3. IS UNIVERSALIZATION IN ETHICS SIGNIFICANT FOR CHOOSING A THEORY OF IDENTITY ACROSS POSSIBLE WORLDS?

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ABSTRACT. Can Lewisian counterpart theory adequately account for the deliberation involved in universalizing moral judgments? In this paper, the dispute between Shalom Lappin and Yehudah Freundlich over the answer to this question is examined and clarified. Then it is argued that Lappin and Freundlich do not join issue in a way which allows for satisfactory adjudication of their dispute. Specifically, they are unaware of the different models of role projection which each employs. By making these models explicit, it can be seen that, regardless of how universalization is construed, a Lewisian can indeed offer an adequate account of moral deliberation.

When universalizing a moral judgment it would seem that one must imagine certain counterfactual situations. Here ethics and possible worlds semantics come together. In the following essay I shall examine whether the fact of universalization need influence our view of identity across possible worlds. In this regard we will look at the recent dispute between Shalom Lappin and Yehudah Freundlich. Lappin claims that we need an account of identity across possible worlds which can make sense of Hare's universalization principle, and that Lewis's counterpart theory is flawed because it can offer no such account. Freundlich, on the other hand, does not think that an account of identity across possible worlds is needed for an adequate understanding of universalization. In addition, Freundlich claims that, even granting such a necessity, Lewis's counterpart theory will do as well as any other in accounting for universalization. Through his defense of this latter claim, Freundlich concludes that the fact of universalization need not influence our view of identity across possible worlds.

I shall argue that neither Freundlich nor Lappin really grasps the issue at stake between them. After outlining the two positions and showing why Freundlich's response to Lappin is inconclusive, I shall show exactly why universalization in ethics need not rule out adoption of Lewisian counterpart theory.
Lappin launches the dispute when he claims that Hare's universalization principle requires role projection but that there are certain types of ethical claims for which role projection is not possible if we adopt Lewisian counterpart theory. Lappin claims that Kripke's strict identity theory is preferable because it is adequate for all situations in which role projection is needed.

Given that role projection involves reference to a possible world where the proponent of a moral judgment occupies a role different from the one he actually does, Lappin claims that we need some account of identity across possible worlds in order to make sense of this common sort of moral deliberation. To make his point in this regard about the adequacy of Kripke's view versus the inadequacy of Lewis's, Lappin has us consider two judgments:

(1) I ought to deny equal opportunities for employment to women.

(2) I ought to deny political rights to Pygmies in southern Africa.

Lappin argues that a Kripkian can make sense of the role projections involved in these two cases. On Kripke's strict identity theory an object in one possible world can be identified with an object in another possible world on the basis of a common point of physical origin.

In regard to judgment (1), we can make sense of role projection while holding to Kripke's view by having the male proponent of this judgment imagine that he has undergone a sex-change operation and is then denied equal employment opportunities. Here the male proponent of the judgment has a way of understanding how he could occupy the role of the person effected by his judgment because he and the individual he imagines share the same history up to a certain point and consequently share a common point of physical origin.

The procedure is similar, says Lappin, in regard to judgment (2). Imagine that Olafson, a Swede, has proclaimed that Pygmies in southern Africa should be denied political rights. In order to carry out role projection, Olafson must imagine that he is placed in the position of a Pygmy. Again, Lappin claims that the proponent of the judgment, Olafson in this case, can identify himself in such an alternative state of affairs on the basis of a common point of physical origin. It is possible, says Lappin, that as a small child, Olafson was exposed to radioactivity in a laboratory accident which caused him to resemble a Pygmy from southern Africa. It is also possible, Lappin continues, that his parents, in order to spare him the difficulty of growing up as a Pygmy child in Stockholm, arrange for him to be taken in by a Pygmy tribe and raised as one of their own. Here Olafson can identify himself in the relevant alternative possible world on the basis of physical origin. A Kripkian can therefore make sense of the kind of role projection needed in this case just as he could in the earlier one.

In contrast to Kripke's theory, Lappin continues, Lewis's counterpart theory cannot make sense of all cases of role projection. In certain circumstances, claims Lappin, the proponent of a moral judgment will be unable to identify himself in the alternative possible world for purposes of role projection. Of course, in counterpart theory the same object
never, strictly speaking, occurs in more than one possible world. Lappin is not making what would be a trivial objection to counterpart theory, that is, that an individual can never pick himself out in an alternative possible world because he exists in only one possible world. This would simply beg the question against Lewis since he intends to use the notion of a counterpart in situations where talk of identity across possible worlds is required. Lappin claims, rather, that there are circumstances where the proponent of a moral judgment will be unable to identify his counterpart for purposes of moral deliberation.

Lappin does think, however, that there are moral judgments in which counterpart theory can adequately make sense of role projection. Proposal (1) is an example of such a judgment. Lappin thinks that one can imagine a world in which the person who most resembles the male proponent of (1) is a woman who has suffered employment discrimination. The two may be quite similar in regard to "physical appearance, psychological attitudes, and social and cultural relations." Here the counterpart theorist can make sense of role projection because the proponent of the judgment can identify his counterpart and engage in the relevant moral deliberation.

This is not so in the case of judgment (2) according to Lappin. Here there are not the same sort of common properties. Olafson simply does not resemble a Pygmy in regard to "physical appearance, psychological attitudes and social and cultural relations." It is impossible to identify a Pygmy as the counterpart of Olafson for purposes of moral deliberation. Though role projection is required, the Lewisian can offer no account of how this is to occur. Lappin concludes, "As no plausible set of qualitative similarities is available for the postulation of a non-arbitrary counterpart relation, counterpart theory cannot, in this case, sustain role projection." The Lewisian cannot make sense of role projection in this instance while the Kripkian can. Lappin holds then that counterpart theory cannot make sense of a necessary kind of moral deliberation.

It might be objected at this point that Lappin, by linking the notions of universalizability and possible worlds, has done rather more than he might have liked. Specifically, it would seem that if Lappin is right about the relevance of role projection in adjudicating between theories of transworld identity, then Kripke's own view could turn out to be inadequate for a perfectly plausible kind of moral deliberation. What, one might ask, about creatures from other planets who could conceivably turn out to be rational beings? Were such beings to exist, we might want to make judgments about their political rights. This on Lappin's view would require role projection and an account of the relevant counterfactual situation. But, for Kripke, in no possible world do I belong to a different species--much less to an evolutionary tree causally independent of our own. This is because I could not possibly share a common point of physical origin with any non-human being. Here, Kripke's view appears unable to make sense of a particular kind of moral deliberation.

Lappin can, though, offer a response to this objection. In fact his account would be much the same as his account of the role projection required for making moral judgments about Pygmies. We can imagine a situation in which we are transformed at birth into any strange or monstrous shape. Given that we further imagine growing up in the relevant
community, it is possible for Olafson or anyone else to identify himself in the relevant alternative possible world on the basis of physical origin. This is true even if the relevant world is Mars and the subjects of our moral judgments are Martians.

There is, however, one potentially serious problem with Lappin's view which needs to be noted now. Lappin does not specify exactly how universalization is to occur. It is unclear in particular what perspective is to serve as that from which the relevant moral judgment is made. Do we judge from the perspective of the Pygmy denied political rights? Is the point then in imagining a counterfactual situation to find the proper perspective from which to make a moral judgment? Or, on the other hand, and this is closer to Hare's view of universalization, do we imagine the counterfactual situation but then make the moral judgment from our actual perspective in the actual world? We will see as our discussion proceeds that this ambiguity in Lappin's account will eventually result in some serious confusions.

II

Freunlich takes issue with Lappin, claiming first that transworld identity is irrelevant to an understanding of universalization. Freunlich asks,

Why should the fact that a Kripkian can identify himself on the basis of physical origin aid us in moral deliberation? After all, does identifying myself as a Pygmy in the possible world on the basis of physical origin help me in any way to know what it feels like to be a Pygmy?

While this part of his presentation is not our main concern, we should note that Freunlich does make an error. The point of adopting a proper theory of transworld identity in this context is not to provide the psychological machinery necessary for role projection, but rather to make sense of one's employment of this machinery. The reason for evaluating the views of Kripke and Lewis is not to help us feel what it would be like to be the victim of a moral judgment. Rather we start with the idea that role projection is a necessary part of universalization which can be carried out and then ask, how it is that this occurs. On Lappin's view, we need a theory of transworld identity in order to answer this question. The fact that role projection occurs even in cases where Lewis's view is inappropriate is reason according to Lappin to reject Lewis's view. That is, we can test various theories of transworld identity to see if they are compatible with our previously established view of ethical deliberation. Freunlich in his criticism seems to think, on the other hand, that talk of identity across possible worlds is intended to do the job of universalization. While he is right that employing Kripke's view does not help us feel what it is like to be the victim of a moral judgment, this is beside the point. Lappin is concerned with transworld identity because he wants to make sense of role projection, not because he needs help in carrying it out.

Freunlich's more important claim is that, granted the relevance of transworld identity for understanding moral deliberation, counterpart theory is as adequate as Kripke's strict identity theory for making sense of role projection:
A Lewisian can find for himself, in the possible world, a counterpart with social and cultural characteristics different from those he has in the actual world. To do this the Lewisian need only construct a similarity measure based on something other than social and cultural characteristics. Because similarity measures for identifying counterparts will vary depending upon our purposes in imagining a possible world, Olafson can indeed identify his counterpart. Noting Lappin’s remark that, “I evaluate a moral judgment by considering what it would be like to experience its effects given the concerns and desires I actually have,” Freunlich infers that the similarity measure must be based upon morally relevant concerns and desires. The point of role projection, says Freunlich, is to “use my (morally relevant) concerns and desires for judging the effects of some action on someone else given his (nonmoral) interests and inclinations.” Since one’s morally relevant interests must be retained in role projection, what Olafson needs is to imagine someone who has Olafson’s own morally relevant interests but has a Pygmy’s nonmoral interests. This counts as Olafson’s counterpart for purposes of universalizing his moral judgment. The significant similarity here is relevant moral concerns. According to Freunlich, “we don’t expect there to be someone other than Olafson who has exactly Olafson’s moral concerns.” This imagined Pygmy does have these concerns so there is no problem in regard to identification.

An example will illustrate why Freunlich believes that moral interests and only they are to be retained in role projection. Suppose that I am a German military officer during World War II contemplating the assassination of some powerful members of the Nazi party. In making my decision I certainly do not have to make my judgment given these members of the Nazi party’s moral interests. I must retain my own. However, I need to make the judgment on the basis of something other than my own nonmoral interests in order to ascertain whether these have had an undue influence on my decision. Perhaps after the assassinations I will rise in the German hierarchy. Through universalization I can see if this nonmoral interest has influenced my moral judgment. Likewise in the cases of Pygmies and women, nonmoral interests must be discounted; for certainly, the proponent of discrimination might in each case wield additional financial or political power if a policy of discrimination is followed.

Having understood role projection in this way Freunlich is able to claim that the Lewisian can identify his counterpart when universalizing a moral judgment. His counterpart for this purpose is someone with his own moral interests but with the non-moral interests of the person affected by his judgment. Since the counterpart is identified on the basis of moral interests, it is not critical that there be other common characteristics.

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Here we see the significance of the initial ambiguity in Lappin's account of role projection. Lappin did not make explicit whether moral judgments which employ universalization were to be made from the perspective of the imagined counterfactual situation or from the perspective of the actual world. Freunlich here assumes that the former sort of moral judgment is to be made. Counterpart theory, claims Freunlich, can supply the necessary counterpart such that moral judgments can be made from the perspective of the counterfactual situation.

When he responds to Freunlich, Lappin concentrates on just this feature of Freunlich's presentation. According to Lappin, Freunlich has misunderstood "the nature of role projection." It is insufficient for identification of one's counterpart, says Lappin, that he share with the proponent of the moral judgment certain moral interests. We are instead to evaluate our moral judgments on the basis of the sum total of our own concerns and desires:

... implicit in Freunlich's suggestion is the assumption that in exchanging roles with the victim of my judgment I must consider the judgment from the point of view of the victim's desires. This is certainly not the case. ... The purpose of role projection is to enable the advocate to place himself in the position of the victim while evaluating his judgment from the point of view of his present concerns and interests; i.e., from the perspective of the concerns and interests which he possesses in the actual world.

In universalizing moral judgments, we are not to make our evaluations from the perspective of interests which we do not actually have. Instead we are to judge on the basis of our own actual interests. Lappin claims that, because Freunlich's view of role projection is faulty, his defense of counterpart theory is necessarily inadequate.

Two questions need to be answered at this point if we are to accept Lappin's response: 1) Why do we need to judge from the perspective of the sum total of our interests and desires in carrying out our role projection?; and 2) Even if we do need to retain these interests, why couldn't we construct a similarity measure on the basis of this sum total of interests?

In regard to the first question, Lappin holds that we must call upon all of our interests and desires in order to properly make a moral judgment. The point of role projection, says Lappin, is not to determine what some hypothetical individual perhaps resembling me to some degree would say about a given situation, but rather for me to say what I think about the situation. Lappin quotes Hare for support:

We shall make the nature of the argument clearer if, when we are asking B to imagine himself in the position of his victim, we phrase our question, never in the form "What would you say or feel, or think, or how would you like it, if you were he?" but always in the form "What do you say ..., about a hypothetical case in which you are in your victim's position? To involve him in a contradiction, we have to show that he now holds an opinion about the hypothetical case which is inconsistent with his opinion about the actual case. (emphasis in original)
Following Hare, Lappin holds that role projection does not consist in imagining any kind of composite individual and then making one's judgment from the perspective of this individual. Instead one makes the judgment oneself on the basis of all of one's own interests. Only in this way can one be caught in an inconsistency. Since Kripke's view does not require us to imagine any composite individuals, Lappin takes it for the preferable view. Kripke's strict identity theory provides a simple way for us to understand what it means to say that we might be in the position of the person effected by a moral judgment. The imagined individual is in no way different from the actual victim except that he has a different history, one that ultimately leads back to the same point of physical origin as the proponent of the judgment. On this view, in role projection, the proponent of a judgment must evaluate his judgment on the basis of his current interests. He is aided here by imagining that he is in the position of the person effected by the judgment, that is, that they share a common origin.

In response to our second question, Lappin would claim that there are serious logical problems in constructing a similarity measure based upon an individual's sum total of interests. Lappin points out that there are cases where the properties which a potential victim possesses which in fact make him a potential victim imply some particular set of interests which may conflict with those had by the proponent of the judgment. Lappin's example of someone who believes the suicidal should be hospitalized illustrates this problem. In order to carry our role projection by employing a similarity measure based upon a sum total of interests, the proponent of the judgment must imagine himself suicidal while still maintaining the sum of his current interests. The problem is that a suicidal person has by definition certain nonstandard interests which the proponent of the judgment does not share and which in fact conflict with interests the proponent does possess. A similarity measure will not help locate the proper counterpart in this case because such a counterpart is a conceptual impossibility. A nonsuicidal individual cannot possibly retain his own interests and imagine that he is suicidal. If we are to employ counterpart theory here, we cannot construct our similarity measure on the basis of all interests. We may be able to identify several individuals in an alternative possible world who are suicidal and in some way resemble the proponent of the judgment. But we cannot find anyone who shares the sum total of his interests and is suicidal. Such a composite is inconceivable. Lappin sees Olafson's making a judgment about Pygmies as a similar case because a Pygmy would have such radically different interests from a Swede that it would be impossible for Olafson to retain his own interests while taking on those of the Pygmy. According to Lappin, Kripke's view is the answer here because identifications can be made on the basis of sameness of physical origin rather than on the number or kind of shared properties.

We see in the answers to both questions Lappin's view that the proponent of a moral judgment must make judgments himself rather than relying on what some imagined composite would say. This is a different view of role projection than that employed by Freundlich. Freundlich was only concerned that a judgment be made from the perspective of the proponent's moral interests. Counterpart theory can make sense of role projection construed in this way. The proper sort of similarity measure can be constructed. In reply Lappin argues that Freundlich's is an inadequate kind of role projection. However, the truth or falsity of this
claim is not really the issue. Freunlich states that he can grant that role projection has the relevance for universalization that Lappin claims for it and still show that counterpart theory can adequately make sense of role projection. Furthermore, this is the course Freunlich should take if he is to prove that universalization in ethics is to have no special effect on our understanding of identity across possible worlds. Lappin will have gone a long way toward showing that there could be such an effect if he can show that this is the case for even one plausible view of moral deliberation. We now see, however, that if all one’s interests must be retained in the course of deliberation as Lappin claims, then Freunlich has failed to show the adequacy of counterpart theory. We seem unable to construct the necessary similarity measure.

III

There is something strange about the way the discussion between Lappin and Freunlich has developed. It becomes apparent for the first time in Lappin’s reply to Freunlich that the disputants do not join issue in a way which allows for adequate adjudication.

In order to see this we need to look again at Lappin’s view. Recall that, according to Lappin, in universalizing a moral claim, I am not to make my judgment from the perspective of a composite individual in some possible world who resembles me in some way. I am, however, to put myself in the position of the person effected by my judgment. Though Lappin never makes this clear, the key to understanding his account is to see that it must consist of two distinct steps. If I am to engage in role projection, I must first imagine a particular sort of situation in which I occupy the role of the person effected by my moral judgment. Secondly, I must reflect upon this situation from the perspective of my actual interests in the actual world. Only if I evaluate the judgment from the same perspective from which it was made can I be guilty of a contradiction. What I do on this account is imagine a counterfactual situation and react to it from the perspective of my actual position. I place myself in the role of the victim but do not make my judgment from this perspective.

Because Lappin does not make this explicit, Freunlich is able to reply by presupposing a different view of role projection. On Freunlich’s view, one also begins by imagining a certain sort of counterfactual situation. In this situation, however, one retains one’s morally relevant interests but adopts the nonmoral interests belonging to the person effected by one’s judgment. This is one’s counterpart for purposes of moral deliberation. Why is the counterpart crafted in this particular way? Because this is the perspective from which one evaluates one’s judgment. We do not imagine the situation, as Lappin does, and then evaluate it from the perspective of our actual interests.

Nowhere are these different views clearly distinguished. For this reason serious confusions arise. As we have seen, Lappin argues against Freunlich’s reply claiming that the significant thing about role projection is to see what I, as the proponent of the judgment, say about a particular situation given my actual interests and desires. Furthermore, he says, one cannot construct a similarity measure on the basis of this sum total of interests because there are situations where the necessary counterpart is a conceptual impossibility. Lappin, it seems, claims that
one's counterpart must share all one's actual interests because he believes the counterpart theorist must hold that moral judgments be made from the perspective of the counterpart which is indeed Freunlich's view. If one must judge from the perspective of all of one's interests (as Lappin claims) and judge from the perspective of one's counterpart (as Freunlich claims), then one's counterpart must share all of one's actual interests. However, if we follow Hare's model of role projection as Lappin apparently does when he presents his own view, then we do not judge from the perspective of the counterfactual situation. It does not then follow that one's counterpart must share all of one's actual interests. There is, then, no problem of conceptually impossible counterparts. Here we see that the original ambiguity in Lappin's account has come back to haunt him.

Let us now examine in more detail the nature of Lappin's error. Initially, Lappin dismissed counterpart theory as inadequate for making sense of universalization because the relevant counterpart could not be located. But what exactly is the relevant counterpart? Lappin in his first paper refers to "physical appearance, psychological attitudes and social and cultural relations." In short, my counterpart needs to substantially resemble me in the cases in which it is imagined as an aid to moral deliberation. In his later article Lappin specifies this somewhat more exactly. One's counterpart must share all of one's own actual interests. Lappin's objection which he puts forward in both papers is that the problem with counterpart theory is that in many cases in which role projection is required we need to identify with someone who lacks these interests. Why, according to Lappin, is this a problem for counterpart theory?

Is the problem that counterpart theory is unable to locate such counterparts, it being some requirement of counterpart theory itself that one's counterpart bear a substantial resemblance to oneself? While Lappin does sometimes seem to make this suggestion, surely this is not his considered view. Lewis makes clear that the counterpart relation is "vague" in such a way that depending upon one's own purposes different respects of similarity and difference may be chosen as having decisive weight. Lewis himself notes that one might choose to give "decisive weight to perfect match of origins." Were we to choose this course, Olafson can have a Pygmy as a counterpart on the basis of just the story related above which Lappin originally used to illustrate how Kripke's view could make sense of role projection. Someone who shares the same origin as Olafson is his counterpart in this case regardless of how different they are in other respects. Overall resemblance need be no more important to Lewis than it is to Kripke. To the extent that Lappin's view presupposes the necessity of such resemblance, it is seriously flawed.

More likely, Lappin's objection to counterpart theory is that in some situations, one cannot locate one's counterpart and then validly use it as a perspective for moral deliberation. Substantial resemblance is only required because universalization is involved. This is certainly suggested when Lappin argues that Freunlich misunderstands the nature of role projection insofar as he does not require one's counterpart for such purposes to share all of one's own actual interests. With this approach, Lappin is able to emphasize, as he does in both papers, such problems for the counterpart theorist as those involving incoherent counterparts. However, what Lappin ultimately argues by taking this
course is that, given his own requirement that in universalization one must judge from the perspective of all one's own interests, counterpart theory is incompatible with a model of role projection like Freunlich's. On Freunlich's model we judge from the perspective of the counterfactual situation. Lappin accepts as a given that the counterpart theorist must use this model. His objection to counterpart theory's being compatible with universalization is that the counterpart theorist cannot employ this model and judge from the perspective of all his own interests. Such a procedure, as we have seen, can result in conceptual difficulties. Lappin, therefore, rejects counterpart theory and asserts that we can make sense of role projection by employing Kripke's strict identity theory. Lappin consistently asserts that moral judgments be made from the perspective of all one's own actual interests. However, he is less consistent regarding whether this perspective is to be found in the actual world or in the counterfactual situation. Lappin's positive view as I have already stated can only be understood as involving judgments made from the actual world. However, Lappin's criticism of Freunlich presupposes that the judgment is made from the perspective of the counterfactual situation.

We come now to the major problem with Lappin's presentation. The requirement that we judge from our current perspective is part of the Hare model, which Lappin himself cites, in which we make judgments ourselves in the actual world about hypothetical cases. A significant question which is never explicitly discussed is whether counterpart theory is compatible with this view. Lappin's response to Freunlich is inadequate because he does not keep distinct two very different models of role projection. Since the different models lie beneath the surface of the dispute, Lappin never gives a straightforward answer to the question of whether counterpart theory is compatible with the one view he can consistently defend and which he himself endorses through his citation of Hare.

In response to this question, I will now show that it makes no difference what view one takes of identity across possible worlds given the Hare/Lappin model of role projection. As with Freunlich's model, one is to imagine a counterfactual situation. However, on the Hare/Lappin model this is not the perspective from which we carry out our moral deliberation. We are not, for example, being urged to imagine that we are suicidal as a perspective for this deliberation. Given Lappin's requirements, this is impossible. Note, though, that the situation which needs to be imagined is not in itself impossible or contradictory. This is because I do not necessarily have to concern myself with retention of my specific interests in order to make sense of this situation. This is only necessary, on Lappin's account, if we are to imagine a situation as a perspective for moral deliberation. Again, Lappin's concern is that the proponent of the judgment perform his evaluation from the perspective of his current interests. And, if we are to be consistent with Lappin's view, we must evaluate the situation from the perspective of these interests. However, Lappin's requirement needn't be extended to cover all counterfactual situations in which I might imagine myself. Lappin is concerned about the perspective from which one makes moral judgments. But on Lappin's own mode of role projection the imagined counterfactual situation is not this perspective.

In making sense of the counterfactual situations imagined by Lappin, one might then employ Lewis's, Kripke's or some other view. The
point, though, is that in considering these views we are not bound by the constraints of moral deliberation. It makes no difference morally if, in trying to make sense of the imagined counterfactual situation, I am imagined to lack some of my particular interests. Lappin's requirement that I retain all interests only applies to the perspective from which I actually make the moral judgment. That is, I must evaluate the judgment from the same perspective from which it was made. Lappin rejects Freunlich's defense of counterpart theory precisely because there are cases where there is no conceivable counterpart from whose perspective one can judge given that one must judge from the perspective of one's actual interests. However, on Lappin's model the counterfactual situation is not the perspective from which any moral judgment is made.

Lappin is unaware that he and Freunlich employ different models of role projection and of the apparent ambiguity of his own position. The result is that he rejects counterpart theory as inadequate for making sense of role projection because, given Lappin's own requirements, it is incompatible with what is actually Freunlich's model. He, furthermore, takes Kripke's strict identity theory to be the only view which can make sense of role projection. Since a Kripkian would not imagine composite individuals in making sense of imagined counterfactual situations and since Lappin excludes this as the proper perspective for moral deliberation, Lappin defends Kripke's view over and against Lewis. We can now see, though, that, given Lappin's model, the fact that a Lewisian counterpart may be this kind of composite does not tell against the Lewisian's ability to carry our role projection. If role projection for Lappin is achieved through reflection from one's actual position upon a certain counterfactual situation, then Lappin's criticism of counterpart theory fails. Since, on Lappin's model, one does not judge from the perspective of the imagined situation, the Lewisian, like the Kripkian, needn't concern himself with composite individuals in carrying out his moral deliberation. The perspective from which the Lewisian would judge on Lappin's model is his actual perspective in the actual world. So, both the Lewisian and the Kripkian would do exactly the same thing in carrying out their moral deliberations. They would reflect upon an imagined situation from the perspective of their actual situations. How one makes sense of the counterfactual situation is not relevant to carrying out this procedure. Of course, the Lewisian and the Kripkian would part ways when it came time to make sense of the imagined counterfactual situation. However, since this is not the perspective from which moral deliberation is carried out, Lappin should not be concerned. There is no problem regarding conceptually incoherent counterparts since there is no reason to require that one's counterpart share all of one's actual interests. On Lappin's view, this is required only if the counterpart is to serve as the perspective from which a judgment is made.

By examining the really significant issue of whether the Hare/Lappin model is compatible with counterpart theory, we have established that, contrary to Lappin's claim, the fact of universalization does not rule out counterpart theory in favor of some other view of identity across possible worlds. Lappin was only able to dismiss Freunlich's defense of Lewis by holding to Hare's requirement that in universalization we make judgments ourselves about hypothetical cases. Without this requirement, Freunlich would have succeeded, as we saw, in defending Lewis and thereby in showing that whether one adopts Lewis's or Kripke's view makes no difference for moral deliberation. We now see that even with this requirement, the Hare/Lappin model of role projec-
tion is such that the Kripkian and the Lewisian would again approach moral deliberation in the same way. With or without this requirement, Lappin is wrong to assert that the fact of universalization can help us adjudicate between theories of identity across possible worlds.

ENDNOTES


2 Lappin 1, 72.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid., 73.

5 Freunlich, 77.

6 Ibid.

7 Lappin 1, 79, quoted in Freunlich, 78.

8 Note that Freunlich uses "morally relevant concerns" and "moral concerns" interchangeably.

9 Freunlich, 78.

10 Ibid., 79.

11 Lappin 2, 168.

12 Ibid.


14 Lappin 2, 169.

15 Freunlich, 76.

16 Lappin 1, 72.

17 Ibid., 72-73.