ABSTRACT. This article shows that Plato is discussing Pauline predication and Pauline self-predication in the Phaedo. The key is the recognition that the "something else" of Phaedo 103e2-5 cannot be a sensible object because any such object which participates in Form 'X' can sometimes appear not to be x. It is argued that Plato has not written in a straightforward manner, but rather has written a series of riddles for the reader to solve. Thus this dialogue is an example of the playful use of the written word discussed at Phaedrus 275ff.

"Pauline predication" is an expression used by Gregory Vlastos to describe cases in which a quality is predicated of a Form or universal when all the objects which are instances of the Form or universal partake of that quality. Vlastos claims that the problem of the seeming absurdity of the self-predication of Forms (e.g., that the invisible Form 'White' is white, that the Form 'Just' is just, etc.) is solved by seeing such self-predication as analytically true cases of Pauline predication. He attempts to prove this claim by showing how it allows us to make sense of various problematic arguments in Plato's dialogues. In this paper I deduce Pauline self-predication from Plato's discussion of the nature of predication in the Phaedo. My paper goes beyond Vlastos' position in two respects: (1) rather than merely showing that Pauline self-predication allows us to make sense of various arguments, I show that when we make sense of certain passages we can see that Plato is discussing Pauline self-predication of Forms in the Phaedo; and (2) we will see that Vlastos must be mistaken when he claims that Plato was not aware that he used Pauline predications.

In addition this paper attempts to show something about what Plato meant when he discussed the playful use of the written word (Phaedrus 277e). In the midst of a very unconvincing argument for the immortality of the soul we find a number of riddles—a number of similar formulations which must somehow be related. When we look at these formulations closely enough we find that we can deduce how they must be related. It becomes apparent that, even though Plato could have told us about these relationships, he wanted us to go through the process of deducing them for ourselves. It then becomes problematic whether
Phaedo 102a10-107b10 is really meant as a serious argument for the immortality of the soul.

The paper is in three parts. In Part I we will see that Plato explains Pauline predication in the Phaedo. In Part II we will see that the self-predication of Forms entails Pauline self-predication. In Part III we will consider how the results attained in the first two parts affect the argument for the immortality of the soul.

PART I

In Phaedo 103e2-5 Socrates claims, "The situation, then, in some cases of this kind, is as follows: not only is the Form itself entitled to its own name for all time; but there is something else too, which is not the same as the Form, but which, whenever it exists, always has the shape of that Form." What sort of thing is this "something else" (τι άλλο;)?

At first glance there would seem to be six possibilities: (1) a Form; (2) a sensible object; (3) a so-called immanent Form (that which is of the type of an opposite in us, e.g., the largeness in Simmias in 102d); (4) one of the mathematical entities which Aristotle claimed Plato envisioned as being between Forms and sensible things; (5) the receptacle of the Timaeus; (6) the primary bodies of Timaeus 53c-55c.

A

We can immediately rule out the mathematical entity possibility and the primary bodies possibility, because 103e2-5 is meant to apply to such cases as fire not receiving coldness and snow not receiving hotness. None of these things are mathematical entities, nor is either snow or hotness a primary body.

B

The "something else" cannot be the receptacle of the Timaeus, for we are told at Timaeus 50b-c that the receptacle can never be called by any other name because it never assumes shapes like those of the things that enter it (the same Greek word for shape, χρώση, occurs in both Phaedo 103e and Timaeus 50b-c). We are looking for something which will always be entitled to some name because, whenever it exists, it always has the corresponding shape. The receptacle cannot be entitled to any such name even for a moment.

C

The argument showing that the "something else" cannot be an individual object is more complex. It involves the following points: 1) Every object which appears to be x sometimes appears to be the opposite of x. 2) Predicating something of an individual object is a naming. 3) If something appears to be x, then we can predicate x of it (we can say it is x). 4) It is impossible for something to be entitled to two opposite names at the same time for the same person. 5) Therefore there will always be a time when an individual object will not be entitled to the name "x".
(1) Proofs that every object which sometimes appears to be x sometimes appears to be the opposite of x can be found at Republic 479 and Phaedo 74-75. In Republic 479 it is specifically claimed that the many beautiful things will sometimes appear to be ugly, the many just things will sometimes appear to be unjust, and so on for a number of other qualities. The context leaves no doubt that such a formulation is true for every quality, because the context is that of establishing the nature of the realm in which the objects of opinions are to be found. The things in this realm are the things which sometimes seem to have one quality and which other times seem to have the opposite quality. Kenneth Darter's exegesis of Phaedo 74-75 also yields the conclusion that beautiful things will sometimes appear to be the opposite of beautiful, and so on for all qualities for which there is a Form. The key to his exegesis is the interpretation of how instances of equality fall short of being like the Form 'Equal' (74d4-8). Darter dismisses the traditional interpretation in the following words: "There has been a tendency to assume that Socrates' statement that equal things do not always appear equal is intended as an assertion that they are not perfectly equal. But this is neither what Socrates says nor what the argument requires." Darter is quite right here, and, in addition, he has very extensive positive support for his view that the reason that equal things fall short of being equal as the Form 'Equal' is equal is that they do not always manage to appear to be equal. When the equality example is generalized at 75c7-d6 we get the same point that is agreed to in Republic 479: every object which sometimes appears to be x sometimes appears to be the opposite of x.

(2) That predicating something of an individual object is a naming can be seen quite clearly at Sophist 251a-b: "We speak of man, for example, under many names—we attribute to him colors and forms and magnitudes and virtues and vices, in all of which instances and in ten thousand others we not only speak of him as a man, but also as good and as having numberless other attributes."

(3) That if something appears to be x then we can predicate x of it can be deduced from Republic 479. There Socrates asks whether great things can be called great any more than they can be called small, because great things sometimes appear small, and so on for other denominations (πορθματα). It is then denied that each of these things is any more than it is not that which we say it is. What is happening here is that a stronger sense of "is" is being introduced, and there is a correspondingly more rigorous understanding of what it means to be entitled to a name. Because things sometimes are called big and sometimes are called small, we really should not call them either name when we consider them atemporally. But, nonetheless, the passage from the Sophist makes clear that the weaker sense of "is" still has meaning. And Republic 479 makes clear that whether or not something is entitled to a predicate in this weaker sense depends upon how that thing appears; when it appears to be x we can say that it is x, and when it ap-
pears to be not \( x \) we can say that it is not \( x \). Thus, to use the example from the Sophist, when a man appears to be tall we can say that he is tall, even though at other times we would have to name him "short".

(4) The proof that it is impossible for something to be entitled to two opposite names at the same time for the same person will be derived from Phaedo 102d–103d. This passage is where the distinction between a Form and a so-called immanent Form is first made. At 102d5–7 largeness itself is distinguished from the largeness in us (an example of the latter is the largeness in Simmias). But Plato's terminology is curiously fluid, for at 103d4–5 Socrates refers to "the opposite itself...whether it be the opposite in us or the opposite in nature" (other passages make clear that the opposite in nature is the transcendent form). Evidently sometimes the expression "\( X \) itself" refers to something other than the \( X \) in us, and sometimes it can refer to the \( X \) in us. A number of scholars hold that immanent Forms (the qualities in us) are not ontologically distinct from Forms. But it seems clear that we experience immanent Forms through our senses, and we are told at Phaedo 65d–e that we do not so experience true Forms. If one thing is of a type such that it can have certain properties (such as being experienced through the senses) and another thing is of a type such that it cannot have these properties then the two things must be ontologically distinct. Phaedo 102–103 does not explicitly state that we can experience the opposites in things through our senses, but this is implicit in the distinction made back at Phaedo 74. There the Form 'Equal' was distinguished from equal things. With this distinction a third type of entity arises, for we can then talk about the equal things' equality. Their equality is neither the Form 'Equal' nor the equal things themselves. Indeed, at 74b we are told that our knowledge of the Form 'Equal' is derived from seeing equal things. These things in some way exhibit equality, even though they do not actually place the invisible Form 'Equal' before our eyes. What else could that which is exhibited be but the equality in them, the immanent Form of equality?

Now, in 102d–e we are told that the largeness in us cannot stand its ground (\( \omega \pi \mu \rho \varepsilon \nu \varepsilon \lambda \nu \nu \) ) and receive the attack of (\( \delta \varepsilon \chi \iota \sigma \theta \alpha \) ) smallness, when smallness advances toward it. The two things cannot even fight because they cannot be present in the same thing at the same time. The same thing cannot exhibit both largeness and smallness at the same time. But whether Simmias exhibits largeness or not depends upon the point of view of the viewer; he can exhibit largeness to one person at the same time that he is exhibiting smallness to another. Plato seems to refer to such cases at 74b8–9. The passage is problematic because the dative phrase "\( \pi \nu \mu \varepsilon \nu \iota \sigma \alpha \psi \iota \varepsilon \tau \alpha \), \( \tau \nu \delta ^{\circ} \xi \)" is ambiguous. It can take on a number of different meanings, two of which Dorter finds plausible: 1) equal things sometimes appear to one person to be equal and to another person to be unequal, or 2) equal things sometimes appear at one time to be equal and at another time to be unequal. Dorter defends the latter possibility by claiming that the
word translated as 'sometimes' "may merely reflect the fact that most of the time we are not attentive enough to be aware of any difference."6 But I find it impossible to read it in this way. At some particular time things are one way at one time and another way at another time? No, everything referred to in the phrase would have to take place at that particular time. Thus only the first alternative is plausible. Plato must then have recognized that sometimes Simmias will appear to be large to one person while appearing to be small to another. Thus whether or not something partakes of a Form is a subjective question. (Does x partake of y-ness for you?) If this were carried over into the Timaeus it would mean that we each would have our own private receptacle. In any case, it seems clear that nothing can appear to have two opposite qualities at the same time for the same person. And this means (by proposition 3 above) that a person cannot predicate two opposite qualities of the same thing at the same time. Therefore (by proposition 2 above) a person cannot judge something to be entitled to two opposite names at the same time.

And now proposition 5 follows immediately. When some individual object, which sometimes appears to be x, appears to someone to be the opposite of x (as it necessarily sometimes does, by proposition 1), it is not entitled to the name "x" at that time for that person. But the "something else" which we are looking for is to deserve the name of some Form always. Therefore the "something else" cannot be an individual object. Thus we are left with two possibilities: the "something else" can be either a Form or a so-called immanent Form.

Phaedo 104d1-3 provides very strong evidence that the "something else" cannot be an immanent Form. There are a number of different ways of translating this passage. David Gallop translates it as referring to "things that are compelled by whatever occupies them to have not only its own form, but always the form of some opposite as well."7 Each occupied thing would be such that whatever occupied it would compel it to have some particular quality. It does not matter which Form is the occupier; the occupied thing must have this quality. But then the cause, the source of the compulsion, would not be the occupier—it would be the occupied thing. Thus Gallop's translation must be incorrect.

R. Hackforth6 and R.S. Bluck9 translate this passage as referring to those things which compel that which they occupy to have not only its own (viz. the occupied thing's) form, but also the form of a certain opposite. This interpretation implies that everything which some Form occupies will have a form of its own. But we have seen that no sensible object will always have the same form. Thus the occupying Form would have to be such that it never occupies a sensible thing. There is no such Form, for 74-75 shows that we learn about each Form through its sensible instances.

Thus the only possible interpretation is that of D. O'Brien10 who holds that the passage refers to those things which compel that which
they occupy to have not only their own (viz. the occupier's) form, but the form of some opposite as well.

This interpretation together with the context makes it clear that the "something else" is the occupier. The occupied thing is compelled to have the form \((L \sim Q)\) of the occupier. This form, let us call it the occupied thing's \(x\)-ness, must be the \(x\)-ness that the thing exhibits, the \(x\)-ness that we can experience. This is what we have identified as the immanent Form of \(x\)-ness, the \(x\)-ness in the thing. Thus the only way in which the "something else" could be the immanent form would be if the occupier could be identified with its form, the form that is imparted to the occupied thing. It is very hard to read 104d1-3 that way; it reads as if the relationship between the occupier and the imparted form were the same as the relationship between the Form 'Equal' and the equality which equal things exhibit; they are not identical but they have the same form. Yet the use of the word "occupies" \((\kappa \alpha \tau \alpha \sigma \chi \gamma\)\) together with the similar military metaphors of 102d-103a suggests that the occupier is the thing that is in the occupied thing. Therefore we need to consider these military metaphors in greater detail.

First note that \(\kappa \alpha \tau \alpha \sigma \chi \gamma\) does not necessarily imply physical presence; it can mean simply "take possession of". Phaedo 102d-103a shows that the largeness in someone cannot stand its ground and receive the attack of smallness, when smallness advances toward it. What is the nature of this thing that advances? It could not be the smallness in the person, for it is not yet in the person. Furthermore, if we say that the thing which advances is the smallness which we can experience, then we are making a claim which goes beyond any evidence anyone can possibly ever have, for we experience such smallness only when it is actually in something. Thus a much more satisfactory way to read this passage is to see the Form 'Small' as attacking someone in such a way that it imparts its form to that person without entering into the person. This way of reading the passage corresponds to Timaeus 50c, where the appearances that the receptacle takes on are said to be stamped into it from the eternal Forms. But it could still be objected that, because Socrates leaves open the possibility that the largeness in someone might flee, the largeness in someone ought to be able to advance also. But there is a qualitative distinction between that which advances and that which might flee. That which advances is all powerful, its opposite cannot even stand its ground and receive the attack. Could the thing which fled subsequently turn upon that which it was not able to face, and would that once powerful thing now be unable to even stand its ground and receive the attack of that which had fled before it? No, it seems clear that they are two different kinds of things. Thus, rather than translating \(\kappa \alpha \tau \alpha \sigma \chi \gamma\) as "occupies", we should translate it as "takes possession of". And thus the form, which which takes possession imparts to that which it possesses, would be what cannot await and receive the attack of its opposite. That which takes possession does not remain in the thing it possesses (it does not occupy it); it merely claims the thing and leaves its mark on it; it does not actually remain to do battle in the future. Thus our reading of 104d1-3 seems justified; it seems clear that that which takes possession is different than the form which is imparted to the possessed thing. And thus it follows that the "something else" cannot be that imparted form, that it cannot be an immanent Form.
Before showing that the "something else" cannot be the only remaining alternative, we shall first consider other arguments which have been advanced to show that the "something else" cannot be an immanent Form, and show that they are all unsound.

David Gallop argues that snow and fire could not be immanent Forms because at 103d5-12 snow and fire are said either to get out of the way or to perish. Gallop takes these to be genuine alternatives, and he holds that we cannot think of immanent Forms of snow and fire perishing because, unlike largeness and smallness, fire and snow are nonrelational terms (largeness is no longer present in something when we view the thing in a different relation). But we know from 74-75 that every object which appears to be hot can sometimes appear not to be hot. If something appears not to be hot, then it cannot appear to be fire. Thus what sometimes appears to be fire will sometimes appear not to be fire; for example, it might appear to be an image of fire (cf. Philebus 85c-d). Then, because, as we have seen, things participate in a Form only when they appear to have the corresponding property, the immanent Form of fire would no longer be in something when that thing appears not to be fire. It must have either perished or got out of the way.

Alexander Nehamas' argument that the "something else" cannot be an immanent Form does not consider other possible ways of understanding certain passages, and therefore his argument is not sound. The first such passage is 103e2-5. What does Socrates mean when he refers to "some cases of this kind"? Nehamas takes this as a reference to such things as fire and snow, but it can also refer to such correlations as fire-hot and snow-cold, to combinations of things like fire with certain opposites. Nehamas claims that the "something else" cannot be an immanent Form, because if it were then 103e2-5 would apply to all immanent Forms, not just some. "No subclass of (immanent Forms) will have been specified; every (immanent Form) has more than one property which always applies to it: our tallness is not only tall but also a size and measurable, our justice is not only just but also a virtue and difficult to come to possess." But there is no such problem if "such cases of this kind" refers to combinations like fire-hot; snow-cold is such a combination and fire-blue is not.

The second passage upon which Nehamas builds his argument is 104b7-10. He translates this passage as "will not resemble those things which accept the Form opposite to that which is in them. . ." Gallop does not mention this as a possible translation. The usual translation places the negative elsewhere, takes ὑοικε to mean "it seems", and takes ταύτα to be in the nominative case. Thus: "These things too, it seems, do not accept the Form opposite to that which is in them. . ." Nehamas' argument is strictly concerned with what it is that Socrates is contrasting, but, according to the usual translation there is no contrasting here at all. Thus Nehamas' argument does not establish that immanent Forms cannot be under discussion because it does not consider other possible ways of understanding 104b7-10. It is not enough merely to have a translation which supports one's view; if one is excluding a possibility, then one must deal with all possible translations.

One of Nehamas' reasons here for eliminating the possibility that the "something else" could be an immanent Form can be applied to the
standard translation of 104b7-10. He claims without support that "no (immanent Form) has any idea in it." Clearly the reason Nehamas believes this claim to be self-evident is that he believes that the distinctions made in 103b (between the opposite in nature, the opposite in us, and the things that have opposites) are absolute, i.e., nothing could be considered to be an opposite in us in one circumstance and a thing which has opposites in another circumstance. But Plato does not indicate that these distinctions are absolute. In 102d5-103a1 the immanent Form 'large' is said not to be able to receive its opposite, while an individual person is said to be able to do so. But what prevents the immanent Form from receiving its opposite is not that it is not the type of thing which receives opposites; it is that the opposite in question is of such a quality that the largeness cannot accept it.

The only remaining possibility is that the "something else" is a Form. There is a major difficulty with this possibility: at 103e2-5 the "something else" is said to have the shape of a Form whenever it exists, and at 79d we are told that Forms are always existent. But this difficulty can be resolved through understanding the ambiguous nature of the word "exists". The key here is one of the great riddle maker's favorite riddles: what person can make all things (Republic 596c, Sophist 233d)?

The answer is a painter or someone with a mirror. For example, when a painter paints a picture of a bed, he can be said to make a bed in a way (τρόπος), even though what he makes is not a true bed. Does a bed exist there? In a way, yes; and, in another way, no. Similarly the painter can make any particular thing: you or me or anything (Sophist 233c). He can make Socrates. Does Socrates exist there? In a way, yes; and, in another way, no. If its nose is not a snub nose, then it is not Socrates, for whenever Socrates exists if his nose can be seen then it appears to be snub. This is true whether we are concerned with a painting of Socrates or with the true Socrates. Even if everyone present knew that Socrates was alive, someone could still say with respect to a painted image: "That's not Socrates, for whenever Socrates exists, he must always have a snub nose."

If the relationship between a Form and something else can be shown to be like that between a sensible object and the image of a sensible object, then it would follow that we could think of the Form existing in two senses; as its true self and as an image. And, in fact, we find the following formulation at Timaeus 50c: "And the figures that enter and depart (the receptacle) are copies (μιμήματα) of those things that are always existent, being stamped from them in a fashion hard to describe." These copies are sensible qualities (Timaeus 52a), like hot and bright (Timaeus 51e). It seems fair to equate them with immanent Forms for two reasons. (1) We have understood immanent Forms to be the sensible representations of Forms, including such Forms as 'Hot' and 'Bright'. (2) The Timaeus envisions three possible types of things, which correspond to the Forms, immanent Forms, and things which have immanent Forms of Phaedo 103d4-5. The Timaeus' first type is "the unchanging Form" (Timaeus 51e). Its second type is the sensible quality, that copy which we claim is the same as an immanent Form. The Timaeus' third type seems to represent a development upon the Phaedo's
third type, which is no longer viewed as being an existing thing. According to Timaeus 49b-50a because all things are continually changing, we may not use the words "this" or "that" to refer to such. The only thing for which we can use these words is that in which various qualities come to be and out of which they vanish: the receptacle. That in which sensible qualities appear is different than in the Phaedo, but that which makes its appearance seems to be the same.

Thus it seems justifiable to say that just as the qualities of the Timaeus are copies of Forms, so too are immanent Forms copies of Forms. And then, just as a painting of Socrates can be said to be Socrates, so too can the copy of a Form (i.e., an immanent Form) be said to be the Form. Does the Form 'Large' exist in Simmias? In a way, yes; and, in another way, no. And, just as we can say that Socrates does not exist in a picture because the man pictured does not look like Socrates, so too we can say that the Form 'Large' does not exist in Simmias, even though in another sense the Form is always existent.

Note also that this type of coming into existence does not imply any change in the thing which is copied; Socrates is not changed by the fact that someone paints a picture of him, or by the fact that the picture is erased.

However, there is a fatal objection to the view that the "something else" is a transcendent Form. In Phaedo 104b5-c4 Socrates discusses the "something else" as being something which can perish or get out of the way, and at 104d5-10 he discusses it as being something which does not receive an opposite's attack. Phaedo 102d5-103a clearly discusses the large in us and the small in us as being that which cannot receive the attack of an opposite, and as being that which must either perish or get out of the way. None of these things would be said of transcendent Forms.

But then at 104d1-3 Socrates switches right over and talks about the "something else" as being something which imparts its form and which is not the imparted form. Sometimes Socrates talks about it as if it were an immanent Form, and sometimes he talks about it as if it were a transcendent form. It would seem that he is thinking of a Form in a sense which includes both the immanent Form and the transcendent Form. Just as we can talk about Socrates without specifying whether it be the true Socrates or only a picture of Socrates, so too can we discuss a quality without thinking of it as being specifically a transcendent Form or an immanent Form. In fact Socrates does exactly this when, at 103b4-5, he refers to "the opposite itself. . ., whether it be the opposite in us or the opposite in nature." The expression "the opposite itself" can include both senses. Thus the "something else" would be referring to a Form in a generic sense, in a sense which includes both specific senses. The "something else" is a quality which always entails some opposite. Socrates can discuss it either as that which imparts its form or as that which is imparted.

Pauline predication of Forms, with the exception of self-predication, is easily deduced from this conclusion. A quality itself, whether it be the quality in us or the quality in nature, deserves the name of
some Form if it is the case that whenever something participates in that quality it also participates in that particular Form. This follows immediately from 104d1-3 and 103e2-5. The fact that this conclusion pertains to the quality in nature means that we have deduced the Pauline predication of Forms.

Thus we have deduced Pauline predication of Forms from what Plato says about predication. It was not easy. There are two possible explanations for the existence of this difficulty. Perhaps, as Vlastos claims, Plato’s thought was very muddy. Or, on the other hand, it might be that Plato believed that he had to write in riddles. It might be that he thought that if he wrote things down in a straightforward way then what he wrote would be “tossed about alike among those who understand and those who have no interest in it”, without any power to protect itself (Phaedrus 275e). And perhaps he felt that if he wrote in riddles then any explanation of his thought (of the answers to these riddles) would have to be tied down to the riddles; those who know could always demonstrate the untruth of what is said by those who are not really interested by referring back to the riddles. If someone tries to use Plato’s terminology in an inappropriate way, they can be called to account by someone who can show that such an understanding of Plato’s terminology does not allow us to solve Plato’s riddles. Thus Plato could have written to treasure up reminders for himself, when he comes to the forgetfulness of old age, and also for others who are following in his path (Phaedrus 276d).

Vlastos links Plato’s muddiness with the claim that Plato did not realize that he used Pauline predications. He writes, “The measure of [a discussion in the Protagoras’] unclarity can be taken from the variety of interpretations that have been put on it over the years by skilled and erudite scholars.” But are these scholars really so skilled and erudite? For example, it took almost 2400 years for us to discover Darter’s interpretation of Phaedo 74; it seems clear that Darter is the first person who could follow Plato through that passage, and at least over the last hundred years many scholars have tried. Rather than indicating that Plato’s thought was muddy, the diversity of interpretations of various passages might simply indicate that Plato’s riddles are very hard ones.

The clues were there. By asking the right questions and by seeing the parallels with other passages we concluded that the “something else” had to be interpreted in a certain way. Once the meaning of the “something else” is established, then it is clear that Plato is explaining Pauline predication. Ergo he must have known that he used it.

Plato could have told us what the “something else” was. He must have been aware that it would be easier for us to understand him if he had told us what it was. No, it seems clear that he wanted us to go through the process of answering the riddles involved.

PART II

Vlastos claims that the self-predication referred to in Phaedo 103e2-5 (where we are told that the Form itself always deserves its own name) is not Pauline predication. He essentially takes this as being self-evident, but he suggests that it is related to the fact that “Odd”
names Three in a different way from that in which 'Three' names Three: for [Plato] speaks of the latter as calling Three 'by its own name' in contradistinction to the former. But the significance of the phrase "its own name" can simply be that of distinguishing self-predication from non-self-predication, and, of course, the fact that self-predication is different from non-self-predication does not establish that self-predication is not Pauline predication.

Vlastos' claim is that this case of self-predication involves referring rather than describing, that this case of self-predication does not involve telling us about the properties of the Form in question and that it merely tells us which Form is being discussed. That Vlastos is wrong can be seen quite clearly from Phaedo 74d4-8 where it is deduced from the fact that the Form 'Equal' never appears to be its opposite (while equal things can sometimes appear to be unequal) that equal things are not equal in the same way as the Form 'Equal' is equal. Thus the way in which the Form 'Equal' is equal tells us something about the properties of the Form; the way in which the Form is equal entails that it never appear to be its opposite. Thus the Form's own name does more than merely refer to the Form.

The way in which the Form 'Equal' is equal must have some positive content; it must mean more than merely that the Form never appears to be its opposite. It seems safe therefore to remove the double negative and conclude that, whenever there is an appearance of the Form 'Equal', the Form appears to be equality. We have seen that an immanent Form can be considered to be an appearance of a Form, just as a picture of Socrates can present an appearance of Socrates. Thus the principle that the Form 'Equal' will always appear to be equality implies that every instance of the immanent Form of equality (every instance of equality being exhibited by equal things) will appear to be equality. Similarly the principle that the Form 'Equal' can never appear to be inequality implies that the immanent Form of equality can never appear to be inequality (Socrates carefully establishes this for Forms generally at Phaedo 102d-103c). Thus we can conclude that the way in which the Form 'X' is x implies that every sensible thing which appears to be x exhibits x-ness and does not exhibit not-x-ness, that it is x and not not-x. Thus the way in which a Form always is entitled to its own name implies Pauline self-predication. Thus we have deduced Pauline self-predication from the clues which Plato has given us in the Phaedo. Again, it seems a sure bet that Plato was aware that he had Pauline self-predication in mind as he was writing these clues down.

PART III

Socrates' discussion of predication in Phaedo 102-104 occurs in the middle of an argument for the immortality of the soul. As we shall see, our interpretation of 102-104 makes that particular argument invalid. But there is nothing necessarily wrong with this, for the following reasons. (1) If Plato is writing in riddles, then one would expect that what is not in the form of a riddle is not essential; as Socrates says in Phaedrus 275d, "He who thinks, then, that he has left behind him any art in writing, and he who receives it in the belief that anything in writing will be clear and certain, would be an utterly simple person." (2) It is very difficult to believe that this argument ever convinced
anyone of the immortality of the soul. And (3) the argument can be seen to serve a purpose within the context of the dialogue as a whole.

The problem in the argument occurs at 106a, where it is agreed that "if the un-hot were necessarily imperishable likewise, then whenever anyone brought hot against snow, the snow would get out of the way, remaining intact and unmelted. For it could not perish, nor again could it stand its ground and receive the attack of hotness." The point here, according to our analysis of 103f., is that nothing could appear both to be snow and to be perishing. That point is irrelevant to the question of whether the soul could perish, for the soul never appears to us at all. The soul is invisible. Thus to talk about the soul as something which cannot have the immanent Form "perishing" within it is to make a category mistake—immanent Forms are necessarily sensible.

The flaw in the argument serves to accentuate the importance of the fact that the soul is invisible. And then this refers us back to the affinity argument (Phaedo 78b4–84b8), which is founded upon the invisibility of the soul (79a). Thus the argument for the immortality of the soul can be seen as ending with Socrates' reply to Simmias' objection to the affinity argument (everything after that merely points back to what had gone before). That reply, in turn, accentuates the significance of the soul as that which directs or leads (93a6–94c–e). While there is still no convincing argument for the immortality of the soul here, the interested reader is given some clues about the nature of the soul.

There is an indication of where a proof for the immortality of the soul can be found. At the end of the last argument for the immortality of the soul Socrates says: "the initial hypotheses, even if they are acceptable to you people, should still be examined more clearly: if you analyze them adequately, you will, I believe, follow the argument to the furthest point to which man can follow it up: and if you get that clear you will seek nothing further" (107b). This refers back to 101d–e, which seems to be a brief description of the way to the unhypothesized beginning discussed in Republic 509d–511e, 533b–535a. I believe that the passages in the Phaedo, which we have been discussing in this paper, lead to the unhypothesized beginning in the following way. The word "is" has been shown to be ambiguous; Socrates can be said to exist in a picture even though he does not truly exist there. 'Socrates' is similarly ambiguous. Thus, in the second part of the Parmenides the expression "the one is" can take on a variety of meanings. This insight can allow us to make sense of the hypotheses of the Parmenides as a coherent whole, which, together with the discussion of the world-soul and the receptacle in the Timaeus, can show us Plato's understanding of the soul.

Here we have been concerned to show that Plato has presented a series of riddles from which the interested reader can deduce the Pauline self-predication of Forms.
ENDNOTES


2 Ibid., 264-5.


4 Ibid., 55.


11 Gallop, *op.cit.*, 198.


13 Ibid., 484.

14 Ibid., 486.

15 Ibid.

16 This is pointed out by Nehamas, *loc.cit.*, 483; Gallop, *op.cit.*, 198; and Vlastos, *op.cit.*, 239n.

17 Vlastos, *op.cit.*, 264.

18 Ibid., 265.

19 Ibid., 264.

20 Ibid., 239.

21 Ibid., 240.