ABSTRACT. The author examines Scheffler's extensional alternative to the usual notion of belief and shows that it is necessarily inadequate to serve the purpose for which it was designed. This point is established by showing that Scheffler's proposed substitute for psychologically intensional verbs like 'believes' can not deliver philosophers from the classical puzzles over propositional attitudes and can not be used in all cases even to provide materially equivalent extensional substitutes for ordinary belief-statements.

In The Anatomy of Inquiry,[2] Israel Scheffler constructs a "structural theory of explanation" according to which scientific explanation is in principle deductive and extensional. Ordinary explanation-language, including that of scientists, is nonextensional. This fact is especially apparent in explanations of human conduct which incorporate information concerning the beliefs, desires, and rationality of human agents, but it holds for ordinary explanations in general. In his view, therefore, the crucial problem for his structural theory of explanation is that of ontologically interpreting explanation-language.

If, for this purpose, one were to accept an ontology which included facts or states such that one explains (conduct in particular) by reference to those facts or states, then one's explanation is non-extensional. Accordingly, Scheffler decides that the range of the variables in

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"For some x and some y, x explains y" is best interpreted as over concrete linguistic entities he calls inscriptions. Explanatia and explananda in general, then, are sentence inscriptions. Inscriptions are, in Peircean terms, tokens as opposed to types. They are bits of the world, made of ink, sound-waves, etc. Explanation in general thus becomes extensional through a nominalistic ontological interpretation of the structure of explanation-language. So-called teleological explanations, however, present a further problem for Scheffler's program. What is the reference of expressions insertable in place of 'p' and 'x' in such psychologically intensional contexts as '... believes that p' and '... desires x' where sentences having such forms serve as premisses of ordinary explanations? Scheffler avoids quantifying over such intensional entities as propositions (believed) and states (desired) by constructing such technical expressions as '... believes-true ---' and '... desires-true ---'. The latter are to serve as relational constants in new statements which are to serve as substitutes for those containing '... believes that ---' and '... desires ---'. The new statements' truth-conditions are stipulatively tied to those of the unreconstructed belief- and desire- statements, while making no commitment as to what the nature of the conditions on either side might be. Thus, one may hope, the new ones become materially equivalent nominalistic substitutes for the old. Instead of quantifying over objects of belief and desire, which invites problems of opacity, the inscriptions contained within the very that-clauses of, e.g., ordinary believes-that statements serve as objects of the new technically defined relation believing-true.

The extensionality requirement of Scheffler's deductivist theory of explanation is thus satisfied while gaining the effect of incorporating into explanations information about what is believed, desired, chosen, sought after, etc., without "duplicating intensions" in the analysis of explanation-ontology. 'x believes-true y' and allied technical notions are not the result of what some philosophers would call a "conceptual analysis" of believing and other psychological attitudes such that analysans and analysandum have all the same entailments.[3] Believing-true is defined as a relation holding timelessly between an agent and some that-p inscription if and only if the agent believes that p, no matter what sorts of truth-conditions believes-that statements may have. Hence the agent need not produce, possess, understand, or be aware of the inscription to which he is believes-true related. We might say that believes-true statements are designed to ride piggy-back on believes-that statements, true or false in all the same cases, but extensional. This hoped-for material equivalence between ordinary statements of, e.g., belief and their corresponding believes-true counterparts will be a matter of central concern for me later in this paper. I will undertake an examination of that point in part III of this paper. In part II, I will consider the question of whether Scheffler's gen-
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eral strategy of inscriptionalism is effective in dealing with so-called propositional attitudes.

II

Scheffler’s construction of technical terms is an attempt to by-pass familiar philosophical problems apparent in psychologically intensional discourse by showing a way of avoiding ontological commitment to propositions, states, etc. But it does not achieve this goal by simply avoiding all ontological commitment. Rather, the key to a successful theory of the structure of explanation is held to be explicit ontological commitment for information embedded nonextensionally in ordinary explanations of conduct. The commitment is to individual things and to no other kinds of entities. In this case, the individual things are agents and inscriptions. The hope is thus raised that ontological problems apparent in psychological discourse which have proved generally vexing in Philosophy of Mind may be set in order almost at a single stroke. If the conceptual requirements of Logic and scientific explanation do not include such oddities as propositions, possible and impossible states, etc., then in showing this point we will have rid ourselves of much of the old temptation to think of believing, for example, as something which is neither physiological nor behavioral. If it is not philosophically necessary to countenance anything other than agents (or, simply, organisms) and inscriptions, then we would appear to be in a condition just like the paradise of the physicalistic behaviorist who once tried to analyze the concept of believing as a relation of organism to actual or potential utterances, except that one also by-passes the problems which have dampened the enthusiasm of those who have attempted such analyses. Believes-true statements are materially equivalent substitutes for believes-that statements, not analyses of them.[4] At any rate, Scheffler’s proposal, if acceptable, seems to remove some of the flaming swords which have, for many, barred the way to such a paradise.[5] I think other problems remain, though. Consider:

A. John believes that Bill believes that Harry is drunk.

B. John believes that Bill fears that Harry is drunk.


Examples like A and B teach us that our ordinary psychologically intensional vocabulary with its ordinary significance
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(whatever that may be) remains with us even if we try to adopt Inscriptionalism and Scheffler's technical substitutes for this vocabulary. When A and B are replaced by their inscriptive counterparts Al and Bl, the object-clause of each counterpart still contains a verb of psychological attitude.

Ordinary teleological explanations often proceed by reference to beliefs, desires, etc., and there are, at least potentially, some explanations the premisses of which are like A and B in containing subsentences incorporating verbs of psychological attitude. Given that Scheffler's program is to interpret ordinary explanation-language by relating agents to inscriptions that are contained within ordinary language, it must be recognized that there are ordinarily deployed inscriptions containing verbs of psychological attitude and that, according to the program, these can be believed-true, desired-true, etc.

To this challenge, Scheffler could reply that these verbs would only seem to appear within type-predicates applicable to inscriptions. Does 'believes' really occur in 'x is a that-Bill-believes-that-Harry-is-drunk'? The hyphenation that Scheffler uses in the formation of such predicates implies that it does not occur there except as an orthographic accident, much as 'brat' has only an orthographically accidental occurrence in 'x is a celebration'. It might thus be explained that type-predicates applicable to inscriptions are indivisible units without internal structure.

My rejoinder is as follows: In a sentence like 'John believes that Harry is drunk and he is correct in so believing', the first conjunct can easily be mirrored by a technical counterpart, but what about the second conjunct? The second in effect says that what John believes is true. It is difficult to understand Scheffler's technical notions unless they require us to suppose that the counterparts of ordinary belief-attributions relate agents to true or false inscriptions. (We shall see in part III that this point has very important implications.) Scheffler might not be guilty of anything obviously absurd in attributing truth-values to "sentence" inscriptions, while denying internal structure in these inscriptions qua embedded in type-predicates applicable to inscriptions, but then we must face the question of how to differentiate between different inscription type-predicates. There is no way of explaining the differences in the truth-conditions of Al and Bl without distinguishing between their over-all structures and the internal structures of the type-predicates applicable to certain classes of inscriptions. Such explanation of truth-condition differences requires the notions of Belief and Fear in their usual sense, and one who maintains that these notions can only be rendered intelligible by countenancing propositions, states, etc., has not been answered. This implication is
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especially pressing if, besides granting that words like 'believes' have genuine occurrence as individually significant elements within type-predicates applicable to inscriptions, one also grants that true or false sentences genuinely occur within these predicate-expressions. One should not then ignore the claim that, if a true sentence contains the verb 'believes', then there is such a thing as believing just as there is such a thing as running if a true sentence contains 'runs' as its main verb.

Still, Scheffler might be defended by arguing that one can avoid the problem just posed by replacing all occurrences of psychological attitude verbs within technical expressions. Formally, this seems possible. But this apparent avenue of escape is an illusion. Scheffler's general strategy is to relate agents to inscriptions appearing within that-clauses of ordinary belief-sentences. Propositional attitude sentences in ordinary language may be embedded in indefinitely many places within sentences the main verbs of which are verbs of psychological attitude. It seems excessively arbitrary to forbid relating agents to just those inscriptions which contain verbs of psychological attitude while permitting the same believes-true relation (indeed, requiring it) to hold between agents and every other kind of sentence-inscription. Scheffler's ontology seems to include believing-that as well as believing-true if such arbitrariness is avoided. If so, a philosopher who is concerned with the classical problems of Intentionality at the heart of Philosophy of Mind will find no relief in Scheffler's inscriptionalism.

III

Suppose that John believes that snow is white and suppose it true that snow is white. We may then say that John has a true belief. It was noted in part II that Scheffler's alternative to the notion of belief seems to need something corresponding to the notion of a true (or false) belief. The most straightforward suggestion would seem to be that, for Scheffler, sentence-inscriptions bear truth-values. Indeed, one of Scheffler's technical terms, "... makes-true...", according to his own announcement requires that inscriptions bear truth-values. The term "... makes-true..." corresponds to the ordinary notion of performing an action. (See AOI, pp. 90, 91, and 105). Scheffler says

... unlike inscriptions desired-true or believed-true, every inscription made-true is in fact true. (AOI, p. 105)

A problem with the idea that inscriptions may bear truth-values stands out when one tries to formally represent the emphasized sentence appearing in the above quotation. If one tries
(S)  (x) (y) [yMTrx => x]

for this purpose, it should be apparent that it won't do because (S) allows such substitutions as

jMtrd => d.

But if one were to assume 'jMtrd' as an additional premiss, 'd' can not be detached as a conclusion because 'd' is not the abbreviation of a sentence inscription, it is the name of some particular sentence-inscription. Hence, 'jMtrd => d' and (S) are neither true nor false but are ill-formed.

The simplest suggestion to remedy this situation is that the ordinary language predicate 'It is true that ...' (abbreviated to 'Tr...') be directly imported into Scheffler's language to be concatenated with names of sentence-inscriptions or bound variables. This suggestion would allow schemata like 'Trd' to be well-formed. But it can not be allowed as well-formed. Again, 'd' is an individual constant. It denotes a particular sentence-inscription. It is not the abbreviation of a sentence-inscription. The predicate 'Tr...' can only be significantly concatenated with (abbreviated) sentences. In 'Trd' one is saying something exactly like

It is true that Dorothy

But, obviously, 'Dorothy' is not a sign which can bear a truth-value, even if its designatum did happen to bear a truth-value. So, some predicate other than 'Tr...' must be devised to do work the work of 'Tr...' without bringing along such difficulties. Could it be the ordinary language predicate '... is true'? This suggestion is inadequate because the ordinary deployment of this predicate is metalinguistic. Its full form is revealed as

'...' is true.

The latter cannot be directly imported into Scheffler's language for the present purpose because it would result in such schemata as

'd' is true

which, with identity, would entail

The fourth letter of the English alphabet is true.

Since sentence-inscriptions are terms in relation to agents, we can not avoid the need for names of sentence-inscriptions as well as names of agents and it is the sentence-inscriptions, not their names, which are to be the linguistic bearers of truth-value.
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If some monadic predicate is to do the work of the ordinary 'It is true that...', it will surely be a technical term which, like the others in Scheffler's stock, is extensionally equivalent to an ordinary term. The best way to see what such a predicate would be like is to begin with a dyadic technical predicate of our own manufacture which is in the same family as '...believes-true...'. Consider '...asserts-true...'. Let us say that if and only if it is true that snow is white, then anyone who asserts-true some that-snow-is-white-inscription is to that extent epistemically correct. Then, we can say, by extension, that any inscription which an agent would be epistemically correct in asserting-true is correctly assertible. The predicate 'A...' may then be introduced with this meaning. Thus (S) would be recast as

\[(S') (x) (y) [yMTrx => Ax].\]

This apparently happy solution soon leads to trouble of major proportions.

A conjunction 'p.q' is contingent only if all of its entailments are non-contradictory. If 'p.q' is contingent and another conjunction 'r.s' entails a contradiction, then there is at least one consistent assignment of truth-values to p, q, r, and s under which the truth-values of the two conjunctions is opposed. This fact further entails that, if s and q in the preceding are independently assumed to be true, then p and r can not be materially equivalent because, under that assumption, the truth values of p and r would be opposed.

I shall argue that there are contingent ordinary belief-statements logically consistent with certain other contingent conditions such that the conjunction of these belief-statements with these conditions is contingent; whereas the technical Schefflerian counterparts to these conjunctions are not contingent because they entail contradictions. If this argument is correct, it will show that there are some important ordinary belief-statements which, because their technical counterparts are mutually inconsistent under conditions indispensable to Scheffler, could not be materially equivalent to those technical counterparts. Scheffler's inscriptionsalism clearly rests on safeguarding his programmatically stipulated material equivalence between these two notions. My candidate for such a belief-statement is b below. I present b with a condition c which is itself contingent and consistent with b.

b. John believes that no inscription that is believed-true is correctly assertible.

c. Whatever John believes is true.
Restrict the range of bound variables in the following schemata so that only names of sentence-inscriptions may be substituted for y- and x-variables and only names of agents may be substituted for \( \tau \)-variables. The technical counterparts of band c may then be represented as

\[
\beta. (\exists x) \left[ \text{That-no-inscription-that-is-believed-true-is-correctly-assertible } x \right. \cdot jBTrx
\]

\[
\gamma. (x) [jBTrx \rightarrow Ax].
\]

Consider the further statement

\[
a. \text{No inscription that is believed-true is correctly assertible,}
\]

which, by mere formalization, becomes

\[
a. (x) (\tau) [\tau BTrx =) -Ax].
\]

The feasibility of Scheffler's program requires some ground rules. One of these rules determines to which class of inscriptions an agent is believes-true related when the agent believes, say, that Harry is drunk. In general, the Schefflerian counterpart to a belief-sentence, e.g., 'John believes that Harry is drunk', will be an existentially quantified sentence, which in this case may be initially approximated as

\[
(\exists x) \left[ \text{That-Harry-is-drunk } x \right. \cdot jBTrx].
\]

One realizes, however, that the interests of the program would not be served if one were to interpret the truth-conditions of the latter sentence as restricting John's believes-true relationships to exactly one inscription, namely, the sentence-inscription embedded within the inscription type-predicate used in the first conjunct of the immediately preceding indented sentence. Given the whole point of the program, one would not want any assumptions which prevented John from also believing-true the following inscription: Harry is drunk. So, the class of inscriptions to which John will be believes-true related would have to be a class containing potentially many members, each of which stand in some relation to the predicate-embedded inscription in question. Otherwise, Scheffler could not gain the desirable effect of referring to propositions (one sort of intension), that the same proposition may be expressed by many different sentences. The most unambiguous Schefflerian counterpart of the belief-sentence now in question would then seem to be

\[
(\exists x) \left[ \text{That-Harry-is-drunk } x \right. \cdot xRd \cdot jBTrx]
\]

where 'd' is the name of the predicate-embedded sentence-inscription and R is the relation we have just seen the need for. In fact, Scheffler proposes a specific R for us.
We first take as replications of one another sentence-inscriptions ordinarily assumed to represent the same sentence. .. Two sentence-inscriptions represent the same sentence if and only if they are replicas of each other (i.e., they are spelled exactly alike), have similar language affiliation (i.e., both are French, both are Italian, etc.), and lack indicator-terms (i.e., term inscriptions which are replicas though one appears in one of the sentence-inscriptions with one denotation and the other appears in the other sentence-inscription with differing denotation). (AOI, p. 103).

Let us ignore, for now, the requirements of similar language affiliation, etc., and concentrate on the necessary condition that the members of the class of inscriptions to which John is to be related must be replicas of one another. It is perhaps exceedingly obvious that Scheffler's notion of replication must be so interpreted that, for any two sentence-inscription-replicas, either both are true or both are false. The obvious is never to be despised, so let us state this condition formally as

\[(S1) (x) (y) [xRy \rightarrow (Ax \equiv Ay)]\]

where 'xRy' abbreviates 'x replicates y'. Let 'a' be a rigid designator such that its designatum is the sentence-inscription first designated by that letter in this paper. Let 'd' be an arbitrary constant. Scheffler adopts another seemingly innocuous ground-rule: An agent believes-true every replica of each inscription that he believes-true. Hence it is clear that Scheffler must also adopt the following as a noncontingent particular truth in his system.

\[(S2) (\exists x) [That-no-inscription-that-is-believed-true-is-correctly-assertible \ x \ . \ jBTrx] \rightarrow (\exists x) [xRa \ . \ jBTrx].\]

Similarly for

\[(S3) Aa \rightarrow (x) (\pi) [\piBTrx \rightarrow \neg Ax]\]

the latter being, I think, an obvious conceptual truth about 'Ax'. Now conjoin (S1), (S2), and (S3) with \(\beta\) and \(\gamma\) to form a premiss-set:

\[\beta. (\exists x) [That-no-inscription-that-is-believed-true-is-correctly-assertible \ x \ . \ jBTrx]\]

\[\gamma. (x) [jBTrx \rightarrow Ax]\]

\[(S1) (x) (y) [xRy \rightarrow (Ax \equiv Ay)]\]
(S2) \((\exists x) [\text{That-no-inscription-that-is-believed-true-is-correctly-assertible } x \cdot jBTrx] \Rightarrow (\exists x) [xRa \cdot jBTrx]\)

(S3) \(Aa \Rightarrow (x) (\pi) [\neg BTrx \Rightarrow \neg Ax]\)

We then obtain the following reductio:

1. \((\exists x) (xRa \cdot jBTrx) \quad (\beta, S2)\)
2. \(dRa \cdot jBTrd \quad (E1, 1)\)
3. \(jBTrd \Rightarrow Ad \quad (UI, \gamma)\)
4. \(jBTrd \quad (2)\)
5. \(Ad \quad (3, 4)\)
6. \(dRa \Rightarrow (Ad \equiv Aa) \quad (UI, S1)\)
7. \(dRa \quad (2)\)
8. \(Ad \equiv Aa \quad (6, 7)\)
9. \(Aa \quad (8, 5)\)
10. \((x)(\pi) [\neg BTrx \Rightarrow \neg Ax] \quad (9, S3)\)
11. \(jBTrd \Rightarrow \neg Ad \quad (UI, 10)\)
12. \(\neg Ad \quad (4, 11)\)
13. \(Ad \cdot \neg Ad \quad (5, 12)\)

Formalized (as \(\alpha\)), \(\alpha\) follows formally from \(\beta\) and \(\gamma\). The unformalized sentence \(\alpha\) follows intuitively from the unformalized sentences \(\beta\) and \(\gamma\). But \(\beta\) and \(\gamma\) do not also intuitively entail a contradiction. The ordinary belief-sentences \(\beta\) and \(\gamma\) intuitively imply \(\alpha\) and they imply that, if anyone believes-true \(\alpha\), then \(\alpha\) is false. They do not intuitively imply that someone believes-true \(\alpha\), and the latter cannot be independently assumed.

One might object that \(\beta\) is not contingent on the grounds that it is somehow ill-formed, being a mixture of ordinary language and technical terminology. However, there is no apparent reason why one can not have beliefs about inscriptions having properties, no matter what those properties may be. Further, since believing-true is a definable relation and is defined into existence as a property like Grueness is defined into existence, there is no reason why one cannot have beliefs about agents believing-true inscriptions. John may have read The Anatomy of Inquiry and perhaps injudiciously have become disdainful of the inscriptive approach to belief.
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Even if b and c happened to be false for nonformal reasons, their conjunction could have been true. It is a contingent conjunction. The conjunction of their technical counterparts should, therefore, also be contingent; but, as we have seen, together with (S1), (S2), and (S3), their conjunction formally entails a contradiction and, so, is itself a contradiction. Since there is no reason to believe that ordinary language is governed by rules concerning 'believes' which parallel (S1), (S2), and (S3), there is not even a hint that b and c imply a contradiction.

It has just been shown that there is at least one condition under which the Schefflerian counterpart of an ordinary belief-sentence could not be materially equivalent to that ordinary belief-sentence, namely, when b and c are both true. Therefore, if c (a contingent proposition) is true, and y (its Schefflerian counterpart) is also true, the truth-values of b and \( \neg \) must be opposed. This result shows that there is a fundamental incommensurability between believing and believing-true.

Scheffler has recognized that certain other kinds of belief-sentences present intractable difficulties for constructing inscriptive counterparts for them, so-called "isolated existentials" like "Paul believes something that Elmer does not". Scheffler's response is to declare that "... such sentences are expendable without serious loss ...", and to agree with Quine's view that they "... tend to be pretty trivial in what they affirm, and useful only in heralding more tangible information." (A01, p. 109).[6] Notice, however, that b and c could not be expended on these same grounds. Both furnish tangible information about John, b is not an isolated existential, and it contains a sample inscription for John to believe-true.

Which premiss will Scheffler deny? (S1), (S2), and (S3) are central to his entire approach, so I assume that he will not deny any of them. Keeping them means that it is formally impossible for both b and y to be true. One or the other of these must be rejected.

It has been suggested to me[7] that the simplest course for Scheffler would be to reject c, not as false but, like isolated existentials, as really devoid of specific tangible information, useful only in heralding some such list of specific conditionals as

If John believes that snow is white then snow is white;
If John believes that some roses are red then some roses are red;
  
  
  etc.
But, since there is no way of determining whether the list really contains

If John believes that no inscriptions that are believed-true are correctly assertible then no inscriptions that are believed-true are correctly assertible,

c is too intangible to worry about saving. We need not save it. Therefore the reductio can not be made. I suspect that this reply is quite probably one that Scheffler would make to me.

My first rejoinder to this argument is that one should consider the question "What types of specific ordinary information would ordinarily entitle one to reliably infer c?" If one had a long list of conditionals with true consequents similar to "If John shoots Bill then Bill dies", it would, given a certain number of such conditionals, ordinarily be inductively reliable to infer "Anyone shot by John dies". Statements such as the latter can easily be formalized as extensional schemata. If Scheffler were to insist that c is not going to have a technical counterpart in his language, then no matter how many conditional statements with true consequents one were given (e.g., "If John believes that snow is white then snow is white") and no matter what other things might be known about John (He performs miracles, reads minds, travels faster than light, etc.) it would not even be inductively acceptable in Scheffler's language (let alone reliable) to infer \( \gamma \) from the counterparts of the ordinary premisses.

My second rejoinder is this: The sorts of reasons now being considered for banishing c also require that many other innocent-looking sentences would have to be banished. Among them are the following:

- John has fewer true beliefs than false beliefs;
- John has no beliefs;
- John has exactly three beliefs;
- John has more true beliefs than fulfilled desires;
- Most of what John believes is silly;

The list would obviously go on to great length. It is not a matter of being willing to give up on just one or two kinds of sentences.

Third rejoinder: Obviously a statement like "g is an inscription" would have a representative in Scheffler's language. So would "g is a green inscription". In classical
logical systems, individual constants like 'g' are open to quantification in contexts where its occurrence is referentially transparent. Moreover, in classical systems, if a formula is well-formed, then so is its negation. But, if one were given the Schefflerian information "jBTrg . Ag", it would also be well formed to write "jBTr . -Ag", only because we happen in this case to know (presumably) what 'g' denotes. If we did not have this knowledge, we could not existentially generalize from the latter to "(∃x)(jBTrx . -Ax)" because that quantified statement is equivalent to the negation of "-(∃x)(jBTrx . -Ax)" which is equivalent to the counterpart of c. Assuming that b is retained, highly unusual restrictions must be put on the uses of instantiation and generalization in Scheffler's system in order to safeguard against the employment of technical sentences that make the same sort of trouble as γ.

Fourth rejoinder: Consider the argument "If one thing is bigger than another, then the second is green. Tom is bigger than George. So, George is green." Now for the makings of a second argument. Consider the premiss "John makes-true g". What additional premiss in Schefflerian language would deductively warrant the conclusion "g is correctly assertible"? Earlier, Scheffler was quoted as adopting the rule that every inscription that is made-true is in fact true. Note that the statement which in ordinary language would correspond to this rule is "Every action that is performed occurs", a conceptual truth if ever there was one. If, as I have argued, "It is true that ..." must have some counterpart in Scheffler's language like "... is correctly assertible", then the extra premiss needed for a second valid argument with exactly the same formal structure as the first would be "(x) (π) (πMTtrx => Ax)". How can Scheffler permit the latter in his language given that it has the same form as γ? If he expends c, must he not give up the rule for makes-true? If he drops that rule, he will have to drop a large number of other similar rules that are endorsed in AOI.[8] If no third valid argument having the same formal structure as the first two but employing as its major premiss is allowed, it would seem that validity in Scheffler's representation of the structure of scientific language is not a matter of form alone. Which ordinary-language predicate constants are involved in the ordinary argument in question makes a difference to whether arguments obviously of the same form can have merely formalized counterparts in Scheffler's language.

I have criticized the suggestion of expending c at some length in order to show how far-reaching are the consequences of such a step. Such a move carries a larger price than might be supposed.

Suppose that one decides that the price is too high to pay. There is then only one thing to do: give up b as expendable without further loss. If Scheffler were to attempt
this move it would have to be on the basis of some rational­ly defended general criterion. He would have to isolate some characteristic of b such that any belief-sentence hav­ing that characteristic deserved to be forsaken. I, for one, am still unable to imagine what sort of characteristic might do this job. For those who harbor the suspicion that b is the true villain of the present piece on the grounds that, whatever it is that is logically fishing about E. It is said by the Cretan Eubulides that ever­thing said by a Cretan is false is more or less the same thing that is logically fishy about b, disappointment awaits. Supposing that E's logically fishy characteristics can be isolated and that a good argument can be propounded for the claim that all sentences sharing E's logically fishy characteristics deserve to be excluded from a logically perspicuous language, no real progress will have been made toward helping Scheffler. The reason is that the logical fishiness of E will derive from its property of representing Eubulides as saying things about things said by Cretans. By contrast, what b rep­resents John as believing is not something that concerns things believed. Any fishiness of b, therefore, would have to be of a different order.

FOOTNOTES

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4. Scheffler makes this point very explicitly in such passages as the following:

The import of this construal is to take ordinary 'desiring that' statements as tantamount to expressing a certain relation between agents and inscriptions. The total effect concerns the logical form and ontological character of 'desiring that' statements rather than their substantive analysis. i.e., the specification of those conditions under which they hold true. . . . Any further substantive analysis of 'desire', specifying the operative conditions for the truth of (desires-true statements) is theoretically welcome, however, as an independent step. (AOI
5. See, for example, Quine in *Word and Object*, Section 45 wherein he agrees with Chisholm's arguments against the possibility of reducing belief-sentences by analysis to extensional (behavioral) sentences.

6. Richard Feldman has recently pointed out that Scheffler's forsaking such isolated existentials may be seriously called into question. See his paper in *Philosophical Studies*, Vol. 32, (1977).

7. By Randall Dipert in his comments on my paper at the Fall, 1979 meetings of Creighton Club (New York State Philosophical Association).

8. See for example Scheffler's generalization (23) in A01, 105. We may well wonder, too, about the rule that an agent believes-true every replica of each inscription that he believes-true and also about my (S2).