ABSTRACT. Bergmann has proposed an ontology that contains an entity many find strange: particularity. And in fact, Bergmann, too, seems to find it strange. He proposes a phenomenological method in ontology, and holds, as he therefore should, that particularity is presented. Nonetheless, he also holds that it is ineffable, that its presence in a particular is an unsayable state of affairs, and that it is something which is not a thing and yet is also not nothing. Bergmann's position has been long developing, but especially in three recent essays. The aim of the present essay is to explore these views. We shall examine Bergmann's method, and some criticisms of it by Rosenberg, in order to see whether we cannot get a better grasp of particularity. Specifically, we shall try to see whether it is not, after all, effable. It will turn out that this disagreement on the effability of particularity is really three disagreements: one concerning whether a particular can be thought apart from particularity, a second concerning the analysis of intentionality, and a third concerning whether, in the ontologically important sense of 'different', entities that are different are separable.

Now let the generall Trumpet
blow his blast, Particularities,
and pettie sounds to cease.
Shakespeare,
2 Henry VI, V, ii, 44

Bergmann has proposed an ontology that contains an en-
tity many find exceedingly strange. That entity is particularity. And in fact, Bergmann, too, seems to find it strange. He proposes a phenomenological method in ontology, and holds, as he therefore should, that particularity is presented. Nonetheless at the same time he also holds that it is ineffable, that its presence in a particular is an unsayable state of affairs, and that it is something which is not a thing and yet is also not nothing. The aim of this essay is to explore Bergmann's method in order to see whether we cannot get a better grasp of this entity, particularity. Specifically, we will try to see whether it is not, after all, effable. But actually, this disagreement with Bergmann on the effability of particularity is really, as we shall see, three disagreements.

In what follows we shall first discuss Bergmann's philosophical method and gradually move to the case of particularity and our three disagreements. Our discussion of particularity will focus on three recent papers by Bergmann.[1] These essays raise many issues of great importance, and in picking a few that centre around particularity it should not be concluded that the others do not deserve discussion.

It was Kant's suggestion that before undertaking research in ontology we ought to investigate our tools, to see what sort of job they can do, what sort of world they can reveal to us. That is, epistemology must precede ontology. Now, the maxim of checking your tools before you start work may be sound advice for a carpenter, but I cannot think of worse advice for a philosopher. Another maxim, equally appropriate for the craftsman, might perhaps be more apposite for the philosopher: investigate carefully the nature of the material upon which you are going to work before you try to design a tool to work upon it; that is, in the case of the ontologist, ontology must precede epistemology. But even this maxim is misleading in the case of ontology. For, to do ontology we must know what we are talking about. Epistemology thus seems to be both presupposed by and also justified by ontology. But that apparent circle should not surprise us: it is but one way of noting the delicacy of the metaphysical-ontological-epistemological enterprise. One point, however, is clear, and that is the starting point of this enterprise: the starting point of ontology is the world as we experience it, and the starting point of epistemology is our experiencing of the world, and, in fact, these two starting points cannot be separated. Our experiencings of the world from which epistemology takes its start are themselves part of our experience, and part of the world as we experience it, and therefore part of the world that is the starting point of ontology. As for our ways of experiencing the world, that we encounter in our experience, are our loves and our hates, our perceivings and our rememberings, our sensings and our thinkings, our believings and our disbeliefings, our expectations and our hallucinations, our
scientifically methodical researches and our occult fantasizings. No doubt we are agreed that the justified procedure for extending our knowledge of the world is to start from perception and memory and to explore the world by methods of science: that is the pathway to truth. But that judgment—that perception and science are the measure of what is—presupposes that certain basic moves in ontology and epistemology have already been made. It presupposes that the world that we experience has a certain ontology and that our various ways of experiencing it have been examined, located in their places in the world as we experience it, and their capacity to testify to the truth subjected to criticism and evaluated. All of which means that the starting point of all ontology and epistemology can be none other than the phenomenological description of the world as we experience it and of our experiencings of that world. As Bergmann once put it: "Ontology is phenomenological. The rest is merely science. Such is the nature and such are the limits of human knowledge."[2] To suggest otherwise—to suggest as Jay Rosenberg has done—that science begins with epistemology, and that epistemology is exhausted by the methods of science[3]—is simply to avoid all the serious work of philosophy.

It is, of course, true that among the things we find in experience, in the world we experience, are hallucinations, or more generally, falsehoods. In fact, perhaps almost all of our ordinary perceptions are false, as Locke, Hume, and other critical realists have, on the basis of the inferences of science, so cogently argued. That, though, is something we find out about the world we experience: recognizing that fact is one way of experiencing the world. Moreover, the atoms or whatnot that are there where our perceptions are false we know to be there because of what we discover through experience and are parts—though perhaps unperceived parts—of the world we experience. Nor should that surprise us. For, our experience shows that there are, in the world we experience, many parts that we do not perceive. Why should atoms not be among these unperceived parts of the world of experience? But be all that as it may, the point is that, to say that ontology is phenomenological is not to deny the fact of error: error and its correction are processes that must be described by any phenomenological description of experience, that is, of the world we experience and of our experiences of that world. A full phenomenological description of the world we experience cannot but include a description of falsehood and errors.

This being so, it means that what is given to us in experience—what is presented to us in experience—often includes what, later, or even at the moment, we decide is not the case. It follows that what is given to us, what is presented to us, is not given or presented incorrigibly. It is a myth created by the foundationists that what is given is always given incorrigibly. Or perhaps it was created by
those who are concerned to refute something they call the "myth of the given". There is, of course, one sort of experience, often referred to as sensing, or, by some, as direct awareness, which is, in some sense, error-free, or, at least, such that it makes no real sense to speak of correcting it. What is given in the kind of experience called sensing are often in turn referred to as phenomena or as phenomenal entities. There is a sense, then, in which phenomena might be said to be given incorrigibly. But phenomena are only some among the many entities that are presented, and sensing is only one among the many ways of experiencing the world. Moreover, phenomenology or the description of the world that we experience, is not the description of phenomena. Thus, while, when we offer a phenomenological description of something, what we so describe must, in some sense of 'must', exist, on the other hand when we offer a phenomenological description of something it simply does not follow that what is thus described exists.

In addressing ourselves to the philosophy of Gustav Bergmann it is important to be clear on this point. When one criticizes a philosopher, it is best to be clear on the method that philosopher proposes to use in his attempts to solve those problems and perplexities that are typically philosophical. Rosenberg has recently failed to follow this maxim. Bergmann proposes that the core of ontology—and epistemology—is phenomenology.[4] Ontology begins with what is presented to us, or, as he also says, synonymously, with what we are acquainted with.[5] What we are acquainted with we know[6]—in the sense that we know what we are presented with, what is given to us: we can describe it phenomenologically. But, of course, we do not know it in the sense that in knowing it we know incorrigibly that it exists. Acquaintance is in this sense not incorrigible, and it is not what foundationists sometimes call "direct acquaintance". To be sure, Bergmann does speak of "direct awareness"[7] which is a way of experiencing that includes at least some of those sorts of experiencings that others have called "sensings". "Direct awareness" is therefore in a way incorrigible: in some sense of 'must', what is given in direct awareness must exist. But contrary to what Rosenberg suggests.[8] when Bergmann speaks of ontology as phenomenological, or beginning with what one is acquainted with, he is not speaking of direct acquaintance nor of some incorrigible starting point. Bergmann's method is phenomenological but not foundationist. Failure to appreciate this means that Rosenberg almost everywhere misunderstands Bergmann, and it throughout vitiates most of his critique of the latter.

To say that ontology begins with phenomenological description is not to say that the philosopher does not argue. Description does not exclude dialectics. Thus, Bergmann regularly argues that certain entities that are picked out in his phenomenological descriptions solve certain philos-
philical problems and that other philosophers cannot solve these problems without invoking these entities. Such arguments must carefully be distinguished from transcendental arguments. In the latter sort of argument, one argues that certain things that exist within experience could not exist unless certain entities outside the world of experience also existed. For example, Plato argued that things within the world we experience may often correctly be said to be the same, but that no entities within that world could account for that fact, and that, therefore, there must be entities outside the world of experience that account for the sameness of experienced things. These objects are the Forms. These are not simply unexperienced parts of the world we experience, like specks of dust too small to see, or atoms; rather, the Forms transcend the world of experience. But then, if we are to identify things as the same, then we must have some knowledge of these Forms. This provides the basis for a further transcendental argument on Plato's part, an argument to the effect that there must exist a special form of knowing, which Plato calls "reminiscence", that gives us knowledge of these Forms. Needless to say, this sort of knowing is itself not part of our ordinary experience: it is not among the modes of experiencing that we encounter in our experience; it is not something that is described when we give a phenomenological description of the world of experience, and, specifically, of the various modes of experiencing that are given to us in the world of experience.

In contrast to Plato, Bergmann phenomenologically picks out certain entities in the world of experience, and then argues that these entities solve the problem of sameness that Plato thought could be solved only by introducing transcendental entities. Bergmann argues concerning entities in the world of experience; Plato argues for entities that transcend the world of experience. In fact, Bergmann proposes a method that conforms to a Principle of Acquaintance: not only is phenomenology the starting point of ontology-epistemology, it is also the ending point, in the sense that no entity is introduced into one's ontology unless it is given in experience,[9] that is, unless it is picked out of one's phenomenological description of the world of experience. Rosenberg has wrongly concluded that, since Bergmann introduces arguments for his ontology, therefore, he has abandoned phenomenology and the Principle of Acquaintance.[10] This is connected to his other error. Phenomenological description is of phenomena; phenomena are known incorrigibly; what is incorrigible is known non-inferentially; only the corrigible requires inference; but argument is inference; so, Bergmann's arguing testifies that the knowledge he claims to have is corrigible and therefore not phenomenological. At least, that is what Rosenberg seems to think.

One should perhaps add, however, that philosophers are human, too, and are quite capable of convincing themselves
that they are not acquainted with what is in fact presented to them. In this sense, dialectics may contaminate one's phenomenology. Is that any guarantee that anyone's phenomenology is not contaminated? The answer is No: there is no guarantee. The best one can do is be ever vigilant. As Allaire once put it, "one cannot do more; one must not do less". [11]

This does spot, however, an important role that dialectical argument can play in the philosophical enterprise. B. might well succeed in directing the attention of S. to a certain entity, but S.'s own philosophical reflections have convinced him that these entities are philosophically irrelevant. Or perhaps S.'s reflections may lead him to a different philosophical description of those presented entities. Thus, for example, some would, for their own reasons, refer to as "places" what others call "particulars". In such circumstances, B.'s dialectical arguments have the role of aiming to convince S. that the entities to which B. is attending have a certain philosophical relevance. Moreover, it is even possible that S.'s reflections have had the result of convincing him that the entities to which B. is striving to direct his attention do not exist; in this case, S.'s reflections will have convinced him that he is not presented with what is in fact presented to him. In this latter sort of case, B.'s dialectical arguments will have the further aim of challenging those reflections that have led S. to deny the phenomenological claims of B. In this way, B.'s argument does aim to convince S. to, as it were, introduce a "new" sort of entity into his world, and not just his ontology but the world as he phenomenologically describes it. But once again, such dialectical argument is not a form of transcendental argument. It is not an attempt to convince one to introduce into his ontology an entity which is not presented but is rather an attempt to get one to recognize an entity which is presented. [12] None of this is puzzling, but--again it must be emphasized--clarity in these matters is important if we are to understand correctly one who insists upon a phenomenological method in philosophy.

"All awareness is propositional". Bergmann has made this phenomenological claim a central pillar of his ontology and epistemology. [13] It is a claim that is undoubtedly correct. In thought, in perception, in sensing, what is given to us are complexes. In other words, in order to give a phenomenological description of the whole of what is given to us in a perceiving, or a thinking, or in any sort of experiencing, one must use a sentence. If we say that the whole of what is given to us in an experiencing is the intention of that experiencing, then the intention of an experiencing is always propositional, represented by a sentence, rather than a name standing alone. But, of course, to say that--to say that the whole of what is given to us in an experiencing is a complex--is to say that parts of such
complexes are also given. Otherwise they would not be complexes. So, we are presented with complexes and also the parts that are in those complexes. As Bergmann once put it, "To be presented (to me) is the same as to be the intention, or 'in' the intention of an act [of experiencing] (of mine)." This of course requires that we be able to distinguish the parts of the complexes that are given in experience. We must be able to attend to the parts—not, naturally, necessarily as separate entities (though they may be separable), but at least as parts. Otherwise what grounds would we have for including them when we give a phenomenological description of the complex that is the intention of the experiencing? All this is obvious enough. And it is equally obvious that, for one like Bergmann, who proposes to philosophize in accordance with a Principle of Acquaintance, the experiencings through which we distinguish the parts of presented complexes must themselves be ordinary sorts of experiencing—experiencings that are themselves experiences and not forms of experience, like Plato's "reminiscence" of Forms, that are introduced into one's epistemology solely on the basis of transcendental arguments. Moreover, if the complex I am presented with is a red square, then I can clearly distinguish the colour and the shape. That makes it obvious that the experiencings in which we distinguish the parts of presented complexes are ordinary and themselves experienced. So, when Bergmann insists that the parts of presented complexes are also presented, he is not thereby introducing a new sense of 'presentation' or 'acquaintance', contrary to what Rosenberg suggests, and certainly not any kind of acquaintance that is incorrigible in the foundationist sense.

Now consider a red square and a red circle. In each of these two complexes we can distinguish a colour. The colour in each is what we represent in our phenomenological description by the word 'red'. The word 'red' is applied to each of the two complexes because the colour in the one is indistinguishable from the other. It is this indistinguishability that accounts for 'red' applying to both complexes. That is, it is this fact that accounts for the sameness of the two complexes. Assuming that the distinct are distinguishable, it follows that the colour of the one complex is the same as, not distinct from, the colour of the other complex. The colour red is distinguishable from both the shapes. It is also, of course, distinguishable from other shades of colour. It is thus distinct from all these other entities. But the red in the one complex is not distinct from, is the same as, the red in the other complex. A distinguishable entity that solves the problem of same sameness by virtue of the fact that, as the same entity, it can recur in several complexes, is traditionally called a universal. So the red we are presented with in the two complexes is a universal. Similar arguments will of course show that the other colours, the various shapes, and so on, are all universals. And we are therefore acquainted with
Again, none of this is problematic. It is worth noting, though, that in the discussion one moves quickly from phenomenological description ("the red in the one complex is indistinguishable from the red in the other") to dialectical argument ("the fact of their indistinguishability provides the solution to the problem of sameness") to categorizations that are justified by those dialectical moves ("the red in the two complexes is a universal", "since we are presented with red, which is a universal, we are therefore presented with universals"). The point is that such a transition does not imply that one has therefore somehow abandoned phenomenology for philosophy, where the latter is contrasted to phenomenology, perhaps identified with transcendental ontology: the entities described at the end of the dialectical argument are precisely those that are described in the phenomenological description with which one begins.

Bergmann has, of course, made these points about properties and universals.[18] The above discussion is misleading only in the brevity of the dialectic it incorporates. For in fact, the dialectic can and must go on much longer than the above sketch suggests. Nor has Bergmann neglected that dialectic. He has been regularly concerned to argue that those who deny that there are universals are mistaken. In particular, he has been concerned to argue that the nominalism of one like Quine is mistaken. Let us say that the sentences that describe the complexes with which we are presented describe facts. Then, for Quine, facts are "ultimate and irreducible": the facts we are presented with, in perception at least, are not really complex, they have no distinguishable parts. That makes Quine a "fact ontologist" rather than a "thing ontologist",[19] that is, rather than one who, like Bergmann, holds that presented facts have distinguishable parts to which one must appeal in order to solve various philosophical problems. As Quine puts his point:

One may admit that there are red houses, roses, and sunsets, but deny, except as a popular and misleading manner of speaking, that they have anything in common. The words 'houses', 'roses', and 'sunsets' are true of sundry individual entities which are houses, roses and sunsets, and the word 'red' or 'red object' is true of each of sundry individual entities which are red houses, red roses, red sunsets; but there is not, in addition, any entity whatever, individual or otherwise, which is named by the word 'redness', nor, for that matter, by the word 'household', 'rosehood', and 'sunsethood'. That the houses and roses and sunsets are all of them red may be taken as ultimate and irreducible, and it may be held that McX
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is not better off, in point of real explanatory power, for all the occult entities which he posits under such names as 'redness'.[20]

Suppose we are presented with two red spots. We describe the one using the sentence 'This is red' and the other with the sentence 'That is red'. For Quine, 'red' is a common name. We need not rehearse the problems inherent in this notion,[21] nor in the similar notion of a predicate being "true of" something.[22] The crucial point is that the common name 'red' applies non-arbitrarily to this and that. That is, there is something about each of the two spots as presented that justifies applying 'red' to both, as they are presented (which may not be veridically), rather than, say, 'red' to the one and 'green' to the other. This something is, of course, the fact to which Bergmann also appeals, namely, the fact that, with respect to colour, the two spots are indistinguishable, that is, the same. Nonetheless, the spots are two: they are distinguishable. On the other hand, neither do the two spots have any distinguishable parts, according to Quine. So, according to Quine, each spot is an unanalyzable and irreducible entity that is both the same and different as the other spot. The two spots themselves in their simplicity, the pair and nothing else, ground the two relations of sameness and difference. Since the pair itself grounds these relations, they have been called internal relations.

The nominalist has two internal relations, one for difference—here he agrees with the realist—and one for sameness—where he disagrees with the realist, who accounts for the sameness in question not by another internal relation, but by a shared part. Now, we contrast the complexity of a sentence with the simplicity of a name, of a subject term or a predicate term. In this sense, the sentences 'This is red' and 'That is red', used to describe the spots, are misleading in their complexity. The spots would be more perspicuously represented by a name than a sentence. Still, the names 'This' and 'That' won't do, because that will serve only to represent the difference of the two spots. Nor will the (common) name 'red' do, because that will serve only to represent the sameness of the two spots. Rather, the names must be such as to, by themselves, represent both the sameness and the difference. The closest we can come would seem to be 'This - red' and 'That - red', or, more generally, 'red_1', and 'red_2', and 'red_3' . . . and so on.[23] Simple things which, without internal complexity, are both the same as and different from each other, and are most perspicuously represented by internally complex names, have been called "perfect particulars". Thus the phenomenologist uses sentences to describe presented facts, but these facts are held by the fact ontologist to be unanalyzable, and turn out, upon his view, to be perfect particulars. The doctrine of perfect particulars is the core idea of one version of nominalism, the thesis that there are no universals. A fact
ontology like Quine's is therefore nominalistic.

The disagreement between Quine and Bergmann, between the former's fact ontology and the latter's thing ontology, is whether the presented facts really are simple or whether such facts have distinguishable parts. But consider Quine's examples, red houses, red roses, and so on. Or, more simply, a red square and a red circle. These would be named by names like 'This - red - house' or 'This - red - square' or 'This - red - round'. And surely, as a matter of phenomenological fact, no matter the device used to represent the red house or the red square in language, whether it be by names or by sentences, it is still the case that the red house and the red square are presented as complex and that that by virtue of which 'red' applied to any one such complex is part of that complex. The nominalist uses names like 'red1' or 'This - red', but these names have an internal complexity that represents the phenomenologically given complexity of what those names are used to represent.[24] Construing the sentence 'This is red' as the complex name 'This - red' cannot deny the complexity of the fact represented by the sentence; all it does is represent it in one way rather than another.

This far from exhausts the whole dialectic of the universals vs. perfect particulars issue, but it does suffice to sketch, however broadly, certain crucial features. I have done this, not for its own sake, but rather to try to illuminate some other aspects of Bergmann's ontology.

Consider once again our red circle. This is a whole, a complex. This whole has a colour, it has a shape, and it has an area. The colour so to speak fills the area that the shape as it were surrounds. This area is part of the presented complex, and it too is presented. Now, it is clear about areas that, at least so far as we can tell, for each perceived complex there is exactly one area that is part of it, and that the same area is never part of two distinguishable complexes. This is a general fact about perceived complexes: colours, shapes, and indeed all the parts of such complexes save areas, recur, while areas, alone among the parts of complexes, do not recur. If the problem of difference is that of discovering that by virtue of which two presented complexes are correctly judged to be two, then, as Bergmann argues,[25] dialectically, areas can reasonably be claimed to solve that problem: one complex is distinguishable from another just because it contains an area distinguishable from every other part in it and distinguishable from every part, including the area, that is in the other complex. But something which is in perceived complexes, which is not a universal, and which solves the problem of difference, is traditionally called a particular. So areas are particulars.[26] And since areas are presented, so are particulars: particulars are given in perception. Such at least is the case, which does not seem unreasonable, that
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Bergmann makes.

Red itself, however, turns out also to be complex: red has, as part, the feature of being a colour; this distinguishable feature red shares with all other shades of colour; it recurs in blue, green, scarlet, etc. Similarly, the property of being a shape recurs in all the specific shapes, in all the square shapes, all circular shapes, and so on. We thus distinguish properties and properties of properties.

Now, just as colour is a distinguishable property that recurs in, and is common to, all colours, so there is a distinguishable property that recurs in, and is common to, all areas, to wit, the property of being an area. This property is presented to one, just as the property of being a colour is presented to one. It is by virtue of this property that we can identify areas as areas; it is this property that solves the problem of sameness with respect to areas, that is, it is this property that accounts for the fact that all areas are the same, in respect of being areas, just as the property of being a colour accounts for the fact that all colours are the same, in respect of being colours. It is by virtue of this property of being an area that we can formulate the rule for sentences like 'This is red' that the subject-term is to be used to refer to particulars, i.e., areas. In such sentences, the subject-term, 'This', refers on each occasion of its use to a distinguishable area, but nonetheless on each occasion when it is used, it is used to refer to an area, some area or other. Or, if we use the customary standardization instead of the token-reflexive device, where each of 'a₁', 'a₂', 'a₃', etc. names a distinct particular, i.e., area, then the fact that each of the 'aᵢ' refers to an area is reflected in each of these names having the a-shape in common, while the fact that each refers to a different area is reflected in each such name having a different subscript.

If we decide to so speak that the property that is shared by all and only particulars is the property of particularity, then, since areas are particulars, and since that property which all and only areas have in common is the property of being an area, it follows that the property of particularity is the property of being an area. The basis for identifying particularity with the property of being an area is, of course, the previous dialectical argument that areas are particulars; once the case is made that areas are particulars, that is, are the entities that solve the problem of difference, then the identification follows trivially. And it also follows, of course, that, since the property of being an area is presented, so is the property of particularity.

The case for particularity that I have just presented is, of course, just the case that Bergmann presented in his classic discussion in his "Ineffability, Ontology, and Meth-
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He first [27] considers a certain complex, to wit, a green spot. Then, within the fact that the spot is green, he distinguishes two entities, the spot and the character or property that is the spot's colour. He next proceeds to put these entities into the appropriate dialectical context. On the one hand, this shows the relevance of the phenomenological distinction to the solution of philosophical problems. On the other hand, it has a strategic importance in convincing others of the relevance of these entities or even that they are presented with them. Bergmann next turns to the main point of the essay: "When I know that this is a green spot, I also know that (1) the spot is an individual, (2) the colour is a character. . . How could I know all this if it were not, in some sense, presented to me?"[28] The rhetorical question simultaneously makes the phenomenological point—individuality or particularity, and universality are presented—and introduces the dialectical context—how could I know this unless . . . ? But this does not mean that Bergmann has here slipped from phenomenological description to transcendental argument. Rosenberg has completely misunderstood this passage: "Where the PA would lead us to expect reportage—'This and that are presented'—what we find instead is clearly an argument".[29]

Why instead? We find phenomenological reportage and an argument, specifically a dialectical argument: "It is, in fact, a transcendental deduction in the style of Kant, for its major premiss is that something is known and its conclusion that, in order for such knowledge to be possible, something else must be the case."[30] Rosenberg does get correct the premiss and the conclusion of the dialectical argument: if one is to identify particulars as particulars, then there must be a feature of particulars that recurs. Phenomenological description has already yielded such a feature. What the dialectical argument reveals is the relevance of this feature to the philosophical problem of sameness: what is it about things that permits one to identify them as the same? The argument does not have as its conclusion, however, a claim that some non-presented entity exists or must exist. While Rosenberg correctly spots the argument, he wrongly identifies it as a transcendental argument. So Rosenberg's charge[31] that Bergmann is here violating PA and the phenomenological method is just mistaken.

As for his question, "With adequate dialectics available, why the putative phenomenological appeal at all?"[32] the answer is obvious: dialectical argument alone can merely implicitly define its terms; alone, it can give them no content. For those terms and those arguments to acquire content, they must be hooked up to the world—the world that is given to us in our ordinary experience. To achieve such a hook-up, to give our dialectics content, is the task of phenomenology. Phenomenology without dialectic is empty; dialectic without phenomenology is blind. The students of Husserl make clear the former, the students of Sellars the latter.
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Bergmann has recently pointed out[33] with respect to the particular-particularity connection a significant difference between it and the connection between particulars and universals. Any particular is not only distinguishable from but is also separable from any universal. If 'a1' names some particular, then we can think of a1 as separate from any specific colour, shape, pitch, etc. For example, we can think of a1 as separate from the property red. That is, we can form the thought that would be expressed by the sentence:

\[ \sim(a1 \text{ is red}) \]

Indeed, we can attend to a1 itself without thinking of any specific colour, shape, etc., at all; we can think of a1 in isolation from all such universals. For, we can form the thought that would be expressed by uttering the sentence:

\[ (\exists x) (x = a1) \]

which is the thought that Hochberg and Bergmann once, not inappropriately, dubbed "the concept of a1".[34] However, the particular is not in these ways separable from particularity; these points—which Bergmann expresses in the claim that a1 is inseparable in thought from the property of particularity.[35] This, as Bergmann points out, is a crucial phenomenological difference between particularity, on the one hand, and (other) universals, on the other.

This "can't" is a fact about our capacities to think certain things. This fact finds its reflection in the language we use to describe the world, or, at least, in any such language that is systematically developed. Consider the difference between:

\[ a1 \]

and

\[ a1 \text{ is red} \]

That a1 is a particular is represented in the shape of the name, while that a1 is red is represented by the juxtaposition of two names to form a sentence. What cannot be in thought separated from particulars we represent through an internal complexity in the name itself; what is with a particular but can be thought apart from it, we represent by means of a sentence. An inseparable feature of the particular is represented in the logical form of its name; a separable feature is represented by a sentence. The limits of the thinkable are reflected in the logical forms we ascribe to things.

This move concerning the logical forms of names must
carefully be distinguished from a similar move by the nominalist. The latter represent facts by internally complex names, like:

\[
\text{red 1}
\]

which may be said to make \text{red} the logical form of this name. But for the nominalist, there are no distinguishable parts in the fact represented by 'red 1' or 'This - red'. Here the notation represents indistinguishability, the indistinguishability of the \text{red} and this in the This - red. In the present case, however, the particular and particularity are distinguishable, and what the notation represents is inseparability.

In adopting a Principle of Acquaintance as his primary rule of method in ontology, Bergmann is identifying what exists, in the sense of 'exist' relevant to ontology, with the thinkable.[36] Moreover, he goes on to point out, there are aspects of the thinkable that are not sayable.[37] In locating ontology within the realm of the thinkable rather than the realm of the sayable, Bergmann is, of course, disagreeing with the author of the Tractatus. For a sentence to be part of the sayable then, as the Tractatus has it, it must be possible both to assert that sentence and to deny it. Now, clearly, in some sense of 'can't', we can't deny a necessary truth; we must assert. Furthermore, also in some sense of 'can't', we can't either assert or deny an ill-formed sentence. The author of the Tractatus wished 'can't' to be absolute; he wanted its sense to be univocal. This led him to assimilate necessary truths to formation rules and contradictions to ill-formed sentences.[38] This, however, is clearly wrong: while we can't even entertain a proposition expressed by an ill-formed sentence without asserting to its falsity we can certainly can entertain a contradiction without asserting to its falsity--as, for example, when we say that an argument with contradictory premisses conforms to a criterion of validity that an argument is valid just in case that, if its premisses were true, then its conclusion would also be true. After all, we do the latter all the time in logic classes when we show that from a contradiction everything follows validly. Moreover, while we can't deny a necessary truth, we certainly can say it. So that can't be the sense of 'can' or 'possible' in which the "possibility of assertion and denial" defines the limits of the sayable. The point has to be that, while we can't deny a necessary truth, we can entertain its negation. This suggests the following criterion for unsayability: if merely entertaining \( \neg p \) requires us to assert \( p \), then \( p \) is not sayable.

Bergmann connects the sayable and the separable.[39] Consider the sentence:

(1) This is \( P \)
This ought to be denied only when that to which 'P' refers is not with that to which 'This' refers; which is to say that (1) ought to be denied only when This and P are separate. It follows that if (1) is sayable, then the things referred to by 'This' and 'P' must be separable in thought. Conversely, if merely entertaining the separateness of This and P requires us to assert that they are not separate, then (1) is not sayable. Notice, though, that even if (1) is not sayable, it is nonetheless thinkable, in the sense that we can believe it, have it as the intention of a species of experiencing, and in the sense that we can entertain its negation.

Now Bergmann holds that:

(2) This is a particular

cannot be said, since the particular which is the referent of 'This' is inseparable from particularity. But, as we have argued, (2) represents the same presented complex that:

(2₁) This is an area

represents. It follows that neither will (2₁) be sayable. Given the definition of what is sayable, this is not problematic. It does, however, raise problems about phenomenological descriptions. For, on the one hand, we do want to distinguish particularity from particulars, and to do this we must use (2) or sentences to the same effect; while, on the other hand, it would seem that we cannot use sentences (2) = (2₁) to say anything. In order to resolve this problem—which seems to cut to the heart of the idea that ontology is at bottom a phenomenological enterprise—we must look more closely at Bergmann's account of thought.

We may begin our discussion of Bergmann on thought by considering the schema:

(3) \[ \text{\textbf{P} M P} \]

of his classic essay on "Intentionality". 'P' is any well-formed sentence; 'M' represents the "means" of intentionality; 'P' is a name of a character—\(\text{\textbf{p}}\)—propositional character or thought—and specifically it is the name of the thought that means the state of affairs \(p\). A sentence of sort (3) is analytically true while one of form:

\[ \text{\textbf{P} M p} \]

where 'p' and 'q' are different sentences is analytically false.

This analysis may seem as deriving, under certain dialectical and pheomenological pressures, from some reflec-
Frege took the standard analysis of thought at his time to be this: the meaning of a sentence 'p' consists of certain sense ideas in the mind—a sort of vulgar Lockean position. Frege also assumed a sort of nominalism with respect to sense ideas: the same sense ideas could not be in two different minds. The meaning of a sentence 'p' therefore cannot be public. But it is. This leads Frege to advance a transcendental argument for a Third World, neither mental nor sensible, of meanings or senses. When a mind understands a sentence, it is related to the non-mental meaning that is the sense of the sentence. Since senses are non-mental, the nominalistic problem is avoided; several minds can be related to the same sense. Meanings are therefore public. But they are also problematic. Let a person express what he is experiencing by uttering, say, 'That chair is red'. On the one hand, there is the person's experiencing. But what the experiencing relates to directly is not the red chair but rather the sense of the sentence. The sense of proposition thus stands as it were between the experiencing and what is experienced. The result is a version of representationalism. The sceptical problems that always accompany the introduction of transcendent entities immediately appear. These difficulties are obvious. But the more profound criticism is the phenomenological: Fregean senses or propositions are simply not presented to one.

What one requires is that the meaning of the sentence be public, in the sense of sharable by several minds, and also be found in experience. Consider again the experiencing that we express by uttering (a token of) the sentence (type) 'That chair is red'. The experiencing is an event that—details aside—causes one to assert, or at least, causes one to be disposed to assert the sentence 'That chair is red'. Now consider a situation in which we see the same chair again. Once again we have an experiencing that causes one to be disposed to assert the sentence 'That chair is red'. What is relevant to this causal relationship is not the red chair nor a relation of the experiencing to the red chair. For, after all, both occasions may be hallucinatory, and objects that are not actual, merely possible, do not enter into causal relations. What is relevant to the causal relationship is a feature in such experiencings by virtue of which they both cause one to be disposed to utter the same sentence. This feature makes the two experiencings to be of the same sort. So long as one is not a nominalist, this sort can be in many experiencings, both mine and others. It is sharable, and in that sense public, and is also—unlike Fregean senses—found in experience. One may therefore identify this property of experiencings as the proposition that is the meaning one expresses when one utters 'That chair is red'. By rejecting Frege's nominalism, one can locate a feature in experience.
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that permits one to solve the problem he proposed to solve by introducing transcendental entities. The transcendental move—and the consequent radical scepticism—is parasitic upon the nominalism, and once the latter is rejected one is in a position to solve Frege's problems within the framework of the Principle of Acquaintance. It was G. E. Moore who first saw this clearly, when he identified propositions with properties—construed as universals—of acts of experiencing.[49]

Bergmann takes up this Moorean idea. He begins with the notion of the text of an awareness (experiencing):

If one asks the proper question of one who has an awareness while he has it, one elicits a certain answer. If, for instance, somebody points at the tree while I am looking at it and asks me what it is, I shall say "This is a tree". This statement is the text of my awareness.[50]

This text represents the state of affairs that is the content of the awareness. As for the sentence that is the text of the awareness, we may give its meaning in three different senses of 'meaning'. In the sense of context (meaning_c), the meaning of the sentence is, as Sellars puts it,

... understood in terms of the uniformities and propensities which connect utterances with (1) other utterances (at the same or different level of language), (2) with the perceptible environment, and (3) with courses of action (including linguistic behaviour). I say uniformities, but the uniformities are not mere uniformities, for they are grounded in rules in a way most difficult to analyze, but which involves the causal efficacy of rule expressions.[51]

Elsewhere he refers to (1) as "word-word connections", (2) as "world-word connections" and (3) "word-world connections". Sellars so explicates 'meaning' that the conceptual meaning or conceptual content of a sentence or expression is given by the word-word connections in which it stands to other expressions.[52] That is, the conceptual content is given by the axioms that implicitly define it. One may well wonder whether this is a felicitous explication of the idea of the conceptual content of an expression.[53] In any case, for any one who works within the framework of a Principle of Acquaintance, it is another sense of 'meaning', or, at least, a more restricted sense, that is relevant to explicating the idea of the conceptual content of an expression: this conceptual content will be given by the reference (meaning_r) of the expression, which is a matter (though in a complicated way) of the world-word connections that govern its use. Finally, of course, the sentence has as its intentional meaning (meaning_i) the propositional character
that causes one to be disposed to utter the sentence.

E.B. Titchener held that all meaning is meaning\(_C\), denying that there is any meaning\(_I\). The only contents, he argued, were sensory contents, contents that could be described using terms that refer to colours, shapes, pitches, and so on. Thoughts were held to be verbal and other imagery. The meaning of thoughts was to be analyzed on the model of the meaning of sentences, as meaning\(_C\).[54] Sellars defends the same position, and, as he has described it, "the framework of thinkings is an analogical one the fundamentum of which is meaningful overt speech . . ."[55] But this won't do. Upon this account, the meaning of a sentence cannot be a manifest sensory property of the sentence or the verbal image of the sentence, since the same sentence may carry different meanings—the sentence 'Dass ist rot' has one meaning for those who know German, another for those who don't;[56] rather, the meaning of the sentence must be construed as a dispositional property, the propensities that are involved in the world-word, word-word, and word-world connections that define the meaning\(_C\) of the sentence. However, as the research of the Wurzburg psychologists showed,[57] it is impossible on empirical grounds to construe the meaning of the sentence as anything but a manifest property of the mental state that disposes one to utter the sentence.[58] This manifest property is, of course, the one that we have called the proposition or propositional character.

We have, then, this account of propositional characters: the propositional character that is the meaning\(_I\) of the sentence 'p' is that character present in mental states that causes one to be disposed to utter the sentence 'p'. To elucidate this further, consider a parallel case. Suppose we have a disease D which we have reason to suppose is caused by some species of germ or other, without, however, our knowing specifically which species it is. This permits us to form the definite description:

The species of germ the presence of which causes D which in turn permits us to state the causal law that:

The presence of the species of germ the presence of which causes D causes D

This is, of course, a law—a synthetic generality—and not an analytic statement. For, accepting (as I think we must) Russell's account of definite descriptions,

The cause of A causes A

is to be construed as synthetic. The aim of medical research is, clearly, to identify the species of germ that causes D. That is, the research aims to find a species S of
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germ such that

\[ S = \text{the species of germ the presence of which causes } D \]

is confirmed. In the case of propositional characters such research is, for obvious reasons, unnecessary: being the causes in consciousness of the dispositions to utter sentences, these characters are things with which we are per-force acquainted. Moreover, these propositional characters have a characteristic "feel" that distinguishes them from other characters of mental states. Bergmann correctly draws our attention to what he calls the "species" of a mental act,[59] a sort of character always present when a propositional character is present and which disposes one to utter the sentence expressing that character in a specific mode of utterance. Thus, the species "believing" disposes one to utter the sentence in the asserting mode, "disbelieving" in the denying mode, "wishing" in the optative mode, "feeling of obligation" in the resolutive mode (if the obligation is on oneself) or in the imperative mode (if the obligation is on another).[60] Propositional characters "feel" different from these species just as colours "feel" different from shapes. This "feeling" is, of course, nothing other than the fact that the property of being a colour recurs in all colours and in nothing else. Similarly, the characteristic "feeling" of propositional characters is nothing other than the fact that a certain property—call it the property of being a thought—recurs in all propositional characters and in nothing else. Now, since we are acquainted with the propositional character that causes one to be disposed to utter 'p', let us name this character \( \sigma \). We are, furthermore, acquainted with the character of being a thought. And we are presented with the state of affairs that would be described by:

\[ \sigma \text{ is a thought} \]

However, as with so many characters, we do not in general refer to them by names but by definite descriptions. In the case of propositional characters the definite descriptions we use are given in terms of their content, that is, their texts. For \( \sigma \) we could use the definite description

The thought the presence of which causes one to be disposed to utter 'p'.

Here we have the causal relationship:

(a) The presence of the thought the presence of which causes one to be disposed to utter 'p' causes one to be disposed to utter 'p'

and identificatory relationship:
(b) \( q = \) the thought the presence of which causes one to be disposed to utter \( 'p' \).

But this is not yet quite correct; it is not yet exactly in line with what Bergmann means by 'propositional character'. There are in fact many sentences that we are often disposed to utter, that do not express "propositions", in the sense in which Bergmann means that term. For example, we are at times disposed to utter:

Quadruplicity drinks procrastination

This disposition is clearly caused by the presence of a certain specific sort of conscious state. This sort of state is indeed a thought. Yet at the same time, we not unreasonably deny that that sort of state is a propositional character: 'This is red' expresses a proposition in a way that the sentence about quadruplicity does not. Again, 'Dass ist rot' and 'This is red' are different sentences and no doubt express different thoughts--such are the subtle differences in meaning between languages. Nonetheless, there is a felt sense in which these two sentences have the same meaning, that is, express the same meaning. The two thoughts, while different, are also the same, and it is this by virtue of which they are the same that is the propositional character that is meant by each of the sentences. And it is the absence of a feature of this sort that one has in mind when one says that the sentence about quadruplicity does not express or mean a proposition.

In order to get a handle on these things, we can start from the side of sentences. The problem is to classify sentences into the propositional ('This is red') and the non-propositional ('Quadruplicity . . .'), and then to so classify sentences as the same that, when they are the same they "say the same" only in different words. The basic idea is, of course, that two sentences "say the same" if and only if their respective world-word connections are such that they refer to the same state of affairs; two sentences "say the same" if and only if they have the same meaning. And sentences are propositional just in case that there are world-word connections that give them a meaning. One way of effecting this classification is by means of the sort of abstraction that has been called an "ideal language". This is the technique that has been used by Bergmann. For our present purposes, we may take it that Bergmann's ideal language \( L \) has the syntax of (unramified) PM.[61] This syntax is interpreted in a two-stage process. First, the logical words are interpreted--the connectives in the usual truth-table fashion and the quantifiers in the usual satisfaction fashion. And second, to this interpreted syntax are added descriptive constants that are interpreted by coordinating them to presented things--constants of type 0 to particulars, constants of type 1 to properties of (including relations among) particulars, and constants of type 2 to proper-
ties of (including relations among) properties—and in terms of these truth-conditions for atomic sentences are laid down. These latter, together with the consequent semantical interpretations of the connectives and quantifiers yield truth-conditions for all sentences of L. [62] A sentence of L refers to, or means, its truth-conditions. In order to justify the choice of L one must argue that one could in principle use L to "say what one wants to say about the world"—which in this context, that of ontology, means that one could, in principle, use L to provide what phenomenological descriptions one needs for getting on with the task of ontology-epistemology. In such an argument the case is made that in principle any sentence of ordinary language that we might use in our phenomenological description of the world can be translated into L. [63] This then yields the desired classification of ordinary sentences. If such a sentence can be translated into L, then it is a proposition. And if two such sentences receive the same translation in L, then they "say the same".

Thus, for example, suppose that 'p', is a sentence of L and that 'S' and that 'S₁' are sentences of ordinary language. Then 'S' and 'S₁' "say the same" just in case they both translate into 'p'. This may happen if 'S' is one language, say English, and 'S₁' in another, say German. Or, 'S₁' may be definitional shorthand for 'S'. So, for example, 'He is a bachelor' and 'He is an unmarried male' would receive the same translation in L. This last shows, by the way, why transcription into L can only be "in principle": L contains no definitional abbreviations, a point Bergmann has only recently come to emphasize. [64] But in any case, if 'S' and 'S₁' both translate into the sentence 'p' of L, then 'S' and 'S₁' both mean what 'p' means; or, as we may also express it, both 'S' and 'S₁' mean the state of affairs that 'p' means. Thus a one-one relation between

Now, the two sentences 'S' and 'S₁', express different thoughts. One is disposed to utter the one sentence rather than the other because the one thought is present in consciousness rather than the other. But in both cases one is disposed to utter sentences that have something in common: both sentences mean that 'p'. This "something in common" is, of course, a shared dispositional property, defined in terms of relevant world-word connections. The different thoughts can causally explain the presence of this shared dispositional property only if they, too, have something in common. And—we need not repeat the case again—this feature must be a manifest property that is present in the thoughts. We may say that thoughts have flavors, and that different thoughts may have the same flavor in common, much as different colors may have the same intensity. If different thoughts have the same flavor, then the sentences they dispose one to utter mean, the same state of affairs, to wit, the state of affairs that is meant by the sentence in L into which they both translate. There is thus a one-one relation between
flavors and referential meanings. The relation of thought to sentence is one-one; that of referential meaning to sentence is one-many. The relation of flavor to sentence is one-many; but that of flavor to referential meaning is one-one.[65]

Now, for Bergmann, a propositional character is not identified by its actual text but rather by its ideal text.[66] In our way of talking, what correlates to actual texts are thoughts, and it is flavors that correlate to ideal texts. That means, then, that the properties that Bergmann refers to as propositions or propositional characters are what we have been calling flavors.

Since propositions are identified by means of their ideal texts, it follows that the relation between a proposition and actual sentences will be one-many. In particular, two sentences that are definitionally equivalent in ordinary language will express the same proposition. Bergmann has recently pointed out[67] the importance this point has in the detailed phenomenology of perception and in the solution of various philosophical problems concerning perception. D.M. Armstrong has also exploited the same point in a slightly different context.[68]

We can now take up the theme of the separable, the thinkable, and the sayable.

We above mentioned the characters that Bergmann calls the species of an experiencing—loving, hating, wishing, willing, remembering, perceiving, and so on. For present purposes, two species are important, namely, those of believing and disbelieving. If an experiencing is characterized by the species believing and the proposition \( p \), then that experiencing causes one to be disposed to utter assertively a sentence that means \( p \). Similarly, if an experiencing is a disbelieving, then that causes one to be disposed to utter denyingly a sentence of the relevant sort.

Now, for the atomic sentences \( 'p' \) of \( L \), we in general believe—or, at least, ought to believe—-with respect to the proposition for which \( 'p' \) is the ideal text, only if the state of affairs that \( 'p' \) means is given in a perceptual experience. And there are rules, of a more or less complicated sort, that connect these believings to believings with respect to molecular and quantified sentences of \( L \). For most of these cases, the believing does, and ought to, causally result from perceptual experience.

There is one group of sentences, however, for which perceptual experience is not in the same way a necessary condition for evoking the attitude of believing. I refer, of course, to the class of necessary truths.

Our \( L \) contains, thus far, no terms that mean 'possible' or 'necessary'; they must, therefore be introduced. In this
connection one develops the **syntactical notion** of a sentence of L being a tautology: a sentence is a tautology just in case it holds in all possible (non-empty)[69] universes.[70] There are problems here, but at least for the first-order language the idea is unproblematic.[71] It is this syntactical notion of being a tautology that explicates the philosophically problematic notion of "necessary truth". This justifies the following rule for the use of the necessity sign '□' in L:[72]

\[ '□ p' \text{ is true in } L \text{ if and only if } 'p' \text{ is a tautology.} \]

It follows immediately that if 'p' is a tautology, holding in all possible universes, then '□ p' also holds in all possible universes and is therefore also a tautology. It also follows that:

\[ □ p \supset p \]

is a tautology, and therefore also:

\[ □(□ p \supset p) \]

We define possibility '◊' in the usual way:

\[ '◊ p' \text{ is true in } L \text{ if and only if } '\sim □ \sim p' \text{ is true in } L. \]

This gives

\[ p \supset ◊ p \]

and

\[ □(p \supset ◊ p) \]

as further tautologies. The ideas are familiar enough, so we need not develop them further. The basic idea is due to Carnap.[73] Note, however, that the introduction of modal terms into L does not support the philosophic task of explicating the problematic modal terms:[74] rather, it is a technical move that presupposes that the philosophic problems have been solved. Carnap, of course, always more impressed by technical moves than a philosopher ought to be, never quite saw this.[75]

Formerly Bergmann's L contained no modal terms. If I understand him correctly, then now it does. He tells us that "... what is analytic ... is not an expression of IL [ideal language] but the complex it stands for",[76] which must mean that we can introduce into L, Bergman's IL, for any analytic sentence 'p', a new term, '... is necessary', which, when predicated of 'p', to give 'p is necessary', represents the objective feature, to which Berg-
mann refers, of the complex that 'p' stands for (means r).

Let us now sketch, as armchair psychologists, some of the principles that now go under the name of the "logic of belief", that is, the axiomatic treatment of the lawful relations among propositions and the species believing and disbelieving. For example, just as colours are incompatible, so are the species believing and disbelieving. That is, it is a law that:

(B₁) For any experiencing a, and any proposition \( p \), if a is a \( p \) and also a believing [disbelieving] then a is not a disbelieving [believing].

or, to put equally clearly but more briefly:

For any proposition \( p \), if \( p \) is believed [disbelieved] then \( p \) is not disbelieved [believed].

We also have laws that go roughly like this:

(B₂) For any proposition \( p \), \( p \) is believed [disbelieved] if and only if \( \sim p \) is disbelieved [believed].

But if believing \( p \) always excludes believing \( \sim p \), the same does not hold for another species, that of supposing or entertaining. If I believe a proposition, I cannot (as a matter of law) believe its contradictory, but I can still entertain the latter.

The interesting case is that of necessary propositions. For most propositions, believing with respect to them is and ought to be causally evoked through some perceptual experience. But if we have before our minds a proposition to the effect that something is necessary, then that by itself is sufficient to evoke a believing. That is, for such propositions something like this holds:

(B₃) For any experiencing a, and proposition \( \Diamond p \), if a is a \( \Diamond p \) then a is a believing.

Propositions ascribing necessity to states of affairs thus by themselves cause one to believe them. In this way such propositions constrain our capacities to believe and disbelieve, and this is, moreover, a felt constraint: the believing that is evoked by a proposition ascribing necessity to a state of affairs is one that is felt to be imposed, there is a feeling of necessity or inevitability about it. There is, as Bergmann has said, nothing logical about logic. In this sense, there is no logical must. This is indeed so, as far as concerns the truth of such propositions. Nonetheless, it is also a fact of psychology, or of the "logic

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of belief" if you wish, that propositions ascribing necessity demand belief. In this sense, logic does constrain us; in this sense, there is a "logical must". This feeling of constraint that we are talking about is a feature of the believing itself, and such a believing has been said by Brentano to be evident.[78] Bergmann follows Brentano in this way of speaking.[79] Thus, a proposition ascribing necessity to a state of affairs evokes an evident believing.

It is clear that, besides evident believings, there are also evident disbelievings. If \( \neg p \) is a contradiction, in the syntactical sense, of \( L \), that is, a sentence that is false in all possible worlds, then \( \neg \neg p \) holds. \( \neg \neg p \) says that \( p \) is impossible. Then, an evident disbelieving with respect to itself will be evoked by any proposition \( \neg \neg p \) that causes one to be disposed to utter a sentence that means \( p \) is impossible.

We need to record two final laws in our brief "logic of belief". These describe processes of inference. The first concerns inferences from propositions that are believed:

\[(B_4) \text{ For any propositions } p', \quad \neg p \Rightarrow q \text{ and } q', \text{ if } p' \text{ is believed and } \neg p \Rightarrow q \text{ is believed, then } q' \text{ is believed.}\]

This is the modus ponens inference. A similar law will hold for disbelievings yielding the modus tollens inference. And other laws will describe other forms of inference, corresponding to other elementary valid argument forms. We must also recognize that we also have inferences from entertainings, described by laws like:

\[(B_5) \text{ For any propositions } p', \quad \neg p \Rightarrow q \text{ and } q', \text{ if } p' \text{ is entertained, and } \neg p \Rightarrow q \text{ is believed, then } q' \text{ is entertained.}\]

As the last one that we need look at, we should note that:

\[(B_6) \text{ For any proposition } p', \text{ if } p' \text{ is believed then } p' \text{ is believed with evidence.}\]

If we assume that a person believes the tautology \( \neg (\neg p \Rightarrow p) \) then \( (B_4) \) implies that if he believes \( \neg p \Rightarrow p \) then he believes \( p \). That means that believing \( \neg p \Rightarrow p \) and \( \neg p \) places constraints on the attitude one can have with respect to \( p \); thus, in those circumstances, the belief with respect to \( p \) will be an evident belief—which is what \( (B_6) \) asserts. \( (B_6) \) accounts for how tautologies come to be believed with evidence.

In order to specify \( L \) we need a list (11) of individual constants \( a_1 \), \( a_2 \), ... , each of which is interpreted to mean a distinguishable area; and we need a list (12) of
predicate constants, \( F_1, F_2, \ldots \), each of which is interpreted to mean a distinguishable property of areas. (We may, for present purposes, ignore relations.) Now, the Principle of Exemplification holds: for every particular there is a property that it has, and for every property, there is an area that has it. This is reflected in the formation rule for atomic sentences of \( L \): complexes in the world are to be represented by strings of the form \( Fa \), where it is understood that something has the \( a \)-shape if and only if it occurs in the list \( (1) \) of the individual constants that are interpreted to mean areas. Once the atomic sentences are introduced in this way, the other sentences are introduced in the usual way. Thus, for example, we lay it down that if \( \phi \) is any sentence, and in particular any atomic sentence, then \( \neg \phi \) is also a sentence.

There is a sense in which a string \( \phi \) is truth-valuable—can be either true or false—if and only if \( \phi \) is a well-formed sentence of \( L \). We may therefore adopt Strawson’s term ‘presupposes’ and say that \( \phi \) presupposes \( \psi \) just in case that \( \phi \) is a well-formed sentence of \( L \) entails \( \psi \).

Let us now suppose that we have included in our list \( (1) \) of predicate constants a predicate that means the property of particularity, that is, the property of being an area. We will then have a sentence in \( L \) that says:

\[
(4) \quad a_1 \text{ is an area}
\]

Let

\[
(5) \quad \Gamma (a_1)
\]

be any well-formed sentence of \( L \) that contains the individual constant \( a_1 \) but not the predicate that means the property of being an area. It is evident that (5) presupposes (4) for, \( \Gamma (a_1) \) can be a well-formed sentence of \( L \) only if \( a_1 \) is an area: the definition of ‘well-formed sentence of \( L \)’ requires that each constant, and \( a_1 \) in particular, mean a thing which is an area. Thus, in using any sentence (5) about \( a_1 \) which does not explicitly ascribe the property of being an area to \( a_1 \), we are still implicitly ascribing that property to \( a_1 \) in the sense that (5) presupposes (4). In this sense there is never any need to introduce (4) into \( L \), never any need to introduce a predicate that means the property of being an area, i.e., the property of particularity. As Bergmann once expressed it, the property of particularity can be explicitly introduced into \( L \) only with futility.\[82\]

We can already see one sense in which particulars cannot be separated from particularity. Consider the proposition dubbed by Bergmann and Hochberg "the concept of \( a_1 \)", that is, the proposition that would be expressed by uttering the sentence:
This is a special case of (5). It therefore presupposes (4). In this sense, the concept of \(a\) cannot be separated from \(a\) being an area, that is, from \(a\) being a particular or having particularity.

But Bergmann makes a stronger claim: that \(a\) has particularity can be thought but cannot be said. The argument for the futility of introducing a predicate for particularity does not establish the unsayability claim. After all, if something is sayable only with futility, it is still sayable. We must see if we can make sense of Bergmann's stronger claim.

Consider once again the sentence:

\[(4) \quad a \text{ is an area}\]

This has the logical form of an atomic sentence of \(L\). This means that:

\[(6) \quad 'a \text{ is an area}' \text{ is a non-self-contradictory well-formed sentence of } L\]

is a sentence about a sentence of \(L\), but is true if and only if

\[(7) \quad \Diamond (a \text{ is an area})\]

its reflection in \(L\), is true. (7) is itself a well-formed sentence of \(L\), and therefore presupposes (4). We therefore have:

\[(8) \quad \Diamond (a \text{ is an area}) \supset a \text{ is an area}\]

But, the semantics of \(\Diamond\) make (6) and (7) logically equivalent, and the definition of 'well-formed sentence of \(L\)' means that (6) entails (4). Hence the antecedent of (8) entails the consequent. Thus, (8) itself is a necessary truth:

\[(9) \quad \square [ \Diamond (a \text{ is an area}) \supset a \text{ is an area}]\]

Similarly, for the sentence:

\[(10) \quad \sim (a \text{ is an area})\]

we have:

\[(11) \quad \square [ \Diamond \sim (a \text{ is an area}) \supset a \text{ is an area}]\]

Thus, for '\(a\) is an area' we have the principle (9') ab posse ad esse: \(\square (\Diamond p \supset p)\); and for '\(\sim (a \text{ is an area})\)' we
have the principle \((11')\) ab posse ad nonesse: \(\Box (\Diamond p \lor \neg p)\).

But if \(\Diamond p \supset p\) holds for \(p\), then by transposition, so does \(\neg p \supset \neg \Diamond p\). And, by substitution and elimination of double negation, so does \(p \supset \neg \Diamond \neg p\), or, what is the same \(p \supset \Box p\). Thus, \((9)\) commits us to:

\[(9') \Box [\neg (a_1 \text{ is an area}) \lor \Box (a_1 \text{ is an area})] \]

Similarly, if \(\Diamond p \supset \neg p\) holds for \(p\), then so does \(p \supset \Diamond \neg p\), and therefore also \(p \supset \Box \neg p\). Thus, \((11)\) commits us to:

\[(11') \Box [\neg (a_1 \text{ is an area}) \lor \Box (a_1 \text{ is an area})] \]

Let us now suppose that one has an experiencing that is an entertaining of the proposition \(p\_a_1\text{ is an area}\). Assume also that we have thought seriously about these matters and have come to entertain also that \((9')\) is true. By \((B_3)\) we will therefore believe \((9')\). But, by \((B_4)\), this will generate an inference that will lead us to entertain "\(\Box (a_1 \text{ is an area})\)". However, by \((B_3)\) that means we will believe \(\Box (a_1 \text{ is an area})\) and therefore, by \((B_6)\), that we will believe with evidence \(p\_a_1\text{ is an area}\). And the latter believing is one that causes us to be disposed to assert that \(a_1\) is an area.

A similar line of reasoning will show that if we entertain the proposition \(\neg (a_1 \text{ is an area})\), then we will be led to believe with evidence \(\neg a_1\text{ is an area}\) and again be disposed to assert that \(a_1\) is an area.

Compare this to several other cases. Entertain the proposition \(p \lor \neg p\): the "logic of belief" does not bring about the disposition to assert the tautology. Nor does entertaining its contradictory. Or, entertain \(\Box \neg p\): the "logic of belief" leads one to believe that \(p\), to believe with evidence that \(p\), and to be disposed to assert that \(p\). But we can still entertain \(\neg a_1\text{ is an area}\), for which the "logic of belief" would lead us, if we had thought seriously about possibility and necessity, to entertain \(\Diamond \neg a_1\text{ is an area}\), but the "logic of belief" would not lead us to believe that \(\Box a_1\text{ is an area}\), nor to believe that \(p\), nor, therefore, lead us to be disposed to assert that \(p\). In contrast, the truths that relate possibility, necessity, and states of affairs, and the constraints on thoughts that we call the "logic of belief" guarantee that if we entertain a thought that a particular is not an area, that is, that a particular is separate from particularity, then we are constrained to believe, we must believe, that the particular does have particularity. In this sense, no particular is separable in thought from particularity: just to think it separate constrains us to believe that it is not separate. Moreover, if a sentence is sayable, it must be possible to deny it; what cannot be denied is not sayable. But we have just seen that the truths that relate possibility, necessity, and states of affairs, and the laws of the "logic of belief" constrain our
thoughts, and therefore the utterance of sentences expressing those thoughts, in such a way that one cannot deny particularity of particular. Hence, as Bergmann says, while a particular having particularity is thinkable, it is not sayable.

The problem we raised above was this. Given that

(2) This is a particular

and

(2₁) This is an area

represent the same complex, and if what these represent is not sayable, then how can (2₁) = (2₁) be used to give the phenomenological description that is a necessary condition for solving the philosophical problems surrounding particularity? Now, as we laid things out, 'p' is unsayable provided that, whether 'p' or '¬p' is entertained, in either case one is constrained to believe that p. However, it is clear that, even if 'p' is in this sense unsayable, the proposition 'p' that it expresses can be thought: it can be present in an act of entertaining or supposing. Thus, even if 'p' is unsayable, the complex that 'p' represents can still be the intention of an act of experiencing. So, what (2) = (2₁) represents can be the intention of an act of experiencing. And we can have terms—as in (2₁)—that represent different parts of the complex. In short, although the state of affairs that (2₁) represents is unsayable, nonetheless the state of affairs can be represented in language, and recorded, therefore, in our phenomenological description.

Of course, what we can do with such sentences in language is severely circumscribed by their being unsayable. Language is developed not merely to give phenomenological descriptions of the intentions of our experiencings; it is also developed in order to record which among those intentions we believe actually exist in the world. Language is developed not merely to record what propositions we can entertain about the world; it is also developed to represent what we believe to be the truth about the world. Now, one of the things that is important for most of our beliefs, is that we must allow for their revision. After all, there is no foundation for empirical belief. Our language must therefore provide a mechanism by which, for every empirical belief, there is available not only a sentence which records that belief, but also the negation of that sentence which will then be available if we change our minds. Now, although we can think the negation of (2₁)—entertain it as an hypothesis—we cannot believe it. That is why (2₁) is unsayable. And since we can't believe the negation of (2₁), there is no possibility of our changing our belief (2), nor therefore any need to allow for the negation of that sen-
tence in our language. We distinguish between the unrevisable framework beliefs, beliefs like that expressed by \((2_1) = (2)\), and other, revisable beliefs. The state of affairs for which we have unrevisable beliefs are represented in language by the logical forms of names of things, while the states of affairs for which we have revisable beliefs are represented in language by sentences about things. In normal discourse, then, concerned as it is about discovering the truth, states of affairs in which we have unrevisable beliefs can be taken for granted, represented implicitly in the form of names, rather than explicitly in sentences.

Representing the state of affairs that

\[(4) \ a_1 \text{ is an area} \]

implicitly in the form of the name

\[a_1\]

has an important consequence for the negation

\[(10) \ \sim (a_1 \text{ is an area})\]

of that state of affairs. We have seen that if (10) is a well-formed sentence, then it is false. In other words, (10) is excluded from (correctly) representing any state of affairs in the world by the very formation rules of the language in which it occurs. In that sense (10) is an ill-formed sentence. If a state of affairs is not sayable, then its negation is ill-formed. However, even ill-formed sentences can be used, and in certain contexts they must be used. That is, in those contexts we must use sentences that would, in belief-stating contexts, be construed as ill-formed.

This, by the way, permits us to make an interesting point about the nominalist. He uses the name

This - red

to name the red spot, and has the red-shape, which represents the redness of the spot, as the logical form of the name, just as for us the name of a particular

\[a_1\]

has the a-shape, which represents the particularity of the area, as the logical form of the name. It is thus part of the nominalist's language that its formation rules guarantee the truth of

\[(12) \text{This-red is red}\]
and the falsity of

(13) \sim (\text{This-red is red})

Thus, just as for us (4) is unsayable and (10) is ill-formed, so for the nominalist will (12) be unsayable and (13) ill-formed. Moreover, a parallel sort of reasoning will lead directly to the conclusion that, in the nominalist's language the unsayable (12) expresses an unrevisable belief. Thus, the nominalist's commitment to a language in which names like 'This-red' occur amounts to a commitment to the idea that beliefs in which properties are ascribed to particulars are unrevisable. We thus see clearly that nominalists like Sellars are committed to a foundationist account of empirical knowledge. They disguise this foundationalism by adopting the peculiar language that they do, the language with the peculiar names like 'This-red'. Nor, if our above case—which is essentially Bergmann's--against nominalism is correct, does this choice of language have anything to recommend it as the ideal language L that a philosopher might adopt.

But to return to our main theme: in belief-stating contexts it suffices to represent the unsayable implicitly. But, in ontological discourse we must make explicit the structure of these states of affairs, represent their distinguishable parts explicitly in language. Which is to say, we must introduce formally into our language a predicate that represents the property of being an area, that is, the property of being a particular. For, how else could we provide, for our ontological discourse, the indispensible phenomenological description of the state of affairs of, say, $a_1$ being an area. To be sure, the adding of the predicate 'is an area' to language will, in the sense we have suggested, be an exercise in futility. On the other hand, although the use of sentences like $\sim a_1$ is an area' will be futile with respect to conveying information--the information is already implicitly there in the fact that $a_1$ is an individual constant--nonetheless the sentence is still needed in order to make that information explicit for the purpose of solving philosophical problems.

But if we introduce into language a predicate that permits us to form sentences like:

(4) $a_1$ is an area

then we will also have sentences like:

(10) $\sim (a_1$ is an area)

which in belief-stating contexts must be considered as ill-formed. And if we can have sentences like the latter, then we can at least entertain propositions that they can express. We can at least conceive that (10) obtains, enter-
tain it, even if we can't believe it. After all, what is a proposition but a feature of consciousness that causes one to be disposed to utter the sentence said to express it. We have uttered (10), treating it hypothetically. And if we have uttered it, then we were disposed to utter it. And the disposition had a cause in consciousness, to wit, the proposition \( \neg(\alpha) \) that was being entertained. So the negation of (4) is in this sense thinkable.

Now, on this last point Bergmann disagrees. This is the first of my disagreements with Bergmann. For Bergmann, the state of affairs that (10) represents cannot be thought: not only can it not be believed, it cannot even be entertained. And if it cannot be entertained, that is because there can be no proposition intending that unthinkable state of affairs. But a proposition just is the property the presence of which in an experiencing causes one to be disposed to utter a sentence. Where a sentence is available for use, then, there a proposition is possible, and the state of affairs the sentence represents is thinkable. That means that a predicate meaning the property of being an area, i.e., meaning, particularity, cannot be introduced into language, not even with futility. For, once such a predicate is introduced, that permits the formation of sentences that negate its holding of a particular. It follows that, for Bergmann, one can never in a sentence ascribe particularity to a particular. Ontological discourse about particularity must therefore all be non-literal. That can only mean that this sort of ontological discourse can only proceed by means of metaphor and image. Bergmann has often used metaphors and images to discuss ontology, and more often than not they are illuminating. Some of his metaphors about particularity are of this sort. But for us, these metaphors can be unpacked into non-metaphorical language; for us, they do not form the substance of ontological discourse. For Bergmann, in contrast, metaphor is the substance of ontological discourse. But it seems odd that he should say this. Why does he not recognize that a predicate that means the property of being an area can--as we have done--be introduced into language, and therefore that sentences negating it of particulars can be introduced, and therefore that propositions negating them of a particular can be entertained and the separation of a particular from particularity can be thought if not believed?

This disagreement with Bergmann is related to my second disagreement, which concerns the relation between a propositional character and its content.

Bergmann represents this relation, as we saw, by:

\[
(3) \quad \gamma P \quad \mathcal{M} \quad p
\]

where '\( \gamma P \)\' names the propositional character, '\( p \)' represents its ideal text, and '\( \mathcal{M} \)' is read as "means". It
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would seem, from what we have seen above of Bergmann's discussion, that one way of construing (3) would be as:

(14) The presence of the proposition the presence of which causes one to be disposed to utter a sentence that means \( \rho \) causes one to be disposed to utter a sentence that means \( \rho \).

Understood in this way, the sign '\( \rho \)' is a definite description; it is a notational abbreviation for:

The proposition the presence of which causes one to be disposed to utter a sentence that means \( \rho \).

The corner quotes would represent the second-order property of being a proposition, and the occurrence of '\( \rho \)' with them indicates in admirably brief but perspicuous fashion the sort of sentence that the proposition in question causes one to be disposed to utter. As for the sign 'M', this will, it is evident, have to be understood as a shorthand way of referring to the causal relation between the propositional character and that which it causes, viz., the disposition to utter a sentence of a certain sort.

Bergmann, however, does not construe (3) as (14). In the first place, he construes '\( \rho \)' as a predicate, that is, as the name of a character rather than a definite description. And in the second place, he construes 'M' as representing a logical connection rather than as a causal relation; it is a logical connection between a character and a state of affairs. So construing them, he can provide, he believes, and as we saw, a syntactical sense in which (3) is analytic, a necessary truth: [85] a sentence of the form '\( \rho \). . . M . . .' is analytic just in case the sentence of L that comes after the 'M' is identical to the sentence placed between the corner quotes.

This is, however, problematic indeed. For one, the rule for introducing the propositional predicates is general, and yields such a predicate for every sentence of L. But many such sentences one is never disposed to assert, and therefore are the text of no propositional character: these sentences correspond to what might be call unthought thoughts. However, unthought thoughts aren't experienced and therefore can't be named by predicates of L. Hence, the rule for introducing the propositional predicates introduces many predicates that do not denote, many names that do not name. [86] In this way the rule for the propositional predicates is more like the rule for introducing definite descriptions than it is like any rule for introducing names (individual constants or predicates). For two, the propositional predicates are supposed to have all the properties of (undefined) predicates. So far as concerns syntax, the
only structure predicates like:

\[ F_1, F_2, \ldots \]

etc., have is the difference between the \( F \)-shape (which represents the property of being a character, i.e., universality) and the subscripts that distinguish the predicates from each other. If the propositional predicates are predicates among predicates, they should have no further structure than this. So, the sentence \( 'p' \) is no more a part of \( 'F' \) than the word 'cat' is part of the word 'cattle'. This is the reason why one can't quantify into corner quotes: strictly speaking there is nothing (proper) inside the quotes. But in fact the propositional characters do have more syntactical structure than ordinary predicates. It is precisely the internal structure they officially do not have that permits Bergmann to give his syntactical explication of the necessity of \( 'F'Mp' \): we need to know what is between the corners and compare it with what is to the right of the \( 'M' \) in order to determine the analyticity of an \( 'M' \)-sentence.[87] Of course, if the propositional "predicate" is really a disguised definite description, then its internal complexity can be understood. But, in that case, it doesn't really occur in \( M \)--remember, \( M \) contains no abbreviations --in which case the syntactical explication of the necessity of \( 'F'Mp' \) is destroyed. In any case, for three, \( 'M' \) remains in a special syntactical category of its own, neither a relation (which connects things, i.e., individuals or properties, to other things) nor a connective (which connects states of affairs to other states of affairs), but a "pseudo-relation" connecting certain things, viz., propositional characters, to states of affairs.[88]

Bergmann has come to recognize that there are indeed a series of problems here, and has come to modify his view about the relation between a proposition and the state of affairs that is its content. To see where he goes, we can begin by noting that in (3) there is a redundancy. Either

\[ (3') \quad (F^a, p) \]

or

\[ (3'') \quad F M p \]

could represent that there is a connection between a character and a state of affairs. In (3') the connection shows itself in the name of the character; in (3'') the connection is represented as an external relation between the character and the state of affairs. Bergmann's new notation is officially that of (3'').[89] However, it is also explained that the connection is not external to either the character or the state of affairs, but is grounded in the pair (character, state of affairs) and nothing else.[90] This means, then, that unofficially Bergmann has opted for
The move that he makes here is curiously similar to that of the nominalist who insists that the two red spots are simples—can only be named—and also that their sameness is grounded in the spots themselves—something which reflects itself in the internal complexity of names. Just as for the nominalist the colour of the spot becomes the logical form of the name 'This-red' of the spot, so for Bergmann, it would seem, that a proposition has a certain state of affairs as its content becomes part of the logical form of the name of the proposition. In any case, by making the relation of a proposition to its context part of the logical form of the name of the proposition, Bergmann has the formation rules of his language guarantee that a sentence that ascribes the content of a proposition to that proposition will represent the unsayable and express an unrevisable belief, and that the negation of that sentence will be ill-formed. Thus,

\[(3') \text{ } \forall p \exists \neg (\exists p)
\]

will turn out to be a necessary truth. Bergmann is committed to the necessity of (3'). His earlier attempt to explain its necessity syntactically failed. He now attempts to explain its necessity in terms of the formation rules of his language.

On the other hand, one might well question on both dialectical and phenomenological grounds whether Bergmann has succeeded. Dialectically, the names of propositions will stand out from all other names as involving complex patterns of logical form. That is, have the problems surrounding the special names \(\forall p\) really been avoided? Moreover, phenomenologically, propositions would seem to have—as Bergmann also insists—a simplicity that these complex names deny. To be sure, the use of sentences to refer to propositions is natural, but that does not mean that those sentences must be construed as naming the propositions.

In any case, however, Bergmann does wish to construe:

\[(3) \exists p \forall p
\]

as a necessary truth. Now consider our sentence:

\[(10) \sim (a_1 \text{ is an area})
\]

and substitute it in (3):

\[(3) \exists p \forall p \sim (a_1 \text{ is an area})
\]

A necessary truth is a truth, and a truth can be expressed only by a well-formed sentence. But if, as we have argued, (10) is ill-formed, then so presumably is (3*), at least in respect of the occurrence of (10) on the right hand side. Hence, so long as Bergmann construes (3) as a necessary
truth, he cannot allow ill-formed sentences to substitute for \( \text{r} \), and, since (3) is the only schema he has for relating a thought to its content, it follows that ill-formed sentences can never, for Bergmann, express thoughts: \textit{the ill-formed is unthinkable}. It is for this reason, I suggest, that for Bergmann (10) cannot even be thought, cannot even be entertained. Thus, given Bergmann's commitment to the necessary truth of (3), it follows that ontological discourse about particularity must be non-literal.

On the other hand, if we construe \( \text{r} \) as a definite description, and (3) as the causal statement (14), then there is no reason why we cannot have thoughts the texts of which are ill-formed sentences. The problem that Bergmann has with respect to ill-formed sentences no longer arises. We now have:

\[(c) \text{ (The presence of) } \text{r} \text{ causes one to be disposed to utter a sentence that means}_r \text{p} \]

as our construal of \( \text{r} \text{ M p'} \). To say that:

\[
\text{Sentence } S \text{ in English means}_r \text{p}
\]

is to say that:

\[
\text{Sentence } S \text{ in English has the same world-word connections that 'p' has in L.}
\]

So \( \text{p} \) does not \textit{itself} occur in (c), nor therefore in \( \text{r} \text{ M p'} \), as it does on Bergmann's construal. What occurs in (c) is the name of a sentence, and so long as an ill-formed sentence has a well-formed name then that name can occur in (c) and therefore--albeit misleadingly—in the \( \text{p} \) slot on the right-hand side of \( \text{r} \text{ M p'} \). Our construal of the latter in terms of (c) thus permits one to have thoughts that are expressed by ill-formed sentences. Such thoughts may well, as we have suggested, be flavored differently from those expressed by well-formed sentences, so that we group the latter together as propositional and the former as, let us say, non-propositional. But non-propositional thoughts are still thoughts.

The question would then seem to be whether Bergmann has a good reason for holding (3) as necessary. The reason he gives in "Intentionality" is this. He considers the state of affairs that \( a \) is green, which he transcribes into his L as the sentence \( \text{gr } (a) \) and remarks that:

\[
\ldots \text{after 'gr' and 'a' have been interpreted,} \ldots \\
\ldots \text{'gr } (a) \text{' must be interpreted as the name of the character which my awareness possesses if and only if it is an awareness of what 'gr } (a)'
\]
refers to. [That is to say, he recognizes here an objection we raised above concerning the aptness of construing \( \text{r} \text{p} \) as a name. But, he proceeds to argue, this anomaly is justified.] On the other hand, we would like to say that [this] is "merely a linguistic matter" or, as I once put it, that to be an awareness of a certain kind and to have a certain content (and, therefore, text) is one thing and not two.[91]

Now, it seems that there is some justice in this argument. Taking (a) and (b) as our model, we construe \( \text{r} \text{p} \) as the proposition that causes one to be disposed to utter a sentence that means \( \text{r} \text{p} \), and let \( \alpha = \text{r} \text{p} \). In that case we have the law that:

\[
(15) \quad \alpha \text{ causes one to be disposed to utter a sentence that means} \text{r} \text{p}. 
\]

What (15) asserts is that \( \alpha \) constrains us linguistically, and indeed that it constrains us in a very specific way, namely, to utter a sentence with a very specific meaning. In this sense, being an awareness of a certain sort and having a certain content are indeed inseparable. Yet the inseparability is causal rather than ontological. Inseparability in the causal sense does not justify construing:

\[
\text{r} \text{p} \text{M} \text{p} 
\]
as necessary in the sense of analytic. It would seem that Bergmann moves illegitimately from:

One is constrained to utter a sentence that means \( \text{r} \text{p} \) when \( \text{r} \text{p} \) is present

to:

One is constrained to believe \( \text{r} \text{p} \text{M} \text{p} \)

Moreover, as Bergmann so carefully brings out, when a thought \( \text{r} \text{p} \) is present in consciousness, there is also very often a thought of a sentence that means \( \text{r} \text{p} \). I suspect that these further causal relations facilitate the illegitimate move just indicated.

So here, then, is my second disagreement with Bergmann: he construes \( \text{r} \text{p} \text{M} \text{p} \) as analytic where I would construe it as causal.

We now turn to the third point of disagreement. Not surprisingly, it is related to the first two.

Bergmann introduces into his L a sign \( \neq \) to express the concept of difference, or, as he calls it, diversity.[92] The contrary concept expressed by \( = \) is that of
sameness. This concept is, of course, the strict concept of sameness, and not the Russell-Leibniz concept in which two individuals are said to be the same if and only if they have all their properties in common. For clearly, it is possible (in the sense of: not self-contradictory) that two different individuals (strict sense) should have all their properties in common, and therefore be the same (Russell-Leibniz sense).

The basic semantical rule for interpreting the names (individual and predicate constants) of L is that of "one name-one thing". Given this rule, it immediately follows that:

\[ a_1 \neq a_2 \]

is true in all possible worlds and therefore is necessary, while:

\[ a_1 = a_2 \]

and:

\[ a_1 \neq a_4 \]

are false in all possible worlds and therefore are self-contradictory. These things being so, the "logic of belief" [see (B3) and (B6)] entails that if the proposition:

\[ \neg \Box (a_1 \neq a_2) \]

is present then this causes us to believe with evidence the proposition:

\[ \neg a_1 \neq a_2 \]

and to disbelieve with evidence:

\[ \neg a_1 = a_2 \]

We can, however, entertain both this proposition and also the proposition:

\[ \neg \neg (a_1 \neq a_2) \]

without being constrained to believe \[ a_1 \neq a_2 \]. In this case, the merely entertaining of \[ \neg \neg \] does not constrain us to believe \[ \neg \]. It follows that the state of affairs represented by:

\[ a_1 \neq a_2 \]

is sayable, unlike the state of affairs represented by \[ 'a_1 is an area' \]. On the other hand, it is only sayable with futility, since, given the rule for the semantics of L, any
Diversity already shows itself in the difference of names. The diversity of two things is grounded in the things themselves—in the pair and in no third entity. Diversity is thus an internal relation.

Besides the diversity of individuals, we also have the diversity of properties:

\[ \text{red} \neq \text{green} \]

and the diversity of things and properties:

\[ a_1 \neq \text{red} \]

However, the property of particularity is not diverse from particulars.[95] In this sense, for Bergmann a particular is not different from the particularity in it. But at the same time, he also insists,[96] neither is a particular the same as the particularity in it. The concepts of sameness and difference (diversity) simply do not apply to the pair:

\[ (a_1, \text{particularity}) \]

where \( a_1 \)' names some particular. To try to say either:

\[ a_1 \neq \text{particularity} \]

or:

\[ a_1 = \text{particularity} \]

is to try to say the ill-formed. As a consequence, in his ontological discourse about the connection between particulars and particularity Bergmann resorts to metaphors rather than literal discourse: the particular is, he tells us, "pervaded by particularity",[97] and the two, which are not really two, but not really one either, do not form a whole which is complex but rather a "two-in-one".[98]

It is easy enough to see, in the light of our discussion of the first two disagreements with Bergmann, why he must say that a particular and particularity are neither the same nor different, and why he must therefore resort to non-literal discourse to make his phenomenological point. For, if particularity were to be different (diverse) from a particular, say \( a_1 \), then we would be able to say in \( L \):
But in that case 'is a particular' would appear as a predicate in L, which would in turn mean that both the sentences \( a_1 \) is a particular' and \( \lnot(a_2 \) is a particular)' would appear as sentences. The latter, however, is to be construed as ill-formed. But if it could appear as a sentence in L, then the state of affairs it represents would be thinkable. Or, in short, if particularity were said to be different from the particulars it pervades, then the ill-formed would be thinkable.

On Bergmann's account, it would seem that the pair:

\[
(a_1, a_2)
\]

does more than by itself ground the diversity of the two particulars. It would seem that the pair also by itself grounds the sameness of the particulars, that is, the fact that they are the same in respect of being particulars. Moreover, to repeat, they ground this sameness not by virtue of a shared part—for that would make them complex—but simply by themselves and in their simplicity. That would mean, then, that the pair grounds not merely the internal relation of diversity but also a second internal relation of sameness.

Nor is this idea unfamiliar to us. For, it was the nominalist who held that the pair:

\[
(\text{red}_1, \text{red}_2)
\]

by itself grounded the internal relation of difference, by virtue of which there are two red's, and also a second internal relation of sameness, by virtue of which the two are both red's.

However, if—as I think it does—Bergmann's case against nominalism goes through, then it would seem that the same case can be made against his "two-in-one's". Consider the "two-in-one" in which particularity "pervades" a given particular. This state of affairs would be represented—with futility, and not in a sayable way, for Bergmann—by the sentence:

\[
(2) \text{This is a particular}
\]

which, as we have argued, must represent, for Bergmann, the same presented state of affairs that:

\[
(21) \text{This is an area}
\]

represents. \((21)\) is phenomenological description. The identification of \((21)\) and \((2)\) is the upshot of dialectical argument developed subsequently to the giving of this de-
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scription. So the question about "two-in-one's" arises for that which is described in (2_1). Now suppose that the referent of 'This' in (2_1) = (2) occurs in a complex that also contains the color red, and consider:

(16) Red is a colour

The case against nominalism directs our attention to the distinguishable property referred to by 'colour' which is a feature of This and which recurs in other areas. It is just this distinguishable property of being an area that our dialectics leads us to identify as the property of particularity.

But this counts as an argument against Bergmann's ontological claims about "two-in-one's" only if difference (=) is identified with distinguishability. Bergmann was once inclined to make this identification.[99] At that point he was willing to say that a particular and particularity were diverse. Now, however, they are not diverse. In Bergmann's present view,[100] particulars are diverse from other particulars, from universals, and from states of affairs; universals are distinct from other universals, from particulars, and from states of affairs; and similarly for states of affairs. These entities are separable from each other. Thus, Bergmann identifies difference with separability.

This is our third disagreement with Bergmann.

Which identification ought to be accepted? Clearly, this is a matter of dialectics: one must argue that with the identification one chooses one can solve the philosophical problems.

It would seem that Bergmann's identification does run into difficulty. I shall mention but three points. First, Bergmann ends up being unable to say literally what a "two-in-one" is. He must, upon his own account of the matter, turn to non-literal ontological discourse, and resort to metaphors and similes that cannot be unpacked. This by itself is odd for a philosopher who, like Bergmann, locates himself in the more sober philosophical tradition that thinks poetry is best left to the poets. But in any case it also seems to come into conflict with Bergmann's phenomenological method, his phenomenological method, which asserts that phenomenological description must precede all attempts at ontology. The idea of description certainly seems to be that of literal description. Second, if Bergmann permits "two-in-one's"—simples that ground internal relations of sameness and difference—at the point of particulars and particularity, then why does he not allow them at an earlier point—at, for example, the point where the nominalist introduces the "two-in-one's" that he refers to by names like 'This-red'? Peterson has recently raised this point in a strong defense of the nominalist position.[101] If Berg-
mann's reply is dialectical, then that would violate the phenomenological method. But if the reply is phenomenological, then the first difficulty arises immediately.

Third. Bergmann must somehow recognize the distinguishability of the particular $a_1$ and particularity. And indeed he does: the "two" in the "two-in-one" are "things which are not nothings". To do this he will need a sign in his language to mark this notion of distinguishability. But as soon as he does, it will no longer be necessary to speak of two primitive internal relations of sameness and diversity. The relation of sameness between $a_1$ and $a_2$ will be definable in terms of a distinguishable part recurring in each; and the relation of diversity between $a_1$ and $a_2$ will be definable in terms of there being in the one an area distinguishable from the area in the other (with both distinguishable from the property of being an area). It would seem, then, that if Bergmann grants the phenomenological point that particularity is not nothing, that it is distinguishable from the particulars it is said to "pervade", then there is no need for Bergmann's problematic entities, no need for things that are "two-in-one" in a problematic sense, things that are both simple and also complex.

What of the identification of difference with distinguishability that we have proposed? It at least does not run into the problem of describing what Bergmann calls a "two-in-one": the "two-in-one" of a particular being "pervaded" by particularity is simply the complex represented by the sentence 'This is an area'. Moreover, that sentence is as literal and non-metaphorical a description as 'This is red'. There is thus no problem with having to resort to non-literal language. Two possible difficulties are worth mentioning.

One. If we are correct, the ultimate referent of '$a_1$' in the sentence '$a_1$ is a particular'--what Bergmann once called the determinant--and now calls the item, is just different, i.e., distinguishable, from other determinants of the same sort, i.e., from other particulars. But then, are not the determinants also the same as each other in that they are all determinants? The suggestion is, clearly, that the problem of sameness arises once again, with a regress threatening. That is, if we don't make the particular-particularity complex a "complex", i.e., a "two-in-one", then all the problems one hoped to solve by introducing particularity re-appear once more, leading to an infinite regress. Peterson has made this point. One can stop the regress, I think, simply by defining a determinant to be any entity which has either the property of particularity or the property of universality. The determinants which are particulars have in common the property of particularity. The determinants which are universals have in common the property of universality. And the two sorts of determinants have in common the characteristic being
either particulars or universals. A difficulty arises only if one insists that all questions about sameness must be answered in terms of a simple character. But there is no reason why that should be so.

Two. Bergmann suggests that in its basic sense 'true' applies to thoughts.[107] He defines:

(t) \( \text{\textit{P}} \) is true \( \equiv [(\text{\textit{P}} \land \text{p}) \land \text{p}] \)

and:

(f) \( \text{\textit{P}} \) is false \( \equiv [(\text{\textit{P}} \land \text{p}) \land \sim \text{p}] \)

If we allow both (4):

\( a_1 \) is a particular

and (10):

\( \sim (a_1 \text{ is particular} ) \)

into our language, then we must say that (4) is at least potentially false; its falsity, or, what amounts to the same, (10), can at least be entertained, if not believed. But (10) is excluded as false by the formation rules, and must, in that sense, as we saw, be treated as ill-formed. However, the syntax of the sentences (t) and (f) is so specified that only well-formed sentences can be substituted for \( \text{\textit{P}} \). It follows that we need new notions of truth and falsity defined in a further language in which (4) and (10) are both well-formed sentences. But the same sorts of general problem will arise with respect to this linguistic framework and the logical forms of its names. A regress threatens, as Bergmann points out.[108] However, it arises only if one insists that only well-formed sentences are to replace \( \text{\textit{P}} \) in \( \text{\textit{P}} \text{ M p} \). Bergmann does insist, but, as we have argued, one need not do so, nor does Bergmann's reason seem compelling.

There is one further aspect of Bergmann's idea that a particular and particularity form a "two-in-one" that I think is relevant. But to discuss it thoroughly would require this paper, which is already too long, to be considerably longer. I shall, therefore, just mention it. Bergmann refers to the "properties" of particularity and universality as "subsistents". Such entities "need no tie to tie them to the entities they pervade". Similarly, exemplification is a subsistent that "needs no tie to tie it to what it ties". These formulae are introduced as a way of forestalling Bradley-type regresses. Connected with this—as the inclusion of exemplification in the list makes clear—is the issue whether one must take facts as forming a basic ontological category. A full discussion of particularity must eventually treat of all these issues. Which illustrates once again,
I suppose, that in ontology everything is connected with everything else.

FOOTNOTES


4. "Realistic Postscript", 339; also 307; "Ontological Alternatives", (in his Logic and Reality), 127; and "Strawson's Ontology", (ibid.), 185.

5. "Ineffability, Ontology, and Method", (in his Logic and Reality), 45.

6. Ibid.

7. "Realistic Postscript", 309; and also cf. "Acts", (in his Logic and Reality), 5. In these passages, however, Bergmann carefully notes that not all acquaintance is direct acquaintance or sensing—something which Rosenberg ("The 'Given' and How to Take It", 306) seems to have missed, since he ascribes to Bergmann the view that all phenomenological description is description of what is given in acts of direct acquaintance. As a consequence of his failure to read such passages carefully (though he does cite the first!) Rosenberg's whole treatment of Bergmann quite misses its target.

8. "The 'Given' and How to Take It", 305-6.


10. "The 'Given' and How to Take It", 308.


15. "The 'Given' and How to Take it", 311.

17. Note how this approach locates Bergmann squarely in the positivist tradition in which he first learned to philosophize. The problem of universals—how can words be general in their meaning?—is solved by noting such simple and unproblematic facts as that we can have two shirts that are the same colour. The point can be made by reference to the technique of an ideal language L that was employed by the positivists and which Bergmann still uses. (On this, more below; cf. fns. 61 and 63.) Bergmann has an L with predicates like 'Gr' (= 'green'). This predicate names or refers to or denotes green. That is, it is interpreted into that presented feature of things. (Cf. Bergmann's "Logical Positivism, Language, and the Reconstruction of Metaphysics," in his Metaphysics of Logical Positivism, New York, 1953, 60-1, 63.) It applies (let us suppose) to this green shirt (which is called 'a') and that one (which is called 'b'); that is, 'Gr(a)' and 'Gr(b)' are both true. What 'Gr' refers to is a presented feature of a and of b. This idea of interpretation into entities with which we are acquainted is taken as unproblematic. Indeed, it is taken as unproblematic not only by Bergmann but by other positivists such as Carnap. (Cf. C.G. Hempel's discussion of the idea of an "empiricist language" in his "Problems and Changes in the Empiricist Criterion of Meaning," Revue internationale de Philosophie, II (1950), 52-3.) What Bergmann does is take this unproblematic idea and use it to explicate the traditional claim that there are universals. That is, Bergmann argues, dialectically, that by adopting this ideal language he can solve the traditional problem (and also others, e.g., analyticity) where others cannot. (Cf. Bergmann, "Logical Positivism," in his Metaphysics of Logical Positivism, 8; also his "Particularity and the New Nominalism," in his Meaning and Existence.) The language and its interpretation are unproblematic (cf. "Logical Positivism, Language, and the Reconstruction of Metaphysics"). What is problematic are the claims of the other fellow; it is he who has the problems, and they cease to be problems once they are explicated.

In this sense, it is always the other chap who has problems, not Bergmann. Bergmann's task, as he proposes it, is to take those problems that the philosophers of the past have created and bequeathed to their successors, and so explicate them that they admit of commonsensical solutions. Insofar as Bergmann proposes solutions to traditional problems, they are not problematic in the way that they were in the tradition as Bergmann has received it. Once again, this is a positivist stance, but note that it is also philosophical—and, indeed, metaphysical—recall the title of Bergmann's first book, where its appearance led to his being excommunicated by the orthodox positivists! It is philosophical insofar as it, in contrast to what Carnap et al. do, takes the metaphysical tradition seriously, as presenting problems that are the core of the philosophical enterprise. In this sense, Bergmann is a positivist who is also a philosopher, rather than a positivist whose interest is in the essentially non-philosophical area of Grundlagenforschung with respect to science. (Cf. "Physics and Ontology," in his Logic and Reality.)

In a straightforward sense, then, the philosophical problem of universals is solved by pointing to the commonsense fact that for some
shirts, two shirts do have the same colour. At least, it is this fact which one argues is crucial to the solution. But insofar as that is the only fact to which one appeals, the specifically philosophical disappears for Bergmann. In this sense, if you wish, for Bergmann there are, as the positivists said, no philosophical problems. However, Bergmann is not Carnap. If Bergmann is a positivist, he also is (came to be) a philosopher. To explain: Bergmann differs from Carnap in not dismissing as a non-question the question of which alternative solution to a problem, e.g., that of universals, one ought to accept. For Carnap what mattered was decision, not debate. (Cf. R. Carnap, "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology," Revue internationale de philosophie, II (1950).) As he would put it, the issue is practical, without cognitive content. Different solutions to traditional problems amount to different recommendations for an ideal language. The issue between them is to be resolved—dissolved rather than solved—by a simple choice of a convenient language. The issue is to be resolved by a decision, by stipulation and fiat, rather than by argument. For Bergmann, in contrast, (cf. his "Comments on Professor Hempel's 'The Concept of Cognitive Significance,'" in his Metaphysics and Logical Positivism, 267), the questions are to be settled by rational argument, by dialectics, even if he is also convinced—as his adoption of the phenomenological method, or Principle of Acquaintance, shows him to be—that the solutions are to be found by appeal to what is unproblematic and uncontroversial.

Hochberg has warned us against supposing that "... since one can buy two shirts of the same color, some form of Platonism must be adopted and all forms of nominalism must be rejected, on the basis of the fact alone" (H. Hochberg, "Russell's Reduction of Mathematics to Logic," in E. D. Klemke, ed., (Essays on Bertrand Russell, Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1970), 403). This warning may well be just: Bergmann may well be wrong. Only practice of the method will reveal that: as Bergmann has always said, the proof of any pudding is in the eating. Yet the warning is misleading at least in its implied description of the phenomenological method. To adopt this method, and appeal to the two shirts having the same colour to solve the problem of universals, is not to appeal to that fact alone, even if that fact is the only fact to which one appeals. For, one must argue for the relevance of that fact to the traditional problems. That is, one must indicate that fact and also argue dialectically. Hochberg completely misses the latter.

Insofar as Bergmann is, and Hochberg is not, prepared to appeal to such unproblematic facts in the solution of philosophical problems, the former remains closer than the latter to the positivism of Vienna. Another aspect of his closeness to the early logical positivists is Bergmann's continued concern with the problem of analyticity.

18. Cf., e.g., "Ontological Alternatives", 132f.


26. Ibid.

27. "Ineffability, Ontology, and Method", 47.

28. Ibid.

29. "The 'Given' and How to Take It", 308.

30. Ibid.


32. Ibid., 309.

33. "Sketch of an Ontological Inventory".


35. "Sketch of an Ontological Inventory".

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.


39. "Sketch of an Ontological Inventory".

40. In his Meaning and Existence.


42. Cf. R. Van Iten, "Berkeley's Alleged Solipsism," Revue Inter-
nationale de Philosophie, 16 (1962).

43. "On Sense and Reference", 60.


49. Moore, Some Main Problems of Philosophy, 267ff, 308-9, 259.

50. "Intentionality", 7; cf. Moore's remark that the sentence that represents the fact that is the content of a belief is also a name of the belief (Some Main Problems of Philosophy, 256).


54. Bergmann, "Intentionality", 15ff.

55. Sellars, "Notes on Intentionality", 310.


61. Cf. Bergmann, "Intentionality"; also "Analyticity" (in his Meaning and Existence).

62. Cf. Wilson, "Logical Necessity in Carnap's Later Philosophy", in A. Hausman and F. Wilson, Carnap and Goodman: Two Formalists, (The
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63. Cf. Bergmann, "Sketch of an Ontological Inventory", and "Notes on Ontology".

64. Previously Bergmann's L contained defined terms. These represented what he called derived characters. The latter were needed, he believed, to solve certain problems concerning the perception of physical objects; see "Realistic Postscript", 315, and also "Diversity", Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 41 (1968), 29. He now ("Notes on the Ontology of Minds") solves these problems without introducing the--clearly problematic--derived characters. He does this by noting that two definitionally equivalent sentences can express the same thought, mean its intention, and the phenomenological point that consciousness of the intention of (most) thoughts is--I speak succinctly--mediated by the awareness of one of the sentences that means the intention. The solution is ingenious, as phenomenologically adequate as these things can be, and, it seems to me, wholly plausible.

65. Cf. Bergmann, "Notes on the Ontology of Minds". See also Moore, Some Main Problems of Philosophy, 256.

66. Bergmann, "Intentionality", 18; "Notes on the Ontology of Minds".

67. See fn. 64, above.


70. Cf. Wilson, "Logical Necessity in Carnap's Later Philosophy," for a discussion of how the usual set-theoretical techniques can provide a syntactical explication of the notion of "true in all possible worlds."

71. Cf. Bergmann, "Analyticity".


73. Ibid., 186.

74. This point is made in Bergmann, "The Philosophical Significance of Modal Logic", Mind, 69 (1960).

75. Nor does Hintikka really grasp this point; see his "The Modes of Modality", Acta Philosophica Fennica, 16 (1963). As Hintikka points out, an adequate set-theoretical semantics for modal logic has been devised, but the issue is not just this, but rather whether this semantics can contribute to the explication of the philosophical problematic notion of "necessary" in which the necessarily true is what is true in
all possible worlds.

76. "Notes on Ontology", fn. 6.

77. In the dispositional sense of 'believe', as opposed to the non-dispositional sense we are referring to, believing and disbelieving are, of course, compatible—or, at least, are unless they are both actualized at the same time.

78. Cf. Bergmann, Realism, 316ff.

79. "Sketch of an Ontological Inventory", "Notes on the Ontology of Minds".

80. Bergmann, "Stenius on the Tractatus", (in his Logic and Reality), 245-6; "Notes on Ontology".


82. "Ineffability, Ontology, and Method".

83. "Sketch of an Ontological Inventory".


85. "Intentionality", 32.

86. Cf. Bergmann, "Notes on Ontology".

87. Cf. Rosenberg, "The 'Given' and How to Take It", 310.


89. "Notes on the Ontology of Minds".

90. Ibid.


92. "Diversity", 28. This is not a multiplication of entities or wild metaphysics that is somehow incompatible with positivism (cf. fn. 17, above). Rather, it simply makes explicit something that was always implicit in the positivist tradition. When the positivists constructed their ideal empiricist's language, they interpreted its zero level constants (names) into individual things and its predicates into observable features of things. E.g., 'Gr' was interpreted into green, 'R' into red, and so on. The point is that different predicates were assigned to different observable features, that is, observably different features. If the positivist programme of constructing an ideal empiricist's language is to make sense, then the positivist must be presented with facts to the effect that this property is different from that property. Bergmann is simply drawing our attention to these facts.
For the positivists there was no need to emphasize these facts. Their importance derives from their relevance to the solution of various philosophical problems. But the latter were dismissed by such positivists as Carnap, who were always overly anxious to get away from philosophy to the tasks of trying to help the scientist improve his research practice (cf. Wilson, "Logical Necessity in Carnap's Later Philosophy", Ch. 5) and of mere Grundlagenforschung. Because Bergmann returned to the roots of philosophy, even of positivist philosophy, he must stress the relevance of such simple facts, as that of difference being presented, which the positivists accepted but passed over in silence.

93. Bergmann, "Sameness, Meaning, and Identity" (in his Meaning and Existence), and "Notes on Ontology".

94. I.e., in currently fashionable jargon, they are rigid designators.

95. "Sketch of an Ontological Inventory", "Notes on Ontology".

96. "Sketch of an Ontological Inventory".

97. "Sketch of an Ontological Inventory".


100. "Sketch of an Ontological Inventory".

101. J. Peterson, Realism and Logical Atomism, (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama, 1966), Chapters IV and V.

102. "Sketch of an Ontological Inventory".


104. "Sketch of an Ontological Inventory".


106. Certain qualifications must be made, I think, about universality, but they are not relevant for present purposes.
