ABSTRACT. This paper is a contribution to the history of ethics, being an account of an episode in the detachment of ethics from religion. According to certain 17th century Jesuits, a person who does not know or think of God can commit only a 'philosophic or moral' sin which cannot deserve eternal punishment. Arnauld's attack on this 'Philosophism', and on the idea that to deserve blame one must know one is doing wrong, touched on voluntariness, intention, conscientiousness, sincerity, the justice of God's helping some and not others, the requirement to do the right thing for the right reason, and other matters related to wrongdoing, blame, punishment and excuses.

Since the eighteenth century liberal and enlightened men and women have put a high value upon sincerity and a comparatively low value upon actually being right. The earliest exponent of this attitude seems to have been Pierre Bayle; as he said in his Philosophical Commentary (1686-7), 'it is enough to consult sincerely and in good faith the lights God has given us.'[1] This implies that a well-meant but objectively wrong act may not only be excused but even deserve praise and reward: 'An action done in consequence of a false persuasion is as good as if it had been done in consequence of a true persuasion.'[2] Among Bayle's main premisses are propositions about invincible ignorance commonly taught at the time in courses of scholastic moral philosophy.[3] In such courses some Jesuits taught (at least so their critics alleged) that there is no sin, properly speaking, unless we know that we are sinning, which implies that if we act according to our consciences we do not sin; and that if we realise that the act is morally wrong but do not think of it as an offence against God's infinite goodness then it is a merely philosophic or moral sin which can-
not deserve eternal punishment. This is not yet the ethic of sincerity, since there is no suggestion that a well-meant wrong act may deserve praise, but it is a step in that direction.

Antoine Arnauld is best known today for his penetrating comments on the philosophies of Descartes, Malebranche and Leibniz. In his own time he was best known as a theologian, a defender of Jansen’s restatement of Augustine’s doctrine of grace, the leader of the Jansenist party (though he denied there was such a thing) and a determined opponent of the Jesuits.[4] His father had taken a leading part against the Jesuits on behalf of the University of Paris, and Jansen had taken a leading part against Jesuit teaching of philosophy in the University of Louvain; the most famous attack on Jesuit moral theology, Pascal’s Provincial Letters (1656), was written in Arnauld’s defence and with his help.[5] The battle over philosophic sin was an episode in this long war with the Jesuits. In 1689 Arnauld denounced as heresy the thesis that some sins may be merely philosophic; his ulterior purpose was to discredit the underlying principle that no one can sin without knowing it. The Jesuits replied that they had never taught such things, at least not in any heretical sense, and Arnauld tried to show that they had. Rome condemned the proposition denounced, without saying who, if anyone, had held it.[6] To Arnauld’s regret what he regarded as the underlying principle was not condemned,[7] and shortly afterwards Rome also condemned propositions held (or allegedly held!) by Arnauld and other Jansenists, including the proposition that invincible ignorance is not always an excuse.[8]

In this paper I will examine what Arnauld wrote about philosophic sin, and also about another (allegedly) Jesuit heresy which he denounced and Rome condemned at the same time, concerning the love of God.[9] From what Arnauld maintains about the love of God it follows that all the actions of mere philosophers are theological sins, since all sins are theological and all the actions of infidels, even their best, are sins—one of the Jansenist propositions which Rome also condemned.[10] My aim is primarily historical, to summarise and understand what was said; but I will also notice some things that should or might have been said, since criticism helps understanding, and since the point of the history of thought is to stimulate thought.[11]

I WHAT IS PHILOSOPHIC SIN?

The theory Arnauld attacked runs as follows.[12] Sins are either formal or material, and formal sins are either philosophic or theological. ‘Formal’ and ‘material’ mean respectively ‘in a strict and proper sense’ and ‘in an extended sense’. An act is not a formal sin—and according to Arnauld this is the basic mistake—unless the agent (i.e.,
doer) does it with actual knowledge of its malice. 'Malice' means wrongness, without the implication of pettiness that the word often has today. Actual knowledge is distinguished from habitual: if we are not actually thinking of something but could think of it if the need arose then our knowledge is 'habitual'. To sin in the proper sense we must be actually thinking 'this is wrong'; the thought may be merely a suspicion and it need not be true, but for the present these complications can be ignored. If we do something wrong but do not actually think of its wrongness it is still wrong, and having this much in common with sin may be called 'sin' in an extended sense, material sin; but some statements true of sin in the strict sense will not be true of such sins, notably that sin deserves blame and punishment.

Two sorts of wrongness can be distinguished. An act may be wrong as being against natural morality or it may be wrong as being against God's will. Since obedience to God's will is a precept of natural morality, and since God wills that we obey natural law, an act wrong in either way will in fact be wrong in both ways. But since formal sin requires not only that the act be wrong but also that the agent know that it is, and since the act may be known to be wrong in one way without being known to be wrong in both ways, we can commit one species of formal sin without also committing the other.[13] But the thought 'this is against God's will' is a thought an atheist cannot seriously think, and a Christian or other theist, who can think it, may not actually do so. No matter how wrong the act, an atheist or a Christian not actually thinking of God commits at worst a philosophic sin.

An offense is an act of ill-will toward someone, an insult or expression of contempt, either direct or by implication. To do something just because it is against God's will is direct contempt. To do it although it is against God's will ('I will do it all the same') implies contempt, since his objection is taken too lightly. Sins done with such thoughts, and only such sins, are theological. But sin can deserve eternal punishment only if it expresses or implies ill-will toward God: only God is infinitely worthy of respect, only insult to a being infinitely worthy of respect is infinitely worthy of punishment, and eternal punishment is infinite in duration. Therefore only theological sin deserves eternal punishment.[14]

The kind of knowledge required for theological sin can be specified more exactly in terms of contempt. To commit a theological sin we must, first, know, suspect or believe (even mistakenly) that the rule being broken was made by God. If I disobey a rule you made without knowing you made it then, although you may be annoyed at the action, you cannot take it personally as a manifestation of ill-will toward yourself;[15] but if I disobey a rule believing you made it, though in fact you did not, then, although you may not otherwise care about the action, you must take it as a manifes-
tation of ill-will. Second, we must think of God as infinitely worthy of respect. If we think of God as an evil tyrant, or as like a human being only immortal, then—assuming that the evil of ill-will is greater the more goodness the offender can see in the person offended—the evil will that is shown in disobeying him would not be great enough to deserve eternal punishment. The sin must be against a person of infinite worth known as such, or known as the highest and infinite good, or under some similar description.[16]

Third, we must know that God will indeed be offended, and offended gravely. If we believe as the Epicureans did that the gods do not care what we do, or that God is easy going, or that he will not be offended just this once, then the ill-will shown by the act will not be great enough to justify eternal punishment.[17] Fourth, we must act with full attention to all these thoughts. Actual knowledge or advertence can have degrees, and if an act is done somewhat inadvertently its malice will not be enough to justify eternal punishment.[18] In short, to be a theological sin deserving eternal punishment an act must be done with full attention to the thought, 'this is against the will of God, who is infinitely worthy of respect, and it will gravely offend him', or something equivalent.

There is a difference between doing something because it is against someone's will, as an insult, and doing it for some other reason though knowing or suspecting that it is against that person's will. If the former is taken as necessary to the nature of insult and offence we have the position of the fictional Jesuit of Pascal's satire: 'To show you we do not permit everything, know that for example we never suffer anyone to have the formal intention of sinning for the sole purpose of sinning, and that if anyone insists on not having any other end in evil than evil itself, we break with him'.[19] The theory Arnauld attacks assumes, more sensibly, that it is possible to offend people by not taking their wishes seriously enough, as outweighing otherwise good reasons; and in view of his infinite worth God's will ought to be taken with absolute seriousness, as outweighing any reason to the contrary. So whatever may be the reasons for doing the act, whether it is done precisely because it will offend God or for some other reason, the conditions stated above are enough to make it a theological sin.

The analysis of sin as insult, offence and contempt against God goes back to Peter Abelard and Anselm and perhaps beyond. Anselm argued that an action which offends God's infinite honour requires an infinite reparation, which can be paid only by God become man. Abelard argued that God cannot be harmed by sin but avenges contempt: 'Our sin is contempt of the creator', and 'all who offer equal contempt to him are later punished with equal punishment'. According to Thomas Aquinas evil acts deserve blame and punishment because they do not serve God's honour, and ignorance exten-
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uates because 'there is less contempt and consequently less sin'. According to Bonaventure 'sin is measured according to the amount of wilfulness and contempt'.[20] The theory Arnauld attacks carries this analysis through with apparent consistency.

For all the notoriety Arnauld gave it, the Jesuits (if the theory is indeed theirs) were not much interested in philosophic sin. Their concern was to tighten up the criteria for theological sin, more specifically for mortal sin, sin deserving eternal punishment; philosophic sin they left unexplored as a residual category for formal but non-theological sin. If they had analysed it as they did theological sin their account would perhaps have been this: an act is a philosophic sin, deserving moral blame and (finite) punishment, if it is done with full actual knowledge (or rather, with full attention to the belief, true or false) that the act is immoral.

II THE FIRST DENUNCIATION

Arnauld begins the first Denunciation by remarking on the novelty of the doctrine: to live in forgetfulness of God is the way to damnation, Christians have always thought, not a guarantee against it.[21] He relates this 'Philosophism' to another novelty the Jesuits have introduced, sufficient grace,[22] meaning the doctrine that God gives everyone (atheists and pagans included) enough grace on every occasion to keep his commandments and avoid sin. This doctrine is meant to answer the complaint sinners could reasonably make if God punishes with damnation all who fail to keep commandments which cannot be kept without grace which he does not always give: he does always give it, so his justice is vindicated. But, as Arnauld remarks, against this there is an objection from experience. If God always gives the grace needed to avoid sin, why is there so much sin? Some answered that God helps those who do their best with their natural powers and the help already given: there is so much sin because people do not do their best. But this answer has been abandoned as semi-Pelagian. So now, Arnauld says, instead of trying to vindicate God's justice against the complaints of sinners, the philosophers are protecting sinners against God's justice by claiming that no-one can be damned except for theological sin narrowly defined.[23]

Some readers took this passage to mean that philosophism is a further stage in the development of the doctrine of sufficient grace. Arnauld rejects this interpretation indignantly, suspecting perhaps that it is an attempt to deflect his attack from the principle he regards as the source of the new heresy, namely that no-one can sin without knowing the malice of the act. So he insists that philosophism rests independently on that principle, and claims in-
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deed that philosophism and the doctrine of sufficient grace are logically incompatible.[24] But his logic is at fault. There is no logical inconsistency between the statements that God inflicts damnation only for theological sin and that he gives enough grace to avoid sin (however sin is defined). The proponents of sufficient grace meant that God gives enough grace to avoid damnable sin, which they distinguish as formal from material sin even before the distinction between philosophic and theological sin was invented.[25] If they had meant that God gives enough grace to avoid even material sin, they might have had to abandon the doctrine because of the objection from experience and might have put philosophism in its place, but even then the two doctrines would have been logically compatible—the doctrine of sufficient grace would have been abandoned not as incompatible with philosophism but as incompatible with experience. But since they meant damnable sin, and distinguished that from material sin, they already had an answer to the objection from experience, an answer which philosophism strengthens: since in our experience formal sin, and especially theological sin, seldom or never happens, it is quite possible to believe that enough grace to avoid damnable sin is always given. Philosophism thus complements the doctrine of sufficient grace by helping to answer an objection against it, and the latter complements the former by vindicating God's justice in the cases, occasional or at least possible, in which God damns someone for theological sin. Philosophism does rest on its own principle and is logically independent of the doctrine of sufficient grace, but the two are mutually consistent and complementary.

The principle which led to philosophism was developed by Jesuit theologians over a long time. They laid down that to sin one must act voluntarily, which Arnauld agrees is true of actual sin. But they added that an act is not voluntary and culpable unless one knows not only what one is doing but also that it is evil; e.g., for an idolator to sin in sacrificing his child to Moloch he must know not only that he is sacrificing his child to Moloch, but also that such an act is evil.[26] They attribute this conception of the voluntary to Aristotle, but Arnauld shows that Aristotle holds the opposite—that not to know what one is doing may make the act involuntary and excuse it, but not to know that such an act is evil, i.e., ignorance of moral principle, is no excuse;[27] and elsewhere Aristotle distinguishes weakness of will from hardened vice, and says that the weak are less wicked because they know better—again the opposite of what the philosophists would say.[28]

St. Augustine is also against them. He says that those who sin through ignorance do not will to sin, but they will the wrong act, and for sin that is enough.[29] And—to anticipate one of the later Denunciations—Thomas Aquinas is against them. A Jesuit writer quotes words of St. Thomas as meaning that we commit merely philosophic sin if we turn...
toward a created good without turning from God.[30] But St. Thomas's statement is conditional, and leaves the question open whether the condition is ever realised. Elsewhere he says that in serious sin the two turnings necessarily go together,[31] whatever we intend;[32] that is, in willing a gravely sinful act for the sake of some creature we do turn from God and thus commit a theological sin even if we do not intend to do so. So St. Thomas as Arnauld interprets him agrees with Augustine that one can sin against God without willing to do so, by willing something else. Notice that this implies a rejection of the idea that the essence of sin is contempt.[33] Some sins relate directly to God, such as hatred and murmuring against God, and in these the sin consists in contempt, but this is not true of all sorts of sins.[34]

While its principle is thus contrary to Aristotle, Augustine and Aquinas, philosophism itself is contrary to Scripture. With reference to those who simply do not know God Arnauld quotes or refers to the following:[35] Ps 78/79:6 ('Pour out your anger on the people who have not known you', cf. Jer 10:25); Eph 4:17 ('they are far from the life of God because of the ignorance they are in'); Eph 5:6 ('It is for these things that the anger of God has come upon the unbelievers'); 1 Thes 4:4 ('not in following the promptings of concupiscence with the pagans, who do not know God'); Rom 2:12 ('those who have sinned without the law will perish without the law'); Jn 5:28 ('those who have done evil deeds. . .will rise to their condemnation'); Mt 25:32, 33, 46 (those on the left 'will go to eternal punishment'); Apoc/Rev 21:8 ('As for the cowardly, the faithless, the polluted, as for murderers, fornicators, sorcerers, idolaters and all liars, their lot shall be in the lake that burns with fire and brimstone'; cf. 20:15). The passages about judgment day envisage only two categories of people, the just and the damned; so if philosophic sinners are not damned they must be among the just called to eternal life: although they may be murderers, fornicators, etc.--to whom the Apocalypse consigns to the lake that burns with fire, without any exception in favour of atheists.

As for those who know God but sin without thinking of him, Arnauld remarks that forgetfulness of God is one of the greatest sources of disorder in the lives of people in modern times. Too many are badly educated, without any sentiment of piety, without thought of God in the sins they commit to satisfy ambition, avarice, or lust or some other dominant passion, negligent of their salvation, led like beasts only by what strikes the senses. We can see how to judge such lives from what Scripture says of those Israelites who forgot God, for example from passages in the Psalms which characterise the wicked as forgetful of God (e.g., 'The memory of God is banished from all their thoughts', Ps 9:10). There is no hint that this forgetfulness is a protection against God's anger--quite the opposite: 'Listen, you who
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forget God, lest he drag you off to punishment' (Ps 49:22).
Consider the story of Susanna and the elders (Vg Dan 13):
'Their minds were perverted and they turned away their eyes
so as not to see heaven and not to remember God's judg-
ments'; yet Scripture regards them as notable sinners. In
Mt 25:41-46 Jesus says that eternal punishment will be in-
flicted for sins of omission ('I was hungry and you gave me
no food' etc.); but worldly people commit sins of omission
without thinking of God or thinking that he obliges them to
almsgiving and the like, being preoccupied with their own
good and thinking only of enriching themselves; philoso-
phists would have to say that God cannot justly inflict
eternal punishment for such sins.[36]

Scripture shows that people may sin even when they do
what they think pleases God, and therefore do not think
offends him. Jesus foretold that the Jews will think they
serve God in persecuting the disciples (Jn 16:2), for which,
according to Paul, God's anger has come upon them 'to the
end' (1 Thess 2:16--although other translations say 'at last');
speaking of the town which will not listen to his
disciples Jesus says that on judgment day 'Sodom and Gomor-
rah will be treated less rigorously than that town' (Mt
10:15). Speaking of himself, Paul says that he has been a
persecutor of the Church, and that he did this out of reli-
gious zeal (1 Tim 1:12, Gal 1:13-14, Acts 26:9). Phi-
losophists would have to say that Saul persecuting the
Church and heretics waging wars of religion are only philo-
sophic sinners.[37]

After pointing out these conflicts with passages from
Scripture, Augustine and Aristotle, Arnauld applies the doc-
trine to some examples from which he expects that any well-
instructed Christian will see its impiety. Suppose a liber-
tine is converted by some extraordinary grace and makes a
general confession of the sins of his past life: in his
childhood no-one taught him to know and serve God, he fell
in with bad companions who led him into debauchery, drunken-
ness and the like, he developed habits of swearing and blas-
pheming, he made love to married women, he took cruel ven-
gence for anything he took as an affront, he cheated
tradesmen, there was no evil he would not have done if he
had got the chance. His bad habits made him so blind and
obdurate that he never felt the slightest remorse; he was
wholly occupied in satisfying his passions and never thought
of God.[38] Philosophists would have to say that because he
never thought of God all these were only philosophic sins
which he need not confess.

The last section of the first Denunciation, which an-
swers answers to criticisms of philosophic sin made earlier
by others, will be dealt with more conveniently below to-
gether with the other Denunciations, which answer answers to
the first. But before leaving the first let us notice some
weaknesses in Arnauld's arguments so far. Philosophic or
moral sin is a species of formal sin, and formal sin deserves blame and punishment—finite punishment, in the case of philosophic sin. Now it is possible to think of moral wrongdoing as the concern of every member of the moral community, so that any member, including God, may and should blame it, act against it and even punish it (finitely), without taking it as an offence against himself personally.\textsuperscript{39} So perhaps God physically destroyed Sodom and Gomorrah as a finite punishment, but did not sentence their inhabitants to hell eternally. If Arnauld's scripture passages are reconsidered with such a possibility in mind it will be found that most are simply irrelevant to the precise point at issue, namely whether philosophic sin deserves to be punished eternally. There are two passages which do refer explicitly to eternal punishment, Mt 25 and Rev 20-21. To these there are two possible answers. First, for those who have heard these passages, at least while they have them in mind, there is no possibility of merely philosophic sin, so reference to this possibility was unnecessary.\textsuperscript{40} Second, on closer examination of Rev 20-21 it will be found that, although it is said that the devil will be punished eternally in the lake of fire, it is not said that each sinner sent to join him will be kept there eternally.\textsuperscript{41}

As for the passages quoted to show that acts thought pleasing to God may really be sins requiring apology and forgiveness, these do not imply that such acts deserve blame or punishment, and philosophism does not imply that they do not require apology and forgiveness. When one person apologises and the other forgives there is no implication on either side that the act deserved blame. Not to regret an act done in ignorance when the error is discovered would show lack of good will, a disposition such that one would have done the same even if one had known; regret shows that the act is against the general disposition of the will.\textsuperscript{42} Apology expresses and forgiveness acknowledges the apologiser's general disposition, leaving it an open question whether the act deserves blame. As a moral virtue good will means a settled resolution to do what is right, without concern for praise or blame except as an index of right and wrong. This is an important point: a person of good will seeks not to avoid blame, or even to avoid deserving blame, but to do what is objectively right; failure in this purpose, even if not blameworthy, will cause regret. In a religious ethic the appropriate expression of this regret is to ask forgiveness of God. Philosophism does not hold that an act is not wrong unless one thought so at the time, but that unless one thought so it does not deserve blame or punishment. Philosophists can therefore say, without inconsistency, that a person who ignorantly does what is objectively wrong does not deserve blame but should ask God's forgiveness when the mistake is discovered.\textsuperscript{43} The same considerations apply to the example of the penitent libertine: philosophers need not say he has nothing to confess—or if they do, it will not be because they think that merely phi-
losophic need not be regretted, but because they think that the sole purpose of confession is to ward off blame and punishment.

As for Aristotle's opinion that some sorts of ignorance excuse but not ignorance of moral principle, we may ask why he thought so. In a passage which Arnauld does not consider Aristotle says that we punish a person for not knowing what he should know and could know if he took care. But, Aristotle imagines the objection, what if he is simply a careless sort of person? Can he be blamed for being the sort of person he is, or is that a matter of innate temperament? Perhaps one must be born with an eye, as it were, by which to judge rightly and choose what is truly good; and then no-one will be responsible for moral blindness or for the carelessness and other vices which result from it. Aristotle answers that if we are not responsible for our vices then we can claim no credit for our virtues either, and that in fact we do seem to be causes or at least co-causes of our own characters.[44] This passage suggests a possible reason for the dictum that ignorance of moral principle is no excuse: Aristotle may have thought that moral principles are among the things a person should know and could know with care, and that we are always to blame for carelessness and blindness in such matters. But if we think otherwise Arnauld's objection will lose its force. It may seem especially implausible to put ignorance of the true God on a par with ignorance of moral principle, so that even invincible ignorance of God is no excuse; but as we will see later that is just what Arnauld does.

III THE OTHER DENUNCIATIONS

To sin while actually thinking, 'this will offend God who is infinitely worthy of respect', must be a rare event. According to Arnauld the Jesuits turned to philosophism because the doctrine of sufficient grace lay open to the objection that despite the alleged sufficiency almost everyone sins and incurs damnation. Philosophism goes to the other extreme and saves almost everyone. In most of the remaining Denunciations Arnauld's main concern is to block attempts to show that the doctrine leaves plenty of room for damnation after all.

In reply to the First Denunciation and to earlier critics the Jesuits of Louvain made the following points. (1) If a philosophic sin is serious it is mortal and will be punished in hell—though perhaps not eternally, since the eternity of sensible punishment corresponds to an infinite malice, which philosophic sin lacks. (2) For theological sin full advertence to the infinite goodness of God is not required; habitual, obscure or general knowledge is enough. (3) Since God gives everyone, even those who have not heard the gospel, sufficient grace to attain such knowledge, they
cannot be ignorant, except for a short time, without
being at fault in resisting grace, which makes their sins
theological. From (2) and (5) it follows (4) that the sup­
position of merely philosophic sin is a bit metaphysical: it
rarely happens. The Jesuits of Paris said (5) that it
is quite metaphysical: merely philosophic sin has never hap­
pened and never will. According to them, (6) 'none of our
writers has ever taught this doctrine', i.e., that it does
happen; the Jesuits who wrote about philosophic sin were
arguing conditionally on a false supposition, that if there
were any such thing as merely philosophic sin it would not
deserve eternal punishment. As a Jesuit professor of
Anvers put it, (7) 'philosophic' and 'theological' sin are
merely two formalities (distinguishable aspects) of every
sin, not two kinds of sin capable of existing apart.

Arnauld replied to these points as follows. To say
(point (1)) that philosophic sin may be mortal and deserve
to be punished in hell, but not eternally, is out of harmony
with the rest of the theory. In any case it does not remove
the objection since it is a merely verbal concession.
The question is not whether the punishment is called hell
but whether it is eternal. The restriction to sensible pun­
ishment suggests that the pain of loss might be eternal, but
this restriction is arbitrary. The reason given why eternal
sensible punishment would be unjust, namely that infinite
punishment is due only to infinite malice, applies equally
to the pain of loss of God. In fact it applies more strongly,
since that pain would be infinite not only in duration
but also by reason of the good lost.

Point (2) is another concession out of harmony with the
rest of the theory, which assumes that punishment is due to
contempt and that contempt requires full awareness: how can
obscure, habitual or general knowledge be enough? And the
concession goes either not far enough or too far. Consider
the Americans before they heard the gospel. Their beliefs
about their own gods cannot count as even obscure and gener­
al knowledge of the true God, enough to make the malice of
their sins infinite, since their gods are finite. On
the other hand, if it is enough to have general and implicit
knowledge of God under the concept of 'good' which is pre­
supposed to every human action (that is, good in general,
not precisely infinite good), then merely philosophic sin is
not rare (point (4)) but impossible. The claim (point
(6)) that this is exactly what was meant will be dealt with
below.

Point (3) assumes the theory of sufficient grace. Consider the Americans again. Since most of them had no
human means of knowing the true God, point (3) must
mean that God gave each of them a direct revelation of him­
self. This must have taken the form of thoughts in their
minds 'loud' enough to hear. Now God can reveal himself
this way, but there is no reason to suppose that he gives
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and must give such thoughts to everyone to whom preachers are not sent; in fact the normal means by which God reveals himself is outward preaching.[56] The supposition that the Americans have all had such thoughts is refuted by experience: no missionary reports meeting any American who had already heard in his own thoughts anything of the true God; missionaries do not claim to be reminding them of what they have already thought of, and would be laughed at if they did.[57] If God gives all the Americans grace sufficient for knowledge which none of them has, then the grace must be ill-adapted to their state, and given merely to make their ignorance culpable and their sins theological and damnable: so much for the idea of making God more amiable.[58]

But even if the Americans' ignorance is their own fault that is simply irrelevant to the distinction between philosophic and theological sin. If the sinner does not know God, then even if this is his fault his sins are merely philosophic, according to the definitions originally given.[59] If (another concession out of harmony with the basic ideas of the theory[60]) the definitions are changed to make fault relevant an anomaly results. The fault would be itself a merely philosophic sin, since when the sinner resists the grace which would give him knowledge he is not yet at fault in not knowing, yet because of this philosophic sin other sins, which would otherwise have been also merely philosophic, count as theological sins of infinite malice.[61]

Since points (2) and (3) fail, it does not follow (point 4) that merely philosophic sin is rare; the many sins of the Americans must have been, on Jesuitic principles, merely philosophic and exempt from the punishment of hell. But whether such sins have been few or many is a side-issue. The essential point is that if there is no sin without knowledge of the malice of the act then merely philosophic sin is not just 'metaphysically' but 'effectively' possible: it can really happen (whether often or only sometimes) that someone may voluntarily do a gravely immoral act, knowing it to be such, and yet not incur eternal punishment. This is heresy no matter how seldom such sins are supposed to happen, and its principle is the proposition that there is no sin without knowledge of the malice of the act.[62]

If it were true (points (5) and (7)) that philosophical and theological sin are merely distinguishable aspects of every sin Arnauld would have no complaint, as he said before the Jesuits of Paris and Antwerp entered the controversy.[63] But it is not true. Since there are two kinds of malice which can be known separately, then—if there is no sin without knowledge of malice—it must follow that the two kinds of sin can exist separately and that there can be a merely philosophic sin.[64] To escape this conclusion it might be said that no one ever can be ignorant, at the point of decision, of God and his law;[65] this is the doctrine of sufficient grace again, already sufficiently refuted. Or it
might be suggested that those ignorant of God and his law will also be ignorant of natural morality; but missionaries tell of people ignorant of God who know of at least some moral laws.[66] If they know no moral laws then from the principle that sin requires knowledge of malice it would follow that they could commit only material sins exempt from punishment altogether, which Arnauld thinks is even more shocking than the idea that their sins are only philosophic.[67]

Against the claim (point (6)) that no Jesuit writer ever taught that purely philosophic sin can really happen, that they were arguing hypothetically on a false supposition, Arnauld shows that the words of many of them do not admit this interpretation. One says explicitly: Peccatum philosophicum possibile est.[68] If they had thought that every philosophic sin is also theological, they would not have said that philosophic sin is committed by those who do not know or think of God (whether through their own fault or not): if every sin belongs to both species then philosophic sin is not committed by a restricted class of persons.[69] Further, the possibility of merely philosophic sin is a legitimate inference[70] from common Jesuit doctrines of invincible ignorance and probabilism.

The treatment of invincible ignorance in a book by an English Jesuit, Fr. Terrill, published in 1670 is a thorough-going development of what Arnauld regards as the principle behind philosophism, that formal sin requires full awareness of the malice of the act.[71] According to Fr. Terrill ignorance which is inculpable (or involuntary or invincible) always excuses sin so that it is not formally sin and is not imputable or punishable. Ignorance is inculpable unless we actually have the thought that there is or might be something more to know, and also the thought that we have a duty to find out.[72] Whether such thoughts occur is outside our power; if the ignorance is culpable it is because they have occurred but we have neglected to act on them; its continuance ceases to be culpable when the thoughts go or the opportunity for acting on them passes.[73] Culpable ignorance is no excuse, but an act resulting from it is a sin only 'in its cause': there is no new formal, imputable sin in addition to the sin of neglecting to dispel one's ignorance, and no additional punishment is due.[74] Inadvertence is a species of ignorance and therefore subject to the same principles.[75]

Arnauld rejects this theory of ignorance as excuse, as we will see in Section IV. The point here is that those who hold it cannot deny that merely philosophic sin is possible. Assuming that the loophole provided by the doctrine of sufficient grace is by now closed and that the Jesuits will not want to say that all the sins of the Americans are merely material (see above, text at note 67), he argues that on a theory which sets such stringent requirements for the culpa-
bility of ignorance and inadvertence, the Americans will generally be blameless in not knowing or thinking of God and his law, so that their sins qua theological will be excused; if they do wrong knowing that the act is against natural law (which Arnauld thinks the Jesuits must admit is possible), this will be an instance of merely philosophic sin.[76]

Probabilism can be seen as an application of the doctrine of inculpable ignorance. The probabilist principle is that a wrong act is excused if the agent knows of some reputable casuist who says that such acts are permissible; the casuist's authority makes the mistake inculpable. The notion of inculpable ignorance gets stretched a long way: the act is excused even if, suspecting that it is wrong but wanting to do it, we have deliberately gone looking for an authority who permits it, and even if we knew that this authority may be mistaken and that other authorities disagree. If such studied ignorance counts as inculpable then, Arnauld asks, can the Americans be blamed for their ignorance of God and his law?[77]

It seems to me that Arnauld gets the better of this contest. He shows that the principle that sin requires knowledge of the malice of the act does imply the possibility of merely philosophic sin. Even if no Jesuit had drawn out the implication (and Arnauld shows that some had) he had the right to point it out and to press them either to own philosophism or disown the principle; instead they said that merely philosophic sin hardly ever happens (which is beside the point) because no-one can for long be involuntarily ignorant of God (which is surely false).[78] But there is something to be said for the Jesuit side. Arnauld seeks to discredit the principle by drawing out an implication he expected would shock Christian consciences, namely the possibility of a serious violation of morality which could not justly be punished in hell forever. Some seventeenth century Christians did find this possibility shocking, but it seems not to be of the essence of Christianity to find it so. The Jesuits, on the other hand, were moved by an idea which does seem essential to Christianity and to any other religion worth taking seriously, namely that God is just. 'Can anyone be persuaded that a God so just and good punishes a man eternally for having done what he believed in conscience he ought to do--has there ever been such a tyranny? . . . that he has already condemned us to the eternal flames for things we did not know displeased him--is that like a fair master?'[79] Let us see how Arnauld himself answers such questions.

IV THE JUSTICE OF PUNISHING SINS WHICH ARE UNAVOIDABLE

According to Arnauld the Jesuits were misled by merely human ideas of justice, 'although God has said so positively
that his thoughts are not like our thoughts, and that His ways are as far from those of men as heaven is from earth."[80] But he himself tries to show the justice of God's ways in humanly intelligible terms. His arguments are mostly Augustine's, using texts already marshalled to the same purpose in Jansen's Augustinus.[81] Translating Augustine into scholastic terminology, Jansen argued that invincible ignorance does not always (as most scholastics seem to suppose[82]) excuse sin: invincible ignorance of fact or of positive law (including positive divine law) excuses,[83] but ignorance, even invincible, of natural law never does.[84] Invincible ignorance of a part of natural law (total ignorance is not possible[85]) is not itself a sin,[86] but it does not excuse the sins which result from it.[87] Punishment is deserved not for not knowing, but for not doing what we do not know we ought to do. Such 'sins of ignorance',[88] and also sins of weakness, are unavoidable[89] but still imputable and punishable.[90]

Augustine gave various definitions of sin, one of which is 'anything uttered, done or desired against God's law'.[91] Sin is something objective but not merely physical and external; it depends upon what we think we are doing, but not upon whether we think that what we are doing is against God's law. An act which results in a person's death is not against God's law 'Thou shalt not kill' unless we think we are killing someone, but then it is a sin even if we do not think we are doing wrong. It is a sin if, as the act it was intended to be, it is objectively against God's law, even if it was not intended to be a sin.[92] To avoid sin, therefore, it is necessary[93] to know God's law and to make our decisions in obedience to it. Sin will be unavoidable if we either (a) cannot know God's law or (b) cannot will obedience to it.[94] A sin which is unavoidable for either of these reasons still satisfies this definition of sin, and satisfies it fully (so the sin is formal, not material): the act is still a voluntary act objectively against God's law, and therefore imputable and justly punishable.[95]

An act cannot be a sin unless it is intentional and therefore voluntary. But how can a sin be both voluntary and unavoidable? The assumption that an act is voluntary if, but only if, it is avoidable led to the doctrines of philosophic sin and sufficient grace[96] as attempts to meet respectively points (a) and (b) above. Proponents of these doctrines argued that there can be no voluntary because avoidable sin unless the sinner (a) knows that the act is against God's law, and (b) is able (with grace, if necessary) to choose to obey. If either knowledge or power of choice is lacking obedience to God's commands is impossible. It would be unjust of God to punish us for not doing the impossible. Unavoidable sin is therefore not punishable; it is merely material sin.
Arnauld replies that even after Adam's sin, and even without grace, we can always obey God's commands if we choose. To keep the commandments is within everyone's power because all they require is the will;\[97\] that is (I assume Arnauld means), the commandments make allowance for external obstacles, so that a commandment requiring an external act is satisfied by genuine willingness to do it if we can. But although we can satisfy the commandments if we will, God's grace is needed to give the will.\[98\] Without grace sin is inevitable and obedience impossible because we cannot bring ourselves to be willing to obey, and for no other reason. Impossibility of this sort is no excuse; it is clearly just to punish those who are disobedient only because they are unwilling to obey.

To understand this reply more fully we must distinguish three kinds of necessity.\[99\] First, an act may be necessary and involuntary, so that it happens whether we will it or not, by physical constraint. The opposite act is then not in our power and not possible even if we will it. Second, an act may be both necessary and voluntary, in our power but necessary because we necessarily will it. What is done willingly is voluntary even if we cannot help being willing. Third, an act may be 'effectively' necessary: the opposite action is possible conditionally, if we will it, but it is not effectively possible because inevitably and infallibly we will not will it. We have some power to do so, but it is too weak in comparison with the inclination to the other side. The possibility of willing differently is merely 'metaphysical', not 'effective'.\[100\] In the second case the action is in our power but the volition is not, because we have simply no power to will the opposite; in the third case we have some power to will the opposite, but not effective power.

According to Augustine an act is voluntary and free provided it is within our power and not necessary in the first sense, i.e., provided it happens if and only if we will it.\[101\] He says that an act of the will is always free, since we will if and only if we will.\[102\] But an act of will may be necessary in the second sense, for example God's willing his own goodness or a human being's willing his own happiness.\[103\] Following St. Thomas Arnauld says that such acts are determined by natural necessity, 'natural' meaning not by the general order of the universe but specifically by the nature of the will. When an object is presented which corresponds perfectly to the nature of the will we simply have no power not to will it, but if the good presented is in some way imperfect we have power to will it or not.\[104\] In this life we do not meet with any perfectly adequate object; we necessarily will happiness, but since we cannot be completely happy with any particular action we always have power to will that action or not. In this life, therefore, we always have power of opposite choice, i.e., freedom 'of indifference', both of contrariety (i.e., to do
good or evil) and of contradiction (i.e., to do or not do this act).[105]

In his later writings Arnauld decided to restrict the term 'free' to the indifferent, so that voluntary acts determined by natural necessity are not free.[106] Thus the beatific vision is voluntary but not free, since the presentation of the most perfect good leaves no power of rejection.[107] Free choice does not presuppose that the opposite choices are equally possible, or that they are both effectively possible; a choice is free as long as it is not determined by natural necessity, i.e., as long as some (even merely metaphysical) power of opposite choice remains.[108] Choice of any of the imperfect goods we encounter in this life is therefore always free, even when the power to reject it is inevitably and infallibly overborne by desire for it.[109] Thus grace is efficacious without destroying liberty: even when the will is infallibly moved by grace or by concupiscence to choose good or evil, we always have, metaphysically, both the power to choose good and the power to choose evil.[110] Similarly the blessed inevitably but freely will whatever God wills, and Jesus on earth infallibly but freely willed whatever the Father willed.[111] What is done willingly is voluntary, and, if there is at least a metaphysical power of doing the opposite, free.

After Adam's sin human beings, unless helped by grace, are under an inevitable necessity of sinning. No particular sin is inevitable, but, in any situation of choice, if we do not commit one sin we will inevitably commit another, at least the sin of not choosing out of love of God (see below, section V). Nevertheless we are free to do or not do any particular act,[112] and we always have the power to do good if we will—but without grace we cannot will it, and the good act is not effectively possible. Similarly we always have power to do evil if we will, but under the influence of grace we cannot will it and sin is not effectively possible—grace is not constraint, however, since its first effect is willingness.[113] Thus we always have the power to sin or to do good, but in every case one or other choice is not effectively possible. The act is always free, however, since we do it because we will it, and since the opposite act is always (metaphysically) within our power, always in that sense possible, even when actually to do it needs grace and even when that grace is not given.[114] There is no necessity in the first or second senses.

Necessity in the third sense does not excuse sin. Necessity in the first sense, constraint, does excuse. Necessity in the second sense is irrelevant, since to be sinful or meritorious an act must be free,[115] and a naturally necessitated act cannot be morally evil. Arnauld usually does not distinguish this necessity from the third (just as it was late before he distinguished 'free' from 'voluntary'), and says that it does not excuse sin. He means that
there is no excuse if the necessity results from the strength of one's willingness to commit the sin, which is necessity in what he later distinguished as the third sense. If this necessity were an excuse then the greater the willingness to do the act the less would be the responsibility for it, which is absurd. Rather, as St. Thomas says, the greater the willingness the greater the sin. The arrogant man's inability to bear insult, the miser's inability to give alms, and other vices, do not excuse. In such cases, as St. Bernard says, 'the will renders it inexcusable, and the necessity incorrigible'.[116]

Arnauld seems to have felt that it is enough to justify the imputation of unavoidable sin to say that it is voluntary and that we can always choose the opposite 'if we will'. But if a naturally necessitated act deserves neither praise nor blame, then in effect necessity of the second kind excuses, and there seems to be no difference morally between a merely metaphysical power which is infallibly ineffective and no power at all. So why does necessity of the third kind not excuse? Another of Arnauld's doctrines, namely that necessity may be a penalty for sin, provides some sort of answer: what makes the difference morally is the reason for the necessity. Our willingness to sin—the necessity of sinning in the third sense of necessity—is one of the effects and penalties of Adam's sin. God could not justly have created Adam originally with a defective nature,[117] lacking effective power to attain the end appropriate to an intelligent being, namely the vision of God; so in his original state Adam must have had knowledge and effective possibility of right choice sufficient to keep the commandments, avoid sin, and attain his last end.[118] But although he had natural power and grace sufficient to avoid sin Adam did sin, and as a just punishment suffered an impairment of knowledge and will[119] which makes further justly punishable sins unavoidable.[120] Adam's fault is ours too, and we share the punishment. We cannot ourselves repair the impairment inflicted as punishment, only God can; but since the punishment is just he is not bound to do so, and when he does it is a grace. God gives grace to some but not to others;[121] the latter have no right to complain, since grace is not due to any;[122] to prefer one to another is not unjust except in distributing something to which all are entitled, and entitled equally, and to grace no one is entitled.[123] God is not bound in justice to repair, or give special help to overcome, impairments which he has justly inflicted as punishment for sin. So although God could not justly have created Adam originally with these defects, since the defects are man's fault God can now justly leave them unremedied. But the impairment of human powers as just punishment for sin does not impair God's rights. The fall was not God's fault; he can still justly command what he created Adam originally quite able to do, and he can still justly punish failure to obey.[124] Without grace failure is now unavoidable, so there are unavoidable sins
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which God may justly punish.

The argument that a willing act is voluntary, supplemented by the argument that inability to will obedience to God is a just penalty for a sin which was effectively avoidable, explains why the doctrine of sufficient grace must be rejected— that is, why it cannot be held that God must give grace to all. [125] The same reasoning also serves against philosophism. Sins of ignorance are done willingly (by will of the act, not of the sin), and ignorance is a penalty for sin. God could not justly have created Adam originally without sufficient power to know the natural law, that is, the law which a creature of Adam's nature must obey to attain the end appropriate to that nature. If we cannot now avoid ignorance, that is a punishment, and such ignorance therefore does not impair God's right to our obedience. So ignorance of natural law, even if it is now sometimes unavoidable, is never an excuse. Whether we call such ignorance invincible is a verbal question: [126] in view of the senses of 'possible' explained above, we may say that knowledge of natural law is always possible in the sense required to justify punishment, and that ignorance of natural law is therefore never invincible in the sense in which invincible ignorance excuses; or, since knowledge may not now be effectively possible without grace which may not be given, we may say that ignorance of natural law is now sometimes in another sense invincible but not an excuse. If we follow the second usage, which is closer to common ideas, we must deny that invincible ignorance always excuses, since invincible ignorance of natural law does not. Either way ignorance of natural law, even when it is now unavoidable, does not excuse sin: when effectively avoidable it is itself a sin of negligence or self-deception, and otherwise it is a just punishment for Adam's sin. [127] Perhaps inconsistently, [128] Augustine and Arnauld concede that for sins of unavoidable ignorance the burning may be milder; but it will still be eternal. [129]

Ignorance and weakness of will can be remedied only by faith and strengthening grace. God has the power and the right (though no obligation) to give these gifts to anyone in any way; he could have given knowledge and strength of right choice to the Americans before the coming of the missionaries, as proponents of sufficient grace theories think he was obliged to do. That was possible in the sense that God has the power and the right; but it was not effectively possible, because in giving grace God has chosen to follow a certain order (what God does 'ordinarily', ex lege ordinaria), a set of self-imposed rules some of which we can learn from scripture and from experience. [130] In accordance with these rules God does not give faith except to those who hear the gospel preached by human messengers; he does not give strength of right choice sufficient for salvation except to those who have received faith, and even to them he does not give grace to avoid sin altogether. Thus
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there is (ordinarily) no salvation for those who live when or where the gospel is not preached. There is no injustice in this, since faith and strengthening grace are free gifts not due in justice to anyone, and everyone could without injustice have been damned.[131]

Augustine is Arnauld's main guide in all these matters, but he appeals also to Thomas Aquinas. The references to St. Thomas may be partly ad hominem, since the Jesuits were sworn to follow St. Thomas,[132] but Arnauld's respect seems genuine. He wrote several detailed studies of St. Thomas apparently to sort out his own thoughts and not for publication,[133] and his writings for publication include some extended analyses.[134] Some have read St. Thomas as moving toward a liberal position on freedom of conscience but unfortunately not always drawing the conclusions which his principles imply.[135] But Arnauld's Augustinian reading may be historically correct. When St. Thomas says that ignorance excuses unless knowledge is possible he may well mean 'possible with grace' or 'possible but for original sin' (which is what Arnauld's account of possibility in the sense relevant to blame amounts to).[136] Whether anyone can be invincibly ignorant of natural law will then be not an empirical question[137] but a theological one, and St. Thomas's negative answer may be exactly what he means. From that it will follow, as he says,[138] that those who are mistaken about morality cannot avoid sin: they must sin either by disobeying conscience, or by violating the moral law--for which obedience to erroneous conscience is no excuse.[139]

As a justification for punishing sins of ignorance and weakness Arnauld's theory is in my judgment unsuccessful. Questions of justice at least as acute as those it was meant to answer arise again from several of its premises, namely that Adam's sin is also the sin of each of his descendants,[140] that sin can rightly be punished by impairment of the knowledge and will needed to act rightly,[141] and that sins resulting from this punishment can deserve more punishment. What must we think of a father who punishes one child for another's fault[142] by leaving him ignorant of what he ought to do, and then punishes him again for not doing it: but accepts the sufferings of another innocent person (namely, himself!) as a reason for forgiving some of his children, but not others no more guilty? God has good reasons incomprehensible to us, Arnauld says[143]: he might as well have said so at the beginning and left it at that.[144]

V THE SIN OF NOT LOVING GOD

It is not mere coincidence that the two heresies, philosophism and the heresy about love of God,[145] were attacked by Arnauld and condemned by Rome together, since they
are logically connected. According to Arnauld the commandment to love God as worthy of love above all things is the first commandment of natural law, and as we saw in the last section even invincible ignorance of natural law is no excuse. Therefore if we violate this commandment because we do not know God or do not think of him the sin is not thereby excused. It might be objected that ignorance of fact does excuse, and that God's existence is not integral to natural law but a fact external to it. But it is not external to the law, because the first commandment of natural law refers to God. Anyone who does not know or think of God must violate this commandment in every act because it requires that each action be done consciously and explicitly out of love of God. Forgetfulness of God is itself the sin. Thus anyone who satisfied the conditions for committing a merely philosophic sin would also in the same act commit the sin of not loving God, without excuse. Since this sin is theological no act can be a merely philosophic sin.

Why must each act be done out of a love of God which is conscious and explicit? God is somehow the last end of every creature, including sticks and stones, but rational creatures seek God in the way appropriate to their nature, by conscious and voluntary action. Some voluntary actions are not free, are therefore not subject to moral evaluation, and do not come under the commandments of the natural law. What the first commandment requires of us is conscious and free voluntary action. There is a sense in which every free choice of every human being, even the wicked who hate God, is a seeking of God above all things, because it is a seeking of happiness, which is to be found, whether we know it or not, only in God. But this is not enough to satisfy the commandment, because the desire for happiness is not free but necessary (even when the particular act it motivates is free), and because it is consistent with wickedness, even with explicit hatred of God. Those who make themselves--their existence, pleasure, power, etc.--or some other created good their last end do not act formally for love of God, even though the happiness they seek can be found only in God. The good and the wicked are distinguished in part by what they identify as the object they seek. To satisfy the first commandment, therefore, one must consciously and by free choice make God the end of every action.

Certain writers concerned to present the good life as something feasible had suggested various less-demanding interpretations of the commandment, what might be called 'constructive love' theories, amounting to this, that to obey this commandment it is enough to keep the other commandments. They said, for example, that it is enough to have 'effective' as distinct from 'affective' love, doing what one who felt affection would do but not necessarily feeling the affection. Arnauld replies that this makes the commandment figurative, to act as if one loved God: he in-
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sists that love must be taken in its proper sense, as itself the motive of actions, an orientation of will of which feeling is a natural manifestation (though feeling may run pretty dry at times).[153] Or they said that it is enough to love God 'habitually'. Arnauld replies that 'habitual' love would be consistent with total inactivity, a life spent asleep; the commandments require acts, not habits.[154] Or they said that it is enough to love God 'implicitly' or 'interpretatively' or 'constructively', by doing acts which could fittingly be done out of love of God, i.e., acts which violate no (other) commandment of natural law. But it is not 'implicit' love to do what could have been done for love but is not. Arnauld introduces another term, 'virtual' love. He concedes what gives these less exacting theories their plausibility, that it is not possible to be all the time conscious of God, since in carrying out some tasks—even those done out of love of God—one's attention must become absorbed in the task; it is enough if the act has been begun explicitly for love of God, which will then be its 'virtual' motive even when one's attention is absorbed. A doctor, for example, is still acting for the patient's health if that was the purpose with which the treatment began, though he cannot keep thinking of the purpose. So what this commandment requires, according to Arnauld, is that we begin each act out of conscious love of God, although as the act goes on the consciousness may cease.[155] To me this seems too exacting. A doctor can be said to be aiming at the patient's health even if he does not think of that purpose at the beginning of each treatment, or at first meeting each patient, or at the beginning of each day, though he must think of it explicitly sometimes.

But whether the first commandment requires the explicit reference to God of every act or only some, in either case most pagans cannot fulfil it, since they do not know God and therefore cannot act explicitly for love of God even sometimes.[156] They have gods, and they desire happiness, and it may be true that behind these is the true God; but to act out of love of a pagan god or for happiness is not formally to love God.[157] By natural reason some pagan philosophers did know something of the true God,[158] but knowledge is not enough; to act out of love of God one must be made willing by grace (as we saw in the last section), and grace was not given to even the best of the pagan philosophers.[159] In giving grace God follows a certain order, and the first manifestation of grace is humility.[160] We can be sure that the philosophers did not receive grace to love God above all things because they lacked humility and believed they were self-sufficient; their knowledge led to pride and made them worse.[161] Seneca examines his conscience every night and presumptuously forgives himself;[162] Cicero says that while wealth, honours, health and other goods of fortune are gifts of God, virtue and goodness are our own achievement.[163] While affecting to despise human opinion each of them acted to his own applause.[164] Their apparent
virtues were effects of pride and were really vices.[165]
To the question 'Can a philosopher who has never heard of Jesus Christ, do with the help of grace a genuinely good act?' the answer is that he could if grace were given but since it never is he cannot.[166]

It follows that every act of a mere philosopher or other pagan is a sin[167]--and a theological sin, since no sin, especially one against the commandment to love God, can be merely philosophic. Arnauld makes a distinction between acts good secundum officium, which satisfy all the other commandments of natural law, and those good also secundum finem, which also satisfy this first commandment. This corresponds to the familiar distinction between doing the right thing and doing it for the right reason;[168] the first commandment prescribes the right reason, love of God above all things. To be simply good an act must be good not only secundum officium but also secundum finem, whereas a defect in either respect is enough to make the act bad and a sin: bonum ex integra causa, malum ex quocumque defectu.[169] If an act comes under several commandments (and every individual act comes under the first, at least[170]) it must satisfy them all. Every act, even the most wicked, is in some way good; what makes an act bad is that it does not have all the goodness that it ought to have,[171] and lack of some morally necessary goodness is the kind of badness we call sin.[172] Even the best and most apparently virtuous of the acts of the pagan philosophers were therefore sins because they lacked the morally necessary motive, love of God. Failure to refer an otherwise good act to God is a venial sin[173] which the philosophers committed in even their best acts. They were not damned for these venial sins but for other grave sins they were not given grace to avoid.[174]

Arnauld argues that anyone who fails to act out of love of God above all things must make some creature (usually himself) his end: everyone must have a last end, and if not God then a creature; so sin against the first commandment substitutes for our true end something unfit to be a last end.[175] Conversely anyone who sins seriously against any of the other commandments sins also against the first, by turning away from God toward some creature.[176] These points suggest another conception of sin, as being not a violation of law so much as a turning from one goal to another. There are hints that the second conception underlies the first, that the laws are directions for arriving at the goal, so that the first commandment gives point to the others.[177]

Arnauld is in my opinion too hard on philosophers and pagans. It is not true that since everyone must have some last end those who do not know the true God must make some creature their end. We need not definitely make any one thing our last end; we can try to keep our lives open to a
range of possibilities. Arnauld acknowledges that it is not sinful to make a created good the proximate end of an action: the sin is to rest there as if in the last end. Now it is possible to take a step without meaning to rest there, not being sure where it will lead but believing that it is worth taking whatever the goal turns out to be; many things are worth doing on any of the likely views of the meaning of life. Can we not say that acts chosen with a view to a range of possible ends are good secundum finem? Arnauld would answer, perhaps, that not to know what the last end is, or whether there is one, is the ignorance which is a punishment for sin and no excuse; but this is the theory rejected above at the end of Section IV. As for the pride and self-sufficiency of the philosophers, the passages quoted from Cicero and Seneca are not enough to prove that every philosopher must lack humility, or even that they did. Some philosophers, such as Kant, have acknowledged that for living well supernatural help may be needed, and might without inconsistency have prayed for it, at least hypothetically. For Arnauld to claim to know the laws of order God sets himself well enough to infer that the philosophers cannot have received any grace because they seem to him to lack humility is itself presumptuous.

Arnauld's ethical theory and the theories he attacks are mirror images at opposite extremes. The theories he attacks make contempt essential to committing sin, and will not allow that contempt can be 'constructive'--the sinner must be explicitly conscious of the relation of the act to God. His own theory makes love of God essential to avoiding sin, and will not allow that love can be 'constructive'--one must explicitly refer to the act to God, at least at its beginning. Kant's ethical theory, a century later, in some ways like the Jesuits, is on this point like Arnauld's, with respect for the moral law in place of love of God. A middle position worth considering is this: perhaps, as Arnauld held, to deserve blame it is enough to do an act which is in fact wrong, without actual or habitual knowledge of its wrongness; and perhaps, as the 'constructive love' theorists held, an act has moral value simply because it is chosen as the kind of act it is, even if it is done without explicit reference to a determinate last end. Perhaps a man or woman is good or bad because of the kinds of actions he or she is disposed to choose even apart from any explicit theory of the meaning of life.

According to Arnauld, then, sincerity is not enough. It is necessary also to be right about moral principles and to know and love the true God. It is not enough to follow conscience: if our conscience is mistaken not only is the act wrong objectively, it may also deserve blame and punishment. Ignorance of God and his law is no excuse because it is always due to sin, one's own or Adam's. Merely philosophic sin is therefore impossible: one who sins in ignorance of God and his law still offends God, and if the violation
is serious deserves eternal punishment. This moral theory is not original; Arnauld got it almost wholly from Jansen, who got it mostly from Augustine. Arnauld's polemic against philosophic sin is philosophically interesting because of the questions it raises about the relevance of the agent's intention and other thoughts to the moral value of the act, and it is historically interesting as a strong reassertion of Augustinianism at a late date, just as the religious idea of sin was giving place to the idea of ethical wrongdoing. Arnauld and Bayle were already an age apart, although they wrote at almost the same time. [183] Today we are, most of us, merely philosophic sinners; like Seneca we forgive ourselves each day our daily trespasses and go on, without fear of an eternal burning, even a mild one. We must hope Arnauld was wrong.

FOOTNOTES

*I am grateful to Conal Condren, John Gascoigne, and other members of the Sydney History of Ideas Group, to whom I read an earlier version of this paper.


2. Bayle, Commentaire, 428. Benjamin Hoadly wrote, 'the favour of God . . . equally follows every equal degree of sincerity'; William Law replied, 'then . . . he that burns the Christian, if he be but in earnest, has the same title to a reward for it, as he that is burned for believing in Christ'; both quoted by N. Sykes, 'Benjamin Hoadly', in F.J.C. Hearnshaw (ed.), The Social and Political Ideas of some English Thinkers of the Augustan Age (London, 1978), 142, 147.

3. Bayle refers to the courses in scholastic philosophy, Commentaire, 524, 536. For a short time Bayle studied philosophy in the Jesuit college at Toulouse.

4. For biography see P. Bayle, Dictionnaire historique et critique, art. 'Arnauld', and 'Arnauld, Antoine, docteur de Sorbonne' (Paris, 1820, Vol. 2, 389ff and 400ff); also the article by J. Carreyre, in Dictionnaire d'histoire et de geographie ecclésiastique (ed. A. Baudrillart et al., Paris, 1930), Vol. 4, cols. 447-84.


6. H. Denzinger, Enchiridion Symbolorum (35th edn., Fribourg, 1973), 479, no. 2291. The editor, Fr. A. Schönmetzer, S.J., notes that the Jesuit whose thesis occasioned the condemnation did not mean it in
the sense into which his Jansenist accusers twisted it, and refers the reader to H. Beylard S.J., 'Le péché philosophique: quelques précisions historiques et doctrinales', Nouvelle revue theologique 62 (1935), 591-616, 673-98. Fr. Beylard repeats what the Jesuits claimed they had meant after Arnauld attacked them, without reference to what Arnauld then said to justify his interpretation (see below, Section III).


8. Denzinger, Enchiridion, 480, no. 2302. Arnauld did not own this proposition in the condemned sense; see below, note 126.--Some who have read this paper have found it hard to sympathise with Arnauld and the Jesuits in their passionate concern to classify sins and to calculate culpability. Their motives seem to me make good sense. The Jesuits wanted to show that God treats human beings fairly; also, they wanted not to have to refuse absolution or impose difficult conditions, especially since some of their penitents were kings and nobles whose exclusion from the sacraments must be a very public event with possibly harmful effects on the cause of religion. The Jansenists accused them of imposing human ideas of fairness on God, of allowing unworthy people to receive communion and of general subservience to the values of the world (see A.W. Baird, Studies in Pascal's Ethics (The Hague, 1975), chapter 4). Motives became mixed, of course: the Jesuits enjoyed their influence, the Jansenists enjoyed fighting it. For a sympathetic account of both sides see W.E. Rex, Pascal's Provincial Letters: an Introduction (New York, 1977), 11-23.

9. Denzinger, Enchiridion, 479, no. 2290; and Commandment (for references to Arnauld's works see note 11 below).

10. Denzinger, Enchiridion, 481, no. 2308.

11. References to Arnauld's Œuvres will be given by the short titles listed below. In this list the date is the date of publication unless it is enclosed in brackets, and then it is the date of composition of a writing not published in Arnauld's lifetime--for dates I rely on the editors of the Œuvres; a short title is given in brackets, and the volume of the Œuvres in which it will be found: 'De la nécessité de la foi en Jesus Christ', (1641), (Necessity), Vol. 10; 'Dissertation théologique sur le commandement d'aimer Dieu', (1641, printed 1657 as a note to the Latin edition of Pascal, Provinciales--the extant French text is a retranslation by another person), (Dissertation), Vol. 29; 'Second apologie pour Jansénius', 1645, (Jansen), Vol. 17; 'Apologie pour les saints Pères, defenseurs de la grace', 1650, (Apology), Vol. 18; 'Nouvelle hérésie dans la morale', 1689, (Denunciation 1), Vol. 31; 'De la liberté de l'homme', (1689), (Liberty), Vol. 10; 'Second/Troisième... Cinquième denonciation du péché philosophique', 1690, (Denunciations 2-5), Vol. 31; 'Hérésie impie contre le commandement d'aimer Dieu', 1690, (Commandment), Vol. 31; 'Écrit sur les actions des infideles', (1691), (Infidels), Vol. 10; 'Disquisitio utrum, juxta Sanctum Thomam in sua Summa, amor beatificus sit liber ea libertate quam theologi vocant a necessitate', (1691), (Disquisition), Vol. 10; 'Difficultés proposées a M. Steyaert', 1691-2, (Difficulties), Vol. 9; 'Premier/Second écrit sur
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12. Arnauld's clearest brief account of the theory is in a letter to M. Pelisson, Œuvres, Vol. 3, 367-70. Arnauld began by attacking a thesis presented in the Jesuit college of Dijon in 1686; as the controversy went on he collected more material until in the end he had extracts from some twenty-five writers going back to 1660. (For earlier material see Ceyssens, 'Autour du péché philosophique', 390.) The term 'philosophic sin' seems to have been used first in 1670 (see Denunciation 1, 49). Extracts from Jesuit writers directly relating to philosophic sin will be found in his Denunciations, 3-4, 40-1, 48-53, 78, 307, 367-85, (all written before the controversy broke out), and 5-6, 301-2 (written during the controversy, and perhaps a modification to avoid the attack). Note that the exposition of 14-17 (quoted again 70-9), although it is put into the mouth of a Jesuit, is Arnauld's own, based (he claims) on notes dictated by the professor of Dijon; see 239-41. (In its first occurrence this exposition is not in quotation marks, in its second it is because it is a quotation of the first.) A Jesuit spokesman claimed that the Dijon professor's notes show that he taught the opposite of what Arnauld attributed to him (Beylard, 'Le Péché philosophique', 675-6). Neither side ever published these notes.

13. Another Jesuit, Fr. Duffy, recognising only one kind of malice, namely violation of the law of God, classes all sins which are not theological as material. Arnauld notes this as another heresy deriving from the same principle, that sin requires knowledge of the malice of the act; Denunciation 2, 152-7.

14. 'Infinitely worthy of' and 'worthy of infinite' punishment may not be equivalents. On arguments to show that sin deserves eternal punishment see Marilyn McCord Adams, 'Hell and the God of Justice', Religious Studies 11 (1975), 433-47. See also Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae (hereafter Summa), 1-2 q87 arts. 3-5. Arnauld agrees with the Jesuits that sin deserves eternal punishment only because it is against God, who is infinitely good, but denies that to be 'against' God the sin must be committed with knowledge of God, so as to express or imply contempt for infinite goodness; see Denunciation 2, 81(15-20). (Numbers in brackets are line numbers.) Compare note 34 below.

15. 'For a legislator to be personally and formally offended by
one who breaks his law, the latter must have some knowledge of this legislator'; Jesuit thesis quoted Denunciation 5, 318.

16. '... an offence against a person of infinite dignity known as such (cognitae qua talis); '... against God under the description (sub ratione) of highest and infinite good'; Denunciation 2, 49-51.

17. 'For since a human action is never a sin when one does not know that it is a sin, it is necessary also that a human action is not an offense against God when one does not know that it is an offense against God'; 'a sin committed by someone invincibly ignorant of, or not adverting to, the fact that God exists, or that he is offended by sin, is not mortal'; Jesuit writers quoted Denunciation 1, 16, Denunciation 2, 78, and Denunciation 5, 382.


19. Pascal, Provinciales, 116. The point of the satire is that scholastics held that to choose evil as evil is impossible; see St. Thomas, Summa, 1-2 q8 a1.


22. Arnauld uses the term 'sufficient grace' sometimes for the grace that God is said to give all mankind, sometimes for the doctrine that he gives it. Similarly he uses 'philosophic sin' sometimes for the sin which is said to be merely philosophic, sometimes for the doctrine that such sins are possible; in the last Denunciation (298) he introduced the term 'philosophism' for the doctrine.

23. Denunciation 1, 6-9.

24. Denunciation 4, 250-6. The claim that the two doctrines are logically incompatible is in the words of another writer quoted with approval, 252 (23-5).

25. In some of his earlier writing against sufficient grace Arnauld did not take the distinction between formal and material sin seriously enough. For example, against Fr. Lemoine's theory that no one sins without an inspiration of grace to pray for strength to resist the temptation, Arnauld argued at length that it is absurd to suppose that atheists, Epicureans, etc. think of praying whenever they sin--did Caligula think of praying whenever he gave way to his passions? (see Apology, Bk. 8, esp. 918-20). Lemoine's point may rather have been that if they do not think of praying then they do not really and formally (i.e., damnably) sin.


28. Denunciation 1, 10-11. See Aristotle, NE, VII.8. Aristotle says that the weak are more curable, and that they are better because the first principle (reason) is preserved. But that they are more curable and for that reason better need not imply, as Arnauld assumes, that their acts are less worthy of blame.

29. ’Those who sin through ignorance do their action only because they will it, though they sin without willing to sin. Thus a sin even of ignorance can be committed only by the will of the sinner, though by a will of the act and not of the sin (voluntate facti, non peccati). All the same, it is a sin, because for that it is enough to do what one is obliged not to do’; Denunciation 1, 11, a free translation of Augustine, Retractations, I.15 (Migne, Patrologia Latina (hereafter PL), vol. 32, col. 609. Compare Thomas Aquinas, Summa, 1-2 q76 al ad 3, quoted Excuse, 668-9.

30. ’Ecrit des Jésuites’, appended to Denunciation 2, 163. ’If the turning toward a created and temporal good could be without a turning away from God, this turning would be disordered but not a mortal sin’; Thomas Aquinas, Summa, 2-2 q20 a3. See also Denunciation 2, 73 (11-13). On Augustine on sin as ‘turning’ see J. Burnaby, Amor Dei (London, 1938), 184-6.

31. Denunciation 2, 73. Arnauld refers to the following as places where St. Thomas says that in serious sin the two turnings go together: Summa, 1-2 q72 a5, q73 a3 ad 2 and q77 a6 ad 1; 2-2 q10 a3 and q39 al ad 1; 3 q86 a4. In venial sin there is a turning towards creatures without a turning away from God; Denunciation 2, 81(40). See Thomas Aquinas, Summa, 1-2 q72 a5. Arnauld assumes that the seriousness of a sin depends on the objective importance of the law broken and not on the frame of mind in which it is broken, which begs the question: perhaps a sin is serious precisely when it is done with the thought of God that makes it theological.

32. Denunciation 2, 82; cf. 106, and Denunciation 5, 346-7. Arnauld quotes St. Thomas: ‘The seriousness of a sin is from the turning away, which follows from the turning toward per accidens, that is apart from the intention of the sinner’; Summa, 1-2 q77 a6 ad 1 (and see J.M. Boyle, 'Praeter intentionem in Aquinas', The Thomist 42 (1978), 649-665). St. Thomas’s words are not to the point: if someone takes something because he wants to use it, knowing that it belongs to someone else who will be offended, what he intends is not the offense but the use; yet his knowing who it belongs to may well be what causes the offense. That the offense may be apart from the sinner’s intention therefore does not imply that it does not require the sort of awareness the Jesuits said was required for theological sin.

33. See text to note 20 above.
34. Denunciation 2, 82(19-21), 83(4-6).

35. Denunciation 2, 17-21. I will quote only what seem to me the most relevant words; Arnauld quotes more extensively and adds comments. For parallels see Pascal, Provinciales, 6ff.

36. Denunciation 1, 21-4.

37. Denunciation 1, 24-6.

38. Denunciation 1, 29-32. Arnauld later supplied a real-life example, Denunciation 5, 309-15.

39. According to one Jesuit, God detests philosophic sin as something bad in itself, though not as something against himself; Denunciation 5, 381(29-32).

40. In saying that fornicators and the like will not possess the kingdom of heaven (1 Cor 6:9), 'the Apostle assumes that those who commit such crimes know that God has forbidden them; and in fact the Corinthians to whom he speaks know it well'; Jesuit writer quoted Denunciation 5, 376; cf. 372(3-9).

41. 'The fire prepared for the wicked is an everlasting fire; but it cannot be thence inferred that he who shall be cast into that fire . . . shall endure. . . so as to be eternally burnt'; Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. C.B. Macpherson (Harmondsworth, 1968), 490; cf. 646-9. According to one Jesuit writer, philosophic sinners may go to eternal punishment, 'but very likely they will not suffer the fire of the eternal flames for ever'; Denunciation 2, 80 ('eternal flames' reads 'infernal flames' on 167). Arnauld comments that if the scripture text can be interpreted thus for philosophic sinners so it can for all sinners, which is to revive the ideas of Origen; Denunciation 2, 85(12-8), 95(31). Augustine had rejected Origen's hypothesis, De Civitate Dei, XXI. 23. On the revival of Origen's ideas see David P. Walker, 'Origene en France', in Courants religieux et humanisme (Paris, 1959), and The Decline of Hell (Chicago, 1964). The philosophic sin controversy falls between the periods covered by Walker's two studies.

42. 'The man who has done something owing to ignorance, and feels not the least vexation at his action, has not acted voluntarily, since he did not know what he was doing, nor yet involuntarily, since he is not pained. Of people, then, who act by reason of ignorance, he who regrets is thought an involuntary agent'; Aristotle, NE, III.1 (tr. W.D. Ross).


44. Aristotle, NE, III.5.

45. 'For a short time' is the translation provided by the Jesuit author for the original tantisper. But as Ceyssens points out ('Autour du peche philosophique', 392), tantisper is not paulisper. The original
is obscure; it may mean that ignorance is inculpable as long as only ordinary graces are given.

46. For points (1)-(4) see, 'Ecrit des Jésuites' appended to Denunciation 2, 160ff, esp. 167-8.

47. Denunciation 3, 208, 232; and Denunciation 4, 267.

48. Denunciation 5, 301.

49. Denunciation 2, 76(23)-77(14), 81(1-6), 85(1-7).

50. Denunciation 2, 89-97.


52. Denunciation 2, 99(26)-100(28). See below, text at note 149.

53. Denunciation 2, 112(30).

54. Denunciation 2, 106-111.

55. Denunciation 2, 114(3-6).

56. Denunciation 2, 125-30, 139(32)-140(7), 146(1-14). See also Infidels, passim.

57. Denunciation 2, 130(31)-131(21), 133(12-35).


59. Denunciation 2, 87-9, 143.

60. Denunciation 2, 101-3.

61. Denunciation 2, 105 (21-28).

62. Denunciation 3, 234(16-21); Denunciation 4, 268(2-11). On the definition of the heresy and its principle see Denunciation 4, 250-6, and Denunciation 5, 349-55.

63. Denunciation 2, 159(13-23).

64. Denunciation 4, 273(34)-274(7); cf. Arnauld's letter to Pelisson, Oeuvres, vol. 3, 367-70. Beylard ('Le péché philosophique', 689-93) refers to various Jesuit writers who argued that there are two kinds of malice, against morality and against God. Arnauld did not dispute this.

65. Denunciation 4, 272(19-24); Denunciation 5, 331(1-13).


67. Denunciation 4, 276(37-40), 296(4-5); cf. Denunciation 2,
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153-4, and Denunciation 5, 314-313 (recte-315).

68. Denunciation 5, 379 (but possible in what sense?); cf. 380(31-5), 381(11-20), 368(19-33), 372(20-6).

69. Denunciation 2, 302.

70. By itself this would not show that they hold it, since people do not hold all that what they hold implies. But to show that philosophy is connected logically with other parts of their ethical system may help to confirm Arnauld's interpretation of what they say explicitly about it.

71. Denunciation 4, 278-96. Arnauld gives a similar analysis of the remarks on ignorance of the Jesuits of Paris and of Anvers; see Denunciation 4, 269-72, and Denunciation 5, 316-7, 323.


73. Denunciation 4, 283-4.

74. Denunciation 4, 290-91. This means, as Arnauld points out (293), that someone ignorant through negligence that murder is wrong who commits six thousand murders will be blamed and punished not as a murderer but only as one who neglected to inform himself of his duties. He would have been liable to the same blame and punishment even if he had not actually committed any murder. The Jesuit General in 1690, Fr. Gonzalez, criticised Terrill and others who explain sins of ignorance as if the whole sin were in the negligence; the resulting sin is imputed, he says, because the negligence was culpable, but what is imputed is that sin and not merely the negligence; see Ceyssens, 'Autour du péché philosophique', 409-10, 25. Bayle held that if someone sins in culpable ignorance he deserves punishment for the sin which caused the ignorance, but not for the sin which results from it; Commentaire 508 (ch. 3). According to Thomas Aquinas there are in such cases two punishable sins, but the punishment for the resulting sin may be greatly reduced because it is done in ignorance, even though the ignorance is culpable; see Summa, 1-2 q76 a4 ad 2. See also St. Bonaventure, In 2 Sent., d22 a2 q3 ad 5; and Jeremy Taylor, Ductor Dubitantium, in his Works (London, 1851), vol. 9, 137-9.

75. Denunciation 4, 269(31); Denunciation 5, 323-4. Arnauld argues that inadvertence is not a species of ignorance in Ignorance, 646. If it is regarded as a species of ignorance, culpable only if one thinks of overcoming it but neglects to do so, then inadvertence can never be culpable, since to think of adverting to something is to advert to it; Denunciation 5, 324.


77. Denunciation 5, 357-65.

78. See Beylard, 'Le péché philosophique', 694 and 696-7, and De- man, 'Peche', col. 270-1. Arnauld had already argued against the claim that no-one can for long be ignorant of God without personal fault; see
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above, text at notes 52-7. In any case Arnauld would say that the reason why no sin can be merely philosophic is not that ignorance of God not due to personal fault does not happen, but that it does not excuse; see below, text at note 127.


80. Denunciation 1, 7. On the discrepancy between human ideas of justice and God's see also Ignorance, 652(3-5), 653(16ff), 657(6-7); and Cornelius Jansen, Augustinus (Louvain, 1640, reprinted Frankfurt, 1964, 3 volumes bound as one), vol. 2, col. 299.

81. References to Augustinus are (unless otherwise noted) to vol. 2, by column and letter; the letters run down the middle of each page. For a survey of the contents of Augustinus see N. Abercrombie, The Origins of Jansenism (Oxford, 1936), 126-153. Or the topic of section IV see Malcolm E. Alflatt, 'The Responsibility for Involuntary Sin in St. Augustine', Recherches augustiniennes 10 (1975), 171-86.

82. Augustinus, 287B; 'Scholastic' in seventeenth century writers did not always mean medieval; it was sometimes used to refer to contemporary university or college teachers.

83. Augustinus, 311B.

84. Augustinus, 306B, 310B. For this the Jansenists could claim the authority of canon law, Decretum, II c1 q4 c12 (Corpus juris Canonici, ed. A. Richter and A. Friedberg (Graz, 1959), vol. 1, col. 422); see Arnauld, Denunciations, 39, 257.

85. Augustinus, 310A (Ch. 6), 312A.

86. Augustinus, 312B; cf. Jansen, 279-80. Such ignorance is not a sin, but it is 'not without sin', namely the sin which causes it; Augustinus, 279(29), Denunciation 1, 34(7-8, and a letter in Oeuvres, vol. 3, 308(28).

87. Augustinus, Ch. 3 and 4, 291ff. Arnauld points out that a passage in which St. Thomas might seem to say that invincible ignorance always excuses sin, namely Summa 1-2 q76 a2, is really about another question, whether ignorance is itself a sin. The passage is therefore consistent with Jansen's position. See Excuse, 669(30-7).


89. Augustinus, 292B (Ch. 3), 297BC, 299A-301A.

90. Augustinus, 301BC.

91. Auguste, Contra Faustum, xxii. 27 (PL, vol. 42, col. 413). Jansen does not argue from this definition, but something like it is a
presupposition of his theory.

92. See above, note 29.

93. But not sufficient, as we will see in section V. It is necessary also to choose out of love of God.

94. 'Ignorance, therefore, and weakness are the vices which impede the will from doing good or abstaining from evil'; Augustine, De Peccatorum Meritis, II.xvii. 26; quoted Augustinus, 294BC, and Jansen, 283. Augustine often mentions the same two causes (or passion or concupiscence as the second); see e.g., Enchiridion, xxii.81.

95. In certain works written before the Pelagian controversy Augustine made--or seemed to make--avoidability essential to sin. For example, in one place he defined sin as 'the will to keep or seek what justice forbids, from which one is free to abstain', inferred that if someone has no power to abstain we cannot consider the sin his, and remarked that it is the height of injustice to hold anyone guilty for not doing what he could not do; De Duabus Animabus, xi.15 and xii.17 (PL, vol.42, col.105, 107). Elsewhere he wrote, 'Sin is so voluntary an evil that it cannot be sin if it is not voluntary'; De Vera Religione, xiv.27. Later he explained that these remarks 'refer only to the sin which is not a penalty for sin. . . Original sin in infants is not improperly called voluntary because it is inherited from man's first evil will'; Retractions, I.13, and compare I.15 (PL, vol.32, col.603-4, 610). See Augustinus, 300AB, 302BC.

96. Arnauld, Denunciation 1, 7(19-27), 9(1)-10(4); and Apology, 584(18-20).

97. Jansen, 234(17-23); Apology, 583(22-3).


99. Jansen, 238-49; Denunciation 2, 123 (based on Apology, 582). Arnauld quotes or refers to the following passages of St. Augustine: De Civitate Dei, V.10; Enchiridion, xxviii.105; De Natura et Gratia, xlv.54. He refers also to Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles, III.138; De Potentia Dei, q10 a2 ad 5; De Veritate q22 a5 ad 1, ad 3 and ad 4; De Veritate, q23 a4 c and ad ult.; De Veritate, q24 al ad 20; Summa 1 q82 a1 ad 1. He quotes many texts from other medieval authors, Jansen, 244-9. For the distinction between necessities in Luther and Calvin see F. Wendel, Calvin (London, 1972), 190-1. See also Descartes, Philosophical Works, tr. Haldane and Ross (New York, 1955), vol. 1, 175. Arnauld and his sources do not generally distinguish the second kind of necessity from the third. For the three-fold distinction see Disquisition, 635(1-17).

100. Jansen, 181-4. In Arnauld's French the distinction is made with the term 'effectivement', or with the contrast between 'il peut' and 'il peut arriver'; in Jansen's Latin, which Arnauld quotes, the contrast is between 'posse facere' and 'posse fieri'. For similar distinc-
101. According to Augustine a thing is in our power if we do it if we will. On this point Arnauld refers (Apology, 584 and elsewhere) to De Spiritu et Littera xxxi.53; De Civitate Dei, V.10; De Libero Arbitrio, III.iii.7-8; and Retractations, I.22 and II.1 (PL, vol. 32, col. 620, 630). For Aristotle on 'in our power' (eφ' hēmin) see EN 1113 b2-1115 a3; the concept was much discussed in antiquity. For a definition of liberty like Augustine's see Hobbes, Leviathan, 262. For more modern analogues and criticism see C.A. Campbell, "Is "Freewill" a Pseudo-Problem?", reprinted in B. Berofsky (ed.), Free Will and Determinism (New York, 1966), 122ff.

102. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, V.10. He means, I assume, not that there must always be two separate acts of will--so that one cannot will without first willing to do so, which would generate an infinite regress--but that an act of will necessarily satisfies the definition of something in one's power as something that happens if and only if one wills and not whether one wills or not. See Augustinus, vol. 3, 622AB. The argument is an equivocation: the definition is of something that happens if and only if one wills it, and the 'it' cannot simply be disregarded.

103. 'We dare not say that because he cannot will to sin God's justice is due not to will but to necessity', i.e., in the first sense; Augustine, Enchiridion, xxviii.105, quoted Jansen, 238-9; cf. De Natura et Gratia, xlvi.54. Indifference cannot be of the essence of freedom, or God and the blessed would not be free; Jansen, 242-3. For a similar argument from Stoic sources see the quotation from Alexander of Aphrodisias in A.A. Long, 'Freedom and Determinism in the Stoic Theory of Human Action', in Problems in Stoicism, ed. A.A. Long (London, 1971), 183.

104. Liberty, 615(37)-616(2), 619(40)-620(4).

105. Jansen, 181-2, 241-3. Notice that we have freedom of indifference even under the influence of grace; Jansen, 182(1-2); this will be explained shortly. On the two sorts of indifference see Jansen, 181(20-4), 260(3-8), 242(24-5). Jansen refuses to define freedom as implying indifference (note 103 above), but this does not imply that he does not think that human beings in this life have that sort of human freedom.

106. Liberty, 619(22)-620. He says that this is the usage of Thomas Aquinas; see Disquisition, 635(24-33). But Thomas Aquinas sometimes follows Augustine's usage (perhaps in earlier writings, or when he is commenting on Augustine's words), e.g., in the texts quoted Jansen, 240 (e.g., De Potentia, q10 a2 ad 5), and in Summa 1 q82 a1 ad 1 (see Love, 684(29-31)). To define free choice Arnauld gives what seems to be a new turn to Augustine's phrase that the will wills because it wills (see above at note 102), as if it meant that there is free choice if there is or can be two acts of will, one causing or inhibiting the other. The act is free because one wills to will it, or does not will not to will it. Because of the latter possibility there is no vicious regress.)
107. Liberty, 617(28)-618(16). Disquisition is a collection of texts from St. Thomas's Summa supporting this thesis. See for example q82 a1, 1 q5 a4, 1-2 q 10 a2, 1-2 q13 a6. For Arnauld's summary in geometrical form of St. Thomas's arguments see Disquisition, 638-9. Duns Scotus had rejected St. Thomas's position on this matter, but Arnauld does not seem to be aware of any controversy.

108. Liberty, 615(37)-617(5) ('the power of the will is not entirely exhausted, so to speak'), 617(38)-618(9). Contrast the position ascribed to the Jesuits, that freedom requires equal power for either choice; Denunciation 1, p. 7(33-5).

109. Arnauld sometimes uses the word 'determine' for necessity of the third kind. See for example Jansen, 182(18), 184(20), and Liberty, 615(19).

110. Jansen, 182-4. For an analysis of Arnauld's attempt to reconcile efficacious grace with freedom and a discussion of its consistency with the rest of Arnauld's philosophy, see Thomas M. Lennon, 'Jansenism and the Crise pyrrhonienne', Journal of the History of Ideas 38 (1977), 297-306, esp. 305-6, and 'La logique Janséniste de la liberté', Revue d'histoire et de philosophie religieuse 59 (1979), 37-44. See the latter article on the distinction between 'in sensu composito' and 'in sensu divisio'. Compare Augustinus, vol. 3, 825A-27B, 870D-71B, 872CD; the direct or indirect source of Jansen's ideas may be Duns Scotus, Opus Oxoniense, I d39 nn16, 17, 20, in Joannis Duns Scoti Opera Omnia (Rome, 1963), vol. 6, 417-25. The distinction between the two senses seems to come to this: to say that both choices are possible does not mean that they can both be made at once; but although the opposite acts cannot coexist, the opposite powers can coexist, and each power can coexist with the opposite act. If Socrates has both the power to sit and the power to stand but cannot do both at once, then if he sits he cannot at the same moment stand; but not because he has lost the power. This does not help Arnauld's argument much. His thesis is not merely that Socrates cannot do both things at once, but that morally speaking he is too weak to stand by himself at all.

111. Liberty, 618(17-27).

112. Jansen, 259-60.

113. Jansen, 233(17).

114. Apology, 585(23)-586, in which Arnauld quotes Bellarmine, and Denunciation 2, 124, in which he quotes Thomas Aquinas: 'If "in human power" means apart from the help of grace, then human beings are obliged to many things not possible without healing grace: for example, to love God and one's neighbor and to believe the articles of faith. But with the help of grace these are possible. This help, if it is given from heaven, is given in mercy; if it is not given, that is in justice, as a penalty for previous sin, at least original sin, as Augustine says; Summa 2-2 q2 a5 ad 1; quoted also in Excuse, 672, Difficulties, 374. Cf. Summa, 1-2 q109 a4 ad 2.
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115. Liberty, 620(12-22); Love, 678(35-6), 679(16-20). See Arnauld's collection of texts from St. Thomas, Disquisition, 632-4.

116. Denunciation 2, 119, 123-4. The reference to Thomas Aquinas is to Summa, 2-2 q156 a3. The third of the condemned propositions attributed to Jansen is that 'to deserve merit or demerit in the state of fallen nature, man need not have the freedom which excludes necessity; it is enough to have freedom from constraint'; Denzinger, Enchiridion, 445, no. 2003. This condemnation is avoided by the distinction between the second and third kinds of necessity: freedom from 'effective' necessity is not required.

117. Necessity, 220(39). According to Augustine acts resulting from defects of original nature would not be sins (De Libero Arbitrio, III.xviii.51, quoted Augustinus, 303); Jansen argues that then the blame would fall on God, which is unthinkable; so originally Adam's nature cannot have been defective (Augustinus 857ff). This provides a criterion for distinguishing the ignorance which does excuse from that which does not: ignorance excuses only if it is a kind to which Adam was subject before the fall. See Augustinus, 302D-303A.

118. The claim that originally Adam must have been able to attain the vision of God was involved in controversy; see H. de Lubac S.J., Augustinianism and Modern Theology, tr. L. Sheppard (London, 1969), Ch. 6. These three propositions cannot logically be held together: (1) that the vision of God was Adam's natural end; (2) that the vision of God cannot be attained by the unaided natural power of any creature; and (3) that the end natural to a being must be attainable by its unaided natural powers. Proposition (2) was held generally. Some held (2) and (3), which entails rejection of (1); if God meant Adam to attain the vision of himself this was from the outset an end above his nature and any divine help toward it was gratuitous. Others, including Thomas Aquinas, Baius, and Jansen, held (1) and (2) and not (3); on their premises Adam even before the fall needed divine help to attain his natural end (see Jansen, 167-8). Thomas Aquinas held that this help was always gratuitous. Baius and Jansen held that before the fall it was owed in justice, because if as God created him Adam needed help to attain his natural end then God could not justly withhold that help.

119. Denunciation 2, 103(28-9). On ignorance as punishment, see Denunciation 1, 34(7-10). On weakness of will as punishment, see Ignorance, 652(18-21). Augustine: 'man has no power to be good, either not seeing what he ought to be, or seeing it but not being strong enough to be what he sees he ought to be. Who can doubt that this is a punishment?'; De Libero Arbitrio, III.xviii.51, quoted Augustinus, 303. Augustine: 'It is a most just punishment for sin that each one loses what he was unwilling to use rightly when he could have done so, if he had wished, without any difficulty'; De Libero Arbitrio, III.xviii.52, quoted Augustinus, 304A. This may be true of something scarce which can be transferred to someone who can use it, but I should think not of dispositions needed to act rightly.

120. Augustine: 'you are much mistaken if you think there is no necessity of sinning, or if you do not understand that this necessity is the penalty of a sin committed without necessity'; Opus Imperfectum
contra Julianum, l.c.v (PL, vol. 45, col. 1118), quoted Denunciation 1, 34, Augustinus, 300, Jansen, 288, etc. Augustine 'he becomes blinded, and necessarily offends more... This darkening was already their penalty... and by this very penalty... they fell into worse sins still'; De Natura et Gratia, xxii.24, quoted in part (see the whole chapter) in Augustinus, 313. This necessity is no excuse; Augustinus, 301BC.

121. Arnauld denies that after Adam's sin God gives grace to all, which some reject; Jansen, 284. See Arnauld's comments on the maxim 'God will not deny grace to those who do what is in them' (Denunciation 1, 8, Necessity, 226-7, and Love, 683-4): 'What is in them', if it disposes them to grace, is already due to grace; it is Pelagian to say that grace can be earned as a matter of justice by the effort of natural powers not aided by grace. On this maxim see Thomas Aquinas, Summa, 1-2 q109 a6, 1-2 q112 a3; and H.A. Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology (Cambridge, Mass. 1963), 131-3, 44.

122. Necessity, 221(15-22), 272-3; Jansen, 155(14-8); Ignorance, 654. Augustine: 'The whole mass owes the penalty, and if the due penalty of damnation were given to all, undoubtedly that would not be unjust. Those freed from it by grace are called, not vessels of their own merits, but "vessels of mercy"; De Natura et Gratia, v.5. Compare F. Wendel, Calvin, 281-2.

123. Necessity, 224-5.

124. Apology, 613; Denunciation 2, 122(34-6); Ignorance, 657(25-6).

125. It is not to be rejected altogether. The Jansenist theodicy includes something quite like the Jesuit's doctrine of sufficient grace. According to Arnauld, following Jansen, it is fundamental to Augustine's whole doctrine to distinguish between the grace of God the creator, given to Adam before he sinned, and the grace of Christ the saviour, given to some and not others after the fall (see Jansen, 167-75, 196-201). Of the grace of God the creator the doctrine of sufficient grace is true. The Jesuits' mistake is not to realise how much difference the fall makes (compare Arnauld's remark that the proponents of the doctrine of sufficient grace argue like pagan philosophers ignorant of the fall; Necessity, 220(25-9)). The grace of God the creator was not irresistible, it made right choice effectively possible but left sin effectively possible also, and it was given (or would have been given if the fall had not taken place) to all mankind equally (Jansen, 154(33-7)). Like the Jesuits Arnauld offers this doctrine as part of a vindication of God's justice (see Necessity, 220-1). He prefers Jansen's theory to Calvin's because Adam's sin was not a predestined but--given the sufficiency of the grace of God the creator--an effectively free act. He prefers it to the theories of many Catholics because according to Jansen the decrees of election and reprobation did not 'precede' God's foreknowledge of Adam's sin: election is God's decision to give in Christ the grace that will infallibly save some from the punishment justly due to all once Adam sinned, and reprobation is the decision to leave others to the punishment now due to all (see Jansen, 151-6). Arnauld's preferences are based on ideas of justice. On these matters see the first and second of Pascal's 'Écrits sur la grace', especially 948-54, 964-70;
and compare 979-81.

126. Denunciations, 155-6, 238(19-21), 281-2 and Difficulties, 375-7 (cf. Bayle, Dictionnaire, art. 'Rimini', rem. A; vol. 12, 531-3). The ambiguity of the term enables Arnauld to discount the papal condemnation of the thesis that 'though there is an invincible ignorance of the law of nature' it does not excuse (see above, note 8).

127. Denunciation 1, 34-5, and Ignorance, 657-8. Augustine: 'Ignorance is a sin in those not willing to learn, and the penalty for sin in those not able; there is therefore no legitimate excuse in one case or the other'; Epistola CXCIV.vi.27 (PL, vol. 33, col. 883), quoted Denunciation 1, 35, Necessity, 276, Jansen, 281, and Ignorance, 653.

128. Or perhaps consistently: they may think that ignorance does not extenuate but knowledge aggravates; see Num 15:28-31. Jansen makes a similar point using a distinction between simple sin and 'prevarication'; Augustinus 307C-308C; cf. Augustine Enchiridion, xxii.81.

129. Denunciation 2, 128-9; Ignorance, 662; Necessity, 270-1. In these places Arnauld quotes Augustine: The ignorance of one who does not know, though not unwilling to know, ignorant because he has not heard, 'does not excuse him so as not to burn in the everlasting fire, but perhaps so as to burn more mildly (ut mitius ardeat)'; De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, iii.5. Augustine and Arnauld quote Lk 12:47-8: the servant who did not know, and did what deserves a beating, shall be beaten less.

130. Denunciation 2, 125-28, 139(34)-140(10), 146(11-14). It is possible conditionally (it could have happened if God had not decided otherwise), but it is not absolutely or effectively possible--it cannot actually happen, given what God has decided; see Examen, 387(28)-388(33), 396(25)-397(10). For a similar distinction in terms of God's absolute and 'ordinate' power see Oberman, Harvest, 36-8, 473.

131. Examen, 393-5; Necessity, 269-78. Arnauld quotes Augustine De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione, i.xxii.31 (those who live where they cannot hear the gospel preached), De Natura et Gratia, iv.4. (those who cannot hear because of infancy) etc., and Rom 10:13-17. Those who do not hear will not be damned for not believing, but for the other sins which, not having faith and grace, they cannot avoid; Necessity, 271(10-13). See above, note 86.

132. Cf. Denunciation 2, 124(5-8), and Denunciation 5, 347(10-11).

133. Disquisition, Love, Excuse.


136. See above, note 114. St. Thomas says that ignorance is culpable if one can and should know; Summa, 1-2 q6 a8. As a definition of negligence this would not do. What if one does not realise one can and should know? This question leads to Terrill's theory; see above, text.
to note 72, and compare D'Arcy, Conscience, 127. It does not arise if 'can' is equivalent to 'can with grace' or 'could but for original sin'. What St. Thomas says is not intended as a definition of negligence, but of ignorance which is culpable, which need not be due to negligence.

137. 'St. Thomas was the last person to push a priori argument in the face of facts. He was handicapped by not having very much information about the moral values of peoples beyond the borders of Christendom...'; D'Arcy, Conscience, 138.

138. Thomas Aquinas, In 2 Sent., d39 q3 a3 c and ad 5; de Veritate, q17 a4 ad 3 and ad 8; cf. St. Bonaventure, In 2 Sent., d39 a1, q3 c and ad a. This position was commonplace in the seventeenth century; see for example the Anglican moralists William Ames, Conscience with the Power and Cases thereof (London, 1633), 13; William Perkins, A Discourse of Conscience, in T.W. Merrill, William Perkins (Nieuwkoop, 1966), 42; Jeremy Taylor, Ductor, vol. 9, 132-7; William Sarderson, quoted in John Locke, Two Tracts of Government, ed. P. Adams (Cambridge, 1967), 45.

139. Summa, 1-2 q19 a6; cf. Denunciation 2, 151(21).

140. This proposition was attacked already by Julian of Eclanum. For Augustine's answer see F.J. Thonnard, 'Justice de Dieu et justice humaine selon saint Augustin', Augustinus 12 (1967), 387-402, esp. 393ff. See also Baird, Studies, chapter 5.

141. The view of Plato and other Greek writers that punishment is wrong unless it makes people better seems to be what led Origen to the conclusion that hell is not necessarily eternal. See the notes by H. Crouzel and M. Simonetti in their translation of Origen, Traité des principes (Paris, 1978), vol. 2, 169, 223. See also J. Danielou, Origen (London, 1955), 276-88.

142. And what must we think of a parent who does not do what can be done to prevent the fault in the first place? See Bayle, Dictionnaire, art. 'Origène', rem. E(I), and art. 'Pauliciens', rem. E (Vol. 11, 256, 483).

143. Necessity, 274(7), Ignorance, 651(15-21); cf. Augustinus, 295A.


145. See above, note 9. Arnauld had attacked the Jesuits on this subject before; see Dissertation.

146. Denunciation 1, 33(34); Denunciation 2, 73(3-4); Jansen, 309ff; Infidels, 383. Compare Mt 22:37, I Cor 10:31, Col 3:17. Arnauld says that this is a commandment of natural (not of divine positive) law, Difficulties, 339(8); and that it is a commandment, not just a counsel, Dissertation, 29(18ff).

147. Jansen, 318(28-37); cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa, 1-2 q1 a2.
148. See above, note 106.


150. Love, 681(6), 687(29-39), 688(12).

151. 'Non faciunt bonos vel males mores nisi boni vel mali amores'; Augustine, Epistola CLV.iv.13 (PL, vol.33, col.672); quoted Jansen, 307.

152. Dissertation, 23(13); Jansen, 318(14-17); Commandment, 404(31). For interpretations at the other extreme, requiring willingness to suffer eternal damnation if that should be God's will, see Burnaby, Amor Dei, 272-93.


156. Denunciation 2, 140(1-3); Jansen, 318(5-6), 321(23-4); Difficulties, 332(20, 38).

157. See note 150 above.

158. Only a few, notably the Platonists: Denunciation 2, 109; cf. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, VIII.4-12.

159. When they knew God they did not glorify him, Rom 1:21. See Jansen, 322(18-20), and Difficulties, 341(31-40).

160. Examen, 391(21); Necessity, 114.

161. Necessity, 89-134; Jansen, 323-9. Arnauld argues (Examen, 391(22, 39-40)) that there is no reason to think that philosophy makes anyone humble. On the other hand he does not show that it causes pride, but at most that the ancient philosophers were proud in fact.

162. Necessity, 108. The reference is to Seneca, De Ira, III.xxxvi.3-4.

163. Jansen, 327.

164. Necessity, 125. Arnauld quotes Augustine: 'They scorn the judgments of others, as if despising glory, ... and please themselves; but their virtue, if they have any, is in another way subjected to the praise of man, for he who pleases himself is a man'; De Civitate Dei, V. 20. But satisfying one's own judgment is not the same as seeking one's own praise.


166. See Examen, i.e., 'Examination of this proposition: A philo-
sopher who has not yet heard anyone speak of Jesus Christ, but knows
God, can, with the help of a grace given through the mercy of Jesus
Christ, do an action truly good and virtuous, before having any know­
ledge of Jesus Christ'.

167. Jansen, 303(17-8), 321(29-30), Infidels, 381(6-7); Apology,
64-5; etc. Compare Augustinus, 541ff. Luther also held that the acts
of infidels are sins, and Rome censured the proposition; see Denzinger,
Enchiridion, 431, no. 1925. The Jansenist proposition was also con­
demned, see Enchiridion, 481, no. 2308. For Arnauld's comment on the
condemnation see Difficulties, 324, 327-46.

168. Infidels, 381(10-11); Denunciation 2, 144(39-40). On the
distinction between secundum officium and secundum finem see Augustine,

169. Infidels, 381; Difficulties, 331, 334(40). This maxim was the
reason given why a person whose conscience is in error about moral prin­
ciples cannot avoid sin. See above, note 138. St. Bonaventure puts it
this way: 'It is easier to destroy than to build. Goodness requires the
concourse of many circumstances, evil the lack of any one'; In 2 Sent.,
d40 al q1 ad 4.

170. Considered in their species some acts are morally indifferent,
neither required nor forbidden; but no individual act is morally in­
different, because it will be good or bad at least by being ordered or
not ordered to the last end. See Difficulties, 331(25-8), 336(37­
lation to the last end is intrinsic to an individual act; Difficulties,
336.

171. Difficulties, 330(38), 334.

172. 'Malum in genere moris is what we call sin'; Infidels, 381,
cf. Difficulties, 331(38). This is the most general definition. For
others see notes 91, 95 and text at note 177.

173. Dissertation, 41(22-7); Jansen, 304(39); Infidels, 383(14).
How the sin against the first and greatest commandment can be venial is
not explained. However Arnauld distances himself from the view of St.
Thomas that a violation of any of the commandments is mortal; Disser­tation, 49(27-31).

174. See above, note 131.

175. Dissertation, 42(28-31); Jansen, 306-8, 313-5; Difficulties,
339(30)-341(3), 343(1-7).

176. See above, note 30 and text.

177. Denunciation 2, 73(4-5). Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra
Gentiles, III.116.

178. Jansen, 308(11-23); Difficulties, 343(8-23, 35-7).
179. Reason 'says that whoever, with a disposition genuinely devoted to duty, does as much as lies in his power'—see above, note 121—'to satisfy his obligation (at least in a continual approximation to complete harmony with the law), may hope that what is not in his power will be supplied by the supreme Wisdom in some way or other (which can make permanent the disposition to this unceasing approximation)'; Immanuel Kant, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, tr. T.M. Green and H.H. Hudson (New York, 1960), 159. This is a 'hope' which reason merely permits.

180. See above, note 161.

181. Like the writers Arnauld attacked, Kant does not envisage eternal punishments, he admits the possibility of something like sufficient grace, and he says that God cannot command 'pathological' but only 'practical' love (cf. 'affective' and 'effective' love, text at note 153 above). On the first point see Critique of Pure Reason, tr. N. Kemp Smith (London, 1951), 638-40 (insofar as we are unworthy we 'limit our share' of happiness). On the second, see note 179 above. On the third, see Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, tr. H.J. Paton (New York, 1964), 67.


183. Bayle seems to have followed the philosophical sin controversy closely; see notes 58 and 126 above, and his Continuation des pensées diverses, Œuvres, Vol. III, 324, 326-7. His judgment is that the natural light of reason supports philosophism, but that it is inconsistent with what scripture requires theologians to hold about sin; Continuation, 394-5. Compare his Réponse aux questions d'un provincial, Œuvres, vol. III, 782.