to worth is an element in the highest good, the object of a pure practical reason. It is held out to reason as a possible object either in the world or outside the world, in this life or in a future life or an intelligible life (256/B, 123; 244/B, 119). Kant also speaks of our indirect duty to further our own happiness (25/P, 67). On the other hand, when Kant speaks of maxims of happiness and of hypothetical imperatives it appears that happiness is something to be shunned (146/B, 36).

Thus, Kant appears to recognize both a positive role for happiness and a negative role for happiness. Happiness has moral worth if it plays a certain role in an ethic (i.e., as object, purpose) but has no moral worth if it tries to play other roles as well (i.e., as motive). Now, given these two different roles for happiness, it is possible that happiness could be defined in one single way (say, as the satisfaction of a system of inclinations). But it is also easy to see how the meaning of happiness might have become unclear or become two meanings as Kant shifted from
talk of happiness' role as object (positive talk) to talk of its role as motive (negative talk).

Let me make the point one other way. In the second Critique, there is some unclarity about where the highest good (and hence, happiness as an element thereof) is to be realized. At one point Kant says:

we see ourselves obliged to seek at such distance—namely, in the context of an intelligible world—the possibility of the highest good which reason presents to all rational beings as the goal of all their moral wishes. (244/B, 119).

A few pages later he claims: "Happiness is the condition of a rational being in the world, in whose whole existence everything goes according to wish and will" (255/B, 129). Thus, "the highest good is possible in the world only on the supposition of a supreme cause of nature which has a causality corresponding to the moral intention" (256/B, 129–30). The first passage seems to place the realization of the highest good outside this world (in an intelligible world) while the latter passages speak of the realization of the highest good (and hence, happiness) in this world. The question arises, is happiness as part of the highest good realized outside this world or in this world? Given this unclarity in Kant's treatment of the role of happiness, it is not surprising that Kant did not offer a single definition of happiness. Isn't it likely that if happiness is attained outside this world that it would be something different than a happiness which is attained in this world?

I have mentioned here some of the difficulties in trying to pin down the role of happiness in Kant's ethic. My point has been to suggest that there is a connection between Kant's various claims about the place of happiness in ethics and Kant's inability to give a precise definition of happiness. The fact that there is more than one interpretation of happiness is evidence of Kant's difficulty in making clear the role of happiness in a categorical ethic.

ENDNOTES


3 One exception may be O'Connor who claims that "Kant had a coherent and well thought-out conception of happiness" ("Kant's Conception of Happiness", 189).

All references to the *Groundwork* and the second *Critique* will appear in the text. They will list first the page number from the German text, *Werkausgabe* VII, ed. Wilhelm Weischedel (Frankfurt: Suhrkramp, 1980) and then a 'P' to indicate H.J. Paton’s translation, *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals* (New York: Harper, 1964), or a 'B' to indicate L.W. Beck’s translation, *Critique of Practical Reason* (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956) followed by the relevant page number.


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Ibid., 83.

Ibid., 83.

Ibid., 81.

Watson believes that Gregor and Beck support his view that there is an inclination-conception of happiness and a contentment-conception of happiness. He claims in footnote 10 that Gregor notes Kant’s use of these two conceptions of happiness and that Beck singles out the contentment-conception (Watson, "Kant on Happiness in the Moral Life", 101). I find no evidence to support these claims.


Ibid., 57.

Ibid., 49–50.

Ibid., 57.


Watson, "Kant on Happiness in the Moral Life", 96.

Ibid., 83.

Friedman, "Virtue and Happiness", 95.


Ibid., 85.


Paton, *The Categorical Imperative*, 86.

Ibid., 86.


Ibid., 78.
28 Ibid., 97.
29 Ibid., 98.
30 Paton, *The Categorical Imperative*, 86.