ABSTRACT. This paper distinguishes six elements in the Platonic concept of rationality as it appears in the Republic: (a) being fully informed; (b) thinking logically; (c) having the single correct ultimate end; (d) determining the appropriate means; (e) matching action to thought; and (f) promoting one's own interest. The evidence linking the rational part of the soul (the logistikon) to each of these aspects is discussed. The philosopher-guardians are shown to exemplify full and complete "Platonic rationality", whereas the unjust men in books 8 and 9 exhibit different degrees of failure to conform to the six elements listed above.

Rationality is such a rich concept that it would be difficult to capture it completely. However, if one does so with no pretense of exhaustiveness, one can still offer the following as a paradigm of the rational agent. He or she is fully informed and has correctly derived the conclusions which are entailed by that information. As a result, he or she has determined the correct ultimate end and has arrived at appropriate means for attaining that end. He or she is always acting on the basis of such deliberations and never fails to follow the course of action they indicate. Finally, he or she is acting to promote his or her self-interest. In this paper I will argue that in the Republic Plato is working with just this concept of rationality. The novelty in this analysis is not, of course, the claim that Plato is talking about rationality in the Republic. The surprise is the extent to which Plato fills in the details of precisely what "rule by reason" involves.

One reason rationality is worth a closer look is the prominence of the terms "rationality" and "rational" in discussions of Plato. For instance, in his Plato's Moral Theory, to cite a most distinguished recent example, Terence Irwin takes Plato's main concern to be determining what is rational rather than describing morality as we might understand it. Plato, says Irwin, "wants to know what in general it is rational for someone to do". In the course of his book, Irwin uses "rational" in several distinct senses. A craft is rational because it is a clearly articulated and explicable means leading to a definite end. A desire, on the other hand, is rational when it has been formed by deliberation about the agent's overall good. However, there are some sections of Irwin's book in which a desire counts as rational only when it depends upon a conception of the good shaped through a process of "ascent". Irwin also considers the view that a set of principles is rational for an agent only if it contributes to the agent's happiness. Though Irwin's use of
"rational" is careful and precise, the reader may not always be sure for a given occurrence just what the exact force of the term is supposed to be. Irwin himself makes use of these different meanings. For instance, after pointing out that the unjust men in books 8 and 9 are acting in accordance with their "rational plans", Irwin ultimately argues that these men's desires are not really rational after all, at least in the "good-dependent" senses given above. In addition to such nuances in a single author, the student of the Republic will also find different commentators attaching quite different meanings to the term. When, for instance, John Cooper speaks of "the good-itself" as "a perfect example of rational order, conceived in explicitly mathematical terms", he is employing "rational" in a sense different from the ones we have seen Irwin using. In short, there seems to be ample scope for an explicit discussion of "Platonic rationality".

A caution is in order. The English word "rational" does not exactly translate, and is not precisely equivalent to, any Greek word or expression. Though certain terms and phrases, such as "logistikón" [λογιστικόν] and "κοσμά λόγον", are sometimes translated "rational" or "rationally", they are not exact equivalents for those English expressions. The main concern of the present paper, rather than semantic analysis in either Greek or English, is making a start on a clarification of the elements of rationality as Plato portrays them in the Republic. In Section I I will look at the evidence in book 4, where the logistikón is distinguished as one of the three parts of the soul and its roles are introduced. In Section I I I I will set out and describe six aspects of rationality. For each aspect, I will discuss further evidence outside book 4 linking the logistikón to it. I will also look at how the Platonic philosopher-guardians exemplify each aspect of rationality. An important part of that inquiry will be contrasting them with the unjust men described in books 8 and 9. With the help of these different approaches, we will be able to delineate the Platonic concept of rationality as it figures in the Republic.

Plato's discussion of the three parts of the soul in book 4 of the Republic is unsatisfactory on many counts. Much of it is only a sketch. One can also wonder how it squares with the psychological analyses implicit or explicit in other books, especially with regard to the nature and role of the logistikón. However, while there is no doubt room to complain about the imprecision of the division and about the key points it leaves up in the air, a surprisingly detailed picture of the logistikón can be developed on the basis of Republic 4.

To begin with, the logistikón as introduced in book 4 is the faculty which has knowledge. We have been prepared for this at the very introduction of the question whether or not the soul has parts, since one of the psychic activities mentioned is learning. The logistikón is the faculty by which the individual has the virtue of wisdom (442c5) and is itself explicitly said to be wise in 441e4. The association with wisdom also comes out in the parallel with the polis. It is the guardians who make the polis wise (428e7-429a3), and the ευδοξία involved is "some kind of knowledge [ἐνιστήμη τις]".

I
As for the content of this knowledge, the logistikon has "the knowledge of the advantageous both to each [of the three parts of the soul] and to the common whole of the three of them" (442c6-8). The same message seems to be conveyed in 441e5, where the logistikon is said to have "forethought on behalf of the entire soul". When the term "forethought [προμνήθια]" is used in a similar connection in the Gorgias, it occurs in the phrase "forethought of the best concerning the soul". Here in the Republic, the logistikon will know what will produce the proper "alignment" of the soul's parts. However, the logistikon's knowledge is not narrowly focused inward. It is necessarily going to cover a wide range of external matters as well, involving relations with others and the community. For one thing, as Cooper points out, this knowledge has to be the same knowledge which is possessed by the guardian class and so makes the polis wise. That knowledge is described as being about how the polis "may best deal both with itself and with the other poleis" (428d1-3). Thus, in a way one might not have expected, the scope of the logistikon's knowledge is portrayed in book 4 as being very broad, extending even to foreign policy.

In addition to having knowledge, the logistikon is also what may be called deliberative. This idea is already conveyed by the label "logistikon", which is the name Plato usually uses for it. In 439d5-6 the label is explicitly linked to its being that with which one "reckons [λογισταί]", though the latter word is vague and can cover many different kinds of calculation and ratiocination. A clearer link with deliberating comes in 442b7, where the description "βουλευόμενον" is specifically applied to the logistikon.

Just what does the logistikon deliberate about? In 441cl-2 it is characterized as "that which has reckoned [αναλογισάμενον] about both the better and the worse". Given the other things Plato says, the better and the worse must include the better and the worse for the soul and its parts. The parallel with the polis suggests that it reasons about the means to achieve the best for the soul, in the same way that the guardians deliberate about how the polis should best conduct itself (428c11-d3). Unfortunately, Plato gives so few details about his centerpiece example involving the desire to drink that it is not very illuminating for our purposes. He does not tell us why the person does not drink; he just says that the restraining comes "εκ λογισμοῦ" (439d1). However, since such cases are described as frequent (439c4), Plato would surely mean it to cover ones in which the logistikon is resisting drinking on the grounds that the drink is unhealthy, i.e., cases in which the logistikon has concluded that downing the draught is not a means conducive to good health.

Given the plausibility of thus attributing deliberation about means to the logistikon, it is also plausible that the logistikon possesses an end or ends. Accordingly, it must be capable of arriving at, or at least of recognizing, such ends. We can even go further than this. Plato makes it clear what the logistikon's end is: it is the good of the soul and its parts.

Another thing which emerges from book 4 is that the logistikon is directly involved in causing and preventing action. We get the full range of control words. The role of the logistikon is to rule. It is to be the master while the appetites are to serve as the slave (444b4-5). The discussion of the logistikon's operation is also marked by active ex-
pressions and metaphors. The logistikon is first introduced as what "drags against" the thirsty soul, while something else in the soul carries it toward drinking (439b3-5). Plato employs the illustration of an archer, an image which involves physical pushing and pulling (439b8-11). Additionally, in saying that its action comes "ἐκ λογισμοῦ" (439d1), Plato seems to be distinguishing the logistikon's active role in preventing drinking from the thought process which leads to it. It is true that the details are not spelled out. It is also true that there are other kinds of talk here: the logistikon bids and encourages too. Nonetheless, in book 4 the logistikon is not just involved in ratiocination and deciding. There is already a direct link between thought and action.

This link between thought and action also figures in the conception of justice developed in book 4. Although it is not a matter of external action, a soul is just only if the logistikon has managed to actually exercise control in bringing about the proper relationship among the soul's parts. Plato distinguishes this condition from temperance, the state in which the parts just think the same about which part should rule and which should be ruled (442c10-d3). As is well known, not to say notorious, Plato also claims that the proper alignment which the logistikon brings about in the soul will translate into actions which are just by conventional standards. Despite the controversy which has arisen in recent years concerning this claim, there seems to be little doubt in Plato's own mind that action will match thought in this way.

Control by the logistikon is also envisioned in book 4 as being the best state for the soul. This claim is already foreshadowed by the description of what the logistikon knows, since if it knows what is advantageous for the whole soul and for each part, it is natural to assume that the soul will benefit if the logistikon rules. This point is underscored by calling virtue "a kind of health and beauty and good condition of the soul" (444d13-el). The implication of these words is that the soul is in the best condition it can be when the logistikon rules.

To sum up, in book 4 the logistikon has been portrayed in somewhat fuller terms than one might have supposed. The reasoning faculty is both cognitive and directly involved in action: it has knowledge, it calculates, it has the good of the soul as its end, it deliberates about means to that end, it translates thought into action, and it brings about the best state of the soul. To be sure, there are gaps and things which Plato does not make fully precise. But the logistikon has emerged much more fully drawn than a quick reading of Republic 4 might suggest. The next section will show how this conception of the logistikon is developed in the rest of the Republic.

II

As a way of introducing this part of the discussion, we will look at a passage which occurs in connection with the Allegory of the Cave. Socrates is speaking:

Is this not probable, and necessary from what has been said before, that neither can those who are uneducated and without experience of the truth ever adequately superintend the polis, nor can those who are allowed to pass their time as perpetual students, the former because they do not have
one end in their life at which to aim everything they do in both a private and a public capacity, the latter because they will not act willingly, believing that they have already taken up residence in the Islands of the Blessed while still alive? (519b7–c6)

This passage involves almost every aspect of the Platonic concept of rationality as it appears in the Republic. The full concept includes:

(a) being fully informed;
(b) thinking logically;
(c) having the single correct ultimate end;
(d) determining the appropriate means;
(e) matching action to thought; and
(f) promoting one’s own interest.

Each of the items on this list has already figured in book 4. We will now go on to look at each aspect of rationality in detail. Then it will become clear how in the passage just quoted Socrates is accusing his targets of irrationality of various kinds. We will also show how Plato’s philosopher-guardians exemplify full and complete rationality.

One issue which will be intentionally slighted in what follows is the question of the independence of these different aspects from one another. The reader may feel that there is considerable overlap among them, and admittedly the list could be trimmed by consolidation. However, the temptation to tidy things up will be resisted. First, the various aspects are in fact more independent than might appear initially. It is possible to construct scenarios involving failure with regard to just a single one. Second, and more important, Plato’s own practice lends itself to analysis under all these different headings. Hence, whatever conclusions one may ultimately choose to draw about the elegance of the list, the full version can be illuminating in discussing what Plato is doing in the Republic.

Further, in discussing the various aspects we will not make use of the frequently useful distinction between objective and subjective rationality. This distinction is parallel to the distinction in ethics between objective and subjective rightness. Objective rationality involves full conformity to some absolute standard, whereas subjective rationality can be displayed by an agent under such conditions as imperfect information or the like. For our purposes, the notion of subjective rationality is not needed, since the Platonic concept is an idealized one corresponding to full objective rationality. There are, to be sure, limitations on the rationality of the Platonic philosopher-guardians. These limitations are the ones imposed by the embodied human condition and by the need to deal with the sensible world. We could, of course, treat the philosopher-guardians coping with the sensible world as paradigms of subjective rationality, but that would be to ignore their character as ideal types.
(a) Being Fully Informed

The role of the logistikon as the cognitive faculty is already prominent in book 4, as we have seen. Plato returns to this conception of it in later books, in a way that permits us to identify the logistikon with the philosophical element in the soul. Early in book 9, the logistikon is described as capable of arriving at consciousness of self and of attaining truth, thereby satisfying its desire to learn what it does not know (571d6-572b1). In this passage the logistikon is also said to be that "in which understanding [τὸ φονεῖν] arises" (572a6). Later in the same book, the logistikon is described as "always directed to knowing the truth"; hence it is suitably called "φιλοσοφία" and "φιλοσοφος" (581b5-10). Since the logistikon is the φιλοσοφία part of the soul, it is also the part by which the φιλοσοφία individual is said in book 6 to grasp the nature of each thing, "engendering intelligence and truth" (490b5-6). In book 10 it is the logistikon that overcomes appearances (602d6-e2), whereas the rest of the soul is taken in by imitations that are far from the truth.23 The logistikon has functioned in a similar way in book 7, where its operation seems to be described as "νομίζεις".4 The logistikon is also the part of the soul which engages in dialectic, the result of which is the fullest knowledge of reality.25

Not surprisingly, then, the person who exemplifies the rule of the logistikon, namely, the philosopher-guardian, will be in possession of full and complete information. In the discussion of the polis in book 4, Plato seems to accord only the guardians knowledge.26 Book 4 also shows that they will have the cardinal virtue of wisdom (442c5-8). When the guardians go on in the later books to become philosopher-guardians, their vocation as philosophers underlines their status as the ones who know.

This knowledge, of course, is knowledge of the Forms, ratified, so to speak, by apprehension of the Form of the Good.27 Knowledge of the latter is treated as a necessary condition for anyone to act intelligently, either in a private or in a public capacity (517b7-c5). The philosopher-guardians will also have engaged in dialectic. As a result, only they can give and receive an account of what things really are, and thus only they have the knowledge required.28 For instance, they will know the true virtues (536a2-7). Further, the knowledge they have thus gained will be "synoptic" rather than limited and narrow (537c1-7).

As objects of knowledge, the Forms have very special properties. The Forms are "duly arrayed . . . and always the same . . . neither wronging nor being wronged by one another, but all in order and κατὰ λόγον" (500c2-5). This knowledge thus provides a way, in modern terms, of bridging the "fact-value gap". Not only is the knowledge descriptive about what the Forms are and how they are related to one another, but it is also normative in the sense that it provides absolute standards with reference to which our own world can be ordered. In other words, knowledge about the way the Forms are is knowledge about the way the sensible world ought to be. The Forms thus provide paradigms and models for those who are to be molders of virtue in the polis.

The philosopher-guardians will also be in possession of all the other information they will need to lead and govern the polis. Much of this information, however, will not count as knowledge in the strict sense, since it deals with the sensible world. One can still be sure, though, that they will possess it in the most certain, secure, and com-
To begin with, the philosopher-guardians will be drawn from those with philosophical natures, i.e., they will be drawn from those who love truth, are quick to learn, and have good memories. Their musical education will teach them about the virtues and vices as displayed in human life. The subjects which form the educational curriculum described in book 7 will not only lead them to apprehend the Forms but will also have their areas of practical application. Furthermore, the candidates will gain military experience as part of their training. Indeed, the ones who are finally appointed are those who both have knowledge and are not deficient in experience. Elsewhere it is said that the ones who rule will be the ones wisest about how to run the polis (521b7-10), and they will also possess the logos of the original lawgiver (497c8-d2). In short, the philosopher-guardians will be well-informed about soldiering, governing, and human life in general.

The philosopher-guardians can be contrasted with others on this score. One theme in the Republic is the difference between philosophers and the many, who do not, will not, and cannot apprehend the Forms and who cannot be philosophical (493e2-494a4). The opinions of the many about values are "rolling around somewhere between not being and absolute being" (479d3-5). The great images of the central books, most memorably the Allegory of the Cave, show their benighted condition. They are variously and trenchantly described in numerous passages as blind, hard of hearing, or living in a dream world. The Sophists are no better off. They do not have knowledge and can give no account of their views but only retail the opinions and the likes and dislikes of the many (493a6-d9).

We can also contrast the philosopher-guardian with the unjust types portrayed in books 8 and 9. There is a progressive decline as we proceed through the unjust cities and men. The timocratic city arises accompanied by neglect of musical subjects and philosophy. The timocratic man is undereducated, especially with regard to the musical side of education (548e4-549a1). He lacks "logos mixed with music". The oligarchic man is also without the proper education; he has unseated the logistikon and replaced it with the blind (and hence ignorant) god Ploutos. He allows the logistikon to consider how to make profits, but that is all (553d1-4). The democratic man, who starts out as the oligarchic son, is raised uneducated through his father's lack of knowledge of proper upbringing. The transition to "democracy" in the son's soul is accompanied by the infusion of "false and boastful logos and opinions" (560c2). Later on in his life as well, he will not listen to the truth (561b7-c3). The tyrannical man is even more out of touch with reality. His education can be described as a reverse one: he gets rid of useful opinions. He ends up with the "most crazed" part ruling over his soul (577d1-5). In fact, a hallmark of Plato's discussion of him is the word "μανία". A madman like him even hopes to rule the gods (573c3-5).

Plato's philosopher-guardians stand at the opposite pole from the tyrannical man. They possess all the correct information needed and possess it in the best possible way. They have knowledge where knowledge is possible, including knowledge of the Form of the Good, and they also have true opinions about how to lead and govern in the sensible world. In short, they are the ones who fully display the first aspect of rationality.
(b) Thinking Logically

Under this heading we will include two things: avoiding contradiction and drawing the conclusions warranted by what one knows (and by what one believes, where such beliefs do not count as knowledge). Avoiding contradiction is one of the traditional canons of rationality; it is emphasized, for instance, in Kant's ethics and is centrally involved in the Kantian Categorical Imperative. Of course, insofar as the philosopher-guardians apprehend the Forms, they will not be exposed to contradictions, but not all their information comes from the Forms.

In the course of the Republic there is a striking emphasis on the way the sensible world exhibits apparent contradictions at every turn, and Plato charges the logistikòn with the task of eliminating them. Things and events in the sensible world appear to mingle contrary properties in various ways. In book 7, the soul is said to make use of "λογισμός and νός" in overcoming these (524b3-5). In book 10, this function is even more explicitly connected with the logistikòn. It is the ergon of the logistikòn to rise above such contradictions (602e1-2), and it does so with the aid of measuring, numbering, and weighing (602d6-9). Throughout this part of book 10, Plato emphasizes the special role of the logistikòn by simply lumping the other two parts of the soul together. They are prey to, and the logistikòn overcomes, the contradictions inherent in the sensible world and particularly in the deliverances of the senses.

Inasmuch as they are governed by the logistikòn, the philosopher-guardians will avoid contradiction. Plato also takes additional steps to ensure this result. In their early musical education, stories will be selected with a view to avoiding conflicts with beliefs deemed proper in adulthood (377b5-9). The stories rejected, says Socrates, are not even "σύµφωνοι" with themselves (380c3). The educational system will take this goal further. Insofar as their advanced education is based on the Socratic elenchus, the philosopher-guardians will be subjected to a systematic rooting out of contradictory beliefs. For these reasons, then, and for the reason that it leads to knowledge of the Forms, the educational program will lead to a set of beliefs which are consistent.

Once again, Plato makes abundant use of the contrast with others. The many never rise above the contradictions of sense perception. Insofar as their views are formed by ordinary myths and stories, they believe inconsistent things. Their moral views are a hodgepodge of unexamined contradictions. The people who believe that the good is pleasure also believe that there are bad pleasures; thus, they believe that the same things are both good and bad (505c6-11). Such people, unlike those who are controlled by the logistikòn, are easily fooled by the imitator. The many, then, are not roused to weed out contradictions, and they remain so far irrational.

We can also talk about the unjust men in books 8 and 9. Since their educations have not been thorough, they will be subject to the usual contradictions of the unexamined life. One solution these men adopt is just to throw out beliefs and send them into "exile", an image which in the comparison it invites with the cities suggests a somewhat arbitrary process. However, the contradictions which plague them are more than just inconsistent beliefs. Insofar as the unjust men depart...
RATIONALITY IN PLATO'S REPUBLIC

from temperance, they will have disagreements among the parts of their souls about which should rule and which should be ruled. The price some of them end up paying is disintegration of their personality. The oligarchic man, for instance, becomes a "double man" (554d9-el).

The second element included under logical thinking as an aspect of rationality is drawing the correct conclusions from what one knows and believes. It is not enough just to avoid contradiction. One could have a fully consistent set of beliefs and yet never proceed to draw the conclusions which those beliefs warrant. Such failure seems aptly describable as a failure in rationality.

Plato's terminology brings out the logistikon's role in this process. The logistikon is introduced in book 4 as the name of that "with which one λογίζεται" (439d5-6). "Λογίζεται" often means counting or calculating, but it can also refer to drawing conclusions. In book 1, it is used to describe deducing, from the premises that justice is the advantage of the established government and that the established government is the stronger, the conclusion that justice is "the advantage of the stronger" (338e6-339a4). In book 10, Socrates says that few people are able to conclude "συλλογίζεται" that what one enjoys in others becomes part of one's own character, and he gives a reason from which that follows (606b5-8). In book 7, "συλλογίζεται" is applied to concluding that the sun is the cause of everything in the sensible world (516b9-c2) and similarly that the Forms of the Good is the same in the intelligible world (517b8-c5). Later in book 7, Socrates tells Glaucon, "Ἀναλογίζου from what has been said before" (524d9) and then gives him the premises he needs. The use of these words make it clear that it is the logistikon which is involved.

The logistikon's ability and disposition to draw conclusions carry over to the philosopher-guardians. One of the hallmarks of the setting up of the polis in the early books is the claim that the guardians will have no trouble deriving the provisions which are in accordance with and follow from the basic measures on which the polis is founded. To be sure, some of this talk is no doubt literary artifice intended to obviate the need to discuss minutiae. Nor is all of it proof of a unique capacity belonging only to the guardians, since in some of the passages the suggestion is that the conclusions would be obvious to anyone. There is also the point that much of this ratiocination will count as deliberation about means rather than as the kind of inference under discussion here. Nonetheless, Plato rests special confidence in the guardians' ability and willingness to draw the proper conclusions, and those qualities constitute an important part of his characterization of them as a group. We can also point to their employment of dialectic and, in particular, to the deductive system they will construct on the basis of their knowledge of the Form of the Good. Finally, the philosopher-guardians will not fail to draw the correct conclusions concerning the return to the cave.

(c) Having the Single Correct Ultimate End

The third aspect of rationality is having the single correct ultimate end. This aspect can perhaps be traced back in part to the Socratic notion of a craft, which typically involves a single pursuit leading to a single product. In Plato's case, the tendency to assume a single
goal in life comes so readily to his pen that one may suspect is is partly a reflex with him. However that may be, one can easily construct a defense of such a policy. Consider the alternatives. One might have no ultimate end for the ordering of one's life, a situation which Aristotle calls "a sign of much folly". If one has multiple ends, then there is likely to be the problem of adjudicating conflicts between and among them, and a reasonable way to do that would be to have one end which is supreme.

Plato gives the logistikon a single end. We saw in the discussion of book 4 that this end is plausibly taken to be the good of the soul, including the good of each part as well as that of the soul as a whole. Described in such terms this goal might appear to be multiple, but Plato unifies these potentially competing interests in a way which entitles us to treat them as one. Plato also no doubt considers the good of the soul to be the correct ultimate end to have. The other parts of the soul fall down on this score, both because their ends are not the correct ones and because, in any case, their ends tend to be multiple. The appetitive part is sometimes treated as though its end were just money and nothing else, but in fact its ends are many and varied. The spirited part seems like a better candidate for having a single end, and in some instances it may even do so. (In such cases, it would still, of course, have the wrong end.) Generally, however, Plato's assigning of so many emotions and passions to the spirited part will give it multiple ends too.

The philosopher-guardians will exemplify this aspect of rationality. They have an ergon for which they are naturally suited. They must do that ergon and nothing that does not contribute to it. As we have seen, Plato explicitly distinguishes them from those who do not have a single end in their lives at which to aim.

In this respect, though, the philosopher-guardians are not obviously different from the other inhabitants of the ideal polis. They too have a single end, and moreover, their ends are the ones that are correct for them, given their natures. "Correct" here, however, can have a double sense; there is the end which is correct relative to a given individual, and there is the end which is correct in the sense of the best possible end for a human being. The highest and most inclusive good would naturally qualify as the latter, and it is this which the philosopher-guardians have as their end. Their education has been designed to focus them on the Form of the Good, and in particular they have been selected for their dedication to the single goal of the good of the polis. Working toward that end is what they can do to realize the Good in the sensible world.

The philosopher-guardians can be contrasted with the many in this respect. Though everybody, according to Socrates, aims at the good, people are generally mistaken about what the good is. It would be ridiculous to think that the public's likes and dislikes are a reliable indicator of it. Ordinary people, for instance, consider ruling to be a great good, and many also take pleasure to be the ultimate good. Furthermore, of course, the average person outside the polis does not have his or her life organized in terms of a single end anyway.

The unjust men in books 8 and 9 can also be contrasted with the philosopher-guardians. The timocratic man gives himself over to rule by
RATIONALITY IN PLATO'S REPUBLIC

a single part of his soul, but that part does not have a single end. Even if its end were single, it would not be the best end for a human being. In addition, he has yielded up control to his spirited part through nothing more than a split-the-difference compromise (550a4–b7). Later in life he loses whatever benefit there is from letting spirit alone set his ends, since he gives a role to the appetite part and wealth becomes another end for him (549a9–b4).

The oligarchic man's end is single; it is wealth. He is dogged in pursuing it, but it is not the correct end for a human being. The oligarchic man has merely taken over as his own the end set by some of the appetites (namely, the "necessary" ones) belonging to the soul's appetitive part. His focusing exclusively on them leads to distortion and repression within the soul. As a result, the oligarchic man does not gain the integrative benefits of having a single end. In fact, his single end produces a double man (554d9–e1).

The democratic man fails to have a single end at all. His end might appear to be liberty, but it really amounts to taking as his end whatever happens to suit his fancy at the moment. As a consequence, rather than having a genuine single end, he suffers from a multiplicity of ends. Plato gives us a graphic picture of the democratic man's life:

... he lives day by day gratifying the desire which occurs to him: at one moment getting drunk and reveling in the flute, the next drinking nothing but water and dieting. Sometimes he exercises, but then there are times when he is inactive and neglects everything, though the next minute he busies himself with the semblance of philosophy. Often he goes in for politics, and jumping up he both says and does whatever occurs to him. On other occasions he may admire some martial types, and be drawn in that direction, or moneymakers may catch his fancy, and he will go off on that tangent. And there is neither order nor necessity in his life, but calling this life pleasant and free and blessed, he pursues it always. (561c6–d7).

In this passage the democratic man is portrayed as adopting in no particular order the ends associated with different parts of the soul. He does tend to have single ends on a temporary basis, but since they are constantly shifting, he hardly counts as having a real end at all.

The tyrannical man has been taken over by Lust ("Eros") (573d4–5). In a sense, Lust might be said to set his ends for him, but Lust is really an insatiate craving rather than an appetite with a determinate object. It lives "in total anarchy and lawlessness" (575a1–2). Hence, the tyrannical man is the one who most fails to conform to this aspect of rationality.

(d) Determining the Appropriate Means

The fourth aspect of rationality involves determining the appropriate means to one's end. This conception of rationality as technical deliberation is one of the standard and most commonly employed ones. The pattern of reasoning involved is both straightforward and familiar.
Starting with a given end, reason determines how to bring about or produce it, sometimes working through intermediate steps and stages. The prime requisite throughout is effectiveness; the means must be ones which will in fact achieve the desired end. Of course, the means must also fall within the limits of what is possible and available. Considerations of economy can come into play too. Other things being equal, the highest degree of this aspect of rationality is displayed by attaining the end with the minimum expenditure of time, effort, or other resources.

We have already seen that as introduced in book 4 the logistikon discovers means to ends; its doing so is reflected in its being described as "deliberating" in 442b7. This role is a natural one for the logistikon, since the word "λόγος κρατήρα", in addition to referring to the drawing of conclusions, can also be applied to working out means. In book 2, it is used to describe someone who determines that religious rites are effective means to avoid the consequences of sin (366a6-7). In the same part of book 2, "συντροφική λόγος κρατήρα" is used in connection with determining how best to order one's life based on the rewards and punishments which can be expected in this life and the next. In book 8, the oligarchic man only lets his logistikon determine the means (λόγος κρατήρα) to make money.

The philosopher-guardians will display this aspect of rationality. Plato does not attempt to reduce justice to a craft, but he does describe the guardians as craftsmen. In doing so, he is implicitly making the claim that they will be in possession of the correct means, since a craft is a collection of effective means to a particular end or product. Plato describes the process by which the guardians' "product" will be brought to perfection when they are reforming a city (501b1-c2). The process envisioned seems to be one of mixing and mingling ingredients so as to approximate the Forms viewed as a set of models. To help in this undertaking, the philosopher-guardians will also have apprehended the Form of the Good. Their work will no doubt require a certain amount of on-the-spot improvising. If so, then there is even more need for the philosopher-guardians to be proficient in discovering means than there would be if they could just use a cut-and-dried routine procedure. Perhaps the best parallel is the true helmsman in 488a7-489a2, who must constantly adjust to changing conditions.

There are other passages which describe the philosopher-guardians as effective in discovering appropriate means. According to Socrates, as we have noted, it is only necessary to provide a general outline of the way the polis will be organized, because the guardians will be able to discover the specific provisions required. Some of this reasoning will have to be working out means to ends. Socrates elsewhere implies that he has full confidence in the guardians' ability to discern appropriate means. They will have to devise "clever lots" (460a8) and "contrive every contrivance" (460c9-d1). When it comes to reforming a city, they will determine that it is necessary to start with a clean slate (501a2-7) and that the fastest and easiest way to proceed is to expel all but the young (540e5-541a7). They will also see that returning to the cave is a necessary means to maximizing the happiness of the entire polis.

The philosopher-guardians' display of this kind of rationality can be contrasted with the behavior of the unjust types in books 8 and 9. We do not get a description of how well the timocratic man does in this
RATIONALITY IN PLATO'S *REPUBLIC* 623

respect, though he is likely to be moderately successful in determining the means to his ends. The oligarchic man does become wealthy, proof that his *logistikon* does well in selecting the means to make money, but he is portrayed as a bad manager of other aspects of his life.\(^65\) The democratic man is less successful in arriving at suitable means, since he fails to see that his flitting around is unlikely to be effective. The tyrannical man cannot determine the means to his ends simply because there is no way his ends could be attained.

This aspect of rationality is also exemplified by the *Republic* itself. Of course, the *Republic* can be taken as displaying or embodying in some sense all the aspects of rationality, but it is particularly illuminating to view it as the derivation of means to ends on a large scale, including the means to the best life for both the community and the individual. Plato begins in book 2 by determining the means which will most effectively accomplish what communities are established to do. Communities exist because a single human being "is not self-sufficient but rather needs many things" (369b6-7). These needs will be better satisfied if each person specializes rather than trying to produce more than one thing. In fact, a single person is simply incapable of performing multiple tasks well.\(^66\) Human beings also have different talents and abilities and hence are suited for different jobs (370a7-b2). Since specialization will yield products "in greater quantities, with better quality, and more easily" (370c3-4), the most effective means is the one-person-one-task form of organization. Plato also knows that one has to worry about whether certain means are possible; in book 5 this becomes a standard *topos* for advancing the argument. Also in book 5 Plato makes a point of efficiency; he talks about the smallest change which will reform existing cities (473b6-9). All the provisions involving censorship, property, marriage, childbearing, childrearing, education, and the selection of guardians are means to a given end. In fact, the star examples of such means to an end are the philosopher-guardians themselves.\(^67\) Plato thinks he has determined the means to his end so well that the system he has framed will automatically improve itself as time goes on (424a4-b1).

(e) Matching Action to Thought

The aspects of rationality discussed thus far are intellectual and cognitive and need not involve translation into practice. This aspect of rationality bridges the gap between thought and action. First, action must be principled; that is, it must proceed from thought and deliberation. Second, action must not fail to conform to thought. Someone might have all the relevant information, think logically, determine the appropriate means to their single end—and then do nothing (or do something else entirely). Patients who do not listen to the doctor are good examples of failure with regard to this aspect of rationality. They have the information, their end is the proper one of health, and going to the doctor reflects some deliberation about means. But they do not act.\(^68\) Such a failure seems aptly describable as a type of irrationality (and more is involved than just failing to promote one's interest). Plato's recognition that there can be such cases marks an advance over Socrates' position that such behavior is impossible.

Plato charges the *logistikon* with the task of conforming action to thought in both these ways. The *logistikon*'s job, as it emerges in book
4, is to exercise forethought for the soul and to rule. Plato clearly envisions the latter as involving the other parts of the soul's following the logistikon's commands. True, the spirited part does have a role in making those commands effective, but it is clearly meant to be subordinate to the logistikon (442b5-9). In book 10, it is the logistikon alone which is described as "ready to obey the law" (604b6), whereas the rest of the soul is not.

The philosopher-guardians will display this aspect of rationality. Their double character as philosophers and rulers can be viewed as a way of combining thought and action on the level of the polis, thereby guaranteeing conformity to the constitution. Expressed in terms of the traditional Greek antithesis, they will match ἐργαζόμενοι to λόγους and will do so in both of the ways specified above. Their actions will not be random but will be based on thought and deliberation. Also, not only will they have correctly and logically determined their single ultimate end and the means to it, but they will translate their conclusions into action. They will, of course, obey the laws (458b9-c4), but at the same time they will not shrink from lying when it is necessary. This aspect of rationality is also relied upon in the treatment of their fellow citizens. Inasmuch as the guardians use the language of kinship, they will act accordingly, since it would be "absurd [ὑπὸ λόγου]" to use the terms without the corresponding actions (463e1-2). In short, the guardians will not depart from rationality by recognizing that some course of action is necessary and then failing to follow it.

The prime example of this matching of action to thought, of course, is the return to the cave. Plato has made going back hard both by emphasizing the desirability of the life spent philosophizing and also by insisting that the best rulers should not rule willingly. However, the philosopher-guardians will act in accordance with the argument that they must return in repayment for their special upbringing and education (520a6-e3).

The philosopher-guardians' matching of action to thought in these ways is no accident. Plato has taken steps to guarantee it. The Forms provide the principles and guidelines upon which to act. They also, and here the Form of the Good is especially important, provide motivation as well; the philosopher-guardians are automatically led to want to imitate and to bring into being what they apprehend in the Forms. In addition, the selection process has been designed to yield those whose behaviors conform to thought. The philosopher-guardians put into power are those who do what they think is best for the polis. At every stage in the selection process, the decision is based on actual performance. Significantly, it is immediately after a section describing such testing that the guardians are first distinguished from the auxiliaries.

Among the unjust men, there are various degrees of failure to be rational in this sense. The men in the timocratic city fail to obey the law, and Plato compares them to children fleeing their father. This failure is important because it helps pave the way for the oligarchic city. The oligarchic man obeys the law only out of fear from his property, holding his unnecessary appetites in check by force rather than by logos (554c11-d3). When he can get away with disobeying the law, he disobeys it (554c4-9). The democratic man's failure to follow through and his tendency to act on mere whim make him parallel to the way the people in the democratic city ignore the law. This failure in the demo-
RATIONALITY IN PLATO'S REPUBLIC

625

cratic city is likewise an important factor in the descent into tyranny. Finally, the tyrannical man's thoughts are so out of line with reality that he cannot match his actions to them; his actions proceed from his Lust rather than from the logistikon.

(f) Promoting One's Own Interest

The last of the six aspects of rationality is promoting one's own interest. This is another of the traditional conceptions of rationality; it is the one involved, for instance, in the notion of the rational economic agent. This kind of rationality is also commonly presented as the type which inspires and guides the central argument of the Republic. It is often taken for granted that the main aim of the Republic is to demonstrate that the person who embraces justice for its own sake is being rational in this self-interested sense.

The connection between the logistikon and self-interest is firmly established in book 4. As we have seen, the logistikon is described there as knowing what is advantageous for the soul and its parts. Rule by the logistikon is portrayed in book 4 as the best state for the soul (and hence for the individual), corresponding to health in the body. Similar claims about the benefits to be derived from rule by the logistikon are made in later books. In book 10, poetry is criticized for interfering with that rule and getting in the way of our becoming "both better and happier" (606d6). In the image of the composite creature at the end of book 9, Plato goes so far as to represent the logistikon by a man, suggesting that the interests of the whole person are really just the same as the interests of the logistikon.

Given passages like these, it would be natural to think that the philosopher-guardians are promoting their self-interest and are as happy as possible. However, there seems to be some question whether they are doing so and hence whether they are conforming to this aspect of rationality. At the beginning of book 4, for instance, Glaucon protests that the guardians are missing out due to the way the polis is organized (419a1-420a8). If so, this would be an important case in which rule by the logistikon does not lead to the best state for the individual.

In order to clarify the relationship between the logistikon and self-interest, we will first need to discuss the distinction Plato draws between the necessary and the unnecessary desires belonging to the appetitive part of the soul. (To prevent confusion later, we will refer to these as the necessary and unnecessary appetites.) When the class of necessary appetites is first defined, it appears to combine two different groups of appetites. The first group consists of the appetites which we cannot "turn aside", and the second consists of the ones which benefit us when satisfied (558d11-e2). However, when Socrates explains why the appetite for food cannot be turned aside, the reason appears to be that food is necessary for survival (559b3-4). If we grant, as seems reasonable, that survival counts as something beneficial, the first group mentioned above thus turns out to be nothing more than a subset of the second group. Hence, the necessary appetites are really just our beneficial appetites by another name.

The unnecessary appetites, on the other hand, are ones whose satisfaction does us no good and may even do the opposite. They also
attend to have various features which make them especially hard to satisfy. For one thing, they are often open-ended, whereas the necessary appetites tend to be limited, both in number and in what it takes to satisfy them. In addition, satisfying an unnecessary appetite may only make it stronger and cause others to grow up in its train. Thus, not only are unnecessary appetites not beneficial, but they are harder or even impossible to satisfy fully and can breed new cravings.

Thus far we have been talking only about appetites, that is, about the desires of the appetitive part of the soul. The other parts of the soul have their desires as well. Plato does not describe these in great detail, but the necessary-unnecessary distinction can plausibly be extended to cover them too. Presumably, all the desires of the logistikon are necessary in Plato’s sense, since they are no doubt all beneficial. The case of the timocratic man shows that the spirit can have unnecessary desires, but we can probably still assume that some of the desires of the spirit are beneficial and hence necessary. Such, for instance, would be the desires which lead the spirit to ally itself with the logistikon.

This classification of the desires of the three parts of the soul provides us with a way of specifying the best state for a human being. That state is one in which all the necessary desires are exactly satisfied and in which there are no unnecessary desires. It is not enough just to prevent unnecessary desires from being satisfied, because their mere presence in the soul, particularly when they are not being satisfied, would itself be disruptive. The best thing would be not to have any unnecessary desires at all, and Plato does say that we could be rid of the ones belonging to the appetitive part of the soul through appropriate training. Presumably the unnecessary desires of the spirit could be gotten rid of too. If someone has no unnecessary desires and achieves complete satisfaction of the necessary desires, he or she would be as well off as possible. Such a state would be one in which not only the whole soul but also each part would be best off. This point is perhaps obvious with regard to the logistikon’s welfare, since the logistikon would have to be in control, but it also applies to the welfare of the other two parts. As long as their necessary desires are fully satisfied (and unnecessary ones eliminated), the benefit to those parts will be maximized too. Not only does this result follow directly from the definition of necessary and unnecessary desires, but each part will also be subject to less internal dissension if the logistikon is in control. In addition, the other two parts of the soul will get the truest pleasure when and only when they follow the logistikon (586d4–587a5).

Now that we have shown that rule by the logistikon benefits the whole soul, the next step is to show that the philosopher-guardian has attained the maximal level of well-being just described. Here it will be helpful to look at the unjust men first.

The timocratic man is indulging his spirit, and it is easy to imagine that some of its desires are empty and vainglorious and hence unnecessary. Since his logistikon is not being exercised properly, he also has necessary desires which are not being satisfied; in fact Plato even describes him as having a liking for culture though being uncultured (548e4–5). Plato’s need for progressive decline does not permit the timocratic man to be terribly wretched, but we can still see that he is missing out.
The oligarchic man has given control over himself to his appetitive part (553c4-7). He devotes himself to satisfying only his necessary appetites. To that extent, the oligarchic man might seem to be promoting his self-interest. At the same time, however, he also has a large brood of unnecessary appetites which are not being satisfied. These he controls by force rather than by reason, and he lives in fear of awakening them (555a3-4). Such unsatisfied cravings, coupled with his fears, should be sufficient to undermine any positive effects of his concentration on necessary appetites. He has also missed out on satisfying many necessary desires, since he has enslaved both his logistikon and his spirit to his appetitive part (553d1-7).

The democratic man seems worse off still. He treats all his desires equally, satisfying necessary and unnecessary ones alike (561a6-c7). It is true that as a result of such evenhandedness he escapes the internal conflicts which bedevil the oligarchic man. Much of the time, however, the democratic man is satisfying desires which provide no benefit and may even do harm. His logistikon is not being satisfied (though occasionally he flirts with cultivating it). Plato's picture of the democratic man's helter-skelter life suggests that we have moved another notch down the scale.

The tyrannical man has reached rock bottom. The unnecessary appetite which Plato calls Lust has taken over his soul completely (573d4-5). As already noted, this Lust is more an insatiate craving than an appetite for some particular thing. In addition, the tyrannical man's soul is also teeming with other unnecessary appetites, and new ones are continually springing up. Like Lust itself, these appetites by their very nature are unlimited and tend to grow beyond all bounds. Though they are not such that their satisfaction would benefit him anyway, the tyrannical man does not manage to satisfy them and is subject to acute distress. Plato makes his desperate straits quite clear, describing the tyrannical man's soul as "impoverished and unfulfilled always".

The philosopher-guardian is at the opposite end of the scale. We can presume that the desires he has are "simple and moderate" ones (431c5). Under the logistikon's guidance, all his necessary desires are being satisfied. Through careful education and training, his unnecessary desires have been completely eliminated (or reduced to an absolute minimum). The upshot is that the desires which do him good are maximally satisfied, while he avoids spending time attempting to satisfy desires which would not benefit him but which might arise if his life were less controlled by the logistikon. As a kind of icing on the cake, each part of his soul "enjoys the best and truest possible pleasures" (586e7-587a1).

It is this way that Plato shows that justice produces happiness. The analysis presented here in terms of the distinction between necessary and unnecessary desires has the virtue of connecting the discussion of the unjust men in books 8 and 9 with the way the problem was originally set in book 2. In book 2, happiness as conventionally conceived seems to be identified with getting what you want. This conception of happiness lies dormant in the middle books, amid charges that the philosopher-guardians are not being made as happy as possible. In books 8 and 9, though, there is a return to this conception of happiness: the tyrannical man is described as the one who least does what he
wants. Since the philosopher-guardians are at the opposite end of the scale and are happiest, we can assume that they are the ones who most get what they want. In fact, if we identify what people (really) want with the objects of their necessary desires, then getting what you want comes down to having all your necessary desires exactly satisfied. Thus Plato can claim to have given precise content to the notion of getting what one wants, and his apparent return in book 10 to the book 2 conception of happiness is not just empty talk.

If the philosopher-guardians are as well off as possible, then what are we to make of the passages which suggest that they are undergoing some sacrifice in returning to the cave to govern? Some commentators have attempted to mitigate this difficulty by appealing to the doctrines in the Symposium and the Phaedrus about desires to implant and propagate virtue. If the philosopher-guardians have such desires, this approach might say, then they are in a sense serving their own interest by acting on them. It is noteworthy, though, that in the Republic Plato does not emphasize the role of such desires. Further, it may not be entirely captious to ask whether such desires would count as necessary or as unnecessary ones. Without going that far, we can observe that in the Republic the philosopher-guardians' motivation is described as coming from seeing the necessity of doing something as the result of an argument. Perhaps we can explain their return to the cave on the basis of the concept of full and complete rationality developed here. "Rule by reason" demands compliance with all the aspects of rationality and not just the one involving promoting one's own interest. The philosopher-guardians will draw the correct inferences about what needs to be done, including the ones about the only means by which the polis can be realized, and they will not fail to act on the basis of their deliberations.

Conclusion

By way of conclusion, we will look at a passage in book 10 which could almost be called the peroration of the Republic. Drawing the moral from the Myth of Er, Socrates tells Glaucon that everything is at stake when we choose the kind of life to lead. Therefore, one must take the greatest care that each of us, neglecting other objects of study, should become both an inquirer after and a student of this one, if he is somewhere able to learn of and discover someone who will make him capable and expert so that when he distinguishes both the good life and the evil one he always everywhere chooses the better from the ones which are possible. Reckoning up how all the things which have just now been mentioned stand with respect to the excellence of life both when conjoined with one another and when separated, [he should] know what beauty mixed with poverty or wealth and combined with some condition of soul produces in the way of good or evil, and what noble birth and low birth and private stations and public offices and strengths and weaknesses and quickness and slowness to learn and all such natural and acquired things involving the soul produce when mixed together with each other, so that reckoning together all these and keeping his gaze fixed on the nature of the soul, he is able to make a choice
between the worse life and the better one, calling the worse
the one which will carry the soul there, toward becoming
more unjust, and calling the better whichever will carry it
toward becoming more just. He will let all other things go,
for we have seen that this is the best choice for both the
living and the dead. Hence he must go to Hades with an
adamantine grip on this belief, so that there also he may be
unfazed by riches and evils of that sort, and does not fall
into tyrannies and other such actions and commit many ir-
remediable evils, nor again himself suffer greater ones, but
knows always to choose the life which is midway between
ones like those and to avoid the ones which go to excess on
either side both in this life (as much as possible) and in
the whole future, for in this way a man becomes happiest.

(618b7-619b1)

This quotation includes appeals to all the aspects of rationality dis-
cussed in this paper. We need to have the relevant information, either
obtaining it for ourselves or finding someone expert. We must think
clearly and logically about the issues at stake and arrive at a reasoned
conclusion. The end, and indeed the sole end which counts, is the state
of the soul. Only the means to that end matter and everything else can
be ignored. Our deliberations must, of course, be translated into actual
choices. If we do all these things correctly, we are promoting our self-
interest, "for in this way a man becomes happiest".

ENDNOTES

1 I would like to express my appreciation to Nicholas P. White and Al-

fred Mele, who made penetrating comments on an earlier version of this
paper, though of course they are not responsible for its deficiencies. I
am also grateful to the Archives' editor and anonymous referees for
their comments, which led to major revisions.

2 Terence Irwin, Plato's Moral Theory: The Early and Middle Dialogues

3 Irwin, 73–75, 84.

4 Irwin, 78–82, 192–95.

5 Irwin, 234–39, 253.

6 Irwin, 250–51.

7 Irwin, 226–39.

8 John M. Cooper, "The Psychology of Justice in Plato", American Philo-
sophical Quarterly 14 (1977), 155.

9 Irwin points to differences between the logistikos in book 4 and "the
philosophical part" elsewhere (see Irwin, 330 [n. 28] and 338–39 [n. 62]).
Irwin's scruples seem to result in part from the wide range of things
the logistikos is called upon to do. The present paper will attempt to
show how they are all the job of a single faculty.
Cooper in particular has made fruitful use of what Plato says in book 4; see especially Cooper, 151-52.

We will follow Plato in using "knowledge" here, though such things as the crafts mentioned in 428b10-c9 will not count as knowledge under the requirements of the epistemology of the central books. There is a similar relaxation in the discussion of imitation in book 10; see, e.g., 601e4-602a1.

Inasmuch as the word used, "μαθήματι", frequently means "to understand", the translation "learning" may understate its intellectual connotations. Cf. Aristotle S.E. 1.3.165b32-34.

All translations will be my own.

Gorgias 501b4-5.

Cf. 443e4-7.

Cooper, 153.

It is referred to simply as logos in 440b3 and 440d3. This is an appropriate place to acknowledge use of Leonard Brandwood, A Word Index to Plato (Leeds: W. S. Maney & Son, 1976).

Irwin takes this material in book 4 as involving an analysis of "the process of choice" (226) or of "the decision to do this or that action" (230). True enough, but that is not all we find here. The Leontius case, for instance, involves more than just deciding on a course of action; paradoxically, in that case we have action with little real choice.

Cooper expresses this connection by saying that the logistikos is not "doing its job" unless, inter alia, "its decisions are effective" (Cooper, 152).

Indeed they have all appeared even in book 1, especially in connection with the Socratic notion of a craft.

There is an abrupt shift from the use of "ἐπιστήμη" to that of "δόξα" between 429a1 and 429c1.

505d11-506b1, 534b8-d1.

Cf. 533b8-c6, 534b4-7.
A description of the philosophical nature occupies the early part of book 6; see the summing up in 487a3-5.

See 525b3-4, 526d1-6, 527d2-6.

539e3-5. As children they will have seen battle firsthand (466e4-467e7).

In 403e4-7 the idea that a guardian might be in his cups and not know where he is counts as something of a paradox.


549b6. In 411c9-e2, the person who neglects the Muse is portrayed as becoming "μισθολογος" and living in ignorance.

554b4-8; for the polis see 552e5-7.

560a9-b2. Cf. 559d7-8.

573b1-4; cf. 571d5-e2. Note that the opinions are described as "useful"; they may not even have been true in the first place.

The word itself occurs in 573a8, b4, and cognate forms in 573c3, 577d5, and 578a11.

479a5-c5, 523a10-525a2, 602c7-603d7.

603a1-b2, 605a8-c4.

In addition, of course, such beliefs about the gods would be false as well.

Cf. 601a4-b4, 602b1-4, 604e1-605a6.

412b2-6; 423e4-424a2; 425a8-b4, d7-e2; 427a2-7.

Cf. 511b3-c2.

Socrates applies this conception to ruling in book 1: the ruler aims everything he says and does at benefiting the ruled (342e8-11).

Cf., e.g., 580e2-581a1.

Cf. 586c7-d2.

374b6-e5. Cf. 421c1-2.

395b8-c3, 396b3-4.

370a7-c5, 374b6-c2, 423d2-4, 433a4-6, 443c4-7, 453b3-5. Cf. 397e1-9, 406c3-5.

412d9-e3. Cf. 412e5-8, 413c6-7. This end seems to be the *polis*'s freedom in 395b8-c2 and its unity in 462a2-b2, but that does not mean that the end is multiple.

553b7-d7; 554a2-3, b2-3. Cf. 555b9-10.

553d1-7, 556c4-6.

56 553d1-7, 556c4-6. Cf. 562b9-c2.

57 Cf. 557b4-6.

58 Cf. 557b4-6.

59 365a8. This passage shows the difficulties inherent in trying to keep drawing conclusions separate from deliberaing about means, since it interweaves the two. "Deliberating" could perhaps be extended to cover both, but it seems best to keep the two operations separate.

553d2-4. An excellent example, though not from the Republic, comes in *Timaeus* 30b1-6, where both "λογίζομαι" and "λογίσμος" are used in connection with the Demiurge's means-end calculations.

395b8-c3, 421c1-2. Cf. 500d4-8.

60 See also 484c6-d3.

61 Cf. 540a6-b1. The Form of the *polis* may be available too; see 592b2-3.

62 In *Plato's Moral Theory* Irwin argues that Plato abandons the Socratic craft analogy in the *Republic*, observing that it does not appear in a central way outside book 1; see especially Irwin, 177-78, 183-85, and n. 42 on 334. Irwin's comments may be correct concerning the investigation into the nature of justice. However, if one looks at what Plato is saying about ruling, one can argue that Plato has sought to turn that into something like a craft. This "statecraft" is a craft above and beyond ordinary crafts, to be sure, especially insofar as it rests on access to the Forms, but nonetheless the essential features of a craft are there. When the guardians are first introduced, they are linked with a τέχνη (374d8-e2). In addition to being called craftsmen themselves, they are constantly treated as parallel to the other craftsmen (e.g., 420d5-421c6, 466b4-467a5). In short, Plato seems far from abandoning the craft analogy when it comes to ruling.

554e7-555a6. Likewise, the oligarchic city, using wealth as the basis for selecting its rulers, has failed to determine the correct means (551c2-d2).

66 374a5-6, 394e2-6. Attempting multiple tasks will lead to a kind of personality fragmentation (395b3-6, 397e1-2, 423d2-6).

67 Hence, they must be prevented from defeating that end and preying on the populace (416a2-7).

68 Cf. 425e8-426b4.


71 412d9-e3, 413c5-414a7.

72 In addition to the references cited in the previous note, see 503a12-7, el-504a1; 537d2; and 539e5-540a2. Cf. Paul Shorey, The Unity of Plato's Thought (1903; rpt. n.p.: Archon Books, 1968), 11; the passage in question also appears in Plato: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Gregory Vlastos (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor, 1971), II, 10-11.

73 The distinction is first made in 414b1-6.

74 548b4-c2. See also 550d10-12.

75 Cf. 557e2-558a8.

76 562d6-e5, 563d7-e1.

77 Cf. 588e3-589b6, 589c7-590a2, and especially 590c2-d6.

78 559a3-6, b8-c1.

79 For unnecessary appetites as spawning more, see 560b4-5.

80 580d7-8. With regard to the logistikōn in particular, see 572a1-3.

81 559a3-6, b8-c1. Even if there are, as Plato says, lawless appetites in everyone (571b4-c1, 572b4-6), their presence as a matter of fact does not mean that they could not be completely eliminated under the right circumstances.

82 By their very nature, the necessary desires do not seem to offer much scope for improving one's position by developing and cultivating more.

83 554a5-8, 572c1-4.

84 554c11-d3. Cf. 554d9-e1, 558d4-6.

85 573d7-8. Cf. 574a6-7.


87 Cf. 360b6-c3, 362b2-c6.

88 577e1-2. Cf. the tyrannical city in 577d10-11.

89 580b8-c2. Cf. 576e3-5.

90 Cf. 613d1-4.
91 See Kraut, 338-43, and Irwin, 234-43.
92 See, however, 500c5-7.
93 520a6-521a8, 540a4-b7.