ABSTRACT. This paper argues that G.R.G. Mure's use of 'commensurate universal' to translate 'katholou' is mistaken in An. Post. A24, and that throughout this chapter whenever the word 'katholou' appears it is to be translated 'universal' simpliciter. Establishing this requires a short commentary on Aristotle's use of the word 'katholou', which apparently he coined, and used none too carefully.

As is well known, G.R.G. Mure in the Oxford translation of the An. Post. regularly translates 'katholou' by 'commensurate universal', meaning by this the special sense defined by Aristotle in A4, viz. that for a predicate to belong 'katholou' to its subject, it must be true of the subject precisely as being itself, and not as being a species of a certain genus. Mure translates 'katholou' in this way in A24, a chapter which argues that 'katholou' demonstration--i.e., according to Mure's translation, 'commensurately universal demonstration'--is superior to 'particular' (kata meros) demonstration. It is the thesis of this paper that this translation is mistaken, and that throughout this chapter whenever the word 'katholou' appears it is to be translated 'universal', and never (with Mure) 'commensurate universal'.

Mure's reason for introducing the word 'commensurate' is given in his note to A4 73a 27, viz. that Aristotle does not always use 'katholou' "in the strict sense." I assume that the "strict sense" Mure refers to is Aristotle's usual usage, given at An. Pr. A1.24a 18f. and 24b 26f., viz. that a 'universal' is the statement that something belongs to all or none of something else. Aristotle's usage is in fact quite loose with respect to 'katholou'. After tagging the peculiar A4 sense of 'katholou' with the phrase 'heia auto', Aristotle later uses the term 'proton' to likewise designate this same peculiar A4 sense of 'katholou' (An. Post. A24 85b 23-27, B17 99a 33-36, etc.). We will see, indeed, that within A24 Aristotle uses 'katholou' in at least two quite different ways.

In a way, Aristotle is free to do whatever he likes with 'katholou', since he apparently coined the word. The preposition 'kata', which often appears as 'kath' before a word beginning with a vowel, is compounded with 'holos' to form a word which means, roughly, 'according to
the whole’. This rough sense will not get us very far in interpreting Aristotle, however, as he goes quite beyond the usual usage of An. Pr. A1 24a 18f in discriminations of meaning for his coinage.

There appear to be four primary meanings of ‘katholou’ in Aristotle, counting the usual usage as one. The other three are marked by modifiers, at least sometimes, and discriminate separate meanings within the range of the usual usage. All three are presented in An. Post. A4 as conditions for a predicate belonging katholou to its subject. In order for a predicate to belong katholou to its subject, it must be true of every instance (kata pantos) of its subject, it must be true in virtue of the subject’s nature (kath auto), and it must be true of the subject precisely as being itself, and not as being a species of a certain genus (hei auto).

The key to understanding universal predication hei auto in A4 lies in interpreting 73b 28, where it is said that universal predication hei auto is the same as universal predication kath auto. This might at first seem a confusion on Aristotle’s part, as he has just finished carefully distinguishing the two forms of predication, but Ross seems best here (W.D. Ross, Aristotle’s Prior and Posterior Analytics (Oxford, 1949), 523):

Having first used ‘kath auto’ and ‘hei auto’ as standing for different conditions, he now intimates that ‘kath auto’ in a stricter sense means the same as ‘hei auto’; that which belongs to a subject strictly kath auto is precisely that which belongs to it qua itself, not in virtue of a generic nature it shares with other things.

An implication of this interpretation is that an attribute predicated hei auto of a subject is coextensive with that subject, as it is neither more extensive, which would be kath auto in the looser sense, nor less extensive, which would violate the basic kata pantos requirement. Ross makes the conjecture that hei auto sense of predication katholou is found nowhere else in Aristotle, adding that predication katholou usually just means predication kata pantos, which is what we have called Aristotle’s ‘usual usage’.

Ross’ conjecture is obviously threatened by Mure’s translation of An. Post. A24. Consider 85a 26-28 as Mure has it:

But commensurately universal demonstration, instead of proving that the subject itself actually is x, proves only that something else is x—e.g., in attempting to prove that isosceles is x, proves not that isosceles but only that triangle is x—whereas particular demonstration proves that the subject itself is x.

The context is that of comparing particular demonstrations (apodeixeo kata meros) with universal demonstrations (apodeixeo katholou), where the former is said to use universal propositions of a lesser degree of generality than the latter (Ibid., 589-90). The idea is that the former, for instance, would show a predicate true of a subject qua that subject’s species, whereas the latter would show a predicate true of a subject qua that subject’s genus.
Now, at 85a 26-28, we see that Mure has attached predication *hei auto* to universal demonstrations by using a grammatical variation of the word 'commensurate' in his translation. But, we have also seen that predication *hei auto*, following Mure, Ross and the text at 73b 32-74a 3, entails additional restriction of scope of predication *kath auto*. In other words, for predication to be *hei auto*, the predicate must be seen to belong to a subject of equal generality, as having interior angles which sum to 180 degrees belongs to triangle, and not as it belongs to isosceles or does not belong to geometrical figure (compare 73b 4-5 with 85a 26-28). How, then, can we now be expected to see that a demonstration which proves that a predicate belongs to a subject by appeal to generic differentia of the subject as opposed to differentia of some coextensive term is the same as a demonstration employing a type of predication, predication *hei auto*, which specifically bars such appeal to propositions of higher generality? It is just not correct to translate 'katholou' in 85a 26-28 as 'commensurately universal', and appeal to A4 for the sense of 'commensurately'.

Having discovered this translational gap between A4 and A24, it is tempting to sever not only translational but also conceptual connections between them, which is no doubt what originally prompted Ross' conjecture. It seems that if predication *hei auto* has anything to do with A24, it would have to concern particular demonstrations, which require propositions of limited generality, as does predication *hei auto*. But, as clear as the translational gap is, it will not do to deny a conceptual connection between them. In order to see this, we must understand A24 more generally.

The above quoted translation of 85a 26-28 is of a passage within an argument for the superiority of particular demonstrations over universal ones at 85a 21-30. I will adumbrate this argument so that Aristotle's criticisms of it may be understood. It runs as follows, where (5) is ostensibly entailed by (1)-(4):

1. The demonstration which gives greater knowledge is superior.
2. We know a particular individual better when we know it in itself than when we know it through something else.
3. Universal demonstrations prove things through something else.
4. Particular demonstration prove things in themselves.
5. So, particular demonstrations are superior.

Aristotle presents this argument in order to point out at least two confusions in it. The first is that we can come to know that, or prove that, the predicate of either is a more general or a less general proposition belongs to its subject by virtue of that subject itself, since, for example, having interior angles which sum to 180 degrees belongs *kath auto* both to isosceles and to triangle (85b10-14). Premise (2) of the argument, then, applies both to the more general and the less general proof, and can be no evidence that one is superior to the other. This point depends on taking Aristotle to be saying that 'kath auto' and 'kat allo' at 85a23-24 come to the same thing, viz. 'kath auto' as defined in
A4, in the case where the 'allo' is true kath auto of the subject of the proposition for which proof is in question. But this seems exactly what Aristotle is saying, and in this case premise (2) is just nonsense.

Well, what of the case where the 'allo' is not true kath auto of the subject of the proposition for which proof is in question, as in the example at 85a 24-26? This example indicates that we know more when we know that Coriscus is musical than when we know that a man is musical, or just that man is musical. Aristotle responds at 85b 7-8 by pointing out the second confusion in 85a 21-30, which is that an argument that showed that Coriscus is musical using as a premise that Coriscus is a man would not even be a demonstration, since Coriscus is not musical qua his being a man. He cannot be so, since there are men who are not musical. So, if the 'allo' by means of which we try to prove a predicate true of a subject is not a kath auto predicate of that subject itself, then we simply do not have a demonstration. Such an argument violates the kata pantos requirement on universal predications as stated in A4.

Since the 'something else' by means of which we try to prove a predicate true of a subject either is or is not true by virtue of the subject itself in the proposition for which proof is in question, and in both cases the argument presented above for the superiority of particular demonstrations fails, that argument suffers a terminal confusion over the sense of the phrase 'kat allo'. As Aristotle says (85b7-9):

To sum up the whole matter: if a subject is proved to possess qua triangle, that is not demonstration: but if it does possess it qua triangle, the rule applies that the greater knowledge is his who knows the subject as possessing its attribute qua that in virtue of which it actually does possess it.

If Aristotle is, in A24, laying down desiderata for the relationship between subjects and predicates in propositions which figure in demonstrations, then he is endorsing predication heio auto as defined in A4 as the proper relationship. Note that the second confusion which Aristotle points out is a violation of the kata pantos requirement, and the first confusion is a violation of the strict sense of 'kath auto', which strict sense is just predication heio auto. It seems that Aristotle is laying down such desiderata, so Ross' conjecture must be mistaken, except insofar as the idiosyncratic phrase 'heio auto' does not appear in A24. The sense of that phrase is certainly in the forefront of the argument in A24.

Now, as pointed out above, the sentence at 85a 26-28 occurs in the context of an argument for the superiority of particular demonstrations over universal demonstrations, which argument Aristotle rejects by saying that the contrast presupposed by the argument, and by the sentence at 85a26-28, between the two kind of demonstrations is bogus. In other words, to argue in this way, or to utter our focus sentence, is to misunderstand the difference between particular and universal demonstrations. So, we cannot base our conception of the way in which Aristotle himself wants to use the word 'katholou' in A24 on the sentence at 85a 26-28.

In spite of this, we have also seen that Aristotle's jargon from A4 is not wholly irrelevant to A24 because, pace Ross, the heio auto sense of
predication katholou is present in A24. The argument structure of A24 simply does not allow a consistent translation of ‘katholou’, if A4 is taken into account. Aristotle is in this chapter sometimes using ‘katholou’ in his usual way, and sometimes in his more restricted hei auto way, with the latter serving as a device to correct confusions engendered by his usual usage. Mure, by consistently translating ‘apodeixis katholou’ as ‘commensurately universal demonstration’, loads the confused uses and arguments with the conceptual apparatus by which Aristotle wants to correct them, which is certainly no help to the understanding.

We have two options. We can recommend an inconsistent translation based on our analysis of the argument in A24, using grammatical variations of the word ‘commensurate’ wherever that analysis calls for it, and referring to A4 for the sense of ‘commensurate’. The first recommendation is uncomfortable to me, since it is a simple fact that Aristotle does not use the distinctive phrase ‘hei auto’ in A24. If predication hei auto is what he has in mind, why does he not say so? Obviously, he has the vocabularial tools to do so. I cannot answer that question, so the second option, viz. that of striking the word ‘commensurate’ and all of its derivatives from an acceptable translation of A24, seems compelling. This recommendation at least has the virtue of rendering whatever conceptual connection there is between A4 and A24 as clear in English as it is in the original Greek. The quite genuine conundrums with which we are then presented by our translation at least match those of Aristotle’s original.

I am gratified to find that I am anticipated in this by the recent translations of J. Barnes and H.G. Apostle. Neither of these scholars, however, argues for his translation, nor notes that it differs from the Oxford effort.

**ENDNOTE**

* For the benefit of readers who do not read Greek, Greek terms appear in Latin alphabet transliteration. The transliterated terms (and the originals) are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Greek Term</th>
<th>Latin Transliteration</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>katholou</td>
<td>καθόλου</td>
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<tr>
<td>kata meros</td>
<td>κατὰ μερὸς</td>
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<tr>
<td>holos</td>
<td>ὄλος</td>
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<tr>
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<td>κατὰ παντὸς</td>
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<tr>
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<td>ἀποδείξεως κατὰ μερὸς</td>
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