ABSTRACT. A sequel to "A Problem of Motivation for Multipliers", *SJPhil* 20, 209-24. It is argued that Goldman's account of act and event individuation cannot be modified to escape criticisms previously raised. Augmentation generation and the counterfactual basis of the account are featured in the discussion.

In "A Problem of Motivation for Multipliers" [*Southern Journal of Philosophy* 20 (1982), 209-224], I presented Goldman's multiplying account of act and event individuation as being motivated in the main by three objections raised against Davidson's unifying approach. Addressing these objections, I then went on to argue that the multiplying account is not the advance over Davidson's account that it is made out to be.

The first objection taken up was a causal objection. Consider a situation in which Donald pulls the trigger, fires the gun, and kills Alvin. Davidson's unifying account allows for, say, the identity of Donald's act of pulling the trigger and his act of killing Alvin. Goldman's response is that these acts cannot be identical because the act of pulling the trigger causes the gun to fire, while the act of killing does not.

The second objection was a relational objection. Consider the example where John flips the switch and turns on the light. Davidson's account would allow that John's act of flipping the switch could be identical to John's act of turning on the light. Goldman counters this suggestion by claiming that these acts cannot be identical because John turns on the light by flipping the switch but does not flip the switch by turning on the light. The "by"-relation, unlike identity, is asymmetric and irreflexive.

The third objection was a temporal one. Suppose Donald shoots Alvin and Alvin dies, albeit much later, as a result. Davidson would allow for the identity of Donald's act of shooting Alvin and Donald's act of killing Alvin. Goldman, however, objects that these acts cannot be identical because Alvin dies hours after being shot by Donald but not hours after being killed by Donald.

Goldman's cure for these ills was to develop an elaborate account in which acts ('act-tokens') are treated as the exemplification of a property ('act-type') by an agent at a time and are individuated such that they are identical if and only if they involve the same agent, the same
property, and the same time. More formally, this might be regarded as providing (i) an existence condition, viz., \( [x, P, t] \) exists iff agent \( x \) has property \( P \) at time \( t \), and (ii) a criterion of identity, viz., \( [x, P, t] = [y, R, t'] \) iff \( x = y \), \( P = R \), and \( t = t' \). The criterion of identity has the effect of precluding the kinds of act identities proposed by Davidson (and, *ipso facto*, of multiplying act-tokens), inasmuch as the descriptions of the acts specify different act properties. The oft-intuited connections among certain acts under different descriptions, i.e., those connections which Davidson sought to explain as identities, were now to be explained instead in terms of four basis 'act-generating' relations, viz., (1) causal generation, (2) conventional generation, (3) simple generation, and (4) augmentation generation. This, Goldman suggested, would avoid the difficulties raised by his three objections.

For each of the three objections, I showed that the generational explanations led to results which were either compatible with Davidsonian explanations or open to the same objections levelled at Davidsonian identity claims, or upon analysis pointed to incoherencies in Goldman's multiplying account. In what follows, I wish to anticipate and foreclose a certain response which my documentation of the failure of Goldman's multiplying account might have provoked. The response in question involves the counterclaim that the problems I have raised for Goldman's account are problems in letter only and do not penetrate to the underlying intention or the core of the theory. Since the difficulties are superficial, such a response might continue, the theory is susceptible to modifications which would avoid the problems I have raised, while leaving the theory substantially intact. That is, although Goldman's theory is faulty as stated, some close variant of it might nonetheless provide a correct account.

I am not prepared to argue that no modifications whatsoever would yield a correct account while retaining important affinities to the original. What I will do is show that although one sympathetic but critical way of reinterpreting Goldman enables us to get around some of the difficulties, it requires us to assume that a certain detail of Goldman's theory can be tampered with. This, I will go on to suggest, cannot be done without also affecting features of Goldman's theory most central to it.

II

Let me begin by making an admission and a concession. Although I believe Goldman's theory is incapable of satisfactorily handling the causal problem for the reasons that were adduced in "A Problem of Motivation for Multipliers", I have no way of assessing the seriousness of this particular deficiency.

Part of Goldman's problem here, it will be recalled, turned on the issue of how a key term ('consists in') in the conditions for causal generation was to be read. I am prepared to allow that this is a problem that can be remedied in some straightforward way without affecting the rest of Goldman's account—perhaps by specifying an intended technical sense for the otherwise misleading term. Hence, I will set Goldman's causal problem aside and make my case by addressing myself to the more serious individuation problems for Goldman's account encountered in the discussion of the relational and temporal problems.
Let us then call back to mind the arm-raising/signalling case that was presented in the discussion of Goldman's account vis-à-vis the relational problem. There, against the backdrop of a certain story, and seemingly in accordance with Goldman's generational paradigms, we had an act-token of S's raising his arm generating an act-token of S's signalling for a turn and also an act-token of S's signalling for a turn generating an act-token of S's raising his arm. This, as we saw, spelled disaster for the co-tenability of Goldman's existence condition for events, his criterion of identity, and the asymmetry of his generation relation.

These last-mentioned tenets are basic to Goldman's multiplying account and would have to be among the items that remain invariant throughout modification, if we are to consider the results of modification as still being versions of Goldman's account at all. Modifications which directly violate any of these tenets are thus not deemed allowable modifications and will be excluded from consideration here.

The question now facing us is whether, within the constraints just indicated, Goldman's account can be modified to escape the unhappy consequences of the arm-raising/signalling case. I shall approach this question by way of a sympathetic reappraisal of the arm-raising/signalling case in order to isolate a troublesome feature of Goldman's theory as the most likely candidate for revision.

For me to tell a plausible story on Goldman's behalf with respect to the arm-raising/signalling case will require that I bring to the fore something merely implicit in my previous representation of Goldman's notion of generation, but actually made explicit by Goldman in his most general characterization of generation.¹ What has to be made explicit is this: Establishing the occurrence of generation involves establishing the truth of a counterfactual claim.² An act-token is generated by another act-token only if the situation is such that had the latter not occurred, neither would the former have occurred.

Hence, in the case under reconsideration, the situation is as follows. S's raising his arm out the window generates S's signalling for a turn only if it is true that if S had not raised his arm out the window, he would not have signalled for a turn. Likewise, S's signalling for a turn generates S's raising his arm out the window only if it is true that if S had not signalled for a turn, S would not have raised his arm out the window (and thereby gotten his hand toward the hidden button).

So for such a case to involve Goldman in the difficulties indicated previously, it must be possible for the second counterfactual statement mentioned in the last paragraph to be true, given that the first one is (or conversely). Alternatively, for Goldman to escape the difficulties, it must be the case that the second counterfactual cannot be true, given that the first one is (or conversely).

I do not know how to establish such claims concerning counterfactuals in a satisfactory manner. If it is true that S might have gotten his hand toward the button in some way other than signalling, it is equally true that S could have signalled in some way other than extending his arm out the window, say, by using his flash-indicator. Answers to such questions seem not to be an absolute matter but depend on what is built
into the example. In my example, I would insist that if $S$ had not signalled by doing what he did, he would not have generated the act-token desired as outcome.

For the sake of argument, however, I am going to grant Goldman the above-mentioned counterfactual claims that he needs. As well, I will connive with respect to some other counterfactual presuppositions needed to give Goldman as favorable a case as possible, provided these are not obviously unacceptable. Deciding what is favorable to Goldman and what he would be prepared to accept is a vicarious undertaking and as such is subject to certain risks, not the least of which is that of mis-representation. That can't be helped. The fact that the feature of Goldman's account that I isolate as a result of reappraising the arm-raising/signalling case is also one over which Goldman himself expresses reservations in a different context does suggest, however, that my second-guessing of Goldman is not entirely off the mark.

Now to specifics. The following diagram prima facie represents a more favorable alternative to the tree of generationally related act-tokens originally devised for the arm-raising/signalling case:

```
A4 o S's getting his hand in a position to press the button
    |    
A3 o S's signalling for a turn
    |    
A2 o S's raising his arm out the window
    |    
A1 o S's raising his arm
```

Here we manage to avoid the unhappy duplication of act-tokens we had in the original by allowing Goldman suitable counterfactual presuppositions consistent with $A_5$'s generating not another token of $A_1$ but instead something rather like $A_6$.

Let it be noted that the counterfactual moves required to lend credence to such a picture are very complicated. Surely, if we merely consider $S$'s signalling as opposed to signalling by arm-raising or signalling by flipping the flash-indicator, he need not have raised his arm (out the window). So in some sense it might not be the case that had the arm-raising not occurred the signalling would not have occurred, just as we might grant Goldman that it is not the case that had the signalling not occurred the arm-raising would not have occurred. However, for the sake of discussion we are allowing Goldman in this case that $S$ would not have signalled, had he not raised his arm (out the window), but not conversely.

But merely $A_1$ or $A_2$ or $A_3$ do not seem sufficient to give us $A_4$. If anything is true in this case, it is surely that $S$ would not have gotten his hand in a position to press the button had he not also raised his arm out the window toward the button. This token (call it "$A_6$") of $S$'s raising his arm out the window toward the button would be related to $A_4$ by simple generation. Furthermore $A_2$ would be related to it by augmentation generation. But where on the act-tree would we put $A_6$?

Obviously it must be above $A_2$ and below $A_4$. But $A_6$ cannot be between $A_2$ and $A_3$, since it is not true that had $A_2$ not occurred, $A_3$ would not have occurred—the propinquity of secret buttons to one's
hand would not be encompassed in signalling conventions. So clearly $A_2$ must generate $A_5$ without $A_5$'s generating $A_3$. Perhaps in one of the following two ways:

(i) $A_4 \circ A_3$  
(ii) $A_4 \circ A_3 \circ A_2$  

But how are we to express the generational link between $A_5$ and $A_4$? If we try to complete (i) by putting in lines to capture both the fact that $A_4$ was done by $A_5$ and the fact that, if $S$ had not signalled, he would not have been able to raise his arm out the window towards the button, i.e., that $A_5$ was done by $A_3$, we end up with a diagram that, if not unintelligible, is certainly without precedent in Goldman's account.

Diagram (ii) already represents the fact that $A_5$ was done by $A_3$; however, there does not appear to be a felicitous way of putting in the line to represent the augmentation generation of $A_5$ by $A_2$. This is a departure from what Goldman has led us to expect. This may not be a problem in one respect, since the transitivity of generation does guarantee that $A_2$ generates $A_5$ (although not by augmentation), and diagram (ii) does portray this. However, some remarks about why what appears to be a paradigm instance of augmentation generation cannot be represented as such should be forthcoming. At any rate, (ii) seems to be the best we can do with what's provided, and the generation relations represented therein do not violate Goldman's requirement that the generation relation be transitive, asymmetric, and irreflexive.

Thus, if we beg certain counterfactual questions and connive a bit with respect to augmentation generation, Goldman may have a way of escaping the consequences initially drawn from the signalling/arm-raising example.

This sympathetic reinterpretation of the signalling/arm-raising example, in addition to requiring some slack for augmentation, also requires a departure from or reinterpretation of the evidence of the "by"-locution as it actually appears in discourse.

In the initial spelling out of the signalling/arm-raising scenario we had provided a context in which it could truly be said that $S$ raised his arm by signalling for a turn (at $t$). Since Goldman subsumes the "by"-relation under his generation relation, we were thus able to claim that $S$'s raising his arm was generated by $S$'s signalling for a turn. The changes in counterfactual presuppositions in the current reappraisal of the example have not altered the fact that it can truly be said that $S$ raised his arm by signalling for a turn.
Since in the present treatment we are denying (on counterfactual grounds) that S's raising his arm is generated by S's signalling for a turn, where the generational relata are property-exemplifications, we are compelled to take the event answering to "S raised his arm" as it appears in the "by"-locution as being different from S's exemplifying the property of raising his arm at t. Such a move implicitly acknowledges that the same action may be picked out under different descriptions after all.

This departure from the "by"-locutional evidence also suggests a motivational problem for Goldman. The relational objection against Davidson alleged that he failed to accommodate the "by" phenomenon. A motivation for the multiplying account was that it could succeed in accommodating this phenomenon as the generation relation. Since it does not, Davidson can justifiably level the charge of tu quoque against Goldman. Either Goldman has no case against Davidson in this respect, or he has a case which applies equally to his own account. Either way, an important motivation for Goldman's alternative to the 'identity thesis' is lost.

III

Another individuation problem for Goldman was raised in "A Problem of Motivation for Multipliers" both in the discussion of the relational objection and in that of the temporal objection, where we entertained the suggestion that Goldman might escape his other individuation problems by specification of the manner in which acts were performed.

The problem, it will be recalled, was presented by a case where we had two seemingly distinct actions of S's pointing at t nonetheless coming out as identical on Goldman's criterion. Qualifying in regard to the manner of pointing was no solution since that only generated new acts by augmentation generation, as the diagrams here reproduced illustrate:

(i)  o [S, pointing with his left hand, t]
    \   \ [S, pointing, t]
(ii) o [S, pointing with his right hand, t]
    \   \ [S, pointing, t]

This problem is different from the one we have been discussing so far in at least two respects. First, the offending duplicate act-tokens were generated on different trees, i.e., they were not related to one another by generation. Thus, unlike the situation with the previous problem, the asymmetry of generation is not directly a source of the difficulty.

Second, the statements which express the particular instances of generation involved here do not have natural or straightforward "by"-locutional correlates. Consider, for example, the ring of "S pointed with his left hand by pointing" as compared with that of "S signalled for a turn by raising his arm". This would suggest that the difficulty here may lie with generation qua technical extension of the relation expressed by "by"-locutions.
One move that suggests itself as a possible way of avoiding the unwanted duplication of act-tokens here is that of denying that there is such an event at all as S's pointing (at \( t \)) simpliciter. That, however, would not do for Goldman. It would be tantamount to giving up a property exemplification account, since S surely does exemplify the property of pointing when he points with his left hand, say. That much is guaranteed by entailment.

Kim has pointed out that, strictly read, the existence condition for events does guarantee the existence of a unique event, \([S, \text{pointing, } t]\), provided it is in fact true that S is pointing at \( t \). Since the latter can be true despite several simultaneous pointings by S, Kim would have it that likewise a unique event of S's pointing exists no matter how many pointings otherwise individuated by modification there might be.

Would such a claim be of help to Goldman here? In order to make use of it, it must be shown how the unique act of S's pointing, construed a la Kim, manages to generate (or is somehow in a 'unity' with) S's pointing with his left hand and also S's pointing with his right hand. The following diagram might be proposed.

\[
\begin{array}{c}
[S, \text{pointing with his left hand, } t] \\
\downarrow \\
[S, \text{pointing with his right hand, } t] \\
\downarrow \\
[S, \text{pointing, } t]
\end{array}
\]

This, however, does not seem quite right. If act-tokens on the same act-tree are supposedly somehow interdependent, one might ask, what does pointing with one's left hand have to do with pointing with one's right hand? Indeed, Goldman himself would balk at such a representation, since it runs afoul of the distinction he makes in the following passages:

... Many pairs of acts done by a single agent at the same time are completely independent acts. ... Suppose, for example, that S wiggles his toes while, at the same time, strumming a guitar. Neither of these acts is subsequent to the other, but they are not related by level-generation. I shall call pairs of acts of this sort "co-temporal" acts. The criterion of co-temporality is the correctness of saying that one of the acts is done "while also" doing the other. It is correct to say that S wiggled his toes "while also" strumming a guitar; hence these two acts are co-temporal.

It is difficult to see why S's pointing with his left hand at \( t \) and S's pointing with his right hand at \( t \) would not be independent acts of the same order as strumming the guitar "while also" wiggling his toes.

Goldman does have another resource at his disposal which it was not necessary to introduce into the previous discussion but which might be thought to have application here. Goldman introduces as a special case of augmentation generation a fifth kind of generation which he calls "compound generation". In virtue of this compound generation, act-trees can combine such that distinct and independent act-tokens
may together generate what might be construed as a 'compound act'. One of Goldman's examples, involving the jump-shot of basketball, can be represented thus:

\[
[S, \text{jump-shooting}, \ t]
\]

\[
\text{o}
\]

\[
[S, \text{jumping}, \ t]
\]

\[
\text{o}
\]

\[
[S, \text{shooting}, \ t]
\]

The node within a node is used to represent an act which may be generated in some circumstances when one act is done "while also" doing another. Thus the diagram reflects both that the occurrence of S's shooting at \( t \) is a circumstance which enables S's jumping at \( t \) to generate S's jump-shooting at \( t \) and that the occurrence of S's jumping at \( t \) is a circumstance which enables S's shooting at \( t \) to generate S's jump-shooting at \( t \), but avoids the infelicity of:

\[
[S, \text{jump-shooting}, \ t]
\]

\[
\text{o}
\]

\[
[S, \text{jumping}, \ t]
\]

\[
\text{o}
\]

\[
[S, \text{shooting}, \ t]
\]

which suggests that there are two tokens of S's jump-shooting at \( t \). In addition "S's jump-shooting at \( t \)" has the force of and is interchangeable with "S's jumping and [or, while also] shooting at \( t \)". Since the property of jump-shooting is presumably the same property as shooting while jumping. Generally, independent but simultaneous acts can always generate a compound act simply by conjoining the act-type expressions with "and" or "while also", whether or not there is in addition a standard label for such a compound act.

Does this further notion of compound generation help vis-a-vis the original problem? It might be thought that we can now escape it by diagramming the situation in this way:

\[
[S, \text{pointing}, \ t]
\]

\[
\text{o}
\]

\[
[S, \text{pointing with his right hand}, \ t]
\]

\[
\text{o}
\]

\[
[S, \text{pointing with his left hand}, \ t]
\]

However, this picture, given the counterfactual criterion for generation (such as it is), conflicts with two counterfactuals which cannot reasonably be given up, viz., that S could have pointed at \( t \) even if he had not pointed with his right hand at \( t \) and that S could have pointed at \( t \) even if he had not pointed with his left hand at \( t \). Thus neither S's pointing with his right hand at \( t \) nor S's pointing with his left hand at \( t \) can generate S's pointing at \( t \). However, there is no similar problem as far as the generation of the compound act, S's pointing with his left hand while also pointing with his right hand, from the two independent acts is concerned. Hence we must conclude that the individuation problem cannot be sidestepped by invoking compound generation to generate a unique token of S's pointing at \( t \), either.
Finally, there remains one untried possibility as suggested by the following diagram:

```
  o [S, pointing, t]
  |   /
  o [S, pointing with his left hand while
  |   / \ also pointing with his right hand, t]
  |   /   \[8, pointing
  |     o   o [S, pointing with his
  |     with his right hand, t]   left hand, t]
```

where S's pointing at t is not itself gotten by compound generation but from a product of compound generation via some other kind of generation.

This alternative is precluded by reasoning similar to that of the paragraph before last. It is simply not true that S would not have pointed at t if S had not pointed with his right hand while also pointing with his left hand at t. Either hand would have sufficed. So this somewhat indirect appeal to compound generation is of no more help than the more direct one previously considered.

I cannot see any other plausible possibilities for representing the case under discussion within the confines of the generational machinery.

Let me state at this point the features of the foregoing reassessments that I wish to emphasize. Some limited gains were attained on Goldman's behalf with respect to the arm-raising/signalling case, provided (among other things) that some paradigms of augmentation generation are not treated as such. Unfortunately, in the pointing case, where we started with a problem directly created by augmentation generation, similar success was not to be had. Nonetheless, these treatments have yielded one major accomplishment in that they point to augmentation generation as source of difficulty. Thus in augmentation generation we have isolated a good candidate (ceteris paribus) for modification in Goldman's account.

Furthermore, there is a bonus of sorts. It will be recalled that Goldman's technical notion of generation is one abstracted from the phenomenon of the "by"-location in everyday speech. However, with respect to augmentation generation Goldman himself remarks:

The concept of augmentation generation, as I have characterized it, does not mesh completely with the other three forms of generation. And I think that, in general, it is not intuitively as attractive as these other species of generation. The feeling that it is rather different from the other three species is supported by the fact that the preposition "by" is inapplicable in connection with it. In all cases of causal, conventional, or simple generation it is appropriate to say that S did act A "by" doing A. But we would not ordinarily say that S extended his arm out the window "by" extending his arm. Nor would we say that S jump-shot (or "took a jump-shot") "by" shooting.

Thus the feature we have isolated as a candidate for revision is one which Goldman himself considers anomalous and has misgivings.
about. Of course, not too much should be inferred from this, but it does suggest that augmentation generation is the first thing Goldman would be prepared to give up, were he prepared to give up anything at all.

IV

So we have isolated in augmentation generation a feature of Goldman's theory which is the source of his individuation problems, ceteris paribus. Now we must consider the question of whether it is possible to modify the theory, within the constraints previously specified, by tampering with augmentation generation.

If we cannot have augmentation generation as it stands, what could we replace it with? Would it help the account, as one writer has suggested, to identify the acts standing in the relation of augmentation with one another? A moment's reflection will serve to verify that for Goldman the answer has to be "no". To return to our pointing case, if S's pointing with his left hand is identical with, rather than generated from S's pointing, and likewise, S's pointing with his right hand is identical with, rather than generated by S's pointing, then by the principles of identity, S's pointing with his left hand would be identical with S's pointing with his right hand—a patent absurdity! This absurd conclusion can only be avoided if we are willing to countenance distinct tokens of S's pointing at t, which is impossible given Goldman's criterion of identity. Therefore, relinquishing augmentation generations in favor of identities would do little to take us beyond the original difficulties.

What are the alternatives to identity? Kim has suggested some form of 'inclusion' in terms of which "... such acts are different but not entirely distinct . . .", Kim's particular notion of inclusion, insofar as he says anything about it at all, turns out to be none other than Goldman's generation under an alias and thus is of no help in itself. However, the suggestion of inclusion in some other form might be worth pursuing.

Some of the intuitive appeal Kim finds for his notion of inclusion may derive from trading on associations with various notions of inclusion which have philosophical currency. Hence the possibility that one of these might be an improvement on augmentation generation merits consideration. In what follows, I will briefly take up some of these and give reasons why they won't do for Goldman's purposes.

Two forms of inclusion which have to be excluded at the outset involve the inclusion of spatial or temporal parts, as, for example, running from 1st Street to 3rd Street might include running from 1st Street to 2nd Street and running from daybreak to noon might include running from daybreak to mid-morning. The reason for excluding inclusion of these kinds should be self-evident; the inclusion, if such there be, of S's pointing in S's pointing with his left hand is not of this nature. If S is pointing and happens to be doing so with his left hand, little sense could be attached to the claim that S's pointing and S's pointing with his left hand occur in different places and over different time intervals.
Alternatively, the inclusion involved might be at one remove, viz., the inclusion of entailment: *that S is pointing with his left hand entails that S is pointing.*

Such inclusion in itself tells us more about meaning relations between terms (or relations among concepts) rather than about the things denoted by these terms (or the things falling under these concepts); although some philosophers are in the habit of speaking as if it established more. Whether or not such inclusion is helpful or even germane depends on what one wishes to do with it--more pointedly, what one assumes along with it. If one assumes that entailment relations between event descriptions mirror part–whole relationships between events themselves, one is using the former as a criterion for the latter.

I believe such a criterion unsatisfactory for the purpose of picking out an intuitive inclusion relation to supplant augmentation generation. With respect to the case still under consideration, that *S is pointing with his right hand* also entails that *S is pointing.* Are we to conclude from such admittedly undeniable entailments that *S's pointing with his right hand and S's pointing with his left have have a part in common and are thus not entirely distinct actions? That certainly does grate against the intuitions.

We can, of course, tell a special story to make such actions overlap, say, if *S,* while pointing with left hand also uses it to support his paralyzed right hand in a pointing position. However, in the absence of such special circumstances, it is hard to imagine what sense could be given to the claim that part of *S's pointing with his left hand is included in S's pointing with his right hand. They are, ceteris paribus, entirely distinct actions.

Finally, we might consider the possibility of some kind of set-theoretic inclusion involving the extensions of the act–properties exemplified. It is a common enough practice to speak of one property as being included in another, where this is meant to convey the fact that the extension of one is a subset of the extension of the other. However, this kind of inclusion does not seem to be a likely candidate for lending weight to Kim's intuitions either. It is difficult to see how the fact that the extension of one act–type is included in that of another has any relevance at all as far as any particular act's being included in another is concerned.

However, even if it had relevance it would be of no use to Goldman since it would conflict with the main tenets of his account. His existence condition for events and his criterion of identity presuppose that every act–token is a token of exactly one act–type, and thus preclude the sort of inclusion just considered.

The foregoing, I believe, exhaust the kinds of inclusion worthy of consideration as alternatives to augmentation generation--at least if "inclusion" is not to be a totally misleading word. At any rate, they are the only notions of inclusion I am acquainted with from the philosophical literature. While the preceding remarks on identity and the various notions of inclusion may not be the final word, they at least manifest the difficulty of finding a replacement for augmentation generation within the confines of the multiplying account, and in the terms suggested by the literature in this area.
However, I think it is possible to make a stronger statement as to how things stand with respect to augmentation generation than the foregoing one. Inherent in any attempt to tamper with augmentation generation, the source of Goldman's problems, is the inability to confine such moves to just augmentation generation. That this is so is not difficult to demonstrate. For example, if S stabs Alvin, then, provided that S uses the appropriate implement in the event, S's stabbing Alvin generates S's knifing Alvin by simple generation. But S's stabbing Alvin also generates, by augmentation, S's stabbing Alvin with a knife. "S knifes Alvin" and "S stabs Alvin with a knife" mutually entail one another, as they are synonymous. Given the possibility of proceeding in such a fashion in so many cases, special moves against augmentation generation cannot be made which would not ipso facto affect the other kinds of generation as well. Augmentation generation overlaps and hence stands or falls with the other types of generation.

Considering the issue from a motivational point of view, there is another reason why the multiplying account can ill afford to dispense with augmentation generation. Generation as such was invoked by Goldman to provide an alternative account for a certain unity among events which were held to be identical by Davidson. Since generation had to be transitive to ensure this unity, it followed that the different kinds of generation had to have a core in common to ensure transitivity. Let us recall that early in this discussion, just such a common denominator linking all the types of generation was emphasized, viz., that what is generated by what is ultimately dependent on the truth of certain counterfactuals.

If one were to give up augmentation generation, one would either have to give up the counterfactual basis for generation or adduce reasons why the counterfactual considerations should guarantee the occurrence of the other kinds of generation but not guarantee the occurrence of augmentation generation. The former would in effect deprive the account of both the rationale for its claims about particular cases and its explanatory force with respect to those cases. The latter, were it not already frustrated by the fact of generational overlap due to synonymy relations indicated above, would not be indicated by any save ad hoc considerations within the theory as we know it.

By now, I take it, it is obvious that the criticisms made against Goldman in "A Problem of Motivation for Multipliers" do not indicate mere problems in letter that are amenable to easy modification. Goldman's difficulties are deep-rooted and intractable. We isolated in augmentation generation a feature of Goldman's theory as source of the problems and as candidate for revision. However, not only could we not find a suitable alternative to augmentation generation, but on closer examination it also became evident that augmentation generation was so intimately intertwined with the mainstays of the theory that it could not be tampered with without consequences for the rest of the theory.
MODIFICATIONS TO THE MULTIPLYING ACCOUNT

ENDNOTES


2 The fact that Goldman's multiplying account turns on counterfactuals at all might be thought by many to be cause for concern. Let me indicate one that relates to my interest in the account's motivational aspects.

The concerns which prompted Goldman's account issued out of cases where Davidson would account for a certain unity among actions by holding actions differently described to be identical. This had odd-sounding or false-seeming results when substitutions into certain statements were made on the basis of held identities. Such results, Goldman argued, invalidated the presumed identities.

Now let us consider, in outline, the Goldmanian approach with respect to such cases. Suppose, for example, that S moves his hand and that S frightens a fly and that these actions are so related that S frightens the fly by moving his hand. Davidson would account for the relatedness by suggesting that S's moving his hand and S's frightening the fly are the same event. Goldman, on the other hand, would account for this relatedness by taking the facts of the situation materially to imply that S's moving his hand generates S's frightening the fly.

If we cash out the generation relation, that in turn entails that if S had not moved his hand, S would not have frightened the fly, or, alternatively, it entails that if S's moving his hand had not occurred, S's frightening the fly would not have occurred. So Goldman has replaced the Davidsonian explanation of the unity of action in terms of identity with one in terms of counterfactuals.

However, counterfactuals do create an environment for singular terms in which obvious identicals cannot be truly or straightforwardly substituted. For example, we know as a matter of historical fact that

(i) Nixon's succession to the presidency = Johnson's successor's succession to the presidency.

Furthermore, we know that

(ii) If Humphrey had succeeded Johnson as president, Nixon's succession to the presidency would not have occurred.

However, if we substitute (ii) on the basis of (i), we get

(iii) If Humphrey had succeeded Johnson as president, Johnson's successor's succession to the presidency would not have occurred.

On the face of it, (iii) is either false or requires a non-straightforward reading—surely Johnson would have been succeeded by his successor no matter who won the election. However, it is not my purpose here to claim that (iii) must be false or that contexts such as (ii) and (iii) must be opaque or oblique or the like. My point is this: For an ac-
count which turns on counterfactuals to work, we must be able and willing to tell a special story about how the singular terms involved refer in order to explain how false-seeming statements such as (iii) can be understood as consistent with identities such as (i). But that, prima facie, is just the sort of strategy Davidson could pursue in response to Goldman's criticisms.

So to avoid motivational embarrassment, what Goldman needs to provide is not only some reason for believing that such a strategy would work for his account, but also some reason for believing that it wouldn't work for Davidson's account.

3 Goldman's remarks will shortly be reproduced below.


5 Goldman, 21.

6 Goldman, 22. While I think that the correctness of being able to say one act is done while also doing another is inadequate as a criterion for independence, there is no point in getting side-tracked into that issue here.

7 Goldman, 28, 34 ff.

8 Goldman, 28.

9 Goldman, 28-29.

10 Monroe Beardsley, "Actions and Events: The Problem of Individualization", American Philosophical Quarterly 12 (1975), 263-76. Although I am criticizing Beardsley's proposal in the present context, I do not mean to suggest that, disengaged from Goldman's cause, the proposal would not otherwise be a perfectly sensible and indeed intuitive one: S's pointing with his left hand surely is a pointing of S's, if anything is. All I am claiming here is that Goldman cannot coherently make such seemingly straightforward identifications within his account, given its existence and identity conditions for acts and its generating relations. Davidson, on the other hand, would have no problem with such identification.

11 Kim, 170

12 Kim, n. 24; also see his "Noncausal Connections", Nous 8 (1974), n. 3.

13 Goldman, 11.