ABSTRACT. Saul Kripke is struck by a skeptical argument which he says is neither Wittgenstein's nor his own. I call this new skeptic "Saul Wittgenstein". SW's conclusion is that there is no such thing as following a rule. My first aim is to show that Kripke misunderstands the *Investigations* when he says it offers a "skeptical solution" to SW's paradox. Wittgenstein's view of philosophy commits him to a dissolution of the paradox. I show next that LW's writing contains an implicit dissolution of it. Finally, I point out the main lesson to be derived from Kripke's discussion—namely, that there is nothing which is common and peculiar to what we call following a rule.

Reading the *Philosophical Investigations*, Saul Kripke was impressed by a skeptical argument he says is neither Wittgenstein's nor his own; it is "rather Wittgenstein's argument as it struck Kripke".1 Taking a suggestion of William Callaghan's, I call the proponent of this argument and problem "Saul Wittgenstein" or "SW" to prevent his being confused with his less paradoxical "brother" LW. For the benefit of those who have neither heard Kripke's stimulating talk nor read his published version of it, I will outline SW's arguments and position. (It is possible that Kripke would not accept my account of them. If so, I ask that the arguments and views be considered on their merits, independently of Kripke, and for the light they may shed on Wittgenstein and skepticism.)2

SW's bizarre conclusion is that there is no such thing as following a rule; hence there is no language, no meaning—no nothing—not even tiddleywinks. For language, science, games, as well as many other activities require that you be able to follow rules. Kripke maintains that a central task of the *Investigations* is to offer a solution to this new paradox. He characterizes LW's proposed solution as a skeptical one, remarking that it is in this respect like Hume's "solution" to the problem of induction. His contention is that it is a skeptical solution because, like Hume, LW does not think the skeptic is wrong: in a way he accepts SW's doubts. Thus (Kripke continues) rather than offer a refutation of SW, LW presents an alternative picture by focusing on the questions: Under what conditions would you say or when are you justified in saying (and when are you not justified in saying), that somebody is following a rule, or has learned, say, addition? and What role do such things play in our lives? (86–87).
Kripke is right that LW does offer an alternative picture and focuses on different questions. Yet it is misleading, if not positively false, to say that LW offers a "skeptical solution" to SW's paradox, since he in no way accepts SW's doubts and in fact implies that the skeptic is wrong. Saying he offers a skeptical solution mistakenly suggests that solution is unsatisfactory, or at least that he is dissatisfied with it and that it is not as good as the "solution" he wanted to find. Kripke himself remarks that a skeptical solution fails to show "that on closer examination the skepticism proves to be unwarranted"; it concedes "that the skeptic's negative assertions are unanswerable" (66). I would like to make three points in this regard. First, LW's view of philosophy commits him to a rejection of the skeptic's position—in his view, philosophical problems are merely pseudo problems and skepticism is a confused position. Second, LW's writings contain an implicit dissolution of the paradox. Finally, I try to point out what I take to be the main lesson to be derived from Kripke's discussion of Wittgenstein on rules and private language—namely, that there is nothing that is common and peculiar to instances of following or obeying a rule, whether the rule be that of addition or any other rule.

SAUL WITTGENSTEIN'S SKEPTICAL ARGUMENTS

SW begins his argument by pointing out that all the calculations that people have performed have been with numbers smaller than some number n. Simplifying, let us suppose that for me n = 57. Suppose now that I give 125 as the sum of 68 plus 57, believing (a) that 125 is the sum of these numbers and (b) that my calculation accords with my previous intentions as to the use of the plus sign or with what I previously meant by '+'.

SW grants that (a) is true, for he does not begin by questioning mathematics (13). But, he objects, either I am mistaken about (b) or I may be or could be mistaken about (b). Skeptic number one says: in accord with my previous intention, I "should have said '5'" (15). He charges that I had a bizarre experience—under the influence of LSD, in a frenzy, or something—that resulted in a sudden change in my usage or in my misinterpreting my previous ideas. By '+' I had not previously meant addition; "I always meant quus" (9), or 'e', where \( x \circ y =_{df} x + y \) if \( x \) and \( y \) are less than 57, and otherwise equal 5. He might equally well have said that I meant any of an infinite number of other functions, either mathematical or non-mathematical. For example, I might have meant the 'many' function, where \( x \) many \( y =_{df} x + y \) if \( x \) and \( y \) are less than 57, and otherwise equal many; or I meant the 'cross' function, where \( x \cross y =_{df} x + y \) if \( x \) and \( y \) are less than 57, and otherwise equal the sign of the cross. Perhaps realizing that, logically speaking, there is no end to the number of functions I might have meant, skeptic number two more cautiously inserts 'maybe', or some synonymous expression, into the extreme claims and arguments of skeptic one. That is, "perhaps in the past I used 'plus' and '+' to denote the quus function" (8; see also 13, 15).

These initial formulations of SW's problem make it sound like a purely epistemological problem: How can I know—can I ever know (12, 21), establish (21), or justify (13, 23)—what rule I am following or what I mean by a word? Yet SW's problem is not "merely an epistemological
problem" (38). He wants also to raise a doubt about the related metaphysical issue—whether there is a fact about me meaning addition by 'plus', and if so, what the nature of that fact is. Presumably it is such a fact about me, and only such a fact, that will settle the epistemological question of what I meant by '4'.

WHY LW CANNOT ACCEPT SW'S SKEPTICAL POSITION

From the Tractatus on, Wittgenstein held that philosophical problems result from misunderstanding our language. (See 4.003, 4.0031, 6.5, 6.51, and 6.53.) Philosophical problems and paradoxes have "the form: 'I don't know my way about'" (I 123). They are always symptomatic of some misunderstanding of our language, never genuine problems. The "solution", or rather dissolution, of such pseudo problems is achieved by discovering how and why the logic of our language has been misunderstood. You do this by engaging in a linguistic investigation directed at uncovering the mistake and its causes, replacing wild conjectures and explanations "by quiet weighing of linguistic facts" (Z 447). That is why he says: "The work of the philosopher consists in assembling reminders for a particular purpose" (I 127). For the problems in philosophy are solved "by looking into the workings of our language, and that in such a way as to make us recognize those workings... The problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always known" (I 109). Wittgenstein's stated aim is to eliminate the philosophical muddle, to remove the misunderstanding (I 109), or, more colorfully, "To show the fly the way out of the fly bottle" (I 309). "My aim is: to teach you to pass from a piece of disguised nonsense to something that is patent nonsense" (I 464)—for example, to show you that "Scepticism is not irrefutable, but obviously nonsensical, when it tries to raise doubts where no questions can be asked" (Tractatus 6.51).

The dissolution of SW's paradox

Before dealing directly with SW's paradox, it may be instructive to see how LW attacks a closely related paradox in I 201. "This was our paradox", he writes: "no course of action could be determined by a rule [call this C], because [P] every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule". Kripke quotes this sentence (7), but fails to follow it up with the next sentence in which LW resolves the paradox. Wittgenstein's resolution: "The answer was: if everything can be made out to accord with the rule [P], then it can also be made out to conflict with it. And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here."

How are we to understand Wittgenstein's cryptic reply? I take him to be giving a reductio of the false premise, P, that every action can be made out to accord with any rule. This premise was used to support the paradoxical conclusion, C, that no action can be determined by a rule. We are to suppose that P is true only to show that it cannot be. Sup-
posing P, we get the surprising and absurd result that smoking and not smoking, for example, can both be made out to accord with the rule "no smoking". But then both smoking and not smoking must also conflict with the rule, since, by definition of 'accord' and 'conflict', what is in accord is not in conflict and vice versa. Generalizing, we arrive at the absurd conclusion that whatever we do—whether it be A or not-A—it will be both in accord as well as in conflict with some rule, which makes a hash of the distinction. P, then, cannot be true because it implicitly denies that there is a distinction between actions that are in accord and those that are in conflict with a rule. Yet it is a fact that if a certain action, A, is in accord (or in conflict) with a rule, then there is another type of action, not-A, that is not in accord (or in conflict) with that rule. The paradox in I 201 depends on overlooking this grammatical fact about rules.

But LW also takes issue (I 198, 201) with a particular conception of what it is to act according to a rule. On this conception, every action according to a rule is an interpretation of it by some other rule; so there cannot be a way of grasping a rule that is not an interpretation of it. This leads to an infinite regress. If to act according to a rule, you must always interpret it by some other rule, then the same goes for acting according to that second rule; and so on without end. It will then be impossible to act according to a rule, contradicting the grammatical fact mentioned above. LW concludes I 201 by pointing out that what we call "obeying a rule" and "going against it" are ways of grasping or understanding a rule that are not interpretations of it. Obeying a rule is a custom (use, institution) (I 199). He remarks earlier (I 85) that a rule is like a sign-post. It may sometimes leave room for doubt about the way I have to go, and thus require an interpretation; but it does not have to. And it is in order if, under normal circumstances, it does not leave room for doubt about the way I have to go (I 87). Wittgenstein is not saying that there is a time when rules cannot (logically) be further interpreted. But rather that often their further interpretability does not even occur to us. In such cases we simply act either in accord or not in accord with a rule without interpreting it and, a fortiori, without interpreting it by reference to some other rule. (See, e.g., his Philosophical Grammar, sec. 99, 147.)

In I 220, LW also rejects C, or the claim that no rule can determine an action. He writes that a certain action may be logically determined by a rule, or in some sense necessitated, whether or not it is causally determined. Thus if asked to write down the sum of 68 plus 57, those who have mastered the use of the plus sign will recognize—if they are reasonably good adders, attentive, and so on—that there is a sense in which they must (logically) write down '125' as the answer. But that does not mean that someone who can add is causally determined to write down this number. A person who has mastered the use of the plus sign may refuse to add these numbers, or, being a bad or careless adder, give the wrong sum. Incidentally, it was failure to recognize this distinction that led Thor in What's New, B.C.? to pass the ball after going beyond the line of scrimmage in an American football game. He has been told you cannot do this. Misunderstanding, Thor said he wanted to see if he could—whether it was possible for him to do that. I turn next to the criticism of SW's skeptical arguments.
A REFUTATION OF SKEPTIC NUMBER ONE

This skeptic supplies no reason for supposing that I had a bizarre experience, took an intoxicant drug, or worked myself into a frenzy, resulting in my misinterpreting my previous ideas and in a sudden change in my usage. He does not claim to have seen me taking acid, acting funny, frothing at the mouth, blacking out, and so on. There is only the suggested argument that all these things could have happened. As he says, "the sceptic's hypothesis is not logically impossible. . . . it does not seem to be a priori impossible" (9). But it is not a good argument to say "So and so happened because it is not a priori impossible or it is logically possible that it did". That is why the following dialogue is ridiculous. "Why should I believe what you said?" Answer: "Because there is no contradiction in it". If that were accepted as a good reason to believe something, you would have an equally good reason to believe its negation, assuming the original proposition is not a logical truth; so such so-called reasons cancel each other out. Moreover, if we had to doubt everything that is not logically true, we would have to doubt all empirical propositions—not just (b)—including the proposition that we understand anything. We would therefore have to doubt that we can entertain any doubt, which is absurd and ultimately undermines the doubt we profess (C 111, 450). In short, you neither give a reason for believing a proposition by establishing that there is no contradiction in it nor for doubting one by showing that it is not logically true. Finally, it is worth noticing how inconsistently unskeptical skeptic number one is about my previous intentions. If he is really persuaded by the suggested argument, he should not talk so knowingly about my previous intentions. A skeptic who was firmly convinced that we cannot know what we previously meant by a sign would not claim to know what someone meant by it. I charge that skeptic number one's position both lacks support and is incoherent.

Surprisingly, SW seems to agree. For he goes on to remark: "Of course this bizarre hypothesis, and the references to LSD, or to an insane frenzy, are in a sense merely a dramatic device" (10). His point is that the rule exhibited by my previous calculations "could just as well have been the rule for quaddition (the quus function) as for addition. The idea that in fact quaddition is what I meant, that in a sudden frenzy I have changed my previous usage, dramatizes the problem" (11). So the skeptic, in his more cautious mood, does not really want to say I meant quus rather than plus any more than he wants to say I meant plus rather than quus: he does not know what fact would establish any claim of this kind (13). Let us therefore dismiss skeptic one as not the real SW. His role was merely to introduce some drama into the discussion.

A REFUTATION OF SKEPTIC NUMBER TWO

On one interpretation, this skeptic's position is trivially true. He says I might or could have been mistaken about (b), that my usage might have changed suddenly. This is true: these are logical possibilities. But if he wishes to contend that this fact gives me a reason to doubt my previous intentions, what I previously meant by '+' and that it is therefore an open question what I meant by it, then his position merely repeats the bad argument that I criticized in the previous section. Apparently, then, skeptic number two can be dismissed along with
skeptic number one. Neither has yet given an acceptable reason in support of doubting our past intentions. But as LW stresses, doubts and suspicions require grounds (C 4, 458, 323). Until SW provides us with a good reason to doubt what we meant by 'plus', we have no skeptical problem that needs to be solved.

It may be objected that this reply to the skeptic takes the easy way. What I ought to do is to give reasons showing that my calculation accords with my previous intentions as to the use of the plus sign or with what I previously meant by '4'. If my past calculations are equally compatible with both hypotheses, is it not arbitrary to say I meant plus rather than quus? Moreover, I must make my case in a non-question-begging way. Thus I cannot just assume that I remember, in the success sense of the word 'remember', that I meant to add and not to quus. Skeptic number two can be interpreted as implying that this challenge cannot be met, even when no limitation is put on the kinds of evidence that can be cited. To see whether this is so, let us first ask what the criteria are for the way a sign is meant.

LW answers, "It is, for example, the kind of way we always use it, the way we are taught to use it" (I 190). Again, in reply to the question, "How are we to judge whether someone meant such-and-such?" he says, "The fact that he has, for example, mastered a particular technique in arithmetic and algebra, and that he taught someone else the expansion of a series in the usual way, is such a criterion" (I 692). Well, judged by the usual standards, I long ago mastered the use of the plus sign, and I have even taught someone else how to use it in the usual way. Indeed, I learned how to add in the second grade, and to follow the rule of addition is simply to do what I was taught to do then when given addition problems. My teachers, parents, classmates, and I all agree on this. But did not learn how to quus until 1976—many years later—when I heard Kripke's talk. Moreover, my learning how to quus depended on my already knowing how to add, since Kripke explained, and even defined, quusing by comparison to the notion of adding.

It might be thought that this point is undermined by the fact that Kripke could have defined plusing by reference to quusing and some other function, say, glusing, where \( x \text{ glus } y = a_x x + y \) if \( x \) and \( y \) are greater than 57, and otherwise equal 5. Since we know from Kripke that \( x \text{ quus } y = a_x x + y \) if \( x \) and \( y \) are less than 57, and otherwise equal 5, Kripke could now define plusing by reference to quusing and glusing as follows: \( x \text{ plus } y = a_x x + y \) if \( x \) and \( y \) are less than 57 and \( x \text{ plus } y \) if \( x \) and \( y \) are greater than or equal to 57.

What we should notice, however, is that the function glusing was itself explained to us here by reference to plusing; so the whole discussion still presupposes that we begin with an understanding of what it is to plus.

There may be a temptation to object that I have made use of various success words when marshalling my evidence for saying I learned how to add. I said, for instance, that I "mastered" the use of the plus sign, was "taught" and "learned" how to add in the second grade. Accordingly, it may seem that I am violating the stricture mentioned above against assuming the point at issue against SW. But this is not so. Although I did use these words in their success sense, the evidence cited in no way implies (b). For I may not have meant addition by '4' yesterday, a year, or even ten years ago, even though I did mean that in elementary school and once mastered the use of the plus sign.
But then is my evidence not inconclusive and weak as well, and my conclusion arbitrary? No, to both questions. First, the word 'arbitrary' does not signify 'inconclusive', in the sense of not being logically demonstrable. To say that something is arbitrary is to say that it arises from will or caprice, or that it is random and without reason—and none of this applies to the case under consideration. Secondly, my evidence is not weak, since it includes not only what I was and was not taught and what I learned, but also the way those fluent in the language would describe my actions. A natural description would be to say that I was adding when I did those past calculations, not that I was quusing, despite the fact that either rule would have given the same results. And if the dramatic number one skeptic comes back to browbeat me into saying I was actually quusing, we should note how misleading his description of my act is, since it is clear that I did not quus intentionally and I was at no time aware that that was what I was doing.

Finally, I shall refute the skeptic's contention that maybe, all along, I was nevertheless—albeit unconsciously—following the rule of quusing. Two tests together suffice to show that I was not. First, if I was quusing, then I previously took '+' to mean '∅'. Accordingly, I should have answered yes to the question whether \( x + y + z \) could ever equal \( x + y \), where \( x, y, \) and \( z \) are all positive integers; for example, \( 100 + 100 + 1 = 100 + 100 \). But if I denied, as I undoubtedly would, that \( x + y + z \) could ever equal \( x + y \), if \( x, y, \) and \( z \) were all integers greater than 0, surely this would be strong evidence for saying that I did not previously mean '∅' by '+'. Note that while this argument rules out that I was quusing and some other things, it does not rule out an infinite number of other possibilities.

Consider now the second test. Suppose, again, that I had been following the rule of quusing. Then after I heard Kripke's lucid formulation of the rule, would I not have recognized that this was the rule I was following all along? Yet I say I did not recognize this. Indeed, when informed of this rule of quusing, I sincerely denied that I was ever trying—consciously or unconsciously—to make my conduct conform to it. This fact, together with the results of the other test, normally suffice to eliminate quusing as the rule I was following when I performed my past calculations. By a similar line of argument we can eliminate, one by one, the other possible hypotheses imaginative logicians like SW might come up with, even though, taken individually or together, passing the two tests fails logically to imply that I was adding. I conclude that it is certain, i.e., beyond doubt, that I meant addition by the plus sign when I carried out those past calculations.

The rebuttal, of course, hinges on there being a clear distinction between acting in accord with, and acting in obedience to, or following, a rule. (We already find this distinction in LW's Philosophical Grammar, sec. 61, 101.) At least two things seem to differentiate these from one another. First, when you follow a rule, the rule guides your behavior; thus it plays a causal role in bringing about what you do. ("Reasons as causes.") Such is not the case when you merely act in accordance with a rule. To illustrate: some may wish to say that Alexei Karenin acted in accordance with the dictates of his religion when he decided not to cast off Anna Karenina, who had committed adultery; yet these people would be making a mistake if they added that he also followed the dictates of his religion in adopting this course of action. Excluding the possibility
of backward causation, then, such considerations obviously could not have played any causal role in producing his decision. Secondly, you either know right off what rule you are following or you come to know it simply by being presented with a reasonably clear statement of the rule. Thus if I sincerely denied that I had been trying to make my past behavior conform to a rule clearly presented to me, this would normally suffice to establish that I had not been following that rule. But this response would not even be relevant to the question whether my previous behavior was in accordance with the rule.

THERE IS NOTHING THAT IS BOTH COMMON AND PECULIAR TO FOLLOWING OR OBEYING A RULE

SW, if I understand him correctly, would object that the answer given still does not constitute a deductive, a priori argument that when I give 125 as the sum of 68 + 57, my calculation accords with what I previously meant by ' + '. My sincerely claiming that I remember I meant to add does not prove that I did. Again, if it is a fact that I said to myself yesterday that I then intended to add the smaller numbers, I may yet never have had such an intention, for I may in the past have meant by 'adding' what I now mean by 'quusing'. As LW himself remarks, even thinking you are obeying a rule does not imply that you are (I 202). Indeed, citing all my thoughts, experiences, calculations, behavior, along with the beliefs and experiences of others, does not logically imply that I am not mistaken about my past intentions and past usage, since the totality of such evidence is logically compatible with the hypotheses that by '+' I previously meant the quus function.

This last point is correct, and in I 185 LW suggests he agrees. But it is a mistake to suppose that, because LW mentions no fact, or nontrivial truth-conditions, that could prove whether a person meant quus, plus, cross, many, blue, or something else by the plus sign, he must somehow accept SW's doubts and concede to him that there is no fact that I meant plus. That would be like saying there is no fact that someone has a headache if we cannot, as seems to be the case, give nontrivial truth conditions for someone's having a headache. Yet a matter that is not beyond all possible or imaginable doubt need not be doubted and indeed may be beyond doubt (I 213, 84). It may even be known, for as Hamlyn rightly observes, "What we claim to know must be true and based on the best of reasons. But by the best of reasons is not meant proof".6

Moreover, since it is true that I did mean plus, there is, to use Kripke's word, the echt fact that I did, and no reason to think that LW would deny such a truisum. "It is true that p" and "It is a fact that p" are just alternative ways of saying the same thing, as Kripke himself seems to acknowledge (86). So even if LW agrees "with the sceptics that there is no 'superlative fact' (I 192) about my mind that constitutes my meaning addition by 'plus' and determines in advance what I should do to accord with this meaning" (65), this in no way implies that LW must hold that there is no fact about my mind—or better, about me—that constitutes my meaning addition by 'plus'. The qualifier 'superlative' should not be ignored. Unfortunately, Kripke seems to suppose that it does imply that there is no fact about anyone's meaning some definite function by a certain sign (65; see also 69, 71). It is significant, however, that he can nowhere quote any actual denial by LW that there are
such facts. This is because no such quotations are to be found in Wittgenstein's writing. It would also be inconsistent for LW to deny this, for the following reasons that Kripke himself mentions:

In denying that there is any such fact, might we not be expressing a philosophical thesis that doubts or denies something everyone admits? [The denial would thus contradict I 599, quoted above in section II. Further:] We do not wish to deny the propriety of an ordinary use of the phrase 'the fact that Jones meant addition by such-and-such a symbol', and indeed such expressions do have perfectly ordinary uses (69).

In summary, a crucial difference between LW and SW is this. While LW holds that there must be way of determining whether you are obeying a particular rule (I 202), SW requires that this way constitute a logical proof. He is not content that we have criteria for meaning addition by '+' or for following a rule. That there are tests, such as those mentioned, to differentiate between the plus and quus hypotheses does not satisfy him. It still leaves him with his initial doubt. Like the foundationalist, SW wants to obtain the unobtainable. Hence he demands non-trivial truth-conditions for following a rule, such that, if they are satisfied, the rule must (logically) be followed, and if not, the rule must (logically) not be followed. Similarly, he wishes to be told what is common and peculiar to meaning addition by the plus sign. In effect, SW either wants these things to be defined the way we define what it is to be a circle or at least to be given interesting truth-conditions for them, as we do for combustion. (Obviously, we can provide trivial truth-conditions, e.g., "Jones means addition by '+' if and only if Jones means addition by '+'").

The implied answer of LW is, first, that this cannot be done (see I 138-242). (His remark that following a rule is a practice (I 202) is not meant as a definition.) We cannot give that sort of definition of meaning addition by the plus sign or of what it is to follow a rule, or even give the truth conditions for somebody's doing such things, any more than we can define, or give truth conditions for, a game, edibility, and countless other things. Indeed, the point hold generally for all "family-resemblance" predicates. In all of these cases there is also an infinite possibility of defeasibility.

Kripke, in agreement with LW, points out, for example, that we cannot give a dispositional analysis of what it is to follow the rule of addition, arguing that such an analysis is subject to the fatal objections both that it overlooks the fact that adders make mistakes and that our dispositions are themselves finite. He also interprets LW—again I think correctly—as denying that meaning addition by '+' is nothing but an irreducible mental event, experience, sensation, or feeling (see I 557, 592, 675-76, 678). Thus in LW's view, meaning addition by '+' cannot be identified with either a dispositional or an experiential fact. So we cannot define, or even specify the necessary and sufficient conditions of, what it is to mean addition by reference to a series of counterfactuals or subjunctive conditionals, or by some sort of experiential statement.

The second part of LW's answer is that there is no need to provide such analyzes, or truth conditions, in order to refute the skeptic's doubt. For we can identify games, edible food, and instances of someone
following a rule, or meaning addition by the plus sign without having to overcome insurmountable difficulties. As LW observes, in some fields—for example, mathematics—we do not even have disputes "over the question whether a rule has been obeyed or not" (I 240).

A skeptic may object at this point that LW's account of "following a rule" deprives the expression of a definite sense. If having a definite, or determinate, sense means having stable nontrivial truth-conditions that are jointly necessary and sufficient, then the phrase of course only will have an indefinite sense. But then so will many—indeed the vast majority of—declarative sentences in every natural language. So it would be well for philosophers to give up their demand that linguistic expressions have determinacy of sense, in the traditional sense explained. Interestingly enough, this is just what Kripke, like LW, himself seems to do in his own philosophical writings. Kripke quite sensibly does not conclude that this must leave reference "completely mysterious", but it seems that his "relative" SW—unlike LW and Kripke—cannot bring himself to give up this demand. SW insists from the start, and repeats the demand consistently, that a nonskeptical answer to the skeptic "must give an account of what fact it is (about my mental state) that constitutes my meaning plus, not quas" (11, my italics; see also 21, 22, 39, 54, where he again uses the word 'constitutes'). This is really to demand that only a truth-conditions account of what it is to mean something by a word or to follow a rule will be an adequate account of it. When SW considers the response that meaning addition by 'plus' is a state of a unique kind of its own, not reducible to anything else, he counters that this "leaves the nature of this postulated primitive state—the primitive state of 'meaning addition by "plus"'—completely mysterious" (51).

Should we conclude that the sense of 'following a rule' or 'meaning something by a sign' is vague or unclear? And how are we to explain the sense of such expressions? LW replies that "we are dazzled by the ideal" (I 100). It does not follow that there is anything vague or unclear in these expressions. We explain what it is to follow a rule, or to mean something by a sign, the way we do—by giving examples. Nor should we give in to the temptation to object that we should be able to do better than that—in particular, that we should be able to say more than that. For that presupposes that the explanations of sense that we give are somehow not good enough. The great philosophical difficulty here, as elsewhere in philosophy, according to LW, "is to say no more than we know" (The Blue Book, 45). The discontent with our explanations rests on their not conforming to preconceived Humean notions of clarity and of explanation, in which complex ideas must ultimately be defined in terms of simple ones. This ideal continues to dazzle philosophers. We see, then, how profoundly mistaken it is to liken LW's reply to the skeptic to Hume's and to speak of his offering a "skeptical solution". As LW nicely sums it up: "The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the conflict between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, not a result of investigations: it was a requirement)" (I 107). It is also a requirement of our philosophical skeptic, SW, who seems to bear little family resemblance to LW.
Saul A. Kripke, *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language: An Elementary Exposition* (Harvard University Press, 1982), 5. The first 113 pages of this book are an expansion of Kripke's talk, "Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language", at the First International Wittgenstein Symposium at the University of Western Ontario in 1976. All page references are to this text unless otherwise indicated.

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This was pointed out to me by Richard J. Hall.

Stanley Heckman brought this point to my attention.


Carol Slater has pointed out to me that Kripke, for example, doubts whether we can ever give necessary and sufficient conditions for reference, holding that such a philosophical analysis of reference is very likely to fail. See *Naming and Necessity* (Harvard University Press, 1972), 94.