ABSTRACT. This paper assumes that human choices are determined, and distinguishes among the views of some classical modern philosophers regarding what determines choice.

Hobbes and Hume are taken as representatives of choice as determined by subjective propensities; the differences between their views is discussed. Descartes is taken as a major representative of the view that choice is determined by an apprehension of that which is objectively good, and Spinoza, Malebranche, and Leibniz are discussed insofar as they share that view. It is then shown that interpretations of Locke and Mill which assimilate their views to those of Hobbes and Hume are mistaken.

As a third alternative, the self-determinist positions of Green and Dewey are discussed. The views of James, in which attention and effort are key concepts, are traced, and that aspect of his view which stresses attention is accepted, while his emphasis on effort is rejected.

The aim of this paper is limited: I am not going to discuss most of the problems which have arisen in the course of debates over the freedom of the will. Furthermore, in contradistinction to a prevalent tendency in recent Anglo-American discussions, I shall direct my attention to problems regarding choice, not to the question of the circumstances under which we say that a given action was or was not free. This distinction between freedom of choice and freedom of action is by no means new: one finds it clearly formulated in such traditional thinkers as Hobbes and Locke and Hume. Recently it has been used to define a specific position with respect to the problem of the freedom of will. That position, called "compatibilism", holds that even though choice is always determined, a person may be said to be free insofar as he can do what he chooses to do.

Compatibilism, as thus defined, may be said to have become dominant in recent Anglo-American philosophy, though there are a number of thinkers who have attempted to refute it by showing that in some cases choice is not determined, and the will is free. I shall not deal with these libertarian arguments, for I must confess that I do not accept them. I am quite willing to hold that our choices are in all cases "determined", but I shall be using that multivalued term in a loose sense, merely taking it to mean that it is possible to offer a causal account of the factor or factors which are primarily responsible for those acts which involve
what we regard as "choice". My objection to compatibilism, then, is dif-
ferent from that of the libertarian; I object to it insofar as it generally
fails to offer any serious account of what types of determinants might
be responsible for the choices we make. This failure—as we shall see—
was by no means characteristic of most earlier philosophers who held
that our choices are determined: they offered psychological accounts
which sought to explain the factors determining choice. However, few re-
cent Anglo-American philosophers have attempted to offer comparable ac-
counts; in general, they have preferred to offer rather elaborate analy-
yses of what constitutes a free action, with little being said as to what
determines choice.

In this paper I propose to distinguish four types of theory which
seek to account for our choices; each of these theories tends to have
different implications for questions regarding moral responsibility, as
well as having varying implications regarding the relations between cau-
sation in nature and in man. Time will not permit me to follow out the
implications of the theories with which I shall deal. Nor shall I discuss
variations in the ways in which these theories have recently been for-
mulated; instead, I shall discuss the guises in which they have appeared
among some of the classical philosophers of the modern period. I do so
in order to illustrate the fact that when it is said that choice is "de-
termined", that which determines it may assume a variety of different,
incompatible forms. I shall be satisfied if I have formulated a useful
general typology in this much neglected area, and have, at the same
time, been able to correct some basic errors in the ways in which a few
major philosophers have been interpreted regarding the freedom of the
will. Though I shall not offer critical evaluations of the various types of
theory I shall be examining, it will in the end become apparent where
my own sympathy lies.

In what follows I shall characterize the determinants with which I
shall be concerned in the following ways. First, I shall speak of "sub-
jective propensities" as determinants of choice; second, I shall examine
the view that choices are determined by "what is seen as objectively
good"; a third theory is that "self-fulfillment is the goal of all desire",
and that this is what determines choice; finally, I shall discuss "atten-
tion" as determinative of choice. As examples of the first type of theory
I shall discuss both Hobbes and Hume; of the second, Descartes and
Spinoza; of the third, Green and Dewey; and of the fourth, William
James. In addition, I shall discuss Locke and John Stuart Mill in order
to show that neither should be interpreted as if their positions were es-
sentially similar to those of Hobbes and Hume, though this is the con-
ventional interpretation of the theories they held.

Turning first to Hobbes, and then to Hume, it is clear that both
afford classic examples of a compatibilist doctrine, though in contradis-
tinction to most recent compatibilists each offered an account of how
choice is determined. Defining compatibilism as holding that a man's will
may be determined, but that his action may nonetheless be said to be
free, Hobbes offers a classic example of the position. He distinguished
between "the faculty or power of willing" and "the faculty or power of
doing what we will". With respect to the former, he summarily denied
the possibility of freedom, while accepting its possibility with respect to
the latter. As he said, "Liberty and necessity are consistent . . . in the
Actions which men voluntarily do: which because they proceed from
their will, proceed from Liberty; and yet, because every act of man's
will, and every desire, and inclination proceedeth from some cause, and that from another cause, in a continual chain . . . they proceed from necessity". In this passage it is clear that Hobbes was not attempting to avoid the question of choice, which he referred to as "deliberation". He put forward a theory as to the circumstances under which men deliberate, and he accounted for the outcome of deliberation in strictly deterministic terms. To summarize his view one may say that he held that the behavior of men, like the behavior of all other living creatures, depends on "animal notions", that is, on the internal motion, or "endeavour", of the parts of which living things are composed. Through experience, men gradually learn what is grateful and what is hurtful to them, and thus develop various appetites and aversions, seeking some objects and shunning others. This spontaneous form of response continues until objects are encountered which elicit contrary forces of appetite and aversion, and it is then that men deliberate. If deliberation is absent, there is no choice, and we do not then speak of "willing:" on the other hand, as Hobbes says, "If deliberation has gone before, then the last act of it, if it be appetite, is called will: if aversion, unwillingness". In Hobbes' system, the outcome of deliberation simply reflects the relative strength of our appetencies, and is therefore determined. All that may be said to be "free" is the fact that we have acted as our appetencies have inclined us to act; we are not free when we are prevented from so acting by physical restraints or by the wills--that is, by the appetencies--of others.

Turning now to the position of Hume regarding liberty and necessity, we may note that it is frequently regarded as being essentially similar to that of Hobbes, and in some respects it was. For both, the crucial question was one regarding freedom of action, not freedom of choice. On the other hand, Hobbes' rejection of freedom of choice followed directly from his deterministic metaphysics, which reduced all men's activities to the effects of motion, whereas Hume attempted to offer empirical arguments against the view that our choices are free in the sense of not being causally determined. He referred to such a doctrine, which he characterized as "the liberty of indifference", as "fantastical", "absurd", and "unintelligible". In contrast to it he defended "the liberty of spontaneity", that is freedom of action.

The empirical argument which he used to refute freedom of choice (the "liberty of indifference") had the same form in both the Treatise and the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. He began by calling attention to our reasons for holding that natural events are determined, claiming that we do so solely because these events occur in regular sequences. He then argued that similar regularities are to be found in human behavior, and that we must therefore admit that they, too, are determined. The regularities Hume cited in this connection all rested on the fact that individuals act in a consistent manner: on the basis of our knowledge of men's past behavior, we can and do infer how they will act in other, similar situations. Since no more than the presence of similar regularities can be cited in establishing whatever necessity we ascribe to events in nature, we must also admit human actions to be necessitated. This, however, does not preclude us from distinguishing between situations in which a man is free to do that which he wills, and those in which he is not. It is the difference between these cases which Hume holds to be important for moral judgments and for the ordinary affairs of life. Thus, according to Hume, freedom simply means freedom of action, not lack of determinism with respect to our choices. As he
said in the Enquiry, "By liberty, then, we can only mean a power of acting or not acting according to the determinations of the will". But what, then, determines the will? In his analysis of the passions Hume says, "the Will exerts itself, when either the good or the absence of the evil may be attained by any action of mind or body", and he identifies the impressions of pleasure and pain as the bases for whatever we find to be good or evil. To be sure, he recognized that on many occasions we experience contrary passions, and he held, as did Hobbes, that it was always the stronger passion which prevailed. For Hume, however, the strength of a passion was not to be confused with what he referred to as its "violence"; in some situations what he term "the calm passions" are at least equally strong. As he said, "We must distinguish betwixt a calm and a weak passion; betwixt a violent and a strong one". But what, one may ask, are the factors which determine whether, in a given situation, one or another passion--be it calm or violent--will have the greater strength and therefore prevail? Hume usually cites "the general character or present disposition of the person: as the prime factor which is at work." In addition, however, he entered into an elaborate analysis of the various conditions under which concurrent passions influence on another; and also how their strength is affected by repetition, by the imagination, and by the extent to which their objects are present or are remote in space and time. Thus, it was through taking into account both "the general character and present disposition of the person", and the reasons why passions increase or diminish in strength from situation to situation, that Hume attempted to explain the factors which determine choice. Thus, Hume's account, though no less deterministic than that of Hobbes, differs from it in the complexity of the factors which he introduced in explaining what determines choice. Furthermore, although his argument against the freedom of the will depended upon an analogy between the regularities in human behavior and the regularity of events in nature, Hume differed from Hobbes in not regarding human actions as following precisely the same principles as operate in the physical world. Nevertheless, one may classify Hobbes and Hume together not only by virtue of the fact that they held a compatibilist doctrine, but because their views of choice may be characterized as being subjectively determined—that is, determined by propensities inherent within the individual, rather than depending upon a cognitive response to what an individual discriminates as a good existing independently of him.

To clarify this contrast between cases in which choice may be said to be determined by subjective propensities and those cases in which it might be said to be determined by what is seen as objectively good, I should now like to direct attention to the position of Descartes. Descartes, in contrast to the compatibilist thesis, held that men can be said to have freedom of action only insofar as they exercise freedom of choice. In all other cases his explanations of actions were couched in strictly mechanistic terms, assigning no greater freedom to human actions than would be assigned to any machine. Except for the more detailed manner in which he explained the vital functions of living bodies, and except for his abandonment of an irreducible conatus, or endeavour, in explaining animal motion, Descartes' account of the machine-like operations of men's bodies was in principle similar to that of Hobbes. Where he differed, of course, was in the fact that he attributed a mind or soul to man. As a consequence, he was not called upon to explain the processes of thought in physiological terms, nor did he regard choice as being nothing more than a matter of the relative strength of competing
appetencies. Instead, he regarded both thought and choice as actions of the soul. With respect to the soul’s actions, Descartes divided them into two classes: those of the Understanding and those of the Will. He further divided the activities of willing into two classes: those in which the operations of the will control thought, and those in which they control our bodies.\footnote{m.96.0} It is with respect to the latter that we, today, most commonly speak of choice, and it is to them that I shall first attend.

Among the more obvious instances in which Descartes held that the soul influences the actions of our bodies are cases such as those in which, when we make up our minds to take a walk, our legs move. His account of how the flow of the animal spirits through the nerves and into the muscles is so familiar that I need not describe it here. What is of more interest with reference to our problem is his explanation of how the soul acts on the body when, instead of its volition terminating in overt action, it exercises control over one of its passions, such as fear. Like other passions, fear is aroused in the soul when some object with which we have had previous experience, elicits a flow of animal spirits to those organs which dispose the body to shun that object, or objects of that kind. The reflection of what is occurring in these bodily organs is what we experience as the emotion of fear. Similarly, love is evoked in the soul when an object with which we have had experience elicits a flow of the animal spirits to those organs which dispose the body to seek that object. Yet, just as the soul cannot act directly on the legs when we wish to walk, so it cannot directly control an emotion such as fear through a simple act of will. It can do so only indirectly, by turning its attention away from the past pains associated with the object, noting that on other occasions the object did not cause harm, or by directing its thought to rewards to be gained by not being overcome by fear.\footnote{m.96.0}

Descartes recognized, however, that the power of some emotions may be so great as to restrict the capacity of the soul to overcome them merely through redirecting attention to an object associated with a different passion. What occurs in such cases is that the motions of the animal spirits which had caused the original passions are so powerful and persistent that they cannot be overcome for any appreciable length of time by those motions which are associated with the objects to which the soul redirects attention. Yet, Descartes holds that even if we cannot actually rid ourselves of the passion, we can prevent ourselves from acting as it would normally lead us to act.\footnote{m.96.0} A case of this sort would be one in which we experience a terror so great that we cannot redirect our thoughts to anything which supplants our fear, yet we can still prevent ourselves from running away from the object we fear. In such a case, the soul has not actually overcome the passion, but has simply aided us in holding its consequences in check. This, Descartes recognizes as something that all men, no matter how weak, are on some occasions able to do: they see that what they truly desire is not in accord with what their passions would lead them to do. And what some men occasionally do, we should train ourselves always to do: human conduct is to be guided not by passion, but by rules of conduct which derive from a knowledge of that which is truly good.\footnote{m.96.0} Thus, it is true judgment, an action of the soul, which gives us the ultimate power to act as we should. Here we have a first indication of why I have referred to Descartes’ theory as one in which choice is determined by what is seen as objectively good. It is not determined by the strength of competing ap-
petencies, as in Hobbes, nor by the comparative strength of passions which are concurrently experienced, as in Hume; what determines it is a cognitive acknowledgment of rules of conduct which are taken to be objectively good. This interpretation of Descartes' view of choice can be further strengthened if we now turn our attention from those operations of the will which control our bodies to those which control our thought.

It is at this point, once Descartes is no longer bent on explaining how the will controls the actions of our limbs, nor how it affects our passions—that we come into contact with his epistemological doctrine concerning the relation of the understanding and the will. In his Meditations and elsewhere, he explained the possibility of error as due to the fact that the Will is wider than the Understanding: we sometimes affirm or deny propositions which we have not yet fully understood. This being the case, if we are to guard against error we must hold the will in check until we have before our minds indubitable propositions, namely those which are intuitively certain, or, in the absence of these, those which are seen to follow necessarily from others which are certain. Although Descartes grants the mind the power to refrain from affirming propositions which are not intuitively certain, he does not hold that when the mind has before it an intuitively certain proposition, assent can be withheld. Truth may therefore be said to exercise a compulsion over the will. In this sphere, therefore, choice is not free, and since human conduct is to be guided by true judgment, it would seem that Descartes was bound to hold, as Socrates had held, that to know the good is to do the good. Thus, in the end, Descartes' doctrine of choice amounts to this: that the will can, under normal circumstances, control our overt behavior; that it can also exercise control over our passions, permitting us to guide our conduct in accordance with true judgments as to the good; and it has the power to prevent us from falling into error. When, however, we do understand what constitutes human good, we are no longer free to choose evil; but that is a freedom which Descartes, like many others, would gladly give up. At this point the Will is objectively determined, being determined by truths which it cannot escape. As Kemp Smith says with respect to Descartes' view of freedom, "True freedom . . . consists in being determined by the true and the good".17

Until reaching these moral implications of Descartes' analyses of the mind's control over the body, it would have seemed that no common ground existed between his view of human freedom and that which Spinoza held. In all other respects, Spinoza's determinism appears to be essentially similar to Hobbes's view, since both rejected the Cartesian dualism of mind and body, and also rejected the view that there is a faculty or power termed "the will", capable of controlling our thoughts and our actions. Spinoza parted company from Hobbes, however, in his conception of man's ultimate good, and in his conception of that in which human freedom consists. In these respects his views are closer to those of Descartes than they were to the position held by Hobbes.

Time does not permit me to follow the trail of Spinoza's ethical thought to its end, and it is only at the end that he reaches a position similar to the final position of Descartes. The affinity between their ultimate views should be clear from the fact that Part IV of the Ethics was entitled, "Of Human Bondage", and Part V—the escape from bondage—was entitled, "Of the Power of the Understanding, or of Human Freedom". Adequate understanding alone gives us the one true, lasting
good; it permits us to overcome the partiality and self-centeredness of our everyday judgments of value, according to which things are judged to be good or bad only insofar as they are helpful or harmful to us. When this self-centeredness has been overcome, we have freed ourselves from the bondage of the passions, enabling us to enjoy that true and lasting good which is the intellectual love of God. In short, for Spinoza true freedom does not consist of being free to choose between alternatives, but is objectively determined by our apprehension of that which is good. It is therefore fitting that in the title of the final section of his *Ethics*, he should have equated freedom with "the Power of the Understanding", and this—as we have seen—is the point at which Descartes, too, ultimately arrived.

Unlike Descartes and Spinoza, Malebranche and Leibniz dealt with the problem of freedom from a theological rather than a psychological point of view. Their problem was that of reconciling human freedom with the contention that whatever occurs is part of the one divinely established order. Thus, the traditional theological problems of sin and grace, of freedom and God's power and omniscience, were once again brought into the forefront of attention. In attempting to solve these problems, however, they put forward a concept of freedom resembling the views of Descartes and Spinoza, according to which men's action are free insofar as they are determined by an understanding of that which is objectively good. Malebranche developed this doctrine by holding that what we seek is the good, and this general desire for good depends upon God. At the same time, our choices among specific goods depend upon our acts of attention; thus, when we choose evil that choice is attributable to our own lack of understanding of that which attracts us, and such choices are attributable to us, not to God. Thus, like Descartes, Malebranche identified the problem of freedom with the question of choice: men were free insofar as their choices were determined by adequate understanding. On the other hand, Leibniz's metaphysics, like that of Spinoza, forced him to abandon any belief in free choice; instead he identified true freedom with actions of a certain kind, namely those in which our action is enlightened by clear and adequate understanding.

That Leibniz could not have accepted freedom of choice followed from his view that each substance unfolds according to its own inner law, and each at the same time mirrors what is going on in all other substances in accordance with God's pre-established harmony. He was therefore precluded from holding that men had the power of channelling their thoughts in one direction rather than another; the sequence of thought is itself a manifestation of the law which defines a thing's nature. Nevertheless, he offered an account of how—in spite of this complete determinism—we come to distinguish between those actions which we term free, and those in which freedom seems to be lacking. He held that what we regard as freedom is the spontaneity we feel in some of our actions, and not in others. This feeling arises with respect to actions in which we clearly see reasons for acting as we do. When, on the other hand, our perceptions are confused, and we are moved by tendencies which we fail to understand, we feel ourselves to be acting under compulsion. Thus, once again in this period a major philosopher has identified freedom with action which is determined, but is not determined by the relative strength of our appetencies and inclinations, as Hobbes and Hume had held, but is determined by the understanding, conforming to our apprehension and love of that which is objectively good.
Turning to Locke, one finds that his position, at the outset, closely resembled that of Hobbes, yet it should occasion no surprise that it contained contradictory elements. Initially, he set up the problem of man's freedom as one concerning freedom of action, for he said that he would be discussing the idea of liberty as contrasted with necessity in terms of a person's "having the power of doing, or forebearing to do, according as the mind shall choose or direct". Furthermore, like Hobbes, he held that it made no sense to speak of "the will" as if it were a special faculty in man; as he said, to ask whether the will is free is to ask a nonsensical question, comparable to asking whether "sleep is swift" or "virtue square". As he said, "I think the question is not proper whether the will is free, but whether a man is free". Since he had defined a person's liberty as consisting in "having the power of doing, or forebearing to do, according as the mind shall choose or direct", he was forced to ask to what extent the mind has this power. This, in the end, led him back—in spite of himself—to the problem of freedom of choice.

As far as bodily motions are concerned, Locke pointed out that we have the power of "doing or forebearing" with respect to some, but not with respect to all of them. He then proceeded to ask whether we have an equivalent freedom with respect to some of our thoughts, even though we may not have the power to control all of them. In this connection he said, "where any one is such that we have the power to take it up, or lay it by, according to the preference of the mind, there we are at liberty". But what, according to Locke, controls the mind's preference for taking up one idea rather than another, or for preferring to act in one way rather than another? Locke himself raised this problem, asking "whether a man be free to will".

With respect to this problem, he was in the main a determinist, differing from Hobbes in that he formulated his determinism in hedonistic terms, rather than in terms of appetencies. Locke claimed that all motivation is an attempt to avoid "uneasiness"; all actions arise through the attempt to escape some immediately experienced negative hedonic state. As he said, "The motive for continuing in the same state or action, is only the present satisfaction in it; the motive to change is always some uneasiness: nothing setting us upon the change of state, or upon any new action, but some uneasiness. This is the great motive that works on the mind to put it upon action". The ultimate goal which we seek is that of gaining happiness and avoiding misery, but in pursuing this goal we act in accordance with our immediate feelings, avoiding both actual pain and the uneasiness of unfulfilled desire.

In simple cases, then, there is no doubt that our choices are subjectively determined. Locke, however, admits that in the ordinary course of our lives we are often beset by "sundry uneasinesses", and since we have the capacity to judge the future effects of actions in accordance with each of them, the mind has "the power to suspend the execution and satisfaction of any of its desires...this seems to me the source of all liberty; in this seems to consist that which is (as I think improperly) called free-will. For during this suspension of any desire, before the will is determined to action...we have opportunity to examine, view, and judge the good or evil of what we are going to do; and when, upon due examination, we have judged, we have done our duty, all that we can, or ought to do, in pursuit of our happiness; and it is not a fault,
but a perfection of our nature, to desire, will, and act according to the last result of a fair examination". But what, we may ask, gives us the power to suspend action, permitting us to judge which of various alternatives will contribute most to our ultimate happiness?

Locke does not explicitly discuss this question, but it is possible to infer what he almost certainly held. When we are beset with sundry uneasinesses, that is, when we encounter conflicts among our inclinations, we have motives pulling in different directions; and since we are seeking our own ultimate happiness, we must suspend action until we see which of the competing uneasinesses it is more important for us to remove if we are to attain that goal. Thus, the very act of choosing may be said to be necessitated by a conflict of forces within us: we do not choose to choose, it is something we simply must do. This bears a close resemblance to what Hobbes held regarding "deliberation", but on Locke's view what we ultimately choose depends upon an act of judgment, not upon the immediate strength of the competing forces. Thus, Locke allows our cognitive faculty, the understanding, to play a significant role in guiding conduct whenever our immediate impulses have been checked. In such cases, action has been controlled by judgment: what we judge to be better necessitates our acting as we do. Locke said of this control that it is "so far from being a restraint or diminution of freedom, that it is the very improvement and benefit of it: it is not an abridgement, it is the end and use of our liberty; and the further we are removed from such a determination, the nearer we are to misery and slavery".

In this respect Locke's conclusion resembled the positions held by Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz in which it was held that an action is free not insofar as it is undetermined, but only insofar as it is determined by the understanding which apprehends the good. Yet, one cannot say of Locke, as one can say of Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, that choice is objectively determined, for he did not hold that the good which we choose is an objective good, independent of us, nor that it forces us to seek it, once it has been recognized. Rather, Locke's ultimate position in this matter is closer to that which we will find when we examine William James' view of willing: that, in each case, the will is situationally determined.

Before attempting to clarify the notion of what it means to say that the will is situationally determined, I wish to examine one other type of traditional theory: the theory that choice is self-determined.

Today, self-determinism is a theory often casually dismissed because it tends to be identified with those forms of British and American idealism which flourished toward the end of the 19th Century, and into the 20th. It is true that the doctrine had idealists such as Green and Bradley among its most influential exponents, but its appeal had also been powerfully influenced by the psychology associated with Darwin and Darwinian theory, which--like the psychology of the idealists--rejected hedonistic accounts of motivation. However, even these roots do not fully explain the appeal which self-determinism has sometimes exerted. For example, odd as it sounds, one can make a strong case for the thesis that John Stuart Mill--whose views are often assumed to have been similar to the views of Hume--was to some degree a self-determinist. Let me briefly attempt to vindicate this statement which may initially appear to be outrageous.
In *Utilitarianism*, when discussing necessitarianism, Mill characterized the necessitarian as holding "that our actions follow from our characters, and that our characters follow from our organization, our education, and our circumstances; "that a man's character" is formed for him and not by him; therefore his wishing that it had been formed differently is of no use; he has no power to alter it. *But this is a grand error*.30 In short, Mill held that necessitarianism, as thus characterized, was mistaken. Yet, that fact has been widely overlooked, largely--I believe--because *Utilitarianism* offers no positive alternative to this form of necessitarianism, and most commentators on Mill's ethics tend to confine their attention to his *Utilitarianism*. In his *Examination of Hamilton*, however, there is at least a hint of what his positive account would be. Unfortunately, that discussion is opaque unless it is also read in connection with the psychological views which Mill developed elsewhere—especially in his anonymous article on Bentham. I shall not here enter into the details of Mill's account of an agent's ability to change his own character; I shall merely cite the clearest passage in which he formulates his view that this can in fact take place. That passage appears in his *System of Logic*. There, he terms the usual necessitarian view as "Modified Fatalism", in order to contrast it with "Asiatic Fatalism". He rejects this Modified Fatalism, according to which our characters are formed for us, and not by us, saying, "The true doctrine of the Causation of human actions maintains... that not only our conduct, but our character, is in part amenable to our will; that we can, by employing the proper means, improve our character; and that if our character is such that while it remains what it is, it necessitates us to do wrong, it will be just to apply motives which will necessitate us to strive for its improvement, and so emancipate ourselves from the other necessity. In other words, we are under a moral obligation to seek the improvement of our moral character".31 I do not claim that Mill's psychology actually succeeded in allowing him to hold that it lies within our power to change our characters, as he thought it did; I merely wish to indicate that he would have liked to hold to a self-determinist position, and that he attempted to do so. In short, Mill's views as to what determines choice is not the view which is usually ascribed to him.

The same cannot be said of T.H. Green, whose self-determinism I now wish to examine. What Green took to be the characteristic of an individual, insofar as that individual is viewed as a willing being, is that he experiences wants and impulses to satisfy these wants.32 In this respect, men resemble other living things. However, regardless of what may be the case with respect to other beings, a human being is a self-conscious subject for whom these wants furnish motives for action; and it is to these motives that one must look for the causes which determine actions. Thus, Green did not argue that men's actions are not determined; rather, he held them to be determined in another way, and by another source, than are events in nature. They are not, however, undetermined: he absolutely rejected the position of the libertarian. For example, he said, "However we try to give meaning to the assertion that an act of will is a choice without motive, we cannot do so. Unless there is an object which a man seeks or avoids in doing an act, there is not act of will".33 This, however, raises the question of what is the motive in a conflict situation which determines a man to act in one way rather than another. To this Green answered, as other determinists had answered, that this depends upon the character of the person. In saying this, however, he differed from those who analyzed the motives of a
person in terms of some particular set of desires and aversions which
stood in conflict with one another, one of which ultimately proved to be
the stronger. For Green, the motive of an action was not to be identified
with a specific desire or aversion of which the man was conscious be­
fore he willed to act. Instead, Green took the true motive to be the
particular self-satisfaction which a person believed he would gain if he
attained some particular goal or end. Thus, the motive which an act of
will expresses is the desire for this self-satisfaction. Green formulated
that view in saying that a motive "as an object of will is not merely one
of the objects of desire or aversion, of which the man was conscious
before he willed. It is a particular self-satisfaction to be gained in at­
taining one of these objects or a combination of them. The 'motive'
which the act of will expresses is the desire for this self-satisfaction".34
Thus, the individual always acts to develop or realize himself, not to
attain any particular, limited end. It is in this way that self-determinism
and self-realizationism as the standard of good became linked to Green's
moral system. In a statement summarizing the course of his argument
from its epistemological foundations to its conception of the good (Sec­
tions 174 and 175), Green held that man's self-determinism consists in
the fact that, being human and conscious of self, "he is determined, not
simply by natural wants according to natural laws, but by the thought
of himself as existing under certain conditions, and as having ends that
may be attained and capabilities that may be realized under these condi­
tions. It is thus that he not merely desires but seeks to satisfy himself
in gaining the objects of his desire; presents to himself a certain pos­
sible state of himself, which is the gratification of the desire he seeks
to reach; in short, wills. It is thus, again, that he has the impulse to
make himself what he has the possibility of becoming but actually is not,
and hence not merely, like the plant or animal, undergoes a process of
development, but seeks to, and does, develop himself".35

Turning now from the idealism of Green to the thought of Dewey,
we find that at first Dewey's theory closely followed Green. Like Green,
Dewey connected self-determinism with the theory that the basic nature
of the self is a tendency toward self-development, or "self-realization",
and it was in this that freedom consisted.36 Where he gradually broke
with Green was in refusing to identify the self with an ego lying behind
experience: the self was naturalistically conceived—in neo-Darwinian
terms—as based on impulse, and on the need to satisfy impulses in the
environment in which the individual finds himself. In his first formul­
ation, in his Outline of a Critical Theory of Ethics (1891), when his
thought had become more biologically oriented, Dewey said, "The power
to be governed by the thought of some end to be reached is freedom
from the appetites and desires. An animal which does not have the pow­
er of proposing ends to itself is impelled to action by its wants and ap­
petites as they come into consciousness. . . . But a person, one who can
direct his action by conscious ends, is emancipated from subjection to
the particular appetites. He can consider their relation to the end which
he has set before himself, and can reject, modify or use them as best
agrees with the purposed end".37 Thus, like Green, Dewey did not iden­
tify the motive of an action with one or another particular desire or
aversion; and, like Green, he went on to hold that what constitutes the
motive in accordance with which an individual acts depends upon his
character.38

Nevertheless, Dewey felt the need to be more explicit concerning
the nature of an agent's self and character than Green and other ideal-
ists had been. As I have indicated, he refused to identify a person's character with a self or ego which lay behind experience and could serve to explain why an agent in a given situation chose to act in one way rather than another. Instead, he regarded the self as an integrated system of impulses which had developed and been modified in the course of experience. In any given case, an impulse is accompanied by the idea of its consequences, and is seen in relation to the total system of impulses, habits, and ideals which constitute the self. According to Dewey's interpretation of experience, the agent's action flows directly from its relation to character as thus conceived; one does not first experience an impulse to act, then deliberate concerning the consequences of acting in that way rather than another, and finally through an act of will choose to do that which one does. As Dewey said, "The deed cannot be distinguished as act in contrast with mere getting ready to act. The whole process of working out ends, of selecting means, of estimating moral values, of recognizing duty, is, as we have seen, one of activity at every point; it is dynamic and propulsive throughout. The deed is simply this activity focused, brought to a head".

Dewey took this to be an account of the meaning of "choice", saying, "This account of choice is obviously the conception of it as the normal outcome of the process of will, the conclusion of a process which in its primary stage is named impulse, and at a later stage deliberation (intellectual) and effort (emotional). It is thus opposed to those conceptions which regard all that goes on before as non-voluntary, and regards choice alone as act of will. . . . Upon the basis of psychological analysis, there is no more a dualism between non-volitional data, on the one side, and will, on the other, than there is in the process of intellectual judgment. We do not have, in the latter, two separate faculties, one, that of gathering data, weighing, rejecting and accepting evidence, the other, an outside power, reason, to draw the inference".

Given this view of an act as being immediately determined by the system of impulses and of ends which he identified as "the self", Dewey's position was clearly a form of determinism, but one best characterized as self-determinism. As he said, "The ethical conception of freedom is the recognition of the meaning for conduct of the identity of self and act, of will and deed. There is no factor in the act foreign or alien to the agent's self; it is himself through and through. No action is moral (that is, falling in the moral sphere) save as voluntary, and every voluntary act . . . is the self operating, and hence is free. Impulse is self, the developing ideal is self; the reaction of the ideal as measuring and controlling impulse is self. The entire voluntary process is one of self-expression, of coming to consciousness of self. This intimate and thorough-going selfness of the deed constitutes freedom".

Thus, in Dewey as in Green—in spite of the differences between their conceptions of the self—the doctrines of self-determinism and self-realizationism went hand-in-hand; in neither case was deliberative choice between two incompatible alternatives a characteristic moment in morally relevant judgments.

To summarize what may be said concerning the doctrine of self-determinism, it should now be clear that the self-determinist rejects indeterminism, while at the same time rejecting the traditional necessitation doctrine. The middle way that he seeks holds that choice is determined, not as events in the non-human world are determined, but by motives. Furthermore, which of conflicting motives is a given situation is operative as the agent's will is not a function of the relative strength
of these motives considered in isolation; it is a function of the agent's own character. Up to this point, of course, other determinists might still agree. The self-determinist, however, insists—as did Mill—that the agent's character is not simply a product of his original constitution and past experiences; instead, it can be gradually altered by the individual himself. This is held to be possible because underlying all other motives is the one motive which every individual shares: an urge to foster the growth and welfare of the self. Recognizing that actions in accordance with some motives foster growth and welfare, whereas others do not, the individual can choose the former, and gradually transform himself through loss of interest in those which he discovers not to favor his growth. It is in this way that self-determinism regarding choice is closely linked to self-realization as the standard of value.

Finally, I turn to a view of what determines choice which I regard as clearer and psychologically more plausible than the subjective, objective, or self-determinist theories with which I have thus far been concerned. This is the theory that choice is situationally determined; it is the theory which—up to one final point—was the theory developed by James in Chapter XXVI of his *Principles of Psychology*, where he discussed the will. That chapter is so rich in relevant phenomenological details that no concise statement of James's position can do it justice. Nevertheless, the main outlines of his theory are clear, and my delineation of its basic features can be checked against James's own less extensive discussions of it, published two years later, in his *Psychology: Briefer Course*, Chapter XXVI, and his *Talks to Teachers*, Chapter XV.44

In order to understand James's discussion of choice, one must recognize the extent to which he stressed the pervasiveness in human behavior of what he and others termed ideo-motor action. That term refers to those occasions on which the presence of an idea unhesitatingly and immediately calls forth an action. This he took to be the normal process of volition, which operates in much of our lives. He noted, however, that it is sometimes the case that conflicting notions are present to the mind, and in such cases action in accordance with one of them is inhibited by the action which the other would ordinarily evoke. It is in such cases that deliberation, rather than immediate ideo-motor discharge, occurs. James notes that while deliberation may be relatively shortlived, at other times it may be protracted over weeks or months, occupying the mind at intervals whenever one of the notions arises and calls forth and is balanced by the other. James found it of great psychological interest to see how much such conflicts are ultimately resolved, and he sketched five ways in which deliberation is apt to be terminated, so that action can proceed.45 Of these, there was only one which he regarded as especially relevant to a causal explanation of choice; it comprised those relatively rare cases in which the agent feels that through an effort of will he can tip the balance in favor of one alternative rather than the other. This, however, James acknowledged to be merely a description of what the agent feels is happening; it fails to provide any indication of what is involved in making this inward effort, and it does not suggest how such an effort effects the result it aims to achieve. On James's view these questions can only be answered by asking what it is that makes one idea prevail over another in the mind.46 As he said, "We reach the heart of our inquiry into volition when we ask by what process it is that the thought of any given object comes to prevail stably in the mind".47 The illustration which he used in each of his treatments of the problem was that of the drunkard who, after having
foresworn drink, thinks of excuses for taking a drink on some par-
ticular occasion. James lists a few such excuses, among which are the
following: "It is poured out and it is a sin to waste it; others are
drinking and it would be churlishness to refuse . . . it is just to get
through this job of work; . . . or it is Christmas Day . . . or it is just
this once, and once doesn't count". As James points out, all these are
excuses to keep from thinking of this act as what is involved in being a
drunkard. As he says, "That is the conception that will not stay before
the poor soul's attention. But if he once gets able to pick cut that way
of conceiving, from all the other possible ways of conceiving the various
opportunities which occur, if through thick and thin he holds to it
that this is being a drunkard and is nothing else, he is not likely to
remain one long". Thus, according to James, "the essential achievement
of the will . . . when it is voluntary, is to ATTEND to a difficult object
and hold it fast before the mind. . . . Effort of attention is thus the es-
ternal phenomenon of will".

Shortly thereafter—consistently with his whole argument—James
said, "The question of fact in the free will controversy is thus extreme-
ly simple. It relates solely to the amount of effort of attention or con-
 sent which we can at any time put forth". This led him to propose the
following alternatives: either the duration and intensity of this effort
are "fixed functions of the object", as in the case in "effortless voli-
tions", or else it is the case that the effort is exactly what it seems to
be—"an independent variable" such that "we might exert more or less of
it in any given case". As is well known, James opted for the latter
alternative: he believed that what he termed "the dead heave of the
will" does count. To be sure, James did not claim that the truth of
this alternative could be established within psychology; but he was
equally strenuous in denying that psychology (or "science" in general)
could rule out the efficacy of effort in determining choice. When dis-
cussing this issue in his chapter on "Attention", as well as in the
chapter on "Will", he insisted that the issue must be decided on other
grounds. Some persons, he pointed out, were inclined to decide it in
speculative metaphysical grounds, but for him the deciding factor was
what he took to be the ethical import of the doctrine that effort does
count. It is at this point that his treatment of the issue in the Princi-
 ples of Psychology makes contact with the argument of his essay on
"The Dilemma of Determinism".

Since I do not happen to believe that the two alternatives which
James outlines are equally balanced, I should like to retreat one step,
and return to James's argument as to the role of attention in choice.
What I wish to propose is that one can use James's insight here, and
yet fit it into a deterministic account in which one need not say that
"effort counts". In short, I wish to propose that choice is determined
through attention, and that attention is itself determined. It is this ac-
count which I wish to characterize as the view that choice is situation-
ally determined.

In speaking of choice, I am confining my attention to those cases
in which a person recognizes that he is faced by a choice between two
alternatives, each of which he has some reason for wanting to do. I am
not concerned with what might be called spontaneous actions, that is
with reflex action, with habitual actions unthinkingly performed, nor
with what James termed ideo-motor action. In some of the latter cases an
onlooker might say that there was in fact a choice to be made even
though the agent—whether culpably or not—failed to recognize that fact. I am, then, only concerned with those cases in which the agent does recognize that a choice is to be made, and where he finds that each of the alternatives between which he must choose has some appeal to him, or some claim upon him.

It may well be that there are cases in which an agent need not have learned through past experience that he is forced to choose: like Buridan’s ass, he may be confronted by a situation in which he is immediately aware of two incompatible alternatives, toward each of which he is immediately drawn to respond. In all probability, however, such cases are comparatively rare. In most cases in which we are conscious of being faced by a choice we owe the consciousness of the alternatives not to the immediate attractiveness of directly presented alternatives, but to our earlier experience in a variety of other situations. When unpleasant experiences have followed from some of our spontaneous actions, we have become conditioned to be more apt to look to the situation we face in an attempt to discover various alternatives for action which may be present. Although part of this process of conditioning is certainly due to the direct effect of painful experiences, probably a greater share comes through the way parents and others punish us for acting in whatever way it may happen to suit us to act. Punishment, and the threat of punishment, condition us to take heed of alternatives which we, in our self-interest, might otherwise be apt to overlook. In thus providing a check to spontaneous action, this conditioning forces us to attend to the alternative ways in which we might act in whatever situation confront us, and this lesson may carry over from any particular type of situation to form in us a habit of looking before we leap. As we all know, when such conditioning is extreme, it may end in habitual indecisiveness—in an endless search for other possible alternatives, so that the agent becomes incapable of acting at all. That danger, great as it is, is a good deal less worrisome than the opposite danger of giving way, under all circumstances, to purely impulsive action, since the strength of impulse is not apt to stand in the need of conditioned reinforcement. It is at precisely this point that one can see how the account which I wish to offer differs from that of James, avoiding his appeal to effort, that is to "a will-power distinct from motives".

James thought it necessary to appeal to effort in order to explain those cases in which "a rarer and more ideal impulse is called upon to neutralize others of a more instinctive or habitual kind". He held that ideal impulses and remote goals can only prevail over the passions, appetites and ingrained habits through the exercise of effort on the part of the agent. He illustrated his point diagramatically, saying that the force of I (an ideal) is per se less than the force of P (a propensity), but that I plus E (effort) can be greater than P. As we have seen, it was his view that the point at which this effort, or act of will, is expended is in holding attention fixated on the ideal goal, in spite of the forces tending to divert it; you will recall that he said, "Effort of attention is thus the essential phenomenon of will". According to James, it is through effort that we can elect to follow what he termed "the line of greater resistance".

The kinds of cases to which James is appealing are, I suppose, familiar to all: when we experience contrary inclinations we find it difficult to keep our attention riveted on the goal which we have started to pursue. The problem, as I see it, is how one can best understand cases
of this type. James often spoke of "the fiat of the will", but this phrase, it seems to me, only has meaning when it refers to the moment when we have reached a decision as between two alternatives: I do not control my attention by fiat. Thus, I think James's account of the phenomenology of choosing is defective. It seems to me no accident that in the section of the chapter on will which is entitled, "The Feeling of Effort", he offers no descriptive characterization of this effort, nor does he indicate at what point in the process of decision it occurs. I am inclined to explain this lacuna in his account as indicative of the fact that no feeling of effort is actually present during the decision process, that it is only after our vacillation has been resolved, and we have reached a decision, that the notion arises that our choice involved effort on our part. At that point, our feeling of relief and accomplishment at having reached a decision is a feeling which resembles the feelings we have when, through physical effort, we have accomplished what we set out to do. Thus, I should say that in the case of willing, which--as James agrees—is an act of the mind, we are using the term "effort" in a non-literal or metaphorical sense.

If, as I have held, our past experience has trained us to check impulsive action in certain types of situation, it will not take a special act or effort to consider that alternatives there may be in any analogous situation we presently face. The question then arises whether what James regarded as ideal motives can exert as strong an influence on us as do the propensities which work against them. James, as we saw, was convinced that this could not be the case: "the independent variable of effort" had to be called into play if the ideal end were to prevail. Yet, in his own favorite example, that of the drunkard, the only way in which the drunkard could save himself was, according to James, to form a clear conception of what was involved in the case at hand: to see it in its true light as succumbing to the attractiveness of drink. Were the drunkard to attach a negatively charged name to that alternative, perceiving the case as that of being "a drunkard", then--so long as he thinks of his situation in that way--he will not drink. As James said, "The effort by which he succeeds in keeping the right name unwaveringly present to the mind proves to be his saving moral act". Yet, we may ask, "Is it indeed effort that achieves this?" and "Why does this name have the efficacy that it does?" My contention is that the process of "conditioning" (however we may conceive of it) not only accounts for the fact that the person checks his impulse to drink, and considers the alternative, but it also accounts for the strong negative affect which attaches to the fact that taking this one drink is categorized as being a drunkard, as succumbing to drink. The whole idea of succumbing to temptation—once such a term is used—surely carries a negative charge which can be no less strong than the positive attractiveness of which the object of any propensity may have. The mere fact that James and others are inclined to characterize such factors as "ideal", because they are not related to instinct or habit, does not provide an adequate reason to deny that they have less power—either to repulse or attract—than do other motives which are more obviously related to our bodies.

Yet, given the drunkard's conflict between his desire to drink and his abhorrence of the label "drunkard", on what basis is a decision reached? If one were to hold that choice is subjectively determined, the decision would go to whichever of the two forces was the stronger, and James presumably introduced the variable "effort" to avoid this pseudo-solution. Yet, earlier, he had identified another way in which delibera-
The determinants of choice may be ended, and a decision be reached, and one which does not appeal to the presence of effort. This was the type of decision-making which he termed "the reasonable type".65

In the reasonable type of decision, when the agent who is faced by conflicting alternatives, the arguments for and against each of alternatives is weighed until—as James said—"they seem gradually and almost insensibly to settle themselves in the mind and to end by leaving a clear balance in favor of one alternative, which alternative we then adopt without effort or constraint... the reasons which decide us appearing to flow from the nature of things, and to owe nothing to our will. We have, however, a perfect sense of being free".66 In his discussion of these cases, James stresses the fact that "the conclusive reason for the decision in this cases usually is the discovery that we can refer the case to a class upon which we are accustomed to act unhesitatingly in a stereotyped way... In general, a great part of every deliberation consists in turning over all the possible modes of conceiving the doing or not doing of the act".67 When James then continues, "the wise man is he who succeeds in finding the name which suits the needs of the particular situation best", we are forcibly reminded that this was precisely the analysis which he gave of the situation in which the man who had foreworn drink was able to resist taking a drink: it is possible as soon as he thought of himself as being a drunkard if he were to take that drink. Thus, the only difference between the two types of decision which James attempted to separate—the reasonable type and the type involving effort—is that he held that in the latter case effort is used to control attention, to hold the idea steadfastly in mind. Yet, as I have suggested, he fails to make it plausible that we expend what is called "effort" in controlling attention. The view which is psychologically more plausible seems to me to be the view which we earlier saw that Spinoza had held: that ideas have a conatus of their own, that they persist until driven out of our minds by other ideas. Once we have been trained to see the other possibilities to the ways in which we spontaneously tend to react in a given situation, we are forced to consider the choices we face. It is then that—as James said—"the 'reasons' which decide us (appear) to follow from the nature of things, and to owe nothing to our will". This, it will be noted is reminiscent of the views of Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, though James differed from them—as would I—in appealing to the nature of the particular situation in which the individual finds himself, rather than to a set of absolute values, objectively given. It is for this reason that I characterize James' view as one in which choice is situationally determined.

I shall have more to say concerning this in a moment, but first I wish to point out that James' account of the reasonable type of decision was somewhat misleading insofar as he tended to identify the importance of "naming" or classifying an action with acting in a stereotyped way. To be sure, agents often shun specific forms of action because they are labelled "stealing" or "cheating", and engage in other forms of action because they are seen as being "honest". There is, however, no reason to identify the importance of classifying actions under certain general terms with stereotypical. For example, when a person checks an egoistic impulse because he sees that it would constitute an "ungenerous" act, generosity is a name which covers a broad range of types of behavior rather than being confined to any one specific type of act; one can be generous or ungenerous in many different ways, rather than in any one stereotyped way. In fact, James can be taken as having rectified what
seems to have been an overemphasis on the role of specific rules and stereotypes when he spoke of a "reasonable" character as being "one who has a store of stable and worthy ends, and who does not decide about an action till he has calmly ascertained whether it is ministerial or detrimental to any one of these". Thus James' analysis of what occurs when choice is reasonably determined is essentially similar to the analysis which Locke finally offered as to the role of judgment in deliberative choice. Unlike Locke, however, James did not hold that it was the agent's own ultimate happiness which dominated his choice. For James it was a question of which of two alternative ways of structuring a particular situation was one which, given the sum total of the individual's likes and dislikes, his self-image and his ideals, dominated the other. Unlike those who held that it was the relative strength of two conflicting propensities within the individual, on James' view of choice the envisioned alternatives themselves were what tempt or repel us; the forces arrayed against each other do not arise from within us, but existed in the appeal which is seen as present in each of the alternatives between which we were forced to choose.

In a much earlier article, I attempted to show that this form of determinism is psychologically plausible, and that the objection which undoubtedly springs immediately to mind—that the appeal of each of the alternatives is due to our past experience—is an objection which cannot be sustained. Furthermore, in that article I argued that this theory, unlike some other forms of determinism, does not undercut our belief that men are justifiably held responsible for their choices when they have an opportunity to choose—that is, when they are in a position to recognize alternatives within the situations they face. Were it the case that they inevitably chose as they did because of the relative strength of the propensities within them, without reference to the objects toward which these propensities were directed, we might be inclined to incarcerate them for our own protection, but we could not justify their incarceration; we ourselves—if this doctrine were true—would simply be acting in terms of our own strongest propensities, which is not what we ordinarily take the course of justice to be. Our notion of justice demands that each case be judged on its merits, in terms of what has been done and what the law is, but this is to say that we expect a judge's decision to be situationally determined, and not to be determined in any other way.

ENDNOTES

1 The chief arguments usually given in defense of libertarianism have been drawn from the notion of an individual's moral responsibility. Another usual argument has been that a person is an active agent whose actions are to be interpreted in terms of his purposes, and these purposes are not to be interpreted as themselves having been determined by anything other than the agent himself. As J.R. Lucas said, "The buck stops here" (The Freedom of the Will) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), 172. This is also the view of C.A. Campbell in his Inaugural Lecture, "In Defense of Free Will", 1938. This lecture is reprinted in Milton Munitz, ed., Modern Introduction to Ethics (Glencoe: Free Press, 1958). It is also the view held by Roderick Chisholm, in Human Freedom and the Self (Lawrence: University of Kansas, 1964). Chisholm cites Aristotle, Reid, and Richard Taylor as holding the same position (3 n.); he might also have cited Clarke.
An analogous view which, however, does not appeal to an autonomous self is the view widely held by recent ordinary-language philosophers, such as Ryle and Melden, who claim that the categories of scientific explanation cannot be appropriately applied to human action; that reasons are distinct from causes.

A fourth, and more radical view of the same approach is to be found in existentialist attacks on the adequacy of an objective, scientific approach in any field.

Karl Popper's attack on deterministic accounts of human actions differs from all of the above, resting on his special ontology of the relations between the physical world ("World I"), the psychological world ("World II"), and the world of abstract meanings ("World III"). (Cf. Conjectures and Refutations °New York: Basic Books, 1962), Chapters 12 and 13; also, his Objective Knowledge, Chapter 6, and his contribution to Popper and Eccles, The Self and its Brain (Berlin and New York: Springer, 1977). In the case of Eccles, a neurophysiologist, we find the claim advanced that the neurological evidence establishes the existence of a mind distinct from the brain, but connected with it; and that the mind is capable of affecting conduct through its influence on what occurs in the brain. (Cf. The Self and its Brain, Chapter E7.)

In short, one can discriminate at least six different forms of indeterminism among recent writers concerned with the problem of the freedom of the will.

2 Cf. the paragraph in Concerning Body which includes the passage quoted in the next footnote.

It should also be remarked that when Hobbes speaks of "willing" he does not presuppose, but explicitly rejects as nonsense, the notion that there is a faculty termed "the will" which is responsible for willing. Cf. Liberty, Necessity, and Chance, Preface "To the Reader" and Reply No. XVII (Hobbes: English Works, Molesworth edition, vol. V, i and 236).


Cf. the following passage from Concerning Body, Ch. XXV, Section 13: "Such a liberty as is free from necessity is not to be found in the will of either men or beasts. But if by liberty we understand the faculty or power, not of willing, but of doing what we will, then certainly liberty is to be allowed to both".

4 In Liberty, Necessity, and Chance, contraverting the position of Bishop Bramhall, Hobbes points out that in this respect "horses, dogs, and other beasts" may be said to deliberate in the same sense as do men, for they too "do demur oftentimes upon the way they are to take: the horse retiring from some strange figures he sees, and coming on again to avoid the spur. And what else doth man that deliberateth, but one while proceed toward action, another while retire from it, as the hope of greater good draws him, or the fear of greater evil drives him?" (Animadversions No. VIII °English Works, Molesworth edition, vol. 5, 808.)

6 In Leviathan, Part II, Ch. 21, Hobbes discusses physical constraints on freedom of action, but does not discuss the constraints imposed by the will of others. Earlier, when he discussed the conditions existing in "a state of nature", he had recognized the existence of such constraints. In Ch. 21, however, his attention was focussed on the relation of sovereign to subject and he failed to deal with the question of the constraints imposed upon the liberty of one subject by the will of another.

7 For the contrast between these two meanings of "liberty", cf. Treatise, Bk. II, Part III, Section ii (Selby-Bigge edition, 407-8). His characterization of the liberty of indifference as "absurd" and "unintelligible" appears in this passage; his characterization of the doctrine of "fantastical" appears in the preceding section (Selby-Bigge edition, 404).

8 Section VIII, Part I (Selby-Bigge edition, 95). The italics are in the original.


In his Dissertation on the Passions, which is to be found in volume 4 of the Green and Grose edition of his Philosophical Works (London, 1882), Hume opens his discussion by laying down the same basic principles.


11 For this terminology, cf. Treatise, Bk. II, Part III, section iii (Selby-Bigge edition, 148). In other places he uses such equivalent terms as "the temper and disposition of a person".

12 Helvetius, Hartley, and Priestly—the other major Associationists of the period—also offered deterministic accounts of choice in terms of the association of ideas; however, their accounts, like the account of Hobbes, was greatly simplified as compared with that of Hume.

13 Descartes phrases this distinction as one between those volitions which "terminate in the soul itself" and those which "terminate in our bodies" (Passions of the Soul, Part I, Article XVIII). "Here, and elsewhere, I cite from the Haldane and Ross translation."

14 Passions of the Soul, Part I, Article XLVI.

15 Passions of the Soul, Part I, Article XLVI.

16 Passions of the Soul, Part I, Articles XLVIII and XLIX.

Furthermore, Kemp Smith points out that Descartes repeatedly insisted that the relation between the Will and the Understanding is different insofar as God and man are concerned: God's will is not bound by His Understanding, whereas man's is (Ibid., 268-69); in the same connection, Kemp Smith quotes at length from Descartes' Reply to the Sixth Set of Objections, cited above.


For the importance which Malebranche attaches to the act of attention in choice—which parallels what we shall find in William James—see Martial Gueroult, Malebranche (Paris: Aubier, 1959), III, 198-201.


20 Essays Concerning Human Understanding, edited by A.C. Fraser (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894), Bk. II, Chapter XII, Section 10.

21 Essay, Bk. II, Chapter XXI, Section 10.

22 Essay, Bk. II, Chapter XXI, Section 21.

23 Essay, Bk. II, Chapter XXI, Section 12.

24 Essay, Bk. II, Chapter XXI, Section 22.

25 This is a special form of psychological hedonism. Locke, like John Stuart Mill, denies that we act for future pleasures and to avoid future pains, but holds that we act in accordance with the hedonic tone of present idea. He differs from Mill, however, in his negative formulation of this principle: it is the unpleasantness of a present idea which moves us to act, not the positive hedonic tone which, because of past experience, has come to be associated with some present idea.

26 Essay, Bk. II, Chapter XXI, Section 29.

27 Essay, Bk. II, Chapter XXI, Sections 42 and 43.

28 Essay, Bk. II, Chapter II, Chapter XXI, Section 48.

29 Essay, Bk. II, Chapter XXI, Section 49.

30 Collected Works (Toronto; University of Toronto Press, 1963- ), VIII, 840. *The italics in the last sentence are added.*

31 Collected Works, IX, 465.

32 Prolegomena to Ethics, 5th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924), Section 85 (97). In this characterization of man's basic motivation it is obvi-
ous that Green's theory, like Darwin's, starts from anti-hedonistic premises.

Prolegomena, Section 108 (115-16). He also said, "To a will free in the sense of unmotivated we can attach no meaning whatever" (Ibid., Section 97 (108). Furthermore, Green argued that if a man's will were absolutely undetermined, he could not be held responsible for his actions (Ibid. Section 110 (123).


Prolegomena, Section 175 (199). This, I should say, is identical with what Mill sought to establish.

Even as late as the third revised edition of his Psychology (1891), when Dewey's thought took on a more naturalistic cast, he spoke in the same terms as did Green regarding the realization of the self as the true object of all desire. For example, in the Chapter on "Volition" we find such statements as the following: "The Object which satisfies the impulse is only the means through which the desire is realized. It is desired only because it is felt to be necessary to the satisfaction of self" (Early Works (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1967-72), II, 312. Similarly, he said, "Ultimately, there is but one end, the self; all other ends are means" (Ibid. II, 320).

This point is later expressed in his Study of Ethics where he says, "Motive is only character in a given instance. Motive is never bare natural impulse, but is impulse in the light of the consequences which may reasonably be supposed to result from acting on it" (Early Works, IV, 242-43).

Also, cf. "The Ego as Cause", Philosophical Review, III (1894), 337-41. (Reprinted in Early Works, IV, 91-95.)

Early Works, IV, 337.

Early Works, IV, 339-40.

In the following section, which bears the title "Determinist and Indeterminist Theories" (344-49), Dewey holds that once the dualism between self and motive is overcome, the whole controversy between the Free-Willist and the "Predeterminist" vanishes. Their futile arguments, he claims, rest on the fact that both accept the same faulty psychological analysis, according to which the question was one between "mechanical causation on one side, and arbitrary interference on the other, forgetting that both alternatives arise from the unexamined assumption of the dualism of self and ideal and motive" (349).

In this respect, as we shall see, James's theory of the will differed radically from Dewey's views. In fact, Dewey, in the essay on "The Ego as Cause", was highly critical of James. (Cf. Early Works, IV, 93, as well as the notes to pages 93 and 95.)
Unfortunately, most philosophers know only James's discussion of the free-will issue through his essay on "The Dilemma of Determinism". As we shall see, however, that essay relates to only one point in his analysis of the question, and that is to the point at which he holds that, in the end, one must "look to one's general philosophy to incline the beam", since "the last word of psychology here is ignorance" (Principles of Psychology, I, 429). (N.B. This, and all subsequent references to any of James's writings refer to the now standard edition, Works of William James, ed. by Frederick Burkhardt, et al., published by the Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1976- .)

Principles, II, 1138-42.

Principles, II, 1164 f.

Principles, II, 1166.


Principles, II, 1166-67 f.

Principles, II, 1175.

In fact, in one passage he claimed that the basic characteristic of a moral action "consists in the effort of attention by which we hold fast an idea which but for that effort of attention would be driven out of the mind by the other psychological tendencies that are there" (Talks to Teachers, 109-10). For his use of the phrase "the dead heave of the will", cf. Principles, II, 1141.

James's view presupposed his further belief that "thinking exists as a special kind of immaterial process alongside the material processes of the world", and this was a belief to which he firmly adhered. (Cf. Principles, II, 1174-75; I, 141-45, and II, 1185-86.)

Cf. the section entitled "Is Voluntary Attention a Resultant or a Force?" in the chapter on "Attention", Principles, I, 423-30. (Note especially pages 424 and 428-30 in that section.) Also, compare the section entitled "The Question of 'Free Will'", in the chapter on "Will", Principles, II, 1173-82, and Talks to Teachers, 111-12.

It is in this way that I would account for what James termed "the obstructed will". My account of what he termed "the explosive will" is similar to his, and immediately follows. (For his use of these terms, cf. Principles, II, 1143-44.)

It is thus that he characterizes the factor of effort; cf. Principles, II, 1141. A parallel passage is to be found in Psychology: Briefer Course, 433.

Principles, II, 1154. Cf. Ibid., II, 1143 for a fuller statement of the same point.

Principles, II, 1155.
51 *Principles*, II, 1167.

52 *Principles*, II, 1154-55.

53 For example, he spoke of "the *fiat*, the element of consent or resolve that an act shall ensure" *Principles*, II, 1111), and in speaking of de­liberation he said, "when finally the original suggestion either prevails and makes the movement take place, or gets definitively quenched by its antagonists, we are said to decide, or to utter our voluntary *fiat* in favor of one or the other course" (*Principles*, II, 1136).

54 *Principles*, II, 1142-44.

55 I find support for this contention in G.F. Stout's analysis of attention in Volume I of his *Analytic Psychology* (London: Sonnenschein, 1896). In this connection, page 197 of his chapter entitled "The Process of Attention", as well as the whole of the subsequent chapter, "Further Questions Relating to Attention" (and especially 240-44) are highly relevant.

For a brief summary of Stout's view regarding "voluntary attention", and its relation to his acceptance of self-determinism, cf. his *Manual of Psychology*, 3rd ed. (London: University Tutorial Press, 1913), 731-34. That account is wholly compatible with James's account of what constitutes the process of "reasonable decision", and does not in any way introduce "the feeling of effort" on which James had laid stress.

I might also note that E.B. Titchener, in his discussion of "Attention", took issue with James on this point, denying that there is any special form of activity, or effort, involved in focussing attention. (Cf. *A Beginner's Psychology* (New York: Macmillan, 1915), 92 and 95-96.)

56 *Principles*, II, 1164-65.

57 *Principles*, II, 1170.

58 I say "pseudo-solution" since I agree with James in holding that the question of relative strength is begged, rather than solved, by appealing to the fact that one rather than the other did win out. (Cf. *Principles*, II, 1154.) There is surely no independent way of measuring the strength of each of two conflicting motives in any given situation.


60 *Principles*, II, 1138.

61 *Principles*, II, 1138f.


63 "Determinism and Moral Responsibility", *Ethics*, 70 (1960), 204-19.