ABSTRACT. In paragraphs 107-108 of his *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein remarks, "The preconceived idea of crystalline purity can only be removed by turning our whole examination round. (One might say: the axis of reference of our examination must be rotated, but about the fixed point of our real need.)" This paper attempts to illuminate his notion of this "real need" which is shared by that work and by his earlier *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* by comparing these works with some of the writings of Tolstoy and Schopenhauer with which he was familiar. I do this not to discredit either of his writings as works on logic but to show in what manner they are, indeed, works on logic.

In his Preface to the *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein remarks that his new thoughts (the *Investigations*) should be published together with his old (the *Tractatus*) since the former could be seen in the right light "only by contrast with and against the background of my old way of thinking" (p.x). In amplifying this, he says in the next paragraph that, on returning to philosophy sixteen years earlier, he was forced to recognize grave mistakes in what he wrote in the *Tractatus*. One way of summarizing what these grave mistakes amount to come from paragraphs 107-108 of the *Investigations*.

The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the conflict between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, not a result of investigation: it was a requirement.) . . .

We see that what we called "sentence" and "language" have not the formal unity that I imagined, but are families of structures more or less related to one another.---But what becomes of logic now? Its rigor seems to be giving way here.---For how can it lose its rigor? Of course not by our bargaining any of its rigor out of it.---The preconceived idea of crystalline purity can only be removed by turning our whole examination round. (One might say: the axis of reference of our examination must be rotated, but about the fixed point of our real need.)

Since the publication of the *Philosophical Investigations* philosophers have been eager to come to understand the "right light", and the
more successful attempts have come from those who have worked with
the contrast "with and against the background" of the Tractatus. A dif-
ficulty I have found, however, even with the better attempts, is a seem-
ing indifference to the explicitly made point that both the Tractatus and
the Philosophical Investigations have something in common, something
which Wittgenstein was not very expansive in expressing, but which he
nonetheless calls "our real need". Wittgenstein's general remarks which
may help illuminate that real need are left at a very cryptic level. To be
sure, that need does gain expression in the Philosophical Investigations
through the detailed examination of the myriad little things we are in-
clined to say about learning, understanding, pain, etc., but what holds
these all together in such a way as to be also appropriate to the Trac-
tatus is far from clear.

We know, historically, that Wittgenstein had a great deal of re-
spect for the sensitivity of Augustine, Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer, and
Tolstoy toward our real need. We also know that in his life and work,
his was not simply a need to make sense of the human capacity to think
and say things, as if this were just one problem among others in epis-
temology and logic. In some manner yet to be unearthed, his real need
was much more catholic than is generally countenanced in professional
philosophy. This is clear both biographically and from the very tone and
manner of his works. And lastly, we know that he was much interested
in logic, in his early work in a sense clearly connected with the work of
Russell and Frege, and later in a sense more his own which we have
come to call "philosophical logic". In some manner Wittgenstein's percep-
tion of our real need has something to do with all of this; to hold to
one aspect and ignore the others leaves a great gap in our appreciation
of and reflection on the various texts which comprise his life's work. In
what follows, I will pick up two of these threads, Tolstoy and Schopen-
hauer, and look at them as a point of entry first into the Tractatus, and
through that, into the Philosophical Investigations. I wish to do this in
a way which in no way diminishes these other influences even though
space will not permit more than passing allusions to them.

Let's begin by looking at what Tolstoy has to say in works Witt-
genstein was familiar with. In Chapter XIII of My Confession,1 Tolstoy
records that the true office of any faith is to give life a meaning which
the recognition of our personal death cannot destroy, and that the an-
swer to the one eternally repeated question, "Why do I live, and what
will come of my life? • • • [which] though one and the same in reality,
should be infinitely varied in its phenomena." He records this after hav-
ing said in the preceding paragraph that "All that men sincerely believe
in must be true; it may be differently expressed, but it cannot be a
lie." The full impact of these remarks is greatly diminished unless one
has read Tolstoy's account of his life and thought to that point, the
preceeding chapters, in which he vividly portrays his falling into utter
despair and meaninglessness, and of his struggles to overcome this de-
spair, but these statements are clear and unequivocal even apart from
their context. Faith, for Tolstoy, is altogether without foundation (the
preceeding chapters have destroyed any possible foundation); it is the
answer to our horrible questioning, and though one in reality, is in-
finitely varied in its phenomena, and it must be true. Is such faith our
real need, and is Wittgenstein attempting to respond to our need for
faith? At a deep level, I think so, although in different ways in the
Tractatus and the Philosophical Investigations.
If we look at the overall movement of the *Tractatus*, it becomes rather apparent that the ethical drive of it is to delimit the sphere of the thinkable by delimiting what we can say, and to do so in such a way as to lead the thoughtful reader to the point of recognizing who we are and our relation to the world or life. "I am the world. (The Micro-cosm.)" The "I" subject is, of course, the metaphysical subject, or logical form, and this shrinks to a point without extension leaving us only with the world. This "I" or subject is only manifested insofar as a proposition with truth value is thought, which propositions reach right out to the world, to what is thought about. Thus any particular proposition presumes the whole backdrop of logical form, is always, as it were, in the present, and pictures a particular fact against the whole backdrop of all that is the case. "To view the world *sub specie aeternie* is to view it as a whole—a limited whole. Feeling the world as a limited whole—it is this that is mystical" (Proposition 6.45). This feeling the world as a limited whole is, of course, not a thinkable proposition—any more than logical form is thinkable—since such propositions have no truth value. It is and must remain the backdrop which is only showable in thinking propositions which do have truth value. Nonetheless, it is showable as being presumed, even if we are not aware that we are so presuming, even if we are not aware of the mystical.

The comparison of this with Tolstoy's notion of faith is striking. Faith for Tolstoy, is not the acceptance of a dogma at least not at the writing of *My Confession*: any dogma or creed is a superstition, and for the most part destroys what it attempts to state. A dogma or creed can only be given in the face of others, and in so doing asserts of these others that they are wrong. Thus they divide men rather than unite them. Also, they could be false and so cannot be what men sincerely believe in. Faith, though, can be shown, and is indeed shown, by anyone who is alive and participating in life (the masses, or more particularly, the peasants). It is shown by those who live wholly in the present, but with the whole of the ongoing life of humanity as a backdrop. The aristocracy, insofar as they are parasites on life, living at the expense of others, the theologians, insofar as they think of themselves as talking straightforwardly about divine matters, the bureaucrats, insofar as they view themselves as sustaining and promoting a social, man-made, organizational structure, the judges and members of the legal system, insofar as they feel qualified to punish and reward, and thus put teeth into the laws men devise, are, all of them, vain. They all attempt to make life over in terms of their own interests, no matter how noble they think those interests are. Such people have not faced the emptiness of their lives (and this includes most of us), or, if they have, they continue to live as if they had not, and so have not arrived at the recognition that they are nothing, but that life is everything. Thus they, and we, are denying that we most sincerely believe in—our faith.

What then is our faith? First, to put the answer negatively, remember that Tolstoy says faith is what gives life a meaning which the recognition of our death cannot destroy. Tolstoy is very keen on this; it is a recurring theme in much of his post-confession work probably the most famous of which is *The Death of Ivan Ilych*, and is certainly the backbone of his *My Confession*. In the latter work, Tolstoy recounts his having been born into a position of great power and money, of his having gained international fame through his literary efforts, of his having a wonderful wife and family, and yet, in the face of all of this, how he began to brood over his eventual death, which brooding called into
question all he had been given and all he had attained, and drove his
to the verge of suicide. This destruction of his former life is vividly al­
Legorized in his My Confession by recounting an Eastern story of a
traveller on the steppe who is overtaken by an infuriated beast.

Trying to save himself from the animal, the traveller
jumps into a waterless well, but at its bottom he sees a
dragon who opens his jaws in order to swallow him. And the
unfortunate man does not dare climb out, lest he perish
from the infuriated beast, and does not dare jump down to
the bottom of the well, lest he be devoured by the dragon,
and so clutches the twig of a wild bush growing in a cleft
of the well and holds on to it. His hands grow weak and he
feels that soon he shall have to surrender to the peril
which awaits him at either side; but he still holds on and
sees two mice, one white, and other black, in even measure
making a circle around the main trunk of the bush to which
he is clinging, and nibbling at it on all sides. Now, at any
moment, the bush will break and tear off, and he will fall
into the dragon's jaws. The traveller sees that and knows
that he will inevitably perish; but while he is still clinging,
he sees some drops of honey hanging on the leaves of the
bush, and so he reaches out for them with his tongue and
licks the leaves. Just so I hold on to the branch of life,
knowing that the dragon of death is waiting inevitably for
me, ready to tear me to pieces, and I cannot understand
why I have fallen on such suffering. And I try to lick that
honey which used to give me pleasure: but now it no longer
gives me joy, and the white and the black mouse day and
night nibble at the branch to which I am holding on. I
clearly see the dragon and the mice, and am unable to turn
my glance away from them. This is not fable, but a verita­
ble, indisputable, comprehensible truth.

The former deception of the pleasures of life, which
stifled the terror of the dragon, no longer deceives me. No
matter how much one should say to me, "You cannot under­
stand the meaning of life, do not think live!" I am unable to
do so, because I have been doing it too long before. Now I
see that alone, because that alone is the truth. Everything
else is a lie. (21-22, Wiener translation).

What is it, then, which our personal death or our recognition of its in­
evitable can destroy? The answer is our individual lives, and the
value we struggle to attain and to preserve in those live. Faith then,
can have nothing to do with anything I value in life or any belief I
hold to be true. All such things are merely the drops of honey, the en­
joyment of which is destroyed by my inevitable death.

But this is a negative answer. The positive answer is more diffi­
cult to express. Tolstoy records in Chapter Ten of My Confession, that
his struggles were relieved somewhat only when he lived among the
poor, the simple, unlettered folk, the peasants.

And of such people who are deprived of everything
which for Solomon and for me constitutes the only good of
life, and who withal experience the greatest happiness, there
is an enormous number. I cast a broader glance about me. I examine the life of past and present vast masses of men, and I saw people who in like manner had understood the meaning of life, who had known how to live and die, not two, not three, not ten, but hundreds, thousands, millions. All of them, infinitely diversified as to habits, intellect, culture, situation, all equally and quite contrary to my ignorance knew the meaning of life and of death, worked calmly, bore privations and suffering, lived and died, seeing in that not vanity, but good.

I began to love those people. The more I penetrated into their life, the life of men now living, and the life of men departed, of whom I had read and heard, the more did I love them, and the easier it became for me to live. Thus I lived, for about two years, and within me took place a transformation, which had long been working within me, and the germ of which had always been in me. What happened to me was that the life of our circle—of the rich and the learned—not only disgusted me, but even lost all its meaning. All our acts, reflections, sciences, arts—all that appeared to me in a new light. I saw that all that was mere pampering of the appetites, and that no meaning could be found in it; but the life of all the working masses, of all humanity, which created life, presented itself to me in its real significance. I saw that that was life itself and that the meaning given to this life was truth, and I accepted it. (60-61, Wiener translation).

What then is the faith which gives life meaning? Life itself. Not a life lived according to the dictates of how we think it should be arranged, not a life where we lean on the struggles of others to give us our ease, but a life in which our whole energies are spent in creating and preserving life. The meaning of life comes to those who live it, not to those who question. For the brief moments Tolstoy could accept God, those moments when he had faith and lived with the masses, his horrible questioning would stop and he felt joyous. But those moments did not last long; again and again his questioning destroyed him. This questioning, though, led him to a point where he recognized that any concept of God is not God because it could be believed or not believed, and that was not what he was searching after. He was not searching for any understanding of God since that understanding is something he could accept or not accept, and in his present state he would have branded any understanding on "epicurean distraction"—a licking of the honey while the mice gnaw away at the branch to which we cling—and so would not have accepted it. What he was searching for was a life of meaning and value, and this he had only when he lived among the simple working classes. And thus his very powerful conclusions: God is life, and faith in God is life with meaning.

This notion of Tolstoyan faith, which is an acceptance of life, not a creed, and which comes in response to the recognition of our own vanity, a recognition brought on in Tolstoy's case by his broodings over his eventual death, and which finds that the only value in life is the whole of life, and thus which draws ones to live wholly in the present but within the backdrop of the whole of life, this notion provides a very crucial key to our appreciation of both the Tractatus and the Phil-
Thus the aim of the book is to draw a limit to thought, or rather—not to thought, but to the expression of thoughts: for in order to be able to draw a limit to thought, we should have to find both sides of the limit thinkable (i.e. we should have to be able to think what cannot be thought). . . . I therefore believe myself to have found, on all essential points, the final solution to the problems. And if I am not mistaken in this belief, then the second thing in which the value of this work consists is that it shows how little is achieved when these problems are solved (3-5).

To appreciate this passage fully, we should also understand the work of Schopenhauer and his attempt to draw a limit to thought. This though would take us somewhat off the track at the moment (we shall look at Schopenhauer presently.) Let it stand as sufficient to acknowledge here that both Wittgenstein and Tolstoy owe a great debt to Schopenhauer, and to ask instead how the aim of the Tractatus—drawing a limit to the expression of thoughts—makes any connection with Tolstoyan faith? In answering this, note first that Wittgenstein viewed his work in this book as philosophical, and then look to see what Tolstoy says regarding what the proper office of philosophy is. In Chapter V of My Confession, Tolstoy records what he found when he turned to experimental science (what we might today call "physical" and "social" science) and to speculative science (in particular, philosophy) in an attempt to find answers to his awful questioning.

Experimental science need only introduce the question of final cause, and nonsense is the result. The problem of speculative science is the consciousness of the causeless essence of life. It need only introduce the investigation of causal phenomena, such as the social and historical phenomena, and the result is nonsense.

Experimental science gives positive knowledge and manifests the greatness of the human mind only when it does not introduce the final cause of its investigation. And on the other hand, speculative science is a science and manifests the greatness of the human mind only when it entirely sets aside the questions of the consequenteness of causal phenomena and considers man only in relation to the final cause. . . . This science clearly puts the question: "What am I, and what is the whole world?" . . . And if it sticks firmly to the problem, it cannot do otherwise than answer to the question, "What am I and what is the whole world?", by saying "Everything and nothing"; and to the question, "Why?", by saying, "I do not know why". (30-31, Wiener translation).

While Tolstoy rather clearly shows his debt to Schopenhauer in this passage, the important point for us is that speculative science (philosophy) is clearly distinguished from the experimental sciences in that the office of philosophy is to put clearly our ultimate questions, "What am I, and what is the whole world? and why am I, and why is the whole
world?" and to answer the "what" questions by saying "Everything and nothing" while confessing ignorance to the "why" questions. Wittgenstein, by drawing the limit of the expression of thoughts through introducing the general form of proposition, which form must be shared by the world, has, in effect, responded to the "what" questions by saying "Everything and nothing" and has done so in such a way that he has both shown and confessed his (man's) ignorance about the "why" questions. But more than this he has clearly delimited all questions to the factual, and so in our recognizing this, has attempted to dissolve the problem. Thus, even the answer, "Everything and nothing" is not a factual answer to a factual question, but a philosophical or at least non-factual expression of what the vanishing of the problem would be if we could accept it.

Let me go into these points if only briefly. Note that the Tractatus begins with what Wittgenstein will later in Tractatus call a "mystical" expression of the wholeness of the world or life. "The world is all that is the case." (Proposition 1) But what is the world? The answer he gives is that it is the totality of facts. And what is a fact?—the existence of states of affairs. And a state of affairs?—a combination of objects. But objects, states of affairs, facts are not mere aggregations of items. They occur in logical space. Think of this as analogous to a mystical composition. A composition is not a mere aggregation of movements, themes, phrases, notes; something holds them together. That something we might call the "logic of the piece", or its "internal structure". When we struggle to understand a musical composition, what we are attempting to grasp is its logic or structure. Without an awareness of this structure, we may be able to identify particular notes—there's a B flat; there's a B natural—as well as particular movements, etc., but we still may not understand the whole composition—the all that is the case. What makes this "all" or totality mystical can be put two ways. First, the internal structure of a musical composition is not an element in it like its phrases, movements, or notes; it is all these things held together in a certain way. (On this view, the notes, or whatever, are not things which pre-exist their being put together by a composer, they are what they are in combination. Thus we cannot distinguish matter and form along sophomoric lines.) Logic or structure is internal to the things related, and so there is no other things which answers to the name of logic. When we expand this analogy to include absolutely everything we may begin to appreciate the delicate nonsense of what he has said. The way Wittgenstein breaks down his opening proposition would be analogous to saying that music is the totality of musical compositions, is phrases within compositions, etc., all of them held together through an internal structure or logical space which is the essence of music and which cannot be stated but only exemplified through a particular composition. Not terribly informative for someone who was unfamiliar with music (or the world).

To articulate the particulars of what facts must be and what their relationship is to states of affairs and objects, as well as myriad other topics along the same lines, would require a detailed discussion of Wittgenstein's debt to Russell and Frege and would only obscure the point of this paper. The important point I should like to draw attention to is that Wittgenstein "entirely sets aside the questions of the consecutive-ness of causal phenomena"—a Schopenhauerian way of saying what Wittgenstein would call factual questions—and clearly (if mystically) responds by saying that the world is everything. We have yet to see
that in a similar manner he will say the world is nothing, and will do the same for the question, "What am I?"

To see these other responses, and also to see more directly why his opening proposition is mystical, we must speak in a bit more detail about the limits of language, or the expression of thoughts. The core notion that comes through anyone's reading of Wittgenstein's remarks on these topics is that thoughts are propositions and are always pictures of what they purport to be about. (At least whatever else we may say about thoughts is unessential to the "speculative science" of logic.) What this amounts to is that a thought is itself a fact, and thus as much a part of the world as any other fact; what makes a thought (or proposition) different from other facts is not that it is internal to the mind, and thus distinct from the external world but rather that it represents a possible situation in logical space—the internal/external distinction plays no role in the Tractatus. In short, what makes a thought different from other facts is that it pictures something other than itself. Each such picture can stand apart from other pictures, but it cannot stand independently of what it is about, or independently of the possibility of other pictures. If a picture stood (made sense) independently of what it is about, truth and falsity (sense) would be destroyed; if it stood independently of the possibility of other pictures, truth functional compounds would be impossible, and there would be as many logics as there are pictures and the whole house of cards would collapse. When these points (and others) are laid out in detail in the Tractatus, we see that what any picture or proposition requires is logical form—the general form of a proposition—which allows it (and all truth functional compounds of it) to have sense, or to be true or false.

But here two very important points should be noted. First, logical form is not to be looked at as a kind of skeleton or framework which can be used for the building of pictures through the addition of some names. The correct expression in language for logical form is a variable which takes particular propositions as values, and shows how they may be compounded. Logic is internalized into the elements of a picture and is not itself an item; if it were, then the other elements would not be related producing a picture—instead, one would have a mere aggregation of elements. Second, I as a creature do not give sense to propositions, except in the very limited case where the propositions picture something about me. The self we talk about is in the world, not a subject. What Kant, Schopenhauer, et al., mistakenly took to be the subject (the self) when seen properly, is logical form. (With this move the psychologistic discussions of Kant and Schopenhauer have been replaced by logic.) But while older discussions did make such a mistake, it was not a mistake without point. Remember, logical form is what all propositions (including tautologies and contradictions as limiting cases) have in common, and what they have in common is that they are pictures of possible situations—they point beyond themselves. That pointing feature is crucial, but no psychologistic discussion of intentionality could even broach the subject. To even go so far as distinguishing logical form as being the subject, with logical space as being the ontological counterpart is to go too far, since this would suggest a merely accidental relationship between the two with the possibility that there might be one without the other, or that they might be different forms in some sense. But if either alternative were the case, there could be no senseful propositions, no pictures with truth value. Even with the possibility that the relationship between them was accidentally of the sort that propositions could pic-
ture situations, we are in no better shape, since if the relationship was accidental then it would be possible for it to be other than it is, yet no sense can be made of that. Logical form and logical space, then, must be logically (internally) related; to understand the one is to understand the other. Thus proposition 5.6: "The limits of my language mean the limits of my world". And since the metaphysical self is the limit of my language, it is the limit of the world. But since the limit is not a structure which could exist independently of what it limits—like a fence which could exist independently of what it encloses—but is internalized into the things themselves, the limit is, then, nothing other than the world itself. Thus proposition 5.63: "I am my world (the microcosm.)" Thus looked at one way, I am nothing since the metaphysical self is logic and the word 'logic' does not name anything; looked at another way, I am everything, the whole of the world, or life.

In this way, then, Wittgenstein has responded to the "what" questions Tolstoy (and Schopenhauer) poses for philosophy, and has responded to them along the lines Tolstoy has laid down. I am nothing and I am everything; the world is nothing and it is everything. These remarks strike me as absolutely crucial for any understanding of the *Tractatus*, since they take us as far as philosophy can go, for Tolstoy and Wittgenstein. In the sections which follow these remarks where Wittgenstein discusses formal logic, mathematics, and science, the aim seems clearly to show what he calls the "application" of logic to mathematics and science, and how none of these areas can move philosophy any nearer towards answering any of our problems (in particularly, I suspect, the "why" question of Tolstoy noted earlier.) Each of these areas, including formal logic, presume logic, and the best we can hope for in looking to them for answers to our "why" questions is that they may reveal (show) the internal interrelatedness which is logic. In the case of tautology, for example, since any tautology is true under any possible assignment of truth values, it is, as it were, about everything and thus about nothing in particular; thus tautology demonstrates the logical properties any proposition must have. And by demonstrating the logical properties of any proposition, it also demonstrates (remembering the representational character of language) the logical properties of the world, and (remembering the internality of logic) it demonstrates that "The world is all that is the case". Nothing, then, answers the "why" questions; the world, myself as subject, life, must be accepted without foundation or not accepted at all. Granted, he has not said anything that is senseful—true or false—but his goal of drawing the limit to the expression of thoughts, and through that, to helping us accept, as much as philosophy can, the unspeakable faith we already must have but do not quite accept—by doing this, that goal has been accomplished. Indeed, if his remarks were senseful, they would not be speaking from the standpoint of what the proper expression of faith would be, the acceptance of the world or life, and thus would lose the quality of an Augustinian or Tolstoyan confession in the sense of a statement, without justification of the meaning of life. Just as importantly, if his remarks were senseful, they would be the expression of a mere dogma. (C.F. Tolstoy's views on theology alluded to above.)

Arriving at this point, I can understand why Wittgenstein closes his Preface to the *Tractatus* by saying, "... the second thing in which the value of this work consists is that it shows how little is achieved when these problems are solved". In drawing the limit to the expression of thoughts in order to show, in part, that the self we so carefully hide
from the world, and at the same time, the self in terms of which we so vainly attempt to make the world over through half thought out ideas and half understood feelings, that this self is just another fact in the totality of all facts, and, in part, to show that our true self equals or is limited by this totality, in doing this, absolutely nothing has been done to make us choose our true self (life or the totality of all that is the case). Skepticism, in the sense Wittgenstein found important, which has very little to do with the Cartesian egocentric predicament, and which is more adequately revealed through Tolstoy's (or Augustine's) doubt, has not been refuted. Absolutely no reason can be given for accepting the wholeness of life without vanity, but the alternatives are clearly laid out. Either we must accept the wholeness of life as a miracle, or not. The skeptic, the poor fellow who stands immobile on the brink, can no longer seek a reason why; he must either leap or not. He must either accept the miracle of life, or despair. While it is clear that Wittgenstein wavered between these alternatives much of his life, it is also clear that the Tractatus comes down very heavily on the side of acceptance of the unprovable miracle—remember Proposition One.

In looking to the Philosophical Investigations to discover the correctives to the problems of the Tractatus, it is important to keep in mind what the thrust of the Tractatus is. If the Tractatus is an attempt to delimit the sphere of the sayable from within in order to picture for us what Tolstoyan faith would be if it were stated correctly, it would be reasonable to find this same motive at work in the Philosophical Investigations. But here the difficulties arise. If in the Tractatus the aim is to delimit the sphere of the sayable, because he was interested in something unsinn called "the world" or "life", what is the corresponding move in the Philosophical Investigations? If the delimiting is done from "within" in the Tractatus in the sense that the stance of an investigator examining his subject is eschewed, from which stance the question "Why?" could be asked, and is eschewed in favor of a non-foundational confession which begins with an unsinn expression of faith, what is the corresponding move in the Philosophical Investigations? If the correct expression of Tolstoyan faith denies the possibility of the presentation of a dogma, and does this in part by denying that there is any "thing" called self or logic to be dogmatic about, and denies any distinction between subject and object (mysticism in the proper, non-pejorative sense of that term) what is the corresponding move in the Philosophical Investigations?

Before responding to these questions I would like to make a few comments on other connected questions which will be helpful in making the move into the Philosophical Investigations. (Actually they are the same questions about what our real need is but put differently so as to bring certain facets of that need into prominence.)

First, in the passage from the Philosophical Investigations quoted at the beginning of this paper, Wittgenstein announced that the crystalline purity notion of the Tractatus constituted a mistake, and it was announced to be so precisely because it was a presumption or requirement. But a question arises here: Why is it that the fact that it was a presumption enough to constitute it as mistaken? Could it not be a correct presumption? We are now in a position to respond to this question. If the crystalline purity of logic was a preconceived notion, then the stated aims of the Tractatus has not been fulfilled and the presentation of dogma is the result. If the aim was to delimit the sphere of the
thinkable through delimiting the sphere of the sayable, and to do this from within, then if anything one could know or learn about logic or language is presumed, such a delimiting has not been accomplished and the whole house of cards falls. Using the figure introduced in the Preface to the Tractatus both sides of the limit to the expression of thought becomes thinkable, and so the limit has not been drawn. The crystalline purity of logic, as well as its presumption, would be just other facts and so on a par with any others and their statement, mere probability claims. Using more straightforwardly Schopenhauerian language, such a preconception allows for the possibility of raising the question why we should accept the notion that logic is crystalline pure, and an explanation or defense would at least be theoretically possible. As Schopenhauer says,

It is peculiar to philosophy that it presupposes nothing as known, but treats everything as equally external and a problem; not merely the relations of phenomena, but also the phenomena themselves, and even the principle of sufficient reason to which the other sciences are content to refer everything... It cannot be founded upon demonstrations, for they lead from known principles to unknown, but everything is equally unknown and external to philosophy. There can be no principle in consequence of which the world with all its phenomena first came into existence, and therefore, it is not possible to construct, as Spinoza wished, a philosophy which demonstrates from self-evident principles... My philosophy, at least, does not by any means seek to know whence or wherefore the world exists, but merely what the world is. But the why is here subordinated to the what, for it already belongs to the world, as it arises and has meaning and validity only through the form of its phenomena, the principle of sufficient reason. (The World as Will and Idea, Bk. One, First Aspect, Section 15.)

If we substitute the crystalline purity of logic for Schopenhauer's principle of sufficient reason, by excepting the crystalline purity of logic from the otherwise perfectly general question what the world is, he has destroyed that question, and the answer which comes in response is no answer at all. Using Tolstoyan language, such a preconception destroys the work as a confession of faith and introduces a dogma or creed instead, and all such dogmas or creeds are branded epicurean distractions or bits of intellectual vanity. Such a presumption then would make the Tractatus into the presentation, not of what all religions have in common, but of a creed which would stand alongside other creeds and would say of those who lived those other creeds that they were living a lie.

A second question closely connected to this is whether the considerations which led Wittgenstein to the recognition of the presumption constitute a non-presumptive discovery, or does his work in the Philosophical Investigations just introduce a new vantage point with new preconceived notions in place of the old. This is a much more difficult question to respond to, and particularly so if it is taken as a critical question, in which case responding to it would require a kind of stepping back from the text which I am not prepared to do here. But it is also difficult because we have not yet looked to the Philosophical Investigations and so have little basis from which to respond. This much,
though, we can say. If Wittgenstein in the *Philosophical Investigations* is offering a theory of language as many expositors suggest, then the *Philosophical Investigations* is no better off than the *Tractatus* on this score. Any theory by its very attempt to explain the world or life, to "make the pieces fit", is just as much a part of the problem as what is joined together by it. By the same token, though, if the *Philosophical Investigations* is to respond to "the fixed point of our real need", it must, like the *Tractatus*, draw the limit from within and so must presume something comparable to "The world is all that is the case". That is, it must presume the whole of life and not attempt to give it a foundation, and to the skeptic's question why we should accept life, it must dissolve that question when seen from the presumption of accepting the whole of life, or answer, "I do not know why", if that presumption is not made.

The third thing I should like to say is not a response to a question but to an earlier remark. That remark was that in this paper I would be attempting to drive home my contention that, both in the *Tractatus* and in the *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein was trying to accomplish something rather than explain something. While we are not yet in a position to be more open about that remark from the standpoint of the latter work, we are now much better positioned to speak more freely about it in reference to the *Tractatus*. The topic I am raising here is, of course, the "philosophy as therapy" notion which is generally associated with the *Philosophical Investigations*, and which is nowadays rather abruptly dismissed by such modern epistemologists as Quine. This is, to my mind, the most difficult and subtle topic of Wittgenstein's work. No doubt part of the difficulty with this topic is the extreme subtlety of it, but another difficulty is that the topic is generally addressed only from the few remarks Wittgenstein makes in the *Philosophical Investigations*, and all too often is discussed apart from the *Tractatus* and its Schopenhauerian and Tolstoyan underpinnings. While I cannot go into this topic very fully, I should like to make a few remarks which will prove helpful when we come to address the *Philosophical Investigations*.

To put what I want to say in a nutshell, what Wittgenstein was attempting to accomplish throughout his career was what Schopenhauer called an abstract statement of the nature of the whole world, a statement the acceptance of which, Tolstoy might say, is the beginning point of value in our lives. What this will mean will vary considerably from the *Tractatus* to the *Philosophical Investigations*, but the core notion will remain intact. At the time of the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein seems to accept Schopenhauer's distinction between empirical knowledge and rational knowledge, and in the sense of rational knowledge (*wissen*), this abstract statement can be known or realized. By the time of the *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein will come to the view that certain impediments stand in the way of something comparable to rational knowledge, impediments produced by grammatical illusions, and the job of philosophy will be to remove these impediments. This removal of impediments, is of course, the philosophy as therapy notion.

To see what I have in mind here, let's look first at Schopenhauer. For Schopenhauer, what distinguishes man from the brutes is his abstract knowledge (*wissen*).
The brute, on the other hand, is determined by the present impression; only the fear of present compulsion can constrain its desires, until at last this fear has become custom, and as such continues to determine it; this is called training. The brute feels and perceives; man, in addition to this, thinks and knows: both will. The brute expresses its feelings and dispositions by gestures and sounds; man communicates his thought to others, or if he wishes, he conceals it, by means of speech. (The World as Will and Idea, Bk. One, First Aspect, Sec. 8).

Thus, in a move away from Kant, both man and brutes are rational in the sense that they perceive according to the categories (although the Kantian categories are also altered by Schopenhauer) and can act on their perceptions, but only man can form an abstract knowledge (wissen), one expression of which is science, and can also act on that knowledge. The principles of this abstract knowledge are contributions the subject makes to perception, for both man and the brutes, and so are a priori, but by being known in the case of man, the possibilities for his acting are greatly increased; man can, for example, lay down plans for building a bridge, and can think forward to his own death. Since all men must know the principles which determine the world (in short, the principle of sufficient reason), the job of philosophy cannot be to tell us anything new. But since most of us live almost entirely in the concrete (discovering cures for cancer, finding better ways to improve our situation in the market place, etc.), the job of philosophy is to state abstractly what all men already know concretely.

We might indeed say that everyone knows what the world is without help for he is himself that subject of knowledge of which the world is the idea; and so far this would be true. But that knowledge is empirical, is in the concrete; the task of philosophy is to reproduce this in the abstract, to raise to permanent rational knowledge the successive changing perceptions, and in general, all that is contained under the wide concept of feeling and merely negatively defined as not abstract, distinct, rational knowledge.

In this passage Schopenhauer is talking from the aspect of the world as idea. But he will show later, that under the aspect of the world as will, the principles which all men know, and which act as guides to conduct, do not put man (the subject) in a causal relation to the world—the will causing us to act. For example, it is only under the world as idea that we may look at the principles in terms of which bridges are built as directing the actions of the builder. But once we realize that the causal principles used, say, in bridge building, are subsumed under the universal causal principle which is itself subsumed under the principle of sufficient reason, once we realize that these principles are principles of the world precisely because they are aspects of the knowing (wissen) subject, and that therefore they cannot be used to relate the subject to the world, once we realize this, we also realize that knowledge of the will just is knowledge of the body acting in the world, and by extension the whole world.

Lastly, the knowledge which I have of my will, though it is immediate, cannot be separated from that which I have of my body. I know my will, not as a whole, not as a unity,
not completely, according to its nature, but I know it only in its particular acts, and therefore in time, which is the form of the phenomenal aspect of my body, as of every object. Therefore the body is a condition of the knowledge of my will. Thus, I cannot really imagine this will apart from my body. In the essay on the principle of sufficient reason, the will, or rather the subject of willing, is treated as a special class of ideas or objects. But even there we saw this object become one with the subject; that is, we saw it cease to be an object. We there called this union the miracle par excellence, and the whole of the present work is to a certain extent an explanation of this. (The World as Will and Idea, Book Two, First Aspect, Sec. 18)

The abstract knowledge of this, as it is worked out in the course of The world as Will and Idea, will lead Schopenhauer and, he would say, other knowing subjects, to the recognition that the will "finds itself" an individual in a boundless world, and must continually create objects of desire in order to survive, with death its final goal. We continually work in order to satisfy ourselves but we can never fully do so else we would stop willing. Thus we are forever unsatisfied and, contrary to Leibniz, this becomes the worst of all possible worlds. With this recognition, then, abstract knowledge becomes manifested in denying the will to life.

Wittgenstein, I want to suggest, was enormously struck by this, but with very fundamental differences. The first is that he was quite opposed to the psychologistic mold Schopenhauer uses to frame his work. (This we noted earlier.) A second difference hinges somewhat on how we are to interpret the denial of the will to life. If we are to interpret Schopenhauer as espousing asceticism in the sense of self denial then there is an enormous difference between Wittgenstein and Schopenhauer. If, however, we interpret that denial as a denial of the fundamental opposition between self and will and the world, then there is much similarity. It would be inappropriate to take the time, here, to look carefully at the Schopenhauer texts to settle this matter, but I must say, in passing that the former way of reading him seems to make hash of the texts. But the comparison between these two men that is most important for us here is that the distinction Schopenhauer makes between concrete or empirical knowledge and abstract rational knowledge is reborn in the Tractatus as the distinction between kennen and wissen.

Even a cursory review of the passages in the Tractatus containing the words kennen and wissen will reveal that their usage is not accidental, and that wissen is used for what is showable (logic) but not sayable, and kennen, for the meaning of names and for facts (things extra-logical, although not independent of logic). Certainly, knowledge in the sense of wissen is not assertable—perhaps we should add, not assertable sensefully, i.e., such assertions cannot be pictures and so cannot be true or false—but that does not mean they are not knowable, and thus they compare most favorably to Schopenhauer's notion of abstract rational knowledge. Tautologies are knowable but the assertion of a tautology is sinnlos: identity claims are knowable, although it seems clear that their assertion would not be sinnlos, and if not sinnlos, the only other alternative seems to be unsinn. The relationship between these non-assertables would be an interesting topic but cannot be gone into here. Would "I am my world." (5.63) be an identity claim and so a
"mere representational devise" which says "nothing about the meanings of the signs 'a' and 'b'? (4.242).

The implications of this distinction are staggering. We can (and do) have a knowledge of logic and thus of the world/self, although not in the sense of knowledge of fact. Such a knowledge cannot be expressed psychologistically as Schopenhauer had attempted since that would make it knowledge of a fact (kennen), and this knowledge must encompass the whole range of the possibility of facts. Thus, of course, it cannot be stated sensefully since senseful propositions are either true or false, yet we cannot countenance what the falsity of this knowledge would be. It can be shown though, and is indeed shown each time a senseful proposition is thought. (Indeed, as Wittgenstein suggests in his "A Lecture on Ethics", the only proper expression in language for this wissen knowledge is the whole of language.) Since each of us already knows how to speak, the pointing out of this knowledge is pointing out what each of us already knows. It is in this sense, then, that the knowledge of logic is mystical. But in so completing logic, in showing us our mystical knowledge, has Wittgenstein given us Tolstoyan faith? Not at all. By completing logic he has denied the theologian any factual knowledge of religious matters; religion can no more be looked upon as having anything to do with doctrine or creed, although what theologians are attempting to say through such creeds has now been said. But to understand fully what has been said is to throw such wissen knowledge away in the sense of rising above it. What this means, quite simply, is that we rise above this knowledge and live mysticism, a mysticism each of us already lives but so vainly struggles against. This is the philosophy as therapy notion in the Tractatus.

To see this same movement of thought at work in the Philosophical Investigations is even more staggering. The philosophy as therapy notion in this latter work, however, undergoes a transformation, primarily because the crystalline purity of logic has been given up, or rather, because it is looked upon as a superstition produced by grammatical illusions. Without the crystalline purity of logic there can be no wissen knowledge to find expression for and so to rise above—the therapy notion in the Tractatus. But as these grammatical illusions are investigated, something comparable to the movement of the Tractatus begins to emerge. What anything is, is going to be pictured through a description of a possible situation, and what the picture shows is that thing's internal relations with all else in the situation (the language game), and this includes language itself. Language is no longer a picture of facts but part of what is pictured. This very picturing is, now, what Wittgenstein does in order to remove an illusion, and not what he discusses. The very things philosophers are inclined to say about about rules, pains, language, etc., and even wissen knowledge, indeed, anything we are tempted to say about the "logos" of life, is grist for the philosopher's mill and is to be "investigated" through pictures of possible situations or through allusions to such pictures. Thus the mysticism of logic presented in the Tractatus, the acceptance of which leads to value becomes, if anything, more profound in the Philosophical Investigations where it is denied. To use a figure made famous by Isaiah Berlin in his discussion of Tolstoy, the hedgehog of the Tractatus is performing the work of the fox. No general claims of logic are to be permitted, and instead, what those claims are attempting to say will be pictured through asystematic descriptions.
But at this point two very important questions arise. First, from what vantage point does Wittgenstein give his pictures? Is his activity on a par with the activities he pictures, i.e., is his activity a part of life, or is it in some way different, and if different, in what way is it different? Second, why is language so important a part of this philosophical activity? If in asking my dinner companion to pass the salt, that companion, the salt shaker, etc., are just as essential to the activity at hand as my request, why is it that language, the request, is pulled into prominence by Wittgenstein? Why not the other elements in the situation? In addressing these questions, while we are still attempting to address the philosophy as therapy notion as this applies to the Philosophical Investigations, it should also be noted that we are now at the very nub of questions raised at the beginning of this paper. That questioning might be summarized by asking what the "real need" is which both the Tractatus and the Philosophical Investigations are a response to, a need which cannot be addressed externally, i.e., through presuming anything about what life must be and yet must presume the whole of life as an article of faith, a need which is filled by what all men know (in some sense of 'know') and yet what cannot be expressed in any creed, and lastly a need which is fulfilled by the recognition of our union with life, a union which is not destroyed by the recognition of our eventual death.

We have seen that for the Tractatus the proper expression in language for this need, this Tolstoyan faith, is the whole of language which can only be given in the form of a variable which takes any proposition as a value. Yet since the Tractatus expression presumed the crystalline purity of language which allowed for the (wissen) knowledge of the unity of life, there cannot in Philosophical Investigations be anything like such an abstract statement the acceptance of which could constitute what I only know to call a mystical union with the world or life. But this difference not withstanding, the other parameters of Tolstoyan faith just mentioned remain in effect, and here the problem arises. Even if we presume, as many of us are inclined to do, that the therapy activity of the Philosophical Investigations consists in removing the barriers, in the forms of logical or grammatical superstitions, which presume man as a somewhat self-contained ego capable of having propositional knowledge about the logic of the world and his relationship with it, a knowledge the mere having of which would destroy Tolstoyan faith, even if we presume that the therapy activity is wholly negative in this way, this seems to allow the "therapist" some vantage point from which he can recognize a superstition, a vantage point of life. The problem then, is simply this: How can such a vantage point be possible, given all the negative work Wittgenstein has engaged in?

While this formulation of the problem is particularly Wittgensteini-an, in general outline it is one shared by a number of writers of this period, including but not limited to the great Russian writers one of whom was Tolstoy. Isaiah Berlin, in his The Hedgehog and the Fox discusses the view of history in Tolstoy's preconversion novel, War and Peace, and says some things which with modification, offer considerable help in understanding this problem of Philosophical Investigations. In what follows I should like to note a few of the things Berlin has to say about Tolstoy and to tie them in with some passages out of the Investigations in order to respond to the question at hand.
In this most illuminating and sensitive essay on Tolstoy, Berlin paints a portrait of Tolstoy as a part of an anti-intellectual intelligentsia in Russia, an intelligentsia which includes such notables as Herzen and Turgenev. What places Tolstoy in this movement is that he both asked himself the all important moral question how men ought to live, and yet worked to discredit any universal answer as a possible response. It is essentially in carrying on this activity that Tolstoy becomes a very tragic figure. As a critic of any monolithic truth which would once and for all answer the problems of ultimate moral need, Tolstoy is unrelenting. But in the face of this unrelenting criticism, Tolstoy remains, nonetheless, in desperate need for some idea, some simple truth which would escape his devastating critique. And thus the title of Berlin's essay, *The Hedgehog and the Fox*. The fox perceives the world not from a unitary vision, but in its multiplicity. According to this vision people do not act according to some overall plan or purpose, a battle plan, say, in time of war, or social framework in time of peace. If they attempt to, they become hollow shells. Rather, what moves us to act are unique feelings in unique situations and in unique interactions with others. This is what Tolstoy is so gifted at displaying in the narrative parts of the novel. The hedgehog, on the other hand, sees some flow to the course of things, and if he is good, a flow which does not deny but rather unifies the infinite and unique individuality of daily affairs. According to Berlin, Tolstoy was a supreme fox who longed for the vision of a hedgehog.

The view of history which Tolstoy returns to again and again in the course of *War and Peace*, and particularly in the non-narrative philosophical sections, is properly understood, according to Berlin, as Tolstoy's attempt to express what history must be in light of his sense of the uniquely individual character of things and events. In commenting on Maistre, to whom Tolstoy owes a great debt, Berlin gives a sympathetic characterization of Tolstoy's longed for vision of the hedgehog.

Practical wisdom is to a large degree knowledge of the inevitable: of what, given our world order, could not but happen; and conversely, of how things cannot be, or could not have been, done; of why some schemes must, cannot help but, end in failure, although for this no demonstrative or scientific reason can be given. The rare capacity for seeing this we rightly call 'a sense of reality'—it is a sense of what fits with what, of what cannot exist with what; and it goes by many names: insight, wisdom, practical genius, a sense of the past, an understanding of life and of human character. (69).

And Berlin sees this vision of "understanding life" and "human character" pointed to most powerfully in the lead characters of Tolstoy's novels of this period. In questioning what Pierre, Prince Andrey, and Levin discover in the course of their lives, and what is lost on Napoleon or Oblonsky or Karenin, Berlin responds,

We are here plainly intended to see that these 'heroes' of the novel— the 'good people'—have now, after the storms and agonies of ten years and more, achieved a kind of peace, based on some degree of understanding: understanding of what? Of the need to submit: to what? Not simply to the will of God (not at any rate during the writing of the great novels, in the 1860's or 70's) nor to the 'iron law' of
the sciences; but to the permanent relationships of things, and the universal texture of human life, wherein alone truth and justice are to be found by a kind of 'natural'—somewhat Aristotelian—knowledge. . . . We—sentient creatures—are in part living in a world the constituents of which we can discover, classify, and act upon by rational, scientific, deliberately planned methods; but in part (Tolstoy and Maistre, and many thinkers with them, say much the larger part) we are immersed and submerged in a medium that, precisely to the degree to which we inevitably take it for granted as part of ourselves, we do not and cannot observe as if from the outside: cannot identify, measure and seek to manipulate; cannot even be wholly aware of, in as much as it enters too intimately into all our experience, is itself too closely interwoven with all that we are and do to be lifted out of the flow (it is the flow) and observed with scientific detachment, as an object. (70-1).

In spite of the fact that Wittgenstein shows little interest in history, and in recognition that both he and Tolstoy will disavow that what they were attempting to find expression for could be known (even in the sense of wissen knowledge) I find a great deal of similarity between Wittgenstein and Tolstoy on this point. Quite clearly, a major portion of the Philosophical Investigations is "investigative" in Wittgenstein's sense; that is, after some philosophical/logical point is introduced about what "must" be—usually as a consequence of some earlier investigations—Wittgenstein introduces questions, stories analogies, etc., to redirect, and sometimes force, the attention of the reader, and writer, to everyday situations (language games). By doing this, the particular philosophical/logical claim under investigation is shown to be a superstition, seldom a mistake; it is shown to be an improper expression, a distortion, of the facts. This most readers of Wittgenstein are aware of. But the interesting question is from what vantage point are the questions, stories, analogies, and sometimes commands, given. The answer, I would like to suggest, is the man of practical wisdom Berlin discusses and Tolstoy paints in his novels. Whatever we want to call him, he is one who can see through the superstitions to the reality those superstitions are attempting to capture.

And Wittgenstein does not leave us altogether in the lurch in recognizing this all important feature of the Investigations. In the closing pages of Section xi of Part II of the Investigations, Wittgenstein talks about 'expert judgment' concerning the genuineness of expression of feeling.

Is there such a thing as 'expert judgment' about the genuineness of expressions of feeling?—Even here, there are those whose judgment is 'better' and those whose judgment is 'worse'.

Correcter prognoses will generally issue from judgments of those with better knowledge of mankind.

Can one learn this knowledge? Yes; some can. Not, however, by taking a course in it, but through 'experience'?—Can someone else be a man's teacher in this? Certainly. From time to time he gives him the right tip.—This is what
'learning' and 'teaching' are like here.—What one acquires here is not a technique; one learns correct judgments. There are also rules, but they do not form a system, and only experienced people can apply them right. Unlike calculating-rules.

What is most difficult here is to put this indefiniteness, correctly and unfalsified, into words.

"The genuineness of an expression cannot be proved; one has to feel it".—Very well,—But what does one go on to do with this recognition of genuineness? If someone says "Voila ce que peut dire un coeur vraiment epri"—and if he also brings someone else to the same mind,—what are the further consequences? Or are there none, and does the game end with one person’s relishing what another does not?

There are certainly consequences, but of a diffuse kind. Experience that is varied observation, can inform us them, and they too are incapable of general formulation; only in scattered cases can one arrive at a correct and fruitful judgment, establish a fruitful connection. And the most general remarks yield at best what looks like the fragments of a system. (227-28).

Could it be that, here, in these closing pages of the Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein is saying obliquely what Tolstoy and Berlin have worked to express, and that this is the experience needed to write the Philosophical Investigations as well as what it is designed to give us? I am convinced he is, but to show this is most difficult since the passage and surrounding remarks are among the more cryptic of the Philosophical Investigations, and since the whole last half of Section xi is acknowledged by him to be illuminated by the first half of that section, his discussion of perception, and in particular, of 'seeing as'. While it would be beyond the scope of this paper to go into a detailed discussion of this whole section, I should like to make a few remarks to set the context in order to illuminate the main gist of the passage just quoted.

If we grant that from the vantage point of the Philosophical Investigations, the Tractatus was built on superstitions (not mistakes), it would seem reasonable that the later work would attempt to correct those superstitions and find a proper expression for what the Tractatus put incorrectly. In following this hunch and looking to the Philosophical Investigations we may note a number of things. Just as in the Tractatus where the schematic cube is introduced to comment on the "experience" that would be needed to understand logic, so also, the discussion in the Philosophical Investigations of seeing aspects is used to comment on the experience that would be needed to understand the work there. But unlike the Tractatus where the experience is a mystical insight, in the Philosophical Investigations the notion of experience is more like "varied observation". To see this, note that Wittgenstein announces in the latter work that the discussion of seeing aspects and of the possibility of aspect blindness are important because of the connection between this and experiencing the meaning of a word. (214) But if "experience" were something one has, say like a toothache, what would it mean to experience the meaning of a word, particularly after Wittgenstein has worked so hard for over 200 pages to have us look at meaning as use, and not,
among other things, as a psychological item, an experience? When we look to the remarks on seeing aspects to discover the sense of experience he has in mind what we find is, first, that the seeing of aspects is contextualized such that seeing is not organizing elements (a psychological/philosophical claim) but reading books, playing games, etc. The second thing we note, at least in the majority of cases, is that the seeing of an aspect in these curious drawings involves a familiarity with the things we see them as. I couldn't very well see a duck in the duck-rabbit drawing unless I knew what ducks were. (218) But that familiarity is not with items stripped out of their natural surroundings but with things in contextualized surroundings (language games). The crucial point this touches on is that the experience which would be needed to see the duck in the duck-rabbit drawing is not a universal, a species 'duck', nor an organization of elements, but the practical experience each of us has, which experience comes through the uniquely individual situations we have each of us lived through, and of our ability to see "family resemblances" between those unique settings. A third thing we may note is that the cases introduced are special and that not all seeing is seeing an aspect. Given the proper background and the proper setting, I can request that you find the duck in the duck-rabbit drawing, but for all that, one doesn't take the cutlery at a meal for cutlery, and the request to do so would not make any sense. (195) The crucial point here is that one might live, remembering Schopenhauer, altogether in the concrete, or within the flow, remembering Berlin, with reference to ducks, i.e., ordering duck at a restaurant, watching cartoons about a duck with a lisp, hunting duck, etc., and be altogether blind to the duck aspect of the drawing. To see the duck aspect depends upon, and is not the same as being able to move from case to case, to be able to go on, to see family resemblances; it requires the awareness of all of this, and is a move to a higher order experience.

When we look to the discussion of experiencing the meaning of a word, the analogy between seeing aspects and these experiences become apparent. The examples Wittgenstein introduces in discussing experiencing the meaning of a word are cases like reading a poem or narrative with feeling, walking the environs of a city and feeling as if the city lay on one side, etc. Certainly, he introduces cases like saying the word "March" first as a command and then as the name of a month, but these cases, like the cases of seeing aspects, are raised to point out, first, that what we are saying when we announce these things play a part in some contextualized setting, and second, that such experiences require familiarity with the natural settings (the primary meaning) of commanding someone to march, etc. Lastly, of course, experiencing the meaning of a word is not something we are always doing when we speak or are spoken to. Just as we are not always struck by the three-dimensionality of things in our day-to-day activities where we nonetheless display our mastery of a variety of techniques such as reaching for the doorknob, etc., so also do we not always experience meaning. On page 208 Wittgenstein is talking about seeing a triangle with one side first as apex, then as a base, and he says the following.

"Now he's seeing it like this", "now like that", would only be said of someone capable of making certain applications of the figure quite freely.

The substratum of this experience is the mastery of a technique.
But how queer for this to be the logical condition of someone's having such-and-such an experience! After all, you don't say that one only 'has a toothache' if one is capable of doing such-and-such.---From this it follows that we cannot be dealing with the same concept of experience here. It is a different though related concept.

It is only if someone can do, has learnt, is master of, such-and-such, that it makes sense to say he has had this experience.

And if this sounds crazy, you need to reflect that the concept of seeing is modified here. (A similar consideration is often necessary to get rid of a feeling of dizziness in mathematics.)

We talk, we utter words, and only later get a picture of their life.

Notice that he is here not only saying that experiencing the meaning of a word, of getting a picture of their life, logically depends upon talking or uttering words just as seeing the triangle now like this, now like that, is dependent upon the mastery of a technique, he is also saying that talking and uttering words does not always involve having "a picture of their life". Most often when I am asked at dinner to pass the salt, I just pass it.

But even granting the similarities between experiencing the meaning of a word and aspect seeing, we may still want to ask what's all the bother, why introduce this concept of experience at all. Remember, in the early context of the Tractatus, the schematic cube was introduced to say something about logic, about the self and the world, and about the experience which would be needed to understand all this. Is there a corresponding move in the Philosophical Investigations? I am convinced there is. In the closing pages of Section xi where Wittgenstein is discussing the notions of meaning something and intending something, one finally begins to see the whole point of that section, and with that, I suggest, the whole point of the Philosophical Investigations. One of the big points that comes out in this discussion of intention (thought, motive, feeling) is that, even though intention, for example, is not a something, an experience--"If God looked into our minds he would not have been able to see there whom we were speaking of" (217)--language, in the sense of referring to someone, and by extension, telling jokes, giving orders, etc., would be dead without it (them) and it is these uniquely human "qualities" which makes language language. "If a lion talked I would not understand it" (223). (Snoopy in the comics might talk, but so also does he dance and chase the Red Baron.) But what is lacking in a lion or a light switch such that no matter what they said, they would not have said anything? Well, the lion's mouth is all wrong and his tongue too floppy for him to be confused, or to say something in earnest, or to tell an amusing story. And the eyes, they show no laughter. They may be sleepy or vicious, vacant or alert, but there are limits. Pull the pose of a drill sergeant commanding a squad of troops to march. Now imagine a lion doing the same and you see the difference. The light switch is even worse, for where could the eyes be? Or the determined jaw? Or the puffed up chest? Were I a cartoonist I could
draw a light switch commanding troops, but then I would also have to show the pride, the arrogance, the authority. And I would do this, perhaps, by giving it (him) eyebrows and a posture of a certain sort. Can we not see from this that to get a picture of language is to get a picture of human life?

The gaining of this picture of language, which presumes the "mastery of a technique" as its substratum, puts language in a very prominent place, and for a very special reason. While in one sense language (words) is just something else in a language game and has whatever meaning it has by being internally related to all else in the context, in another sense language is human life. Thus to understand in the full human sense is to understand man in all the individual contextualized settings which go to make up our lives, and is to understand what fits with what, what can lead to what, and what not. Thus to understand man and his relationship in the world is to understand language, and this understanding can be given by the man of "varied experience" through the giving of tips (language games or allusions to such) although any statement of this would look at best, like "the fragments of a system". It cannot be given generally or in a neat system, since, of course, everything is different.

This, I am convinced, is the therapy notion as it operates in the Philosophical Investigations. Wittgenstein, this man who came to teach us differences, was not interested in a nihilistic critique of philosophy although his positive work could not come out without such a critique; he was not interested in philosophy as therapy, at least in the sense of curing us of the thought that there is anything worth thinking about in philosophy, but was interested in a therapy which responded to our "real need", a need which we might express in terms of the questions "Who am I?", "What is life?", and "What am I to do?"; he was not, though, like Tolstoy, who saw only nihilism in his preconversion novels and thus still longed for a unitary vision but who stumbled whenever he tried to express that vision, he was not a fox longing to be a hedgehog, but a hedgehog who could perform his Prometheus mission only by playing the part of a fox; and above all, he was not a mathematical logician who happened to say some cryptic mystical things at the end of an early work (or a mystic who got sidetracked into logic) and who threw away that early work in his later work but a logician/mystic in his early work who had a goal which he realized he had not reached and so had to repeat to correct superstitions in the hope of teaching us (and himself) what we need to learn.

One final comment. We saw earlier that the very fact of the presumption of crystalline purity was enough to undo the work of the Tractatus. But now the question is whether the Philosophical Investigations is itself presumptive. The conclusion I have come to is that yes, indeed, it is. But I offer this not as a criticism. What must be presumed to understand the Philosophical Investigations is what anyone who raised an ultimate question would be willing to grant. Remember, Tolstoy records in his My Confession:

My life came to a standstill. I could breathe, eat, drink, and sleep, and could not help breathing, eating, drinking, and sleeping; but there was no life, because there were no desires the gratification of which I might find reasonable. . . . I could not even wish to find out the truth, because I
guessed what it consisted in. The truth was that life was meaningless. (Ch. IV).

What Wittgenstein is presuming in his *Philosophical Investigations* is the eating and sleeping Tolstoy alludes to, or what Wittgenstein might call "the mastery of a technique". Our "real needs" are indeed strange. What we need is what we already have but cannot accept. Because we cannot accept life, it does absolutely no good for somebody to tell us that life is eating, etc. We know that, and that is the problem. By the same token since our need is for what we already have, it does no good for someone to tell us something new, as so frequently happens in philosophy. Anything new would be just as much leveled by our real need as what we now know. The only way to respond to our real need would be to tell us something anew, but that is no easy task. Were Wittgenstein nihilistic in his therapy, he would be taking the first alternative. Were he doing something comparable to science, he would be taking the second. His work did neither of these and is helpful only for those who search to be human, for that is our real need.

ENDNOTES


2 Actually, the issue is even more complex than this analogy suggests. The elements of a fact, as well as the expression of a situation, do not, as it were, lie in wait to become part of a fact or proposition. Names are only names in the context of a proposition; objects are only objects if they have the possibility of being named. Likewise elementary propositions are so only if they have the possibility of being combined truth functionally.

3 Crucial to this mysticism is the relation between the self and the world. This will be introduced presently. The two elements of mysticism I am interested in at this point are, first, that what the mystic (logician) is keen on communicating is not some factual truth but what allows for the possibility of any factual truth and second, that the mystic (logician) cannot give us new information but, as it were, can only tell us what we already know even if we have not found expression for it.

4 The limiting cases are, of course, tautology and contradiction.

5 A possible exception to this rather clear distinction is that *kennen* is also used in connection with knowing all the possible occurrences of objects and knowing the internal properties of objects. (These amount to the same claim.) Both of these occurrences seem to indicate a knowledge of something logical rather than a recognition of some thing. Also, the comparison of this with 6.2322 seems to raise a problem but I cannot pursue it in this paper. An adequate working out of this problem would, I suspect, collapse the distinction between *kennen* and *wissen* in a Schopenhauerman manner and leave us only with *kennen*.

6 This allusion will be gone into more fully in a moment. All I mean at this point is that the synoptic vision of language and life presented
as *wissen* knowledge in the *Tractatus* is critiqued by appeal to individual situations called language games. As we shall see later, though, Wittgenstein will continue to struggle to find expression for a new vision of the hedgehog, a new synoptic vision.

7 The *Hedgehog and the Fox* was first published under its present title in 1935 by Weidenfeld and Nicolson in London, and by Simon and Schuster in New York. Page references, however, will be from a new four-volume collection of Berlin’s writings by Penguin Books, edited by Henry Hardy and Aileen Kelly. The particular volume which includes this essay is entitled *Russian Thinkers*.

8 One of the big differences, Berlin notes, between Maistre and Tolstoy at the time of *War and Peace* (and, we might add, between Tolstoy of this period and of the period during which he wrote *My Confession*) is that Tolstoy felt that history could, in principle, be written, that it was scientific, if we knew more of the minute particles which go to make it up.