ABSTRACT. In this paper it is argued that the predominant mode of organization of work in capitalist society undermines the conditions for self-respect and self-esteem. Although no society can guarantee that everyone have self-respect and self-esteem, it is a requirement of justice that a society provide conditions favorable to their development. Worker control is a form of society which can satisfy this requirement, in a manner that is compatible with political democracy and basic liberties, and thus, from the standpoint of justice, is to be preferred to capitalism.

A common theme of discussion of capitalist organization of work is that it is dehumanizing—that it degrades the quality of work itself by breaking up skilled crafts, and that it strips from the worker control over the labor process, making the worker dependent upon capital. It is a common theme of discussions of justice, that providing conditions for self-respect and self-esteem is an essential condition of a just society. In this paper, I intend to bring these two lines of thinking together, and show that the predominant mode of organization of work in capitalist society undermines the conditions for self-respect and self-esteem, and hence that capitalism is unjust. A just society among other things, would have to provide for the democratization of work.

It should be noted first of all that by capitalism, I mean not only the idealized model of laissez-faire capitalism, but also the departures from it exhibited in America up to this point in the twentieth century, including growth of monopolies, the welfare state, and substantial government regulation of the economy. Second, the term 'self-respect' is ambiguous. It is sometimes confused with 'self-esteem', and sometimes distinguished from it. After clarifying the different senses of these terms, I shall argue that the predominant mode of work organization in capitalism as it has hitherto developed in the United States undermines both self-respect and self-esteem, and on both counts raises questions about whether capitalism can be just. Worker control socialism—involving worker self-management of enterprises in a market economy, with state management of investment—can provide conditions for self-respect and self-esteem where capitalism fails.
SELF-RESPECT AND SELF-ESTEEM

It is important to distinguish self-respect from self-esteem, although some philosophers confuse them. Michael Walzer notes that 'self-esteem' is defined as a "favorable appreciation of oneself" whereas 'self-respect' is defined as "a proper regard for the dignity of one's person or one's position." Self-respect is normative in a way that self-esteem is not, since it involves appeal to moral standards. Larry Thomas captures this in his somewhat more abstract definition of 'self-respect' as "a sense of worth which we are justified in having in virtue of the fact that we are persons." When one recognizes that one is a person, (or more concretely, a citizen, or a member of a community, or a worker, or a teacher), one realizes that one is entitled to certain rights and a certain kind of treatment. Self-respect, in this sense, is an attitude towards oneself that mirrors the attitude others ought to have toward one in virtue of one's personhood (or citizenship, etc.). In so far as all people, in virtue their personhood, are entitled to certain equal rights and equality of treatment, we can say that the bases of self-respect should be distributed equally.

Self-esteem, is less tied to objective standards, and thus it may be more difficult to specify what social institutions constitute conditions for it. But judgments concerning one's self-esteem are not, as Walzer suggests, entirely subjective. While one's opinion of oneself need not appeal to the standards by which others esteem one, one can be in error in thinking highly of oneself: we do make a distinction between self-esteem and vanity. More importantly, self-esteem is tied less to one's status as a person, or one's position, than to one's personal accomplishments. As persons we are all equal, and we can recognize and respect one another as such. But we excel, or fail, or are mediocre as writers, or singers, or carpenters, and the esteem of others, and often our self-esteem involves a comparison with the achievements of others more than a judgment against an objective standard. A consequence of this, as Thomas has shown, is that it is impossible to guarantee equal self-esteem to everyone, although it is possible to provide equality of conditions for self-respect for everyone.

Two final points of clarification should be made before proceeding with the argument. First, Stephen Darwall has made a further distinction between "recognition respect", which when applied to persons is recognition that "they are entitled to have other persons take seriously and weigh appropriately the fact that they are persons in deliberating about what to do," and "appraisal respect" which consists in a positive appraisal of a person for his/her character. Akin to appraisal respect is a notion of self-respect which indeed not all people are entitled to. While everyone may be entitled to recognition and fair treatment as a person, and ought to respect themselves accordingly, not everyone is entitled to think of themselves as having maintained their dignity and fulfilled the requirements of their position with honor.

Finally, it should be acknowledged that there can be no social guarantees of subjective attitudes such as self-respect or self-esteem. It is possible to preserve one's self-respect in the most adverse and degrading conditions, or to fail to have it in spite of general social recognition. Similarly, it is possible to maintain self-esteem when one's accomplishments are small, or to lose it in spite of achievement or social support. Nevertheless, a society can provide conditions which gener-
ally sustain, or undermine these attitudes in its members. What does justice require in support of self-respect and self-esteem? Can capitalism provide it? These are the questions to which we now turn.

JUSTICE, SELF-RESPECT, AND SELF-ESTEEM

First, justice requires that the conditions for self-respect (in the sense of recognition respect) be distributed equally. I won't repeat the argument others have made here. The gist of the argument is that to the extent that one's self-respect is sustained by public recognition of one's status as a full and equal member of the community, through guarantee of equality of those basic rights and liberties to which each person is, qua person entitled, these rights should be guaranteed equally for all. Unequal rights, or unequal enforcement of rights, constitutes differential recognition, and designation of some people as less worthy than others. It is precisely such unequal treatment which has been singled out as injurious to the self-respect of blacks and other minorities. The maintenance of conditions which support self-respect may also be important for the maintenance of justice itself in a just society, in so far as people who lack self-respect are not apt to show much respect for the rights of others.

The requirements for self-esteem cannot be as stringent. As Thomas has argued, self-esteem cannot be guaranteed to be equal for everyone in a society. Why this is the case will be clear if we consider in more detail what self-esteem is, and how it is acquired and sustained. Rawls provides a valuable account of self-esteem, although he does not distinguish it from self-respect, and uses the terms interchangeably. Rawls considers self-esteem to be perhaps the most important primary good. It includes (a) the "secure conviction that one's conception of one's good, one's plan of life, is worth carrying out," and (b) "a confidence in one's ability, so far as it is within one's power, to fulfill one's intentions." Self-esteem is a "primary good" since it is one of the things anyone wants, whatever else one wants. It is the most important, because without self-esteem, all the other goods lose their value for us. "Therefore the parties in the original position would wish to avoid at almost any cost the social conditions that undermine self-respect." Rawls discusses two conditions for the maintenance of self-esteem. The first is having a rational plan of life, particularly one conforming to the Aristotelian principle. The Aristotelian principle states that "other things equal, human beings enjoy the exercise of their realized capacities (their innate or trained abilities), and that this enjoyment increases the more the capacity is realized, or the greater its complexity." As Rawls argues, When activities fail to satisfy the Aristotelian Principle, they are likely to seem dull and flat, and to give us no feeling of competence or a sense that they are worth doing. A person tends to be more confident of his value when his abilities are both fully realized and organized in ways of suitable complexity and refinement. The second condition of self-esteem is being appreciated by others. "Unless our endeavors are appreciated by our associates it is im-
The appreciation of others is achieved if our plan of life is rational, and conforming to the Aristotelian Principle, and complementary to their plans.

Others tend to value [our endeavors] only if what we do elicits their admiration or gives them pleasure. Thus activities that display intricate and subtle talents, and manifest discrimination and refinement, are valued by both the person himself and those around him. One's plan of life will be complementary to those of others if one belongs to a "social union" (an association with a shared final end and common activities valued for their own sakes). In addition, one's confidence is supported by the reduction of risk of failure made possible through social union. Rawls' concern in A Theory of Justice is to show that these conditions for self-esteem are guaranteed, or at least made possible, by his principles of justice. I shall not take issue with his claim, but will examine whether a capitalist society could provide these conditions.

Before turning to that question, it is worth noting that self-esteem is important, like self-respect, also for the support it provides to the maintenance or pursuit of justice itself. For justice to be established and maintained, Rawls thinks, it is important for individuals to develop a sense of justice, an ability to understand the conception of justice to which their society conforms, to be able to see how their society conforms to it, and to be disposed to act out of a regard for justice. If one lacks self-esteem, it is difficult for one to develop a sense of justice. There are at least two ways in which loss of self-esteem can be manifested. The first, which Rawls discusses at some length, is envy, "the propensity to view with hostility the greater good of others even though their being more fortunate than we are does not detract from our advantages." The second way in which loss of self-esteem can be expressed is self-contempt, and an exaggerated admiration of one's superiors. In either case, one's sense of justice can be impaired.

Envy which results from the loss of self-esteem is excusable according to Rawls.

A person's lesser position as measured by the index of objective primary goods [i.e., wealth, income, power and authority] may be so great as to wound his self-respect; and given his situation we may sympathize with this sense of loss. ... For those suffering this hurt, envious feelings are not irrational; the satisfaction of their rancor would make them better off.

Now persons suffering from excusable envy are not able to recognize their condition as such. They are hostile towards their superiors, and so are incapable of recognizing them as moral equals. Hence, they are incapable of putting themselves in the original position, and from there finding their own envy excusable. Basic moral sentiments of sympathy and respect have been corrupted by envy, and a desire to level.
In order to see why envy corrupts the sense of justice, let us consider the sense of justice more closely. To have a sense of justice is both to be able to see clearly what justice requires, and to be motivated to do what one sees to be just. While these two elements can be analytically separated, they are not easily separated in fact. A person whose self-esteem has been injured may become so obsessed with self-defense that, not only does this take precedence over his desire to do the just thing, but also it blinds his perception of what is just. One feels the wound and strikes back, and one loses sight of the point of view of justice. Considerations of justice will carry weight and be attended to only when the loss of self-esteem has been restored.

One might object, isn't it possible for someone suffering from injustice to recognize the fact of injustice, and demand justice coolly, from a sense of justice? The answer is yes, but what such a person exhibits is not envy but righteous indignation or "resentment." Envy, in contrast, is a pathological condition. It is not justifiable, but, in certain circumstances—when provoked by assaults on one's self-esteem or self-respect—it is excusable. As Rawls puts it:

envy is not a moral feeling. No moral principle need be cited in its explanation. It is sufficient to say that the better situation of others catches our attention. We are downcast by their good fortune and no longer value as highly what we have; and this sense of hurt and loss arouses our rancor and hostility. Thus one must be careful not to confuse envy and resentment. For resentment is a moral feeling. If we resent our having less than others, it must be because we think that their being better off is the result of unjust institutions, or wrongful conduct on their part. Those who express resentment must be prepared to show why certain institutions are unjust or how others have injured them. What marks off envy from the moral feelings is the different way in which it is accounted for, the sort of perspective from which the situation is viewed. Rawls does claim later that "we can resent being made envious," but the fact remains that judgments made out of envy are not made from the point of view of justice, but are a disregard of justice. And envy is rightly regarded as a vice, even if an excusable one. Rawls does not discuss self-contempt and an exaggerated admiration of others. But it is another type of loss of self-esteem and self-respect, equally, if not more destructive of the sense of justice. In the extreme case where the loss of self-esteem shades into loss of self-respect, the victim of self-contempt is unable to recognize the other as an equal, not because he hates him, but because he cannot conceive of himself on a level with the other. He views his existence as for the sake of those who are morally worthy, so he cannot conceive of a point of view from which both are equals. His "sense of justice" is deference to the moral judgments of his superiors. It is the mentality of a slave. The slave often compensates for his loss of self-esteem and self-respect in a displaced pride in the abilities of his master. Thus Frederick Douglass, in his autobiography, recounts how American slaves would get into fights among themselves over who had the richer master.
They seemed to think that the greatness of their masters was transferable to themselves. It was considered as being bad enough to be a slave; but to be a poor man's slave was deemed a disgrace indeed. This exaggerated self-contempt, and exaggeration of the superiority of another, is vicious, like envy, only here the victim is not another, but oneself. For social institutions to be said to be undermining self-esteem, it is not necessary to show that everyone's self-esteem is undermined, or everyone's in a certain class or in certain conditions. It is apparent that slavery is a condition which threatens both the self-respect and self-esteem of the slave, yet it is possible for even a slave to preserve both. The slave can merely pretend servility, without being really servile. Alternately, the slave can protest, or revolt, both of which are ways of affirming self-respect. But the price of protest, not to mention revolt, is high, and it is hard to pretend servility consistently without actually becoming servile. In such conditions, in spite of numerous exceptions, it is accurate to say that the conditions for maintaining self-respect and self-esteem are lacking. We admire people who maintain their self-respect in such circumstances precisely because it is difficult.

What I now wish to argue, in greater detail, is that under capitalism the conditions for self-esteem and self-respect are lacking. I will first describe some of the characteristic features of capitalist relations of production. Then I will show how such relations work to undermine both self-respect and self-esteem. Finally, I will argue that these tendencies are not compensated for by other dimensions of capitalist society, such as equal basic liberties, or social relations outside the workplace.

**CAPITALISM AND SELF-ESTEEM**

I will argue that in the paradigmatic case of capitalist production, inequality of control over production has resulted in the detail division of labor, the separation of conception from execution, the replacement of cooperative labor processes with atomized assembly line or otherwise "Taylorized" processes, authoritarian hierarchical control, and marked differences of status between those engaged in execution and those responsible for conception and control of the labor process. Here there is, for most members of the productive organization, no scope for the exercise of excellences, whether they be technical, intellectual, or social. So most members cannot develop in conformity with the Aristotelian Principle in their work. For this reason, the productive organization cannot be a social union—even on the assumption that there is a shared final end, since the other conditions for social union are lacking: scope for each to develop more complex and sophisticated capacities, and "the public recognition of the attainments of everyone." Hence, in capitalist production the conditions for development of self-esteem are lacking. Let us develop the steps in the argument.

First, consider the claim that in the paradigmatic case of capitalist production, inequality of control over production has resulted in the detailed division of labor, the separation of conception from execution, and other features characteristic of "Taylorism" or "scientific management." In capitalist society, the workers characteristically work only for the
sake of the wage, and consequently their labor is extorted from them by allowing them access to the means of labor only in exchange for control over their labor and its product. The workers are not in such conditions disposed to work more than they have to. The capitalists are thus faced with the problem of how to increase the output of the worker, in order to increase profits and/or to keep up with cost-cutting efforts of their competitors. Traditionally, one way in which workers resisted capitalist efforts to increase their output was the practice of systematic "soldiering"—agreeing among themselves to work less than they were capable of, in order to conceal from management their true potential, and prevent a raising of the standard of a "fair day's work." Thus while workers characteristically would make innovations which could increase the output of a day's work, they would not apply the innovations to this end for fear of being forced to work harder for the same wage. The principle way in which management combatted systematic soldiering was through a detailed study of the labor process, a subsequent redesign or conception of the labor process aimed at reducing unnecessary motions and determining a standard for the maximum a person could be expected to produce in a day. This method of "scientific management" was pioneered by F.W. Taylor, and hence is called Taylorism. Taylorism enabled managements to analyze and break up traditional crafts into detail operations, which would then be executed by unskilled laborers. The essential feature of scientific management is the separation of conception from execution in the labor process. Its motive is not merely to increase the production of labor. Any system of production would presumably have that motive, and it could be achieved in other ways than by depriving workers of a role in the design of the labor process. (As Braverman asks at one point, why not "scientific workmanship"?) The motive for scientific management is primarily to break the back of workers' resistance to increasing productivity, by depriving them of their traditional knowledge of the labor process.

There is a secondary motive for scientific management referred to by Braverman as the "Babbage principle" after its discoverer, the 19th century economist Charles Babbage. The breakdown of the labor process into detail operations need not be accompanied by a breakdown of the labor force into detail workers. Each person can perform several or all of the tasks. Traditionally, the creation of the detail worker was justified by citing among other things the increased dexterity that specialization facilitated. But the Babbage principle provides a reason which makes sense only in the context of capitalist relations of production (or at least relations of production in which there is expropriation of a surplus):

That the master manufacturer, by dividing the work to be executed into different processes, each requiring different degrees of skill or of force, can purchase exactly that precise quantity of both which is necessary for each process: whereas, if the whole work were executed by one workman, that person must possess sufficient skill to perform the most difficult, and sufficient strength to execute the most laborious, of the operations into which the art is divided.

In other words, the "master manufacturer" achieves a savings by the cheapening of the laborer. To illustrate, consider a factory in which there are several different skills, and tasks requiring their exercise. Imagine that each worker in the factory knows all the skills, so that
tasks can be rotated, one worker can fill in for another, etc. Such a factory might in fact be more flexible and productive than the same, in which each worker knows how to perform only one task. But in a capitalist economy, the multi-skilled worker can demand a higher wage than even the most skilled in the plant with division of the labor force into detail workers. And the capitalist can save considerably, even if he loses something in productivity, by opting for the division of the labor force into detail workers, since he can "purchase exactly that precise quantity" of skill required for the work.

These two principles—the Babbage principle, and the need to take over control of the labor process—are integrally connected to capitalist relations of production, and one can expect to witness their effects so long as no over-riding considerations prevail. As Braverman has shown, the practice of scientific management has prevailed, not only in manufacture, but also in clerical work, in services, and in retail sales—wherever economies of scale have permitted detail division of labor. Recent management-initiated "work humanization" programs, though in a few cases exhibiting a reversal of Taylorism, have for the most part amounted to cosmetic alterations of a thoroughly Taylorized labor process.

Thus Taylorism is in its essence a destruction of craft, of a worker's control over his or her labor, and consequently of the intellectual, technical, and social virtues that have been associated with skilled trades. It is for this reason that most members of a capitalist productive organization cannot develop in conformity with the Aristotelian Principle in their work. And therefore, the productive organization cannot be a social union.

Most people would thus fail to find in their work the necessary conditions for self-esteem. (It should be noted that Rawls claims that in a just society the worst aspects of this division [of labor] can be surmounted: no one need be servilely dependent on others and made to choose between monotonous and routine occupations which are deadening to human thought and sensibility.

For this to be the case, one must construe Rawls' difference principle, which concerns the distribution of wealth, income and power, as prescribing those inequalities of power characteristic of capitalist relations of production and the dynamics of Taylorism.) It remains to be seen whether capitalist society can provide bases for self-esteem outside of relations of production. But before considering this question, let us examine the relationship between capitalism and self-respect.

CAPITALISM AND SELF-RESPECT

We have already examined the loss of self-respect that can result from loss of self-esteem resulting from the degradation of work. I would now like to examine a more direct connection between capitalist relations of production and self-respect. A number of writers have argued that social institutions can sustain or undermine self-respect by the manner and extent to which they affirm the worth of individuals as equal moral persons, by distributing fundamental rights equally for all.
Thus Rawls: "In a well-ordered society... self-respect is secured by the public affirmation of the status of equal citizenship for all... the need for status is met by the public recognition of just institutions, together with the full and diverse internal life of the many free communities of interests that equal liberty allows." While Rawls stresses the importance of general affirmation of principles of justice, he sometimes writes as if self-respect (and in his account self-esteem) would be grounded in a just society in the public guarantee of priority of equal basic liberties, such as the right to vote and hold office, freedom of speech, etc. Thus he says: "The basis for self-esteem in a just society is not then one's income share but the publicly affirmed distribution of fundamental rights and liberties." Rawls here seems to think that the only competitor, as a basis for status and self-respect, is share of income and wealth. The importance of the latter can be minimized by limiting inequalities of income and wealth so that outbreaks of excusable envy resulting from comparisons of differences do not arise. However the difference principle governs the distribution not only of income and wealth, but also of power and authority. These latter can also be sources of status and self-respect. While there are correlations between inequalities of income and inequalities of power, inequalities which benefit the worst off in material terms may not benefit the worst off in terms of power. In the typical case, workers' incomes in capitalist society have risen steadily, and at the same time as a greater proportion of production takes on the commodity form, and as capital becomes increasingly concentrated, workers have become less powerful. Now to the extent that one's self-respect depends upon one's standing as a free and equal member of the community it will require not only possession and recognition of equal basic liberties, but also possession and recognition of equal powers in other spheres, particularly in the sphere of productive work.

Rawls himself provides the beginning of an argument along these lines when he says:

subordinate ranking in the public forum experienced in the attempt to take part in political and economic life, and felt in dealing with those who have a greater liberty, would indeed be humiliating and destructive of self-esteem.

The modern corporation is itself a public forum, a kind of "private government" under the jurisdiction of which most people spend a substantial part of their waking lives. Subordinate ranking therein can justly be regarded as destructive of self-respect, when it limits self-determination and establishes inequalities of power in the manner of the capitalist corporation. Any industrial corporation, capitalist or otherwise, may require some subordination, in the sense of a division between managers and workers. But this division, as I have argued, need not involve a Tayloristic separation of conception from execution, the purpose of which is to strip workers of control over the labor process. Moreover, the managers of a corporation need not be accountable to owners. If they were accountable to the workers themselves, the "subordination" of workers would more closely resemble the deference of electors to their elected representatives than subordination to a master.

Now it might be argued that capitalist work relations, or something like them, are justified if there is no other form of work organization which can provide needed goods and services tolerably effi-
ciently and b) do so in a way compatible with political democracy and basic liberties. In this case, the inequalities in power would be seen as necessary and just, and relative powerlessness would not be grounds for loss of self-respect. However capitalist work relations are not the only form of work organization which satisfies these requirements. Worker control is an alternative mode of production, which holds managers accountable to those who work under them, thereby establishing rights and status for workers denied them under capitalism. It is compatible with political democracy, and it is at least tolerably efficient, if not more efficient than capitalism.

As awareness of an alternative grows, one can expect a growing demand for worker control as a right, and growing sense of humiliation at being denied such a right. Self-respect will then require institutions of worker control. It may be helpful here to think of an analogy with unionization. Trade unions have fought for and won rights to social security, minimally healthy working conditions, and organizing for collective bargaining. The assertion and recognition of these rights has made possible a previously unavailable form of self-respect. Now no self-respecting worker would submit to intolerable working conditions, or a denial of the right to organize, without protest or resistance. As awareness of the possibility of worker control increases, so too will a corresponding sense of self-respect.

It might be objected that the right to worker control is not generally acknowledged, so how can one say that its denial undermines self-respect now? Likewise, if workers don't aspire to meaningful work, or worker control, but instead seek fulfillment in other ways, how can the denial of worker control be injurious to self-esteem? Productive organization is not the only institution in which one can work out a rational plan of life conforming to the Aristotelian Principle, nor is it the only candidate for social union. Perhaps more important candidates are art, science, culture, families, religion, and even games and associations for recreation. Even if people do not consider their working associations to be the scene of their self-development, the basis for others' respect for them, and social union, still they may belong to "non-productive" associations which are social unions, and in which they can conform to the Aristotelian Principle, and it would be in relation to these that they would develop a sense of their own worth, and the confidence that their aims can be fulfilled. These associations would be "compensatory", not in the sense that people belong to them only because their work is unfulfilling, but in the sense that whatever self-esteem and self-respect may be injured in relations of production is more than made up for in non-productive associations and activities. While I do not wish to claim that non-productive associations and activities cannot provide a basis for self-respect and self-esteem, I do hold that such associations and activities are insufficient, in general, to compensate for the undermining of self-respect and self-esteem in work. First, some of the more extensive associations--especially art and science--are, under the present division of labor, the province of the few. So however effective they might be as a basis for self-respect or self-esteem, one cannot expect to base the self-respect and self-esteem of each person on membership in these social unions.

Second, "Whitmanesque enthusiasm" for the variety of social unions and associations which flourish in contemporary capitalist societies can lead one to overlook the predominant importance of some over
others, as bases of self-respect and self-esteem. Even though association A may be a social union, while association B is not, it can be the case that B is more important than A as a source of self-respect (or loss of self-respect). If this is the case, then the mere existence of a variety of social unions outside the sphere of production would not be sufficient to compensate for loss of self-respect or self-esteem in work. And the conditions of self-respect and self-esteem would require the transformation of work.

Third, it is worth conjecturing to what extent, under capitalism, the non-productive associations and activities, rather than compensating for losses of self-respect or self-esteem, actually reinforce them. To illustrate, consider the types of sport and recreation that working class, as opposed to middle or upper class people tend to engage in. If one bowls instead of playing golf or hunting elephants, would this not tend to reinforce one's lower class status? Would not one's lesser capacities be made all the more visible? These sociological patterns may be not so much a product of income as of place in the productive hierarchy.

What social science research is available tends to confirm the claims I have made about the relationships between humane work on the one hand, and self-respect and self-esteem on the other.

The report of the HEW Task Force, Work in America, concludes that a variety of mental health problems have been related to the absence of job satisfaction. These include: psychosomatic illnesses, low self-esteem, anxiety, worry, tension, and impaired interpersonal relations. The factors correlating with these problems seem to be: low status, little autonomy, rapid technological change, isolation of the job, role conflict, ambiguity, responsibility of managing people, shift work and threats to the self-esteem inherent in the appraisal system.50

In an old study of mental health problems of auto assembly line workers, summarized in Work in America, and now regarded as "an underestimate of the mental health problems," Arthur Kornhauser found that approximately 40% had some symptoms of mental health problems, and the key correlation was between job satisfaction and mental health. Kornhauser's findings have been generally corroborated by subsequent studies.

While it is clear from his study that mental health has many roots—advantages of education, favorable economic conditions, and the like—separable and distinct occupational effects were found when these other factors were held constant.

Kornhauser found that job satisfaction "varied consistently with the skill level of jobs held," and "related to the characteristics of the jobs—dull, repetitive, unchallenging, low-paying jobs rated lowest in satisfaction." And, finally, "self-esteem correlated strongly with job satisfaction and mental health."61
In Class and Conformity Melvin Kohn found strong correlations between conditions of work—measured by degrees of routinization, closeness of supervision, and substantive complexity—and degree of development from conformity to self-direction, estimated by eliciting attitudes about child-rearing. Those holding jobs with a high degree of routinization, and closeness of supervision and low substantive complexity, tended to value strict conformity to standards of outward behavior, whereas those holding jobs with less routinization, less close supervision, and greater substantive complexity tended to value self-direction, and judged their children less on the basis of their outward behavior than on the basis of "their interpretation of children's intent in acting as they do." The reason why: "Self-direction implies the necessity for personally responsible moral standards: conformity requires only that one follows the letter—not the spirit—of the law." While Kohn's work does not examine self-respect explicitly, his findings suggest that authoritarian and degraded working conditions tend to result in a kind of servility incompatible with self-respect.

There is also a growing literature on the sociology of worker participation, examining the effects of worker participation on job satisfaction, morale, productivity, participation in other social institutions, and uncovering the extent and nature of worker's desire for more extended participation. Summarizing his collection of studies on industrial democracy and worker participation, Paul Blumberg said:

There is hardly a study in the entire literature which fails to demonstrate that satisfaction in work is enhanced or that other generally acknowledged beneficial consequences accrue from a genuine increase in workers' decision-making power. Such consistency of findings, I submit, is rare in social research.

And surveys tend to confirm the thesis that workers desire a greater role in decision-making in their enterprises.

While these studies are at best suggestive of the relationship between work and self-respect and work and self-esteem that I have argued for, they all point in the same direction.

I am quite willing to acknowledge that there are other spheres of activity in which one finds fulfillment, and recognition as a person, besides work. A complete account of the conditions for self-esteem and self-respect would have to do justice to these in their own right and in their interrelation. But any account must give ample space to relations of production, and acknowledge worker control as a condition for self-respect and self-esteem, and thus as a basic requirement of a just society.

ENDNOTES

1 Adam Smith described the effects of capitalist division of labor on the intellectual, social, and moral virtues of the worker as follows:
In the progress of the division of labor, the employment of the far greater part of those who live by labor, that is, of the great body of the people, comes to be confined to a few very simple operations, frequently to one or two. But the understandings of the greater part of men are necessarily formed by their ordinary employments. The man whose whole life is spent in performing a few simple operations, of which the effects too are, perhaps, always the same, or very nearly the same, has no occasion to exert his understanding, or to exercise his invention in finding out expediens for removing difficulties which never occur. He naturally loses, therefore, the habit of such exertion, and generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become. The torpor of his mind renders him, not only incapable of relishing or bearing a part in any rational conversation, but of conceiving any generous, noble or tender sentiment, and consequently of forming any just judgment concerning many even of the ordinary duties of private life. Of the great and extensive interests of his country he is altogether incapable of judging; and unless very particular pains have been taken to render him otherwise, he is equally incapable of defending his country in war. The uniformity of his stationary life naturally corrupts the courage of his mind, and makes him regard with abhorrence the irregular, uncertain, and adventurous life of a soldier. It corrupts even the activity of his body, and renders him incapable of exerting his strength with vigor and perseverance, in any other employment than that to which he has been bred. His dexterity at his own particular trade seems, in this manner, to be acquired at the expense of his intellectual, social and martial virtues.


3 The model of "worker control socialism" I am referring to is defended on a number of other counts by David Schweickart in *Capitalism or Worker Control?: An Ethical and Economic Appraisal* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980). The model bears a resemblance to the worker-managed market economy of Yugoslavia. The reasons for state management of investment in a worker-managed market economy are spelled out by Schweickart, but need not concern us here. (52-55, 103-32, 183, 200.)


6 But, see Stephan J. Massey, "Is Self-Respect a Moral or a Psychological Concept?*, *Ethics*, vol. 93, January 1983, 246-61, for an account of self-respect as a "subjective" concept. Since Walzer's account is particularistic, and makes reference not only to personhood, but also to position, he can take into account at least some of the varieties of attitude that lead Massey to regard self-respect as subjective. Relativity need not entail subjectivism.

7 Thomas, "Rawlsian Self-Respect and the Black Consciousness Movement," 308.

8 Thomas, "Morality and Our Self-Concept."

9 Darwall, 38-39, 41.

10 As Walzer puts it, "What we distribute to one another is esteem, not self-esteem; respect, not self-respect; defeat, not the sense of defeat; and the relation of the first to the second term in each of these pairs is indirect and uncertain," 273.

11 Shue and Thomas, in the works cited.


15 Rawls, see note 4. Henry Shue, in following Rawls on this point, is led into an error that Rawls manages to avoid. Thinking of self-respect, Shue rightly infers--while noting that Rawls never argues for this--that
it ought to be distributed equally (198), and from this that the bases of self-respect should be equal. But it does not follow that self-esteem or its social bases should be distributed equally, even if it, together with self-respect is the most important primary good.

16 Rawls, 440. Massey disputes this claim (259): "It is surely an excess of rationalism to claim that a person cannot enjoy going to the beach or to a baseball game unless he respects himself." But Rawls never said that all other goods lose their value entirely when one lacks self-esteem, but that one’s plan of life does not seem worth carrying out, or that one lacks the will to carry it out. Surely a society which failed to provide conditions for self-esteem in this sense would be seriously defective, even if it provided some pleasures.

17 Rawls, 414.
18 Ibid., 440.
19 Ibid., 441.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid., 525-26.
22 Ibid., 441.
23 My argument will have implications for Rawls’ claim that a capitalist society could satisfy the principles of justice, 274-84.
24 Ibid., 453-512.
25 What is said about self-esteem here holds equally for self-respect.
26 Ibid., 532.
27 Ibid., 534.
28 Ibid., 533.
29 Ibid., 533.
30 Ibid., 534.
31 Rawls links up here with a tradition going back as far as Aristotle. Aristotle maintains that moral virtue has to do with pleasures and pains, and that pleasures and pains can corrupt moral virtue. Moreover, corruption of moral virtue prevents one from seeing clearly what should be done. Thus:

It is through pleasures and pains that men are corrupted, i.e., through pursuing and avoiding pleasures and pains either of the wrong kind or at the wrong time or in the wrong manner, or by going wrong in some other definable respect. [Nichomachean Ethics, tr. Martin Ostwald (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1962), Book II, chapter 3, p. 37.]
In matters of action, the principles or initiating motives are the ends at which our actions are aimed. But as soon as a man becomes corrupted by pleasure or pain, the goal no longer appears to him as a motivating principle: he no longer sees that he should choose and act in every case for the sake of and because of this end. For vice tends to destroy the principle or initiating motive of action. (Ibid., Book VI, chapter 5, p. 153.)

Aristotle often writes as if the achievement of virtue, and the avoidance of corruption are entirely within the capacity of the agent. We become courageous by doing courageous deeds, and so on. But it should be recalled that this voluntarism is asserted against an assumed background of social institutions which reward (or punish) the agent with the right proportions of pleasure (or pain). "Men must be brought up from childhood to feel pleasure and pain at the proper things; for this is correct education." (Ibid., Book II, chapter 3, p. 37)

In relation to Rawls, two comments are in order. First, education is not merely an affair of childhood. People are subject to influence, and can change for better or worse, throughout their lives. So social institutions—including relations of production—can be viewed in their capacity as organs of education.

Second, the loss of self-esteem is a form of injury. To inflict it is to inflict pain. It is precisely this excessive infliction of pain which is the source of vice—namely envy, or as we will see, self-contempt—and at the same time the cause of distortion of one's moral vision.

31 He does acknowledge that there may be a problem concerning the "special psychology" of "domination and submission" (541).


33 As in the case of envy, self-contempt may be typically developed by others' administration of pleasure and pain. A practiced deference was literally beaten into the plantation slaves. Moreover, in annual holidays, the master would encourage the slaves in the pleasures of alcoholic dissipation, to persuade them that it was better to be a slave to man than a slave to rum. See Douglass, 84-85. Self-contempt is not a moral feeling, since it is not justified by a rational comparison with the other, and because it results from the feeling of being overpowered by the other. A rational assessment of one's inferiority, when combined with the observation that one's inferiority was the result of unjust conditions, would give rise to resentment; or, when combined with opportunities for self-improvement, it might be a spur to self-development. But the mere feeling of one's worthlessness is a debilitating vice, since it leads neither to self-improvement, nor to protest against injustice.

34 Cf. Walzer's remark: "The philosopher slave Epictetus measured himself by his conception of humanity and sustained his self-respect.", 275. Presumably Epictetus' accomplishments gave him ample grounds for self-esteem as well.

35 Rawls, 526.

37 Braverman, 114.


39 My account follows Braverman, 79-82.

40 Smith, 7.


42 Braverman, Part IV, 293-374.


44 cf. Smith, note 1.

45 Rawls, 529.


47 Rawls, 61, for an enumeration of the "basic liberties."


49 This assumption is made explicit by Shue, 201.

50 Rawls, 545-46.

51 Rawls argues that "equal division of all primary goods is irrational in view of the possibility of bettering everyone's circumstances by accepting certain inequalities." *Ibid.*, 546. People can accept inequalities in income, if they are benefited thereby, because in such a situation, the inequality is fair. Inequalities of income and wealth carry with them inequalities of power and authority. See Rawls, 93-4.


53 cf. Marx, "Economic and Philosphic Manuscripts (1844)", 289.

54 Rawls, 544-45. See also Robert Lane, "Government and Self-Esteem," *Political Theory*, vol. 10, February 1982, 5-31. Lane argues that a right to work and a right to participation in decisions affecting one's own work are more important for self-esteem than political liberties.

Schweickart, 58-102, 150-58.

For discussions of this see Thomas, "Morality and Our Self-Concept," 266-67; Boxill. As Thomas notes, there may be overriding considerations, such as fear of death, which prevent a person from protesting, so the failure to protest is not in itself grounds for inferring that a person lacks self-respect.

See Rawls, 536-37.

This expression is borrowed from C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), 244.


Ibid., 83-4.


Ibid., 333.

One such attempt is Walzer's *Spheres of Justice*. It should be noted that a society with worker control might fail to provide other conditions for self-respect of some group of citizens. A worker-controlled society could still be racist or sexist, depriving women and minorities of conditions for self-respect. See Postow.